From 6d33e9fd8c6fd1c53c40c0ef1ccaa4535606610a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Dr. Foulad" <sameh@foulad.com>
Date: Sun, 30 Aug 2026 02:03:26 +0300
Subject: [PATCH] fix: real peer verification in SecureClient, RFC 9110 no-body
 statuses

SecureClient:
- wolfSSL_check_domain_name() is armed for every non-insecure connection.
  SNI names the host but never bound the peer certificate to it, so a
  setCACert() connection still accepted any certificate signed by a
  trusted CA for any hostname.
- wolfSSL_CTX_load_verify_buffer() failure now fails the connect
  outright instead of proceeding to a handshake against an empty trust
  store whose verify error is indistinguishable from a bad peer.

SecureHttpClient:
- 1xx/204/304 responses carry no body (RFC 9110 s6.4.1); read one and a
  kept-alive 304 with no framing headers stalls in readUntilClose()
  until the timeout. Required for conditional GETs (If-None-Match)
  against the GitHub API.
---
 .../SecureNet/include/SecureHttpClient.h      | 11 +++++++++
 libs/network/SecureNet/src/SecureClient.cpp   | 24 +++++++++++++++++--
 2 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/libs/network/SecureNet/include/SecureHttpClient.h b/libs/network/SecureNet/include/SecureHttpClient.h
index ceaa3bac..b5040d21 100644
--- a/libs/network/SecureNet/include/SecureHttpClient.h
+++ b/libs/network/SecureNet/include/SecureHttpClient.h
@@ -262,6 +262,17 @@ class SecureHttpClient {
         return -1;
       }
 
+      // RFC 9110 §6.4.1: 1xx, 204 and 304 responses never carry a body,
+      // regardless of what Content-Length or Transfer-Encoding they echo (a
+      // 304 replays the cached response's headers). Without this, a 304 with
+      // no framing headers would fall into readUntilClose() and stall a
+      // kept-alive connection until the timeout.
+      if (_status == 204 || _status == 304 || (_status >= 100 && _status < 200)) {
+        _bodyComplete = true;
+        if (!_reuse || !keepAlive) closeConnection();
+        return _status;
+      }
+
       // A close-delimited body (no framing) ends WITH the connection, so it can
       // never leave a reusable socket behind.
       // A 3xx body that is about to be followed is protocol plumbing, not
diff --git a/libs/network/SecureNet/src/SecureClient.cpp b/libs/network/SecureNet/src/SecureClient.cpp
index 25460735..7dac8edf 100644
--- a/libs/network/SecureNet/src/SecureClient.cpp
+++ b/libs/network/SecureNet/src/SecureClient.cpp
@@ -85,8 +85,15 @@ int SecureClient::connectWithMethod(const char* host, uint16_t port, void* metho
   if (_insecure) {
     wolfSSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, WOLFSSL_VERIFY_NONE, nullptr);
   } else if (_rootCA) {
-    wolfSSL_CTX_load_verify_buffer(ctx, reinterpret_cast<const unsigned char*>(_rootCA),
-                                   strlen(_rootCA), WOLFSSL_FILETYPE_PEM);
+    // Fail closed on a CA buffer that doesn't parse: the context would
+    // otherwise proceed to the handshake with an empty trust store, and the
+    // resulting verify failure is indistinguishable from a real bad peer.
+    if (wolfSSL_CTX_load_verify_buffer(ctx, reinterpret_cast<const unsigned char*>(_rootCA), strlen(_rootCA),
+                                       WOLFSSL_FILETYPE_PEM) != WOLFSSL_SUCCESS) {
+      if (Serial) Serial.printf("[SecureClient] CA load failed (%s)\n", label);
+      stop();
+      return 0;
+    }
   }
   wolfSSL_SetIORecv(ctx, wcRecv);
   wolfSSL_SetIOSend(ctx, wcSend);
@@ -101,6 +108,19 @@ int SecureClient::connectWithMethod(const char* host, uint16_t port, void* metho
   wolfSSL_SetIOReadCtx(ssl, &_transport);
   wolfSSL_SetIOWriteCtx(ssl, &_transport);
   wolfSSL_UseSNI(ssl, WOLFSSL_SNI_HOST_NAME, host, strlen(host));
+  if (!_insecure) {
+    // SNI names the host but does NOT bind the peer's certificate to it:
+    // without an explicit domain-name check, wolfSSL accepts any certificate
+    // signed by a trusted CA regardless of which hostname it was issued for,
+    // so a CA-verified connection would still be redirectable to any
+    // CA-certified attacker host. check_domain_name matches the connect host
+    // against the leaf's SANs/CN (wildcards included) during the handshake.
+    if (wolfSSL_check_domain_name(ssl, host) != WOLFSSL_SUCCESS) {
+      if (Serial) Serial.printf("[SecureClient] domain check setup failed (%s): %s\n", label, host);
+      stop();
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
 #if defined(WOLFSSL_TLS13) && defined(HAVE_CURVE25519)
   // MEMFIX-PORT: pin the TLS 1.3 key_share to X25519. wolfSSL's default is a
   // P-256 share, generated with fast-math bignums that WOLFSSL_SMALL_STACK