diff --git a/java/jenkins/rce/workspace-child-launch-direct.yaml b/java/jenkins/rce/workspace-child-launch-direct.yaml
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+rules:
+  # ============================================================================
+  # WORKSPACE-RESOLVED PATH FLOWING INTO A PROCESS-LAUNCH COMMAND VECTOR
+  # (CWE-427 Uncontrolled Search Path Element / CWE-94 Improper Control of
+  #  Generation of Code)
+  # Generic shape: a Jenkins build step builds a process command vector whose
+  # executable path (and/or tokens) are resolved from a FilePath inside the
+  # build workspace — either via `workspace.child(...)` / `FilePath.child(...)`
+  # or by STRING-CONCATENATING the workspace path value (e.g.
+  # `$WS + "/binary"`, `$WS + "/" + $NAME`; FilePath.toString() yields the
+  # remote path string so the concat resolves to the workspace on the agent) —
+  # and that vector is handed to `Launcher.launch().cmds(...)` /
+  # `ArgumentListBuilder`. Workspace content is commonly attacker-influenceable
+  # (SCM checkout, shared agent workspaces, earlier build steps); if a step
+  # re-uses an existing file at such a path as the process binary without
+  # verifying it is genuine (e.g. the binary was supposed to be downloaded from
+  # a URL but the download failed silently), this yields arbitrary code
+  # execution in the build and potential credential exposure.
+  # ============================================================================
+  - id: codevigilant.java.jenkins.rce.workspace-child-launch-direct
+    mode: taint
+    message: >-
+      A process is launched with a command vector built from a workspace-
+      resolved path (a FilePath `child(...)` result or a path string built by
+      concatenating the workspace value). Build workspace content can be
+      attacker-influenceable (SCM checkout, shared agent workspace, earlier
+      build steps). Executing a workspace-resolved file without verifying its
+      authenticity can allow arbitrary code execution in the build context and
+      expose any credentials in the process environment. Resolve the executable
+      from a trusted location and verify its integrity (checksum/PGP).
+    severity: WARNING
+    languages: [java]
+    pattern-sources:
+      - pattern: $WS.child($NAME).getRemote()
+      - pattern: $WS.child($NAME)
+      # string-concatenated workspace path (FilePath.toString() == getRemote()):
+      - patterns:
+          - pattern-either:
+              - pattern: $WS + "/" + $NAME
+              - patterns:
+                  - pattern: $WS + $LIT
+                  - metavariable-regex:
+                      # metavariable-regex sees the quoted literal text
+                      # (e.g. "/scannercli"), so anchor on the leading quote.
+                      metavariable: $LIT
+                      regex: '^"[/\\]'
+    pattern-sinks:
+      # scope the add-sink to command-vector-like receivers to avoid
+      # flagging ordinary collection adds (e.g. List<String>.add)
+      - patterns:
+          - pattern: $X.add(..., $T, ...)
+          - metavariable-regex:
+              metavariable: $X
+              regex: (?i).*(arg|cmd|command|argv|launch|proc|builder|token).*
+      - pattern: new ArgumentListBuilder($T)
+      - pattern: $LAUNCHER.launch().cmds($ARGS)
+    metadata:
+      category: security
+      cwe: "CWE-427: Uncontrolled Search Path Element"
+      owasp: "A03:2021 - Injection"
+      technology: jenkins
+      confidence: MEDIUM
+      references:
+        - https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/427.html
+        - www.jenkins.io/doc/developer/security/access-control/sandbox/
+      source: semgrep-rule-gap
+      license: MIT
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