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Refuse to generate proofs with tampered or mismatched Noir/WASM artifacts.
Motivation
Harpocrates handles privacy-sensitive media, proof material, Stellar transactions, and on-chain verification. This change must be production grade: secure by default, bounded under hostile inputs, observable without leaking evidence or witnesses, and recoverable across partial failures.
Scope
Design and implement: signed manifest, digest verification, version/network binding, cache validation, failure UX, CSP interaction, and deterministic fixtures
Integrate with the existing area/frontend modules while preserving current API, proof, and contract compatibility unless a versioned migration is included.
Define typed boundaries, configuration, persistence or artifact changes, rollout/migration behavior, and rollback constraints.
Add privacy-safe operational signals for progress, failures, saturation, and recovery.
Document the threat assumptions, local verification workflow, deployment impact, and troubleshooting steps.
Acceptance criteria
The feature works end to end with explicit compatibility and rollout behavior.
Invalid, oversized, duplicated, concurrent, timed-out, cancelled, and partially completed operations are handled deterministically.
Unit tests cover core logic and negative paths; integration/conformance tests exercise the real subsystem boundary.
Secret witness data, uploaded media, credentials, and proof metadata never appear in logs or durable storage unintentionally.
Resource limits and authorization checks fail safely with stable error semantics.
Existing formatting, lint, type checks, unit tests, circuit checks, contract tests, and builds remain green.
Documentation includes configuration, migration/rollback, operational signals, and limitations.
Engineering expectations
Use explicit state machines, bounded work, idempotent transitions, stable encodings, and versioned cryptographic domains. Avoid correctness that depends on a single process or browser session. Cryptographic changes require deterministic vectors shared across circuit, backend, frontend, and contract layers.
Out of scope
Real user evidence, production secrets, live mainnet deployment, unrelated visual redesign, or dependency upgrades unrelated to the objective.
Definition of done
A maintainer can reproduce positive and adversarial paths locally, confirm privacy properties, operate the feature, and roll it back without undocumented data repair.
Summary
Refuse to generate proofs with tampered or mismatched Noir/WASM artifacts.
Motivation
Harpocrates handles privacy-sensitive media, proof material, Stellar transactions, and on-chain verification. This change must be production grade: secure by default, bounded under hostile inputs, observable without leaking evidence or witnesses, and recoverable across partial failures.
Scope
Acceptance criteria
Engineering expectations
Use explicit state machines, bounded work, idempotent transitions, stable encodings, and versioned cryptographic domains. Avoid correctness that depends on a single process or browser session. Cryptographic changes require deterministic vectors shared across circuit, backend, frontend, and contract layers.
Out of scope
Real user evidence, production secrets, live mainnet deployment, unrelated visual redesign, or dependency upgrades unrelated to the objective.
Definition of done
A maintainer can reproduce positive and adversarial paths locally, confirm privacy properties, operate the feature, and roll it back without undocumented data repair.