Harden GitHub Actions Workflow - generator-generic-ossf-slsa3-publish.yml

[stepsecurity-app]

Summary

This issue is created by StepSecurity related to security issues in generator-generic-ossf-slsa3-publish.yml . The platform has identified 2 vulnerabilities (1 critical, 0 high, 0 medium, 1 low).

Remediation Overview

The platform can generate remediations for a few vulnerabilities. For such vulnerabilities, you can find the fixed workflow file in the Suggested Fix For Auto-Remediable Issues section. You can manually deploy these changes or create a pull request by commenting @stepsecurity-app pull-request create on this issue.

If you’d like an automated pull request with the fixed workflow file, comment:

@stepsecurity-app pull-request create

Other issues require manual investigation and changes.

Once a vulnerability has been remediated, ✅ will appear in the title. Note that it may take up to 24 hours for these issues to be updated.

Please review the individual vulnerability section below and follow the recommended resolution steps.

Security Checks Details

❌ Network and runtime security monitoring should be enabled for GitHub-hosted runners

• Severity: Low

• Description: This check passes if the step-security/harden-runner GitHub Action is used in a job that runs on a GitHub-hosted runner. Harden-Runner prevents exfiltration of code and CI/CD credentials, and detects tampering of files during build.

• Resolution: Add the step-security/harden-runner GitHub Action to the job.

• Automated Remediation Available ?: true

• References:

  • GitHub Security Guide

  • The Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) Security Guide

❌ Actions should be pinned to a full-length commit SHA

• Severity: Critical

• Description: GitHub Action tags and Docker tags are mutable. This poses a security risk. GitHub's Security Hardening guide recommends pinning actions to full length commit.

• Resolution: Pin Actions to a full-length commit SHA..

• Automated Remediation Available ?: true

• References:

  • GitHub Security Guide

  • The Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) Security Guide

Suggested Fix For Auto-Remediable Issues

Below is the updated workflow, which fixes the following security vulnerabilities:

• Network and runtime security monitoring should be enabled for GitHub-hosted runners

• Actions should be pinned to a full-length commit SHA

  # This workflow uses actions that are not certified by GitHub.
  # They are provided by a third-party and are governed by
  # separate terms of service, privacy policy, and support
  # documentation.
  # This workflow lets you generate SLSA provenance file for your project.
  # The generation satisfies level 3 for the provenance requirements - see https://slsa.dev/spec/v0.1/requirements
  # The project is an initiative of the OpenSSF (openssf.org) and is developed at
  # https://github.com/slsa-framework/slsa-github-generator.
  # The provenance file can be verified using https://github.com/slsa-framework/slsa-verifier.
  # For more information about SLSA and how it improves the supply-chain, visit slsa.dev.
  name: SLSA generic generator
  on:
    workflow_dispatch:
    release:
      types: [created]
  jobs:
    build:
      permissions:
        contents: read
      runs-on: ubuntu-latest
      outputs:
        digests: ${{ steps.hash.outputs.digests }}
      steps:
        - 
+ name: Harden the runner (Audit all outbound calls)
+         uses: step-security/harden-runner@bf7454d06d71f1098171f2acdf0cd4708d7b5920 # v2.20.0
+         with:
+           egress-policy: audit
+       - 
  uses: actions/checkout@
+ 11d5960a326750d5838078e36cf38b85af677262 # 
  v4
+ .4.0
        # ========================================================
        #
        # Step 1: Build your artifacts.
        #
        # ========================================================
        - name: Build artifacts
          run: |
              # These are some amazing artifacts.
              echo "artifact1" > artifact1
              echo "artifact2" > artifact2
        # ========================================================
        #
        # Step 2: Add a step to generate the provenance subjects
        #         as shown below. Update the sha256 sum arguments
        #         to include all binaries that you generate
        #         provenance for.
        #
        # ========================================================
        - name: Generate subject for provenance
          id: hash
          run: |
            set -euo pipefail
            # List the artifacts the provenance will refer to.
            files=$(ls artifact*)
            # Generate the subjects (base64 encoded).
            echo "hashes=$(sha256sum $files | base64 -w0)" >> "${GITHUB_OUTPUT}"
    provenance:
      needs: [build]
      permissions:
        actions: read   # To read the workflow path.
        id-token: write # To sign the provenance.
        contents: write # To add assets to a release.
      uses: slsa-framework/slsa-github-generator/.github/workflows/generator_generic_slsa3.yml@v1.4.0
      with:
        base64-subjects: "${{ needs.build.outputs.digests }}"
        upload-assets: true # Optional: Upload to a new release

Additional Information

For more information, refer to the documentation page here.
Please don't make any changes in the description as the platform makes automated updates in description. Please use the comment section below to provide input.

Automated remediation commands and options

• Create a pull request with automated security fixes

@stepsecurity-app pull-request create

• Close this issue and prevent it from being reopened

@stepsecurity-app issue close <REASON>

• Update issue description with latest security check status

@stepsecurity-app issue force-update

• View all available commands and their usage

@stepsecurity-app help

Which GitHub Actions security best practices were evaluated?

The workflow was evaluated for the following GitHub Actions security best practices:

• Network & runtime security monitoring
• Token permissions
• Third‐party GitHub Actions usage & pinning