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+# AEGIS — PIV Hardware-Signer Plan (CROSS-3, final pass)
+
+> **Status:** plan / ready to execute when a YubiKey is in hand.
+> **Scope:** swap the CROSS-3 seal's *software* Ed25519 signer for a *hardware* YubiKey-PIV
+> signer (ECDSA-P256) whose origin is provable via the YubiKey attestation chain, and bind the
+> `max_authorized` ceiling to the same hardware root. The Ed25519 path stays as the dev/CI
+> fallback. No bundle/seal **format** change — the `signature.alg` enum already reserves
+> `piv-ecdsa-p256`.
+
+This is the one piece deliberately *not* built in the seal PRs, because it needs the physical
+token to provision, sign, and verify against. Everything it plugs into already ships and is
+property-tested: the `Signer`/`Verifier` protocol (`core/seal/signing.py`), the detached
+receipt + offline gates **G0–G6** (`core/seal/seal.py`), and the live `/api/seal/*` endpoints.
+
+---
+
+## 0. What already exists (the swap point)
+
+- **`core/seal/signing.py`** — `Signer`/`Verifier` `Protocol`s (`alg() / key_id() /
+  public_key_bytes() / sign()`), plus the software `Ed25519Signer` / `Ed25519Verifier`.
+  **The PIV signer implements the same `Signer` protocol — nothing above it changes.**
+- **`core/seal/seal.py`** — `seal_bundle()` / `verify_seal()` run gates G0–G6; the seal format
+  is `{seal_version, claims, signature:{alg, key_id, value}}`. `value` is base64.
+- **`evidence/schema/.../seal.schema.json`** — `signature.alg ∈ {ed25519, piv-ecdsa-p256}`.
+- **The operator already runs YubiKey PIV/PKCS#11** in the DCN tool (`DCN_SSH_MODE=pkcs11`,
+  `libykcs11.dylib`, a working PIN flow). Reuse that operational knowledge — the plumbing is proven.
+
+---
+
+## 1. Goal
+
+A `PivSigner` backed by a YubiKey PIV slot that:
+1. signs the seal's canonical claim bytes with **ECDSA-P256** via PKCS#11 `C_Sign`,
+2. carries an **attestation chain** (leaf ← slot-`f9` attestation cert ← **Yubico PIV Root CA**)
+   that proves the key is **hardware-resident and non-exportable** — so a software key can't
+   forge a valid seal (this is what makes "hardware-rooted" *structural*, not asserted), and
+3. is selected by config (`AEGIS_SEAL_BACKEND=piv`), with `ed25519` as the default fallback.
+
+Plus: bind **`max_authorized`** (the #5 ceiling) to a PIV-signed policy object so the ceiling
+**cannot be raised by editing the environment** — the explicit `#5-ceiling` follow-up.
+
+---
+
+## 2. Decide up front (hardware + crypto facts)
+
+| Decision | Recommendation | Why |
+|---|---|---|
+| **Slot** | **`9c` (Digital Signature)** for the seal key — *distinct* from the `9a` SSH-auth key | 9c is the PIV signature slot; PIN-per-signature; avoids colliding with the existing SSH key |
+| **Key origin** | **Generate ON-DEVICE** (`ykman piv keys generate`) — never import | Only on-device keys are **attestable**; an imported key has no attestation → defeats the wedge |
+| **Algorithm** | **ECCP256** (NIST P-256 / secp256r1), sign SHA-256 of the canonical claims | PIV-standard ECC; `cryptography` verifies it. (Classic PIV has **no Ed25519** — hence ECDSA here) |
+| **Signature encoding** | `C_Sign`(CKM_ECDSA) returns **raw `r‖s` (64 bytes)** → convert to **DER** for `cryptography` | A real gotcha — `cryptography.verify()` wants DER `(r,s)` via `encode_dss_signature` |
+| **Touch policy** | `never` for unattended sealing; `always` for high-assurance (each seal needs a physical touch) | Tradeoff: `always` blocks automated sealing |
+| **PIN** | `C_Login` before `C_Sign`; source the PIN from a **secrets manager**, never env in prod | PIV locks out after N wrong PINs — never brute-force in tests |
+| **Pinning posture** | **CA + serial allowlist** for regulated fabrics (CA-only survives token swap) | Document the choice; default to CA+serial |
+
+---
+
+## 3. New code (additive — `core/seal/`)
+
+- **`core/seal/piv.py`** — `PivSigner` (PKCS#11 `C_Login` + `C_Sign` on the slot; `alg() ->
+  "piv-ecdsa-p256"`; `key_id()` from the SHA-256 of the attested EC public key; raw→DER sig
+  conversion) and `PivVerifier` (ECDSA-P256 verify against the attested EC public key). Both
+  satisfy the existing `Signer`/`Verifier` protocols verbatim.
+- **`core/seal/attestation.py`** — parse + validate the attestation chain with
+  `cryptography.x509`: leaf ← slot-`f9` intermediate ← **pinned** Yubico PIV Root CA; assert
+  the attested leaf public key **equals** the signing key; optional device-serial allowlist
+  (the serial is an X.509 extension in the attestation cert).
+- **`core/seal/pins.py`** — **compiled-in** constants (NOT file-loaded): the Yubico PIV Root CA
+  fingerprint (SHA-256 of its DER), the pinned seal verification public key + `key_id`, and the
+  serial allowlist. Editing a file must not be able to loosen trust.
+- **`core/seal/seal.py` `verify_seal()`** — when `signature.alg == "piv-ecdsa-p256"`, run the
+  attestation gates **before/with** G1/G2:
+  - **G1a** — attestation chain validates to the pinned Yubico Root CA (+ serial in allowlist);
+  - **G1b** — the attested leaf public key matches `verifier.key_id()` (the pinned key);
+  - **G2** — ECDSA-P256 signature verifies over the canonical claims.
+  The `ed25519` path is unchanged (software/dev/CI).
+- **`core/risk` ceiling** — `load_max_authorized()` verifies a **PIV-signed ceiling policy**
+  `{max_authorized, not_after_utc, key_id, signature}` against the compiled-in pinned key,
+  instead of trusting raw `AEGIS_MAX_AUTHORIZED_TIER`. Env stays as the dev fallback.
+
+---
+
+## 4. Sequencing (the critic's D6–D7 spike). ⚡ = needs the physical token
+
+| Step | Work | HW |
+|---|---|---|
+| **0** | Add the PKCS#11 dep (`PyKCS11`); the EC sign/verify + **raw→DER** helpers; `x509` chain-validation logic — all testable with **software P-256 keys + a self-signed test chain** | — |
+| **1** | Provision the token: generate the seal key on-device in **slot 9c** (ECCP256, PIN policy, touch policy); capture the attestation chain (`ykman piv keys attest 9c` + the `f9` intermediate); export the leaf pubkey | ⚡ |
+| **2** | `PivSigner` against `libykcs11` (`C_Login` w/ PIN, `C_Sign`); first end-to-end **sign → raw→DER → `cryptography` verify** roundtrip | ⚡ |
+| **3** | `attestation.py` chain validation; obtain the **current Yubico PIV Root CA cert from developers.yubico.com**, pin its DER SHA-256, add a checked-in test asserting the pinned bytes match the reference | — |
+| **4** | Capture a **real attestation-chain fixture** once (from the token) → check it into `tests/` so CI validates the chain logic **without** the token | ⚡ (once) |
+| **5** | Extend `verify_seal` with G1a/G1b; **re-run the full G0–G6 + the 0-violation property against the REAL hardware verifier** (the critic's "re-run against the real verify, not the stub") | ⚡ |
+| **6** | Ceiling-policy signing: sign `{max_authorized, not_after_utc, …}` with the PIV key; `load_max_authorized()` verifies it; CI test with a software-signed policy + a one-time hardware one | ⚡ |
+| **7** | `serve.py`: `AEGIS_SEAL_BACKEND=piv` selects `PivSigner`; `/api/seal/pubkey` also publishes the **attestation chain** so a remote verifier validates fully offline | — |
+| **8** | Rotation runbook + CA-only-vs-CA+serial decision documented | — |
+
+---
+
+## 5. Tests — hardware-free vs hardware-gated
+
+**HW-free (run in CI):**
+- ECDSA-P256 sign/verify roundtrip with **software** P-256 keys.
+- **raw `r‖s` → DER** conversion vectors (the easy-to-get-wrong bit).
+- `x509` chain validation against the **checked-in attestation fixture** + negatives: wrong root
+  → fail G1a; a **software-signed leaf must fail G1a** (this is the T6 test); serial not in
+  allowlist → fail.
+- The full **G0–G6** suite with a software-EC verifier (mirrors `seal_test.py`).
+- Ceiling-policy verify with a software key (valid / expired `not_after` / wrong-key / raised-tier).
+
+**HW-gated (run once on the token; `@needs_yubikey`, skipped in CI):**
+- Real `C_Sign` roundtrip; real attestation matches the pinned root; PIN + touch behavior.
+
+---
+
+## 6. Threat-model deltas (what hardware buys — and what it doesn't)
+
+- **Closes T6 (software-key impersonation):** the attestation chain proves the key is
+  hardware-resident + non-exportable; a software signer cannot produce a valid attestation to the
+  pinned Yubico root. *This* makes the "hardware-rooted" claim structural rather than asserted.
+- **Ceiling tamper-proofing:** `max_authorized` becomes PIV-signed → can't be raised by editing
+  env (closes the `#5-ceiling` residual).
+- **Residual (document, do not over-claim):** PIN compromise / coerced operator → mitigated by
+  touch policy + ceiling `not_after` expiry + dual-control (HOTL/BLOCK), **not** eliminated.
+  Supply-chain trust bottoms out at the **pinned Yubico Root CA fingerprint** — which is exactly
+  why Step 3 verifies it against a known-good reference with a checked-in test.
+
+---
+
+## 7. Rotation runbook
+
+- **Seal key rotation:** generate a new on-device key (re-gen `9c` or a new slot), re-capture
+  attestation, update the compiled-in verification pubkey/`key_id`, rebuild + redeploy. Keep a
+  `key_id → pubkey` map so seals from the rotation window still verify (multi-key verifier).
+- **Pinned Root CA fingerprint:** changes only if Yubico rotates the PIV root (rare) — update the
+  compiled-in constant + the checked-in fixture test, rebuild.
+- **Serial allowlist (CA+serial posture):** add/remove device serials, rebuild.
+
+---
+
+## 8. Dependencies / config
+
+- **`PyKCS11`** (or `python-pkcs11`) for the token; **`cryptography`** (already a dep) for EC
+  verify + `x509`; **`ykman`** for provisioning. `libykcs11` module path = the DCN tool's
+  working path.
+- Env: `AEGIS_SEAL_BACKEND=piv|ed25519` · `AEGIS_PIV_MODULE=/path/libykcs11.dylib` ·
+  `AEGIS_PIV_SLOT=9c` · PIN via a secrets manager (not env in prod).
+
+---
+
+## 9. Gotchas (PIV specifics + the DCN tool's experience)
+
+1. **Key must be GENERATED on-device** to be attestable — an imported key has no attestation.
+2. **`C_Sign`(CKM_ECDSA) returns raw `r‖s`, not DER** — convert before `cryptography.verify()`.
+3. macOS `libykcs11.dylib` vs Linux `.so`; the PKCS#11 module must match arch.
+4. **Slot 9c requires the PIN on every signature** (PIV spec) — fine for assurance, but automated
+   sealing needs the PIN available via a secrets manager + an active `C_Login` session.
+5. **Touch policy `always` blocks unattended sealing** — choose per deployment.
+6. PIN lockout after N failures — never brute-force in tests; use a dedicated test token.
+
+---
+
+## 10. Acceptance criteria (done = )
+
+- `AEGIS_SEAL_BACKEND=piv` produces seals whose `signature.alg == "piv-ecdsa-p256"`, carrying an
+  attestation chain that validates to the pinned Yubico Root CA.
+- `verify_seal` accepts a genuine hardware seal and **rejects a software-EC seal at G1a** (the
+  attestation test) — with the **0-violation property re-run against the real verifier**.
+- `load_max_authorized()` rejects a ceiling raised in env when a PIV-signed policy is configured.
+- CI stays green with **no token** (software fallback + checked-in attestation fixture); the
+  hardware path is exercised once, on the token, behind `@needs_yubikey`.
+
+_PIV_HARDWARE_SIGNER_PLAN.md — the final CROSS-3 pass; everything it plugs into already ships._