You signed in with another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.You signed out in another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.You switched accounts on another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.Dismiss alert
Enable publication of a privacy-preserving proof that a redacted derivative was produced from registered source evidence under an allowed transformation policy.
Motivation
Harpocrates needs this capability to become a production-grade, interoperable evidence protocol while preserving privacy, deterministic verification, and safe failure behavior. The implementation must reuse existing metadata, manifest, ZK, backend, frontend, and Soroban boundaries instead of creating parallel truth sources.
Scope
Specify the private witness, public inputs, transformation commitment, parent proof binding, and allowed redaction operations.
Implement a Noir prototype with versioned domain separation and bounded media/chunk commitments.
Ensure removed regions, original frames, secrets, and transformation parameters marked private never enter public inputs or logs.
Integrate browser proving, local verification, artifact versioning, and Soroban verification planning.
Publish benchmark and feasibility limits before enabling the feature by default.
Acceptance criteria
Positive and adversarial vectors cover crop substitution, reordered chunks, altered visible regions, wrong parent, replay, and malformed proofs.
Witness zeroization and cancellation paths are tested.
Cross-layer vectors agree across Noir, JS, backend tooling, and verifier encoding.
Security documentation states cryptographic assumptions and unsupported transformations.
Existing lint, type checks, tests, builds, contract checks, and privacy guarantees remain green.
Engineering expectations
Use versioned canonical encodings, explicit error/status types, bounded resource consumption, idempotent operations, and privacy-safe observability. Schema, contract, circuit, or artifact changes require migration and compatibility analysis. Cryptographic changes require stable vectors and a written threat model.
Out of scope
Live production deployment, real credentials or sensitive media, unrelated visual redesigns, and broad dependency upgrades not required by this objective.
Definition of done
A maintainer can reproduce success and adversarial failure paths locally, understand the trust and privacy boundaries, operate the feature safely, and roll it back without undocumented state repair.
Summary
Enable publication of a privacy-preserving proof that a redacted derivative was produced from registered source evidence under an allowed transformation policy.
Motivation
Harpocrates needs this capability to become a production-grade, interoperable evidence protocol while preserving privacy, deterministic verification, and safe failure behavior. The implementation must reuse existing metadata, manifest, ZK, backend, frontend, and Soroban boundaries instead of creating parallel truth sources.
Scope
Acceptance criteria
Engineering expectations
Use versioned canonical encodings, explicit error/status types, bounded resource consumption, idempotent operations, and privacy-safe observability. Schema, contract, circuit, or artifact changes require migration and compatibility analysis. Cryptographic changes require stable vectors and a written threat model.
Out of scope
Live production deployment, real credentials or sensitive media, unrelated visual redesigns, and broad dependency upgrades not required by this objective.
Definition of done
A maintainer can reproduce success and adversarial failure paths locally, understand the trust and privacy boundaries, operate the feature safely, and roll it back without undocumented state repair.