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Reduce dependence on a single verifier implementation by supporting bounded, versioned verifier sets and configurable m-of-n acceptance.
Motivation
Harpocrates needs this capability to become a production-grade, interoperable evidence protocol while preserving privacy, deterministic verification, and safe failure behavior. The implementation must reuse existing metadata, manifest, ZK, backend, frontend, and Soroban boundaries instead of creating parallel truth sources.
Collect distinct verifier results and finalize atomically after quorum.
Represent disagreement, timeout, partial failure, and incompatible output deterministically.
Govern set changes through existing staged rotation/timelock controls.
Bound verifier count, calls, proof size, and Soroban resource use.
Acceptance criteria
Duplicate verifier votes and replayed results cannot satisfy quorum.
Tests cover split decisions, unavailable verifiers, version mismatch, rotation overlap, and emergency disable.
No partial result is misrepresented as final verification.
Benchmarks, migration, rollout, and rollback guidance are included.
Existing lint, type checks, tests, builds, contract checks, and privacy guarantees remain green.
Engineering expectations
Use versioned canonical encodings, explicit error/status types, bounded resource consumption, idempotent operations, and privacy-safe observability. Schema, contract, circuit, or artifact changes require migration and compatibility analysis. Cryptographic changes require stable vectors and a written threat model.
Out of scope
Live production deployment, real credentials or sensitive media, unrelated visual redesigns, and broad dependency upgrades not required by this objective.
Definition of done
A maintainer can reproduce success and adversarial failure paths locally, understand the trust and privacy boundaries, operate the feature safely, and roll it back without undocumented state repair.
Summary
Reduce dependence on a single verifier implementation by supporting bounded, versioned verifier sets and configurable m-of-n acceptance.
Motivation
Harpocrates needs this capability to become a production-grade, interoperable evidence protocol while preserving privacy, deterministic verification, and safe failure behavior. The implementation must reuse existing metadata, manifest, ZK, backend, frontend, and Soroban boundaries instead of creating parallel truth sources.
Scope
Acceptance criteria
Engineering expectations
Use versioned canonical encodings, explicit error/status types, bounded resource consumption, idempotent operations, and privacy-safe observability. Schema, contract, circuit, or artifact changes require migration and compatibility analysis. Cryptographic changes require stable vectors and a written threat model.
Out of scope
Live production deployment, real credentials or sensitive media, unrelated visual redesigns, and broad dependency upgrades not required by this objective.
Definition of done
A maintainer can reproduce success and adversarial failure paths locally, understand the trust and privacy boundaries, operate the feature safely, and roll it back without undocumented state repair.