You signed in with another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.You signed out in another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.You switched accounts on another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.Dismiss alert
Add bounded C2PA interoperability without treating a C2PA claim as equivalent to a Harpocrates proof.
Motivation
Harpocrates needs this capability to become a production-grade, interoperable evidence protocol while preserving privacy, deterministic verification, and safe failure behavior. The implementation must reuse existing metadata, manifest, ZK, backend, frontend, and Soroban boundaries instead of creating parallel truth sources.
Scope
Define a versioned mapping between Harpocrates evidence/proof digests and C2PA claims/assertions.
Parse and validate signed C2PA manifests with strict size, depth, algorithm, and resource limits.
Export a C2PA-compatible manifest that binds the embedded video hash, metadata hash, proof ID, tier, network, and contract.
Preserve unknown assertions safely and surface unsupported semantics explicitly.
Keep C2PA trust status separate from on-chain and ZK verification status in APIs and UI.
Acceptance criteria
Valid and invalid fixtures cover signatures, malformed boxes, recursion, oversized data, unknown algorithms, and digest mismatches.
Parser fuzzing and production-shaped media tests remain bounded.
Documentation includes trust-model differences, compatibility matrix, and rollback.
Existing lint, type checks, tests, builds, contract checks, and privacy guarantees remain green.
Engineering expectations
Use versioned canonical encodings, explicit error/status types, bounded resource consumption, idempotent operations, and privacy-safe observability. Schema, contract, circuit, or artifact changes require migration and compatibility analysis. Cryptographic changes require stable vectors and a written threat model.
Out of scope
Live production deployment, real credentials or sensitive media, unrelated visual redesigns, and broad dependency upgrades not required by this objective.
Definition of done
A maintainer can reproduce success and adversarial failure paths locally, understand the trust and privacy boundaries, operate the feature safely, and roll it back without undocumented state repair.
Summary
Add bounded C2PA interoperability without treating a C2PA claim as equivalent to a Harpocrates proof.
Motivation
Harpocrates needs this capability to become a production-grade, interoperable evidence protocol while preserving privacy, deterministic verification, and safe failure behavior. The implementation must reuse existing metadata, manifest, ZK, backend, frontend, and Soroban boundaries instead of creating parallel truth sources.
Scope
Acceptance criteria
Engineering expectations
Use versioned canonical encodings, explicit error/status types, bounded resource consumption, idempotent operations, and privacy-safe observability. Schema, contract, circuit, or artifact changes require migration and compatibility analysis. Cryptographic changes require stable vectors and a written threat model.
Out of scope
Live production deployment, real credentials or sensitive media, unrelated visual redesigns, and broad dependency upgrades not required by this objective.
Definition of done
A maintainer can reproduce success and adversarial failure paths locally, understand the trust and privacy boundaries, operate the feature safely, and roll it back without undocumented state repair.