objectstack-ai
diff --git a/‎.changeset/21499-verify-never-mints-key.md‎
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diff --git a/‎packages/verify/src/harness.key-custody.test.ts‎
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+---
+"@objectstack/verify": patch
+---
+
+`bootStack` (and so `os verify`) no longer creates a data key file in the key home, and no longer seals its fixtures under a key the host already holds (#21499)
+
+Clause-②: no
+
+The harness composed the settings service with no crypto provider and bound the engine to a default `LocalCryptoProvider`. `bootStack` forces a development posture. In that posture, with no `OS_SECRET_KEY`, no `OS_DEV_CRYPTO_KEY` and no key file, both providers wrote a new key file into the key home. So `os verify`, a one-shot command over an in-memory database, left key material behind, and the next development-posture process on that host adopted it. On a host that already had a key, the harness sealed its throwaway fixtures under that real key.
+
+- **What the harness uses now.** One `LocalCryptoProvider` over a random key held in this process's memory only. It never reads `OS_SECRET_KEY`, `OS_DEV_CRYPTO_KEY` or the key file, and it never writes anywhere. The settings service and the engine get the same instance, so `secret` fields and encrypted settings still seal and open on a host with no key at all.
+- **One key per process, not per boot.** Two `bootStack` calls over one `databaseFile` in the same process (the harness's restart) still open each other's secrets.
+- **Unchanged.** `BootOptions` and the rest of the public API, and `os verify`'s stdout and `--json` report. The one stderr line announcing the minted key file is gone.
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+// Copyright (c) 2026 ObjectStack. Licensed under the Apache-2.0 license.
+//
+// [#21499] `bootStack` never creates key material in the key home, and never
+// seals under a real key the host already holds.
+//
+// `os verify` is a one-shot command: it boots this harness twice (the CRUD
+// stack and the RLS stack), each over an in-memory database, and exits. The
+// harness used to compose the settings service with no `cryptoProvider` and
+// bind the engine to a bare `new LocalCryptoProvider()`. `bootStack` forces a
+// development posture, and in that posture, with no env key and no key file,
+// both of those providers MINT a key file in the key home so the next restart
+// reuses it. That is right for `os serve`, the long-lived host. For a run that
+// seals nothing it keeps, it is an undeclared side effect on key custody: the
+// file outlives the run, and the next development-posture process on that host
+// adopts it and seals real secrets under it.
+//
+// The one-shot shape the CLI uses ("read an existing key, or refuse every
+// call") does not fit here, because the harness SEALS AND OPENS secrets in its
+// own database: a `secret` field write, an encrypted setting. On a keyless host
+// a refusing provider would break exactly those. So the harness holds its own
+// data key, in this process's memory only, and hands that one provider to the
+// settings service and to the engine. What this file pins, in a development
+// posture:
+//
+//   1. the control — the default provider mints a key file in this posture and
+//      this home, so an empty home after a boot is a reading, not a vacuity;
+//   2. an empty key home stays empty through a boot, a secret-field write, an
+//      encrypted-setting write and `stop()`, while both secrets still read back;
+//   3. a key file already in the key home is never rewritten, and nothing the
+//      boot seals opens under it — so it was never the key in use;
+//   4. the same for an `OS_SECRET_KEY` in the environment;
+//   5. two boots in one process over one `databaseFile` — the harness's restart
+//      — open each other's secrets, so the key is the process's, not the boot's.
+//
+// Every boot runs in a hook: a case measures behaviour, never loading.
+
+import { describe, it, expect, beforeAll, afterAll } from 'vitest';
+import { mkdtempSync, readdirSync, readFileSync, rmSync, writeFileSync } from 'node:fs';
+import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
+import { join } from 'node:path';
+import { ObjectSchema, Field } from '@objectstack/spec/data';
+import { LocalCryptoProvider, type SettingsManifest } from '@objectstack/service-settings';
+// `.js` extension deliberate: this package resolves NodeNext, so an
+// extensionless relative import does not resolve under its typecheck.
+import { bootStack, type BootOptions } from './harness.js';
+
+// Booting the full in-process stack runs well past vitest's 5s default.
+const BOOT_TIMEOUT = 120_000;
+
+/** Every variable that decides where a data key comes from, and the posture. */
+const KEY_ENV = [
+  'NODE_ENV', 'OS_SECRET_KEY', 'OS_DEV_CRYPTO_KEY', 'OBJECTSTACK_DEV_CRYPTO_KEY',
+  'OS_HOME', 'OBJECTSTACK_HOME', 'OS_CRYPTO_AUTOKEY',
+] as const;
+
+/** The file name the default provider persists its key under, in the key home. */
+const KEY_FILE = 'dev-crypto-key';
+
+/** A host's real key, as a key file or as `OS_SECRET_KEY`. Fixed bytes, never a secret. */
+const HOST_KEY_HEX = '606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a7b7c7d7e7f';
+const HOST_KEY = Buffer.from(HOST_KEY_HEX, 'hex');
+
+const OBJECT = 'keycustody_vault';
+const SECRET_FIELD = 'token';
+const SETTINGS_NS = 'keycustody_settings';
+const SETTINGS_KEY = 'api_key';
+const SYS = { isSystem: true } as const;
+
+/** The producer scope each `sys_secret` row was sealed under, by its namespace. */
+const SCOPE_OF: Record<string, 'object_secret_field' | 'settings'> = {
+  [OBJECT]: 'object_secret_field',
+  [SETTINGS_NS]: 'settings',
+};
+
+const app = {
+  manifest: {
+    id: 'com.example.key-custody',
+    namespace: 'keycustody',
+    version: '0.0.1',
+    type: 'app',
+    name: 'Key Custody Fixture',
+  },
+  objects: [
+    ObjectSchema.create({
+      name: OBJECT,
+      sharingModel: 'public_read_write',
+      label: 'Vault',
+      pluralLabel: 'Vaults',
+      fields: {
+        name: Field.text({ label: 'Name', required: true }),
+        [SECRET_FIELD]: Field.secret({ label: 'Token' }),
+      },
+    }),
+  ],
+};
+
+/** One encrypted setting, so the settings service's provider is exercised too. */
+const settingsManifest: SettingsManifest = {
+  namespace: SETTINGS_NS,
+  version: 1,
+  label: 'Key custody',
+  scope: 'global',
+  readPermission: 'setup.access',
+  writePermission: 'setup.write',
+  specifiers: [{ type: 'password', key: SETTINGS_KEY, label: 'API key', required: false }],
+};
+
+// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any
+type Engine = any;
+// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any
+type Settings = any;
+
+// eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-explicit-any
+const rowsOf = (r: any): any[] => (Array.isArray(r) ? r : Array.isArray(r?.records) ? r.records : []);
+
+interface SealedRow {
+  id: string;
+  namespace: string;
+  key: string;
+  kms_key_id: string;
+  alg: string;
+  version: number;
+  ciphertext: string;
+}
+
+/** What one boot sealed, and what it read back through its own doors. */
+interface BootReading {
+  /** The secret field, read back through the engine's privileged door. */
+  fieldReadBack: string | null;
+  /** The encrypted setting, read back through the settings service. */
+  settingReadBack: unknown;
+  /** Every `sys_secret` row the boot holds. */
+  sealed: SealedRow[];
+  /** The key home's entries after the writes, before `stop()`. */
+  homeBeforeStop: string[];
+  /** The key home's entries after `stop()`. */
+  homeAfterStop: string[];
+}
+
+const savedEnv: Record<string, string | undefined> = {};
+const scratch: string[] = [];
+
+function freshDir(label: string): string {
+  const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), `os-21499-${label}-`));
+  scratch.push(dir);
+  return dir;
+}
+
+/**
+ * A development posture with no key anywhere, and `home` as the key home. Set
+ * before each boot: `bootStack` forces `NODE_ENV=development` itself, and the
+ * control below needs the same posture with no harness in the way.
+ */
+function keylessDevelopmentPosture(home: string): void {
+  for (const k of KEY_ENV) delete process.env[k];
+  process.env.NODE_ENV = 'development';
+  process.env.OS_HOME = home;
+}
+
+beforeAll(() => {
+  for (const k of KEY_ENV) savedEnv[k] = process.env[k];
+});
+
+afterAll(() => {
+  for (const k of KEY_ENV) {
+    if (savedEnv[k] === undefined) delete process.env[k];
+    else process.env[k] = savedEnv[k];
+  }
+  for (const dir of scratch) rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
+});
+
+/** Write a secret field and an encrypted setting into a booted stack. */
+async function sealBoth(engine: Engine, settings: Settings): Promise<string> {
+  const row = await engine.insert(OBJECT, { name: 'vault', [SECRET_FIELD]: 'field-plaintext' }, { context: SYS });
+  await settings.set(SETTINGS_NS, SETTINGS_KEY, 'setting-plaintext');
+  return row.id as string;
+}
+
+/** Boot `bootStack(app, opts)`, seal both producers' secrets, read them back, stop. */
+async function bootAndSeal(home: string, opts?: BootOptions): Promise<BootReading> {
+  const stack = await bootStack(app, opts);
+  try {
+    const engine: Engine = await stack.kernel.getServiceAsync('objectql');
+    const settings: Settings = await stack.kernel.getServiceAsync('settings');
+    settings.registerManifest(settingsManifest);
+    const id = await sealBoth(engine, settings);
+    const reading: Omit<BootReading, 'homeAfterStop'> = {
+      fieldReadBack: await engine.resolveSecretField(OBJECT, id, SECRET_FIELD),
+      settingReadBack: (await settings.get(SETTINGS_NS, SETTINGS_KEY)).value,
+      sealed: rowsOf(await engine.find('sys_secret', { context: SYS })),
+      homeBeforeStop: readdirSync(home),
+    };
+    await stack.stop();
+    return { ...reading, homeAfterStop: readdirSync(home) };
+  } catch (e) {
+    await stack.stop().catch(() => undefined);
+    throw e;
+  }
+}
+
+/** Does `row` open under a provider over `key`, in its producer's own context? */
+async function opensUnder(key: Buffer, row: SealedRow): Promise<boolean> {
+  const provider = new LocalCryptoProvider({ key });
+  const handle = {
+    id: row.id, kmsKeyId: row.kms_key_id, alg: row.alg, version: row.version, ciphertext: row.ciphertext,
+  };
+  try {
+    await provider.decrypt(handle, { scope: SCOPE_OF[row.namespace], namespace: row.namespace, key: row.key });
+    return true;
+  } catch {
+    return false;
+  }
+}
+
+/** Both producers sealed exactly one row each — the population every "none opens" reads. */
+function expectOneRowPerProducer(sealed: SealedRow[]): void {
+  expect(sealed.map((r) => r.namespace).sort()).toEqual([OBJECT, SETTINGS_NS].sort());
+}
+
+describe('[#21499] the control: this posture and this home are where a key gets minted', () => {
+  let home: string;
+  let keySource: string;
+  let entries: string[];
+
+  beforeAll(() => {
+    home = freshDir('control-home');
+    keylessDevelopmentPosture(home);
+    keySource = new LocalCryptoProvider().keySource;
+    entries = readdirSync(home);
+  });
+
+  it('the default provider mints a key file in the key home', () => {
+    expect(keySource).toBe('generated-file');
+    expect(entries).toEqual([KEY_FILE]);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('[#21499] an empty key home stays empty through a whole boot', () => {
+  let home: string;
+  let reading: BootReading;
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    home = freshDir('empty-home');
+    keylessDevelopmentPosture(home);
+    // The options `os verify` boots its CRUD stack with on a single-tenant host.
+    reading = await bootAndSeal(home, { multiTenant: false });
+  }, BOOT_TIMEOUT);
+
+  it('no key material is created, before or after stop()', () => {
+    expect(reading.homeBeforeStop).toEqual([]);
+    expect(reading.homeAfterStop).toEqual([]);
+  });
+
+  it('the harness still seals and opens both producers\' secrets on a keyless host', () => {
+    expectOneRowPerProducer(reading.sealed);
+    expect(reading.fieldReadBack).toBe('field-plaintext');
+    expect(reading.settingReadBack).toBe('setting-plaintext');
+  });
+});
+
+describe('[#21499] a key file already in the key home is never the key in use', () => {
+  let home: string;
+  let before: string;
+  let reading: BootReading;
+  let opened: boolean[];
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    home = freshDir('keyed-home');
+    keylessDevelopmentPosture(home);
+    writeFileSync(join(home, KEY_FILE), HOST_KEY.toString('base64'), { mode: 0o600 });
+    before = readFileSync(join(home, KEY_FILE), 'utf8');
+    reading = await bootAndSeal(home);
+    opened = await Promise.all(reading.sealed.map((row) => opensUnder(HOST_KEY, row)));
+  }, BOOT_TIMEOUT);
+
+  it('the key file is left exactly as it was, and nothing joins it', () => {
+    expect(reading.homeAfterStop).toEqual([KEY_FILE]);
+    expect(readFileSync(join(home, KEY_FILE), 'utf8')).toBe(before);
+  });
+
+  it('nothing the boot sealed opens under the key file\'s key', () => {
+    expectOneRowPerProducer(reading.sealed);
+    expect(opened).toEqual([false, false]);
+    expect(reading.fieldReadBack).toBe('field-plaintext');
+    expect(reading.settingReadBack).toBe('setting-plaintext');
+  });
+});
+
+describe('[#21499] an OS_SECRET_KEY in the environment is never the key in use', () => {
+  let home: string;
+  let reading: BootReading;
+  let opened: boolean[];
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    home = freshDir('env-key-home');
+    keylessDevelopmentPosture(home);
+    process.env.OS_SECRET_KEY = HOST_KEY_HEX;
+    reading = await bootAndSeal(home);
+    opened = await Promise.all(reading.sealed.map((row) => opensUnder(HOST_KEY, row)));
+  }, BOOT_TIMEOUT);
+
+  it('nothing the boot sealed opens under the environment\'s key', () => {
+    expectOneRowPerProducer(reading.sealed);
+    expect(opened).toEqual([false, false]);
+    expect(reading.fieldReadBack).toBe('field-plaintext');
+    expect(reading.settingReadBack).toBe('setting-plaintext');
+    expect(reading.homeAfterStop).toEqual([]);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('[#21499] the key is the process\'s: a restart over one database file opens what the last boot sealed', () => {
+  let home: string;
+  let first: BootReading;
+  let fieldAfterRestart: string | null;
+  let settingAfterRestart: unknown;
+  let homeAfterRestart: string[];
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    home = freshDir('restart-home');
+    keylessDevelopmentPosture(home);
+    const databaseFile = join(freshDir('restart-db'), 'verify.db');
+    first = await bootAndSeal(home, { databaseFile });
+
+    const second = await bootStack(app, { databaseFile });
+    try {
+      const engine: Engine = await second.kernel.getServiceAsync('objectql');
+      const settings: Settings = await second.kernel.getServiceAsync('settings');
+      settings.registerManifest(settingsManifest);
+      const [row] = rowsOf(await engine.find(OBJECT, { context: SYS }));
+      fieldAfterRestart = await engine.resolveSecretField(OBJECT, row.id, SECRET_FIELD);
+      settingAfterRestart = (await settings.get(SETTINGS_NS, SETTINGS_KEY)).value;
+    } finally {
+      await second.stop();
+    }
+    homeAfterRestart = readdirSync(home);
+  }, BOOT_TIMEOUT * 2);
+
+  it('the second boot opens both secrets the first sealed, and the key home stays empty', () => {
+    expectOneRowPerProducer(first.sealed);
+    expect(fieldAfterRestart).toBe('field-plaintext');
+    expect(settingAfterRestart).toBe('setting-plaintext');
+    expect(homeAfterRestart).toEqual([]);
+  });
+});