diff --git a/.github/workflows/release.yml b/.github/workflows/release.yml
index c45397a..8fd13d0 100644
--- a/.github/workflows/release.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/release.yml
@@ -64,6 +64,14 @@ jobs:
         uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1  # v7.0.1
         with:
           fetch-depth: 0
+          # CodeRabbit catch (CWE-250, task_1788457898992): the default
+          # persisted credential would stay live through npm ci/build/test
+          # below, so a compromised dependency's lifecycle script could
+          # misuse it to push. Each git network call downstream instead
+          # authenticates individually via an inline `-c http.extraheader`
+          # (never written to .git/config — see the second CodeRabbit catch,
+          # CWE-522, at "Determine mode" below).
+          persist-credentials: false
 
       - name: Setup Node.js
         uses: actions/setup-node@820762786026740c76f36085b0efc47a31fe5020  # v7.0.0
@@ -89,6 +97,24 @@ jobs:
       # steady state, and never retries the artifacts that actually failed).
       # This makes a rerun after a partial failure resume exactly the
       # missing steps instead of silently skipping them.
+      #
+      # Git auth note (CodeRabbit, CWE-250 then CWE-522, task_1788457898992):
+      # persist-credentials is false on checkout above, and this step's own
+      # `git fetch --tags` is the first git network call after the untrusted
+      # npm lifecycle. A first pass re-authenticated via `git remote
+      # set-url`, but that WRITES the token into .git/config where any later
+      # process in the job could read it back off disk. Using a `-c
+      # http.extraheader` on the git invocation itself instead scopes the
+      # credential to that one command's process environment -- nothing
+      # persists to a file. Every git network call in this workflow uses
+      # this same inline pattern; none set the remote URL.
+      #
+      # Also (CodeRabbit, CWE-319): every such call targets an explicit
+      # https://github.com/... URL rather than the `origin` remote name --
+      # if something upstream of this point ever rewrote origin's URL to an
+      # http:// scheme, using the remote name would silently send this
+      # Basic-auth header in cleartext. An explicit https:// URL can't be
+      # redirected that way.
       - name: Determine mode (publish vs prepare)
         id: mode
         env:
@@ -96,7 +122,9 @@ jobs:
           GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
         run: |
           set -euo pipefail
-          git fetch --tags
+          AUTH_HEADER="AUTHORIZATION: basic $(printf 'x-access-token:%s' "$GITHUB_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')"
+          echo "::add-mask::$AUTH_HEADER"
+          git -c http.extraheader="$AUTH_HEADER" fetch "https://github.com/${{ github.repository }}.git" --tags
           VERSION=$(jq -r '.version' package.json)
           PKG_NAME=$(jq -r '.name' package.json)
 
@@ -125,11 +153,15 @@ jobs:
 
       - name: "Publish: tag"
         if: steps.mode.outputs.mode == 'publish' && steps.mode.outputs.tag_exists == 'false'
+        env:
+          GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
         run: |
           set -euo pipefail
           VERSION="${{ steps.mode.outputs.version }}"
+          AUTH_HEADER="AUTHORIZATION: basic $(printf 'x-access-token:%s' "$GITHUB_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')"
+          echo "::add-mask::$AUTH_HEADER"
           git tag "v${VERSION}"
-          git push origin "v${VERSION}"
+          git -c http.extraheader="$AUTH_HEADER" push "https://github.com/${{ github.repository }}.git" "v${VERSION}"
 
       - name: "Publish: npm publish"
         if: steps.mode.outputs.mode == 'publish' && steps.mode.outputs.npm_published == 'false'
@@ -173,8 +205,9 @@ jobs:
       # subject to that restriction (verified live the same day: an
       # App-token `gh pr create` against this exact repo succeeded, PR
       # authored by app/wyre-agent-fleet). Used only for the `gh pr` calls
-      # below — `git push` keeps using actions/checkout's default credential,
-      # which was never the blocked operation.
+      # below — `git push` authenticates separately with the default
+      # GITHUB_TOKEN via an inline http.extraheader (see PUSH_TOKEN below),
+      # since push was never the blocked operation.
       - name: "Prepare: mint App token for PR creation"
         if: steps.mode.outputs.mode == 'prepare' && steps.prepare.outputs.release_needed == 'true'
         id: app-token
@@ -205,6 +238,7 @@ jobs:
         if: steps.mode.outputs.mode == 'prepare' && steps.prepare.outputs.release_needed == 'true'
         env:
           GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ steps.app-token.outputs.token }}
+          PUSH_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
           VERSION: ${{ steps.prepare.outputs.version }}
         run: |
           set -euo pipefail
@@ -220,7 +254,9 @@ jobs:
           merge method) triggers this workflow's PUBLISH mode, which tags,
           publishes to npm, and creates the GitHub release — nothing
           publishes until this merges."
-          git push --force origin release/next
+          AUTH_HEADER="AUTHORIZATION: basic $(printf 'x-access-token:%s' "$PUSH_TOKEN" | base64 | tr -d '\n')"
+          echo "::add-mask::$AUTH_HEADER"
+          git -c http.extraheader="$AUTH_HEADER" push --force "https://github.com/${{ github.repository }}.git" release/next
 
           if gh pr view release/next --json state --jq .state 2>/dev/null | grep -q OPEN; then
             gh pr edit release/next --title "chore(release): ${VERSION}"