@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+---
+"@objectstack/plugin-security": patch
+---
+
+A permission-set resolution with no active organization now reads the organization-less permission sets only. A permission set scoped to an organization applies only while that organization is active. This is the rule `resolveUserAuthzGrants` already applies to grant rows.
+
+Clause-②: no
+
+Before, the by-name `sys_permission_set` read carried no organization when the caller had none active. Every organization's row of each requested name came back, and the first one won. The names requested include the principal's positions. So a permission set another organization had authored under the name of a built-in role could reach an organization-less principal's resolved sets and effective object map. The same read could also resolve another organization's same-named copy of a set the principal holds through a global grant.
+
+- **Unchanged:** a principal with an active organization resolves exactly as before. That read was already scoped to the organization and the organization-less rows, and it still prefers the organization's own row. Global grants still apply everywhere. A global position folded onto a global permission set of the same name still resolves with no organization active, and so does a global user grant. Permission sets declared in metadata or bootstrap resolve as before, because they never reach this read.
+- **If a principal relied on it:** make the organization active, or grant the permission set globally (no organization) when it is meant to apply everywhere.
@@ -0,0 +1,314 @@
+// Copyright (c) 2026 ObjectStack. Licensed under the Apache-2.0 license.
+
+/**
+ * [#20555] A principal with NO active organization resolves permission sets
+ * from the organization-less rows only — never from a set some organization
+ * authored under a name the principal happens to hold as a position.
+ *
+ * ## The seam
+ *
+ * `resolvePermissionSetsForContextUnmemoized` requests
+ * `[...positions, ...permissions]` as permission-set NAMES, and anything not
+ * declared in metadata or bootstrap is read from `sys_permission_set` by name
+ * through `dbLoaderFor(callerOrganizationId(context))`. With no active
+ * organization, `resolveUserAuthzGrants` still lists every current
+ * membership's role (`org_member`, …) and the `everyone` anchor in
+ * `positions`, and the by-name read carried no tenant — so it returned every
+ * organization's row of each name, and the loader kept whichever came first.
+ *
+ * Measured on `main` at 1c761c0d, over this file's rig: a member of
+ * `ORG_HOME` only, with no organization active, resolved the sets `ORG_OTHER`
+ * had authored as `org_member` and `everyone` — their `systemPermissions` and
+ * their object map (view/modify-all included) reached the resolved sets and
+ * `getEffectiveObjectPermissions`. The same principal's GLOBAL grant to
+ * `platform_ops` resolved `ORG_OTHER`'s same-named copy instead of the global
+ * row it names. With `ORG_HOME` active the read was scoped and none of this
+ * happened.
+ *
+ * ## The rule pinned here
+ *
+ * A row scoped to an organization applies only while that organization is
+ * active; an organization-less row applies everywhere — the rule
+ * `resolveUserAuthzGrants` already applies to grant rows. So the negative
+ * pins below are paired with preservation pins: the global grants an
+ * organization-less principal really holds (a global position folded onto a
+ * global same-named set, a global user grant) keep resolving, and an
+ * organization's own set still reaches its own members while it is active.
+ *
+ * ## The rig
+ *
+ * A real `ObjectQL` over a real `SqlDriver` (better-sqlite3 `:memory:`), the
+ * real platform object definitions, the real `SecurityPlugin` resolved through
+ * the `security` service it registers, and principals built by
+ * `buildContextForUser` — the same `resolveUserAuthzGrants` the request path
+ * runs. The plugin's `kernel:ready` bootstraps are collected and never fired:
+ * the loader under test does not depend on them, and a bootstrap left running
+ * would race the engine teardown.
+ */
+
+import { describe, it, expect, afterEach } from 'vitest';
+import { ObjectQL } from '@objectstack/objectql';
+import { SqlDriver } from '@objectstack/driver-sql';
+
+import { SysPosition } from './objects/sys-position.object.js';
+import { SysPermissionSet } from './objects/sys-permission-set.object.js';
+import { SysPositionPermissionSet } from './objects/sys-position-permission-set.object.js';
+import { SysUserPosition } from './objects/sys-user-position.object.js';
+import { SysUserPermissionSet } from './objects/sys-user-permission-set.object.js';
+import { SysOrganization, SysUser, SysMember } from '@objectstack/platform-objects/identity';
+
+import { SecurityPlugin } from './security-plugin.js';
+import { buildContextForUser } from './explain-engine.js';
+
+const SYS = { context: { isSystem: true } } as any;
+/** The organization that authors the colliding sets. Nobody below is its member except `USER_OTHER`. */
+const ORG_OTHER = 'org_other';
+/** The principals' own organization. */
+const ORG_HOME = 'org_home';
+/** A member of `ORG_HOME` only. */
+const USER_HOME = 'usr_home_member';
+/** A member of `ORG_HOME` only, holding two GLOBAL grants. */
+const USER_GLOBAL = 'usr_home_global';
+/** A member of `ORG_OTHER` — the control that the authored set resolves at all. */
+const USER_OTHER = 'usr_other_member';
+
+const PROBE_OBJECT: any = {
+  name: 'probe_ledger',
+  label: 'Probe Ledger',
+  fields: {
+    id: { type: 'text', label: 'Id', primary: true },
+    name: { type: 'text', label: 'Name' },
+    owner_id: { type: 'text', label: 'Owner' },
+  },
+};
+
+const FULL = {
+  allowRead: true, allowCreate: true, allowEdit: true, allowDelete: true,
+  viewAllRecords: true, modifyAllRecords: true,
+};
+
+const engines: ObjectQL[] = [];
+afterEach(async () => {
+  while (engines.length) {
+    try { await engines.pop()?.destroy(); } catch { /* noop */ }
+  }
+});
+
+async function insertSet(e: any, id: string, name: string, organizationId: string | null, caps: string[]) {
+  await e.insert('sys_permission_set', {
+    id,
+    name,
+    label: `${organizationId ?? 'global'} ${name}`,
+    organization_id: organizationId,
+    managed_by: 'admin',
+    active: true,
+    object_permissions: JSON.stringify({ probe_ledger: FULL }),
+    system_permissions: JSON.stringify(caps),
+  }, SYS);
+}
+
+async function boot(): Promise<ObjectQL> {
+  const engine = new ObjectQL();
+  engine.registerDriver(
+    new SqlDriver({ client: 'better-sqlite3', connection: { filename: ':memory:' }, useNullAsDefault: true }),
+    true,
+  );
+  await engine.init();
+  engine.registerApp({
+    id: 'com.objectstack.qa.orgless-position-name-fold',
+    name: 'Organization-less position-name fold',
+    version: '1.0.0',
+    type: 'plugin',
+    scope: 'system',
+    objects: [
+      SysPosition, SysPermissionSet, SysPositionPermissionSet,
+      SysUserPosition, SysUserPermissionSet,
+      SysOrganization, SysUser, SysMember, PROBE_OBJECT,
+    ],
+  } as any);
+  await engine.syncSchemas();
+  engines.push(engine);
+  const e = engine as any;
+  await e.insert('sys_organization', { id: ORG_OTHER, name: ORG_OTHER, slug: 'other' }, SYS);
+  await e.insert('sys_organization', { id: ORG_HOME, name: ORG_HOME, slug: 'home' }, SYS);
+  for (const id of [USER_HOME, USER_GLOBAL, USER_OTHER]) {
+    await e.insert('sys_user', { id, name: id, email: `${id}@example.test` }, SYS);
+  }
+  await e.insert('sys_member', { id: 'mem_home', user_id: USER_HOME, organization_id: ORG_HOME, role: 'member' }, SYS);
+  await e.insert('sys_member', { id: 'mem_global', user_id: USER_GLOBAL, organization_id: ORG_HOME, role: 'member' }, SYS);
+  await e.insert('sys_member', { id: 'mem_other', user_id: USER_OTHER, organization_id: ORG_OTHER, role: 'member' }, SYS);
+
+  // ORG_OTHER authors sets named after what every member holds as a position.
+  await insertSet(e, 'ps_other_org_member', 'org_member', ORG_OTHER, ['manage_metadata', 'probe.other_org_member']);
+  await insertSet(e, 'ps_other_everyone', 'everyone', ORG_OTHER, ['manage_metadata', 'probe.other_everyone']);
+
+  // USER_GLOBAL's GLOBAL grants — what an organization-less principal really holds:
+  //  (1) a global position assignment, folded onto a global same-named set;
+  await e.insert('sys_user_position', {
+    id: 'up_global_ops_lead', user_id: USER_GLOBAL, position: 'ops_lead', organization_id: null,
+  }, SYS);
+  await insertSet(e, 'ps_global_ops_lead', 'ops_lead', null, ['probe.global_ops_lead']);
+  //  (2) a global user grant to a global set, beside ORG_OTHER's same-named
+  //      copy. The copy's id SORTS FIRST (`ps_0_…` before `ps_1_…`) and the
+  //      SQL driver's read comes back ordered by id, so an unscoped read meets
+  //      the copy first. With the ids the other way round this pin stays green
+  //      against the unscoped read (measured by its ablation), so the order is
+  //      load-bearing.
+  await insertSet(e, 'ps_0_other_platform_ops', 'platform_ops', ORG_OTHER, ['probe.other_platform_ops']);
+  await insertSet(e, 'ps_1_global_platform_ops', 'platform_ops', null, ['probe.global_platform_ops']);
+  await e.insert('sys_user_permission_set', {
+    id: 'ups_global_platform_ops', user_id: USER_GLOBAL, permission_set_id: 'ps_1_global_platform_ops', organization_id: null,
+  }, SYS);
+  return engine;
+}
+
+/** One `sys_permission_set` by-name read the loader issued, and the rows it got. */
+interface LoaderRead { rows: Array<{ id: string; name: string; organization_id: string | null }> }
+
+/**
+ * The real engine's `find`, OBSERVED and forwarded verbatim — the one verb the
+ * loader under test calls. No write or by-id verb is exposed: the plugin's
+ * `kernel:ready` bootstraps are never fired here, so nothing on this path
+ * needs one, and a verb that is not there cannot answer on the engine's behalf.
+ */
+function observed(engine: any, reads: LoaderRead[]): any {
+  return {
+    registry: engine.registry,
+    registerMiddleware: (...a: any[]) => engine.registerMiddleware?.(...a),
+    getSchema: (n: string) => engine.getSchema?.(n),
+    find: async (o: string, q?: any, opt?: any) => {
+      const r = await engine.find(o, q, opt);
+      if (o === 'sys_permission_set' && q?.where?.name?.$in) {
+        reads.push({
+          rows: (r as any[]).map((x) => ({ id: x.id, name: x.name, organization_id: x.organization_id ?? null })),
+        });
+      }
+      return r;
+    },
+  };
+}
+
+interface Rig {
+  engine: ObjectQL;
+  reads: LoaderRead[];
+  security: any;
+}
+
+async function rig(): Promise<Rig> {
+  const engine = await boot();
+  const reads: LoaderRead[] = [];
+  const plugin = new SecurityPlugin();
+  const ql = observed(engine, reads);
+  const services: Record<string, any> = {};
+  const ctx: any = {
+    logger: { info: () => {}, warn: () => {}, debug: () => {}, error: () => {} },
+    registerService: (n: string, s: any) => { services[n] = s; },
+    registerMiddleware: () => {},
+    hook: () => { /* collected, never fired — see the file header */ },
+    getService: (n: string) => {
+      if (n === 'objectql') return ql;
+      if (n === 'metadata') return { list: async () => [] };
+      if (n === 'manifest') return { register: () => {} };
+      return services[n];
+    },
+  };
+  await plugin.init(ctx);
+  await plugin.start(ctx);
+  expect(services.security, 'the security service was never registered').toBeTruthy();
+  return { engine, reads, security: services.security };
+}
+
+/** What a principal resolves, read back through the registered `security` service. */
+async function resolve(r: Rig, userId: string, organizationId?: string) {
+  const base = await buildContextForUser(r.engine, userId, Date.now(), organizationId);
+  const context = organizationId
+    ? { ...base, tenantId: organizationId, organizationId }
+    : { ...base, tenantId: undefined };
+  r.reads.length = 0;
+  const sets = await r.security.resolvePermissionSetsForContext(context);
+  const loaderRows = r.reads.flatMap((read) => read.rows);
+  const effective = await r.security.getEffectiveObjectPermissions(context);
+  const byName = new Map<string, any>(sets.map((s: any) => [s.name, s]));
+  return {
+    positions: base.positions as string[],
+    permissions: base.permissions as string[],
+    loaderRows,
+    setNames: sets.map((s: any) => s.name) as string[],
+    byName,
+    capabilities: new Set<string>(sets.flatMap((s: any) => s.systemPermissions ?? [])),
+    ledger: effective?.probe_ledger ?? null,
+  };
+}
+
+describe('[#20555] with no active organization, another organization\'s set named like a position does not reach the principal', () => {
+  it('precondition: the organization-less principal really holds the colliding names as positions', async () => {
+    const r = await rig();
+    const orgless = await resolve(r, USER_HOME);
+    // Without these two names in `positions` the pins below would pass for want
+    // of a collision, not because the read is scoped.
+    expect(orgless.positions).toEqual(expect.arrayContaining(['org_member', 'everyone']));
+  }, 120_000);
+
+  it('the by-name read returns no other organization\'s row', async () => {
+    const r = await rig();
+    const orgless = await resolve(r, USER_HOME);
+    expect(orgless.loaderRows.filter((row) => row.organization_id !== null)).toEqual([]);
+  }, 120_000);
+
+  // Three pins, one fact each, so the ablation shows each one fail on its own
+  // rather than all three behind the first failed assertion.
+  it('the authored sets are not among the resolved sets', async () => {
+    const r = await rig();
+    const orgless = await resolve(r, USER_HOME);
+    expect(orgless.setNames.filter((n) => n === 'org_member' || n === 'everyone')).toEqual([]);
+  }, 120_000);
+
+  it('their systemPermissions do not reach the principal', async () => {
+    const r = await rig();
+    const orgless = await resolve(r, USER_HOME);
+    expect([...orgless.capabilities].filter((c) => c === 'manage_metadata' || c.startsWith('probe.'))).toEqual([]);
+  }, 120_000);
+
+  it('their object map does not reach the effective map', async () => {
+    const r = await rig();
+    const orgless = await resolve(r, USER_HOME);
+    expect(orgless.ledger).toBeNull();
+  }, 120_000);
+
+  it('a GLOBAL grant resolves the global row it names, not another organization\'s same-named copy', async () => {
+    const r = await rig();
+    const orgless = await resolve(r, USER_GLOBAL);
+    expect(orgless.permissions).toContain('platform_ops');
+    expect(orgless.byName.get('platform_ops')?.systemPermissions).toEqual(['probe.global_platform_ops']);
+  }, 120_000);
+
+  it('…and the same-named copy\'s systemPermissions do not reach that principal', async () => {
+    const r = await rig();
+    const orgless = await resolve(r, USER_GLOBAL);
+    expect([...orgless.capabilities].filter((c) => c.startsWith('probe.other_'))).toEqual([]);
+  }, 120_000);
+});
+
+describe('[#20555] what the rule keeps', () => {
+  it('a global position folded onto a global same-named set still resolves with no active organization', async () => {
+    const r = await rig();
+    const orgless = await resolve(r, USER_GLOBAL);
+    expect(orgless.positions).toContain('ops_lead');
+    expect(orgless.byName.get('ops_lead')?.systemPermissions).toEqual(['probe.global_ops_lead']);
+  }, 120_000);
+
+  it('the global grants resolve identically with the principal\'s own organization active', async () => {
+    const r = await rig();
+    const home = await resolve(r, USER_GLOBAL, ORG_HOME);
+    expect(home.byName.get('ops_lead')?.systemPermissions).toEqual(['probe.global_ops_lead']);
+    expect(home.byName.get('platform_ops')?.systemPermissions).toEqual(['probe.global_platform_ops']);
+    expect(home.setNames).not.toContain('org_member');
+  }, 120_000);
+
+  it('CONTROL · the authoring organization\'s own member, with it active, does resolve its set — the set is resolvable at all', async () => {
+    const r = await rig();
+    const other = await resolve(r, USER_OTHER, ORG_OTHER);
+    expect(other.byName.get('org_member')?.systemPermissions).toEqual(['manage_metadata', 'probe.other_org_member']);
+    expect(other.ledger).toMatchObject({ viewAllRecords: true, modifyAllRecords: true });
+  }, 120_000);
+});
@@ -1521,9 +1521,37 @@ export class SecurityPlugin implements Plugin {
           // UNREACHABLE. Letting the read fault propagate is what re-arms a
           // diagnostic this repo had already built, and it is the direction the
           // 2026-08-11 store-fault ruling settles: a fault propagates.
+          // [#20555] With NO active organization the read asks for the
+          // organization-less rows ONLY. `seedCtx(undefined)` carries no
+          // tenant, and `applyTenantScope` reads "no tenant" as an unscoped
+          // path, so a bare by-name read returned every organization's row of
+          // each name — and `resolveOwnOrganizationRow` answers an undefined
+          // organization with whichever row came first. The names asked for
+          // include the caller's POSITIONS (the fold in
+          // `resolvePermissionSetsForContextUnmemoized`), and with no active
+          // organization those still carry every membership's role plus the
+          // `everyone` anchor. Measured over a real `SqlDriver`: a member of
+          // one organization, with none active, resolved a set ANOTHER
+          // organization had authored under the name `org_member` — its
+          // `systemPermissions` and its object map, view/modify-all included —
+          // and a GLOBAL grant resolved another organization's same-named copy
+          // in place of the global row it named.
+          //
+          // The rule is the one `resolveUserAuthzGrants` applies to grant rows,
+          // and ADR-0123 D2's "tenant-scoped reads resolve to nothing": a row
+          // scoped to an organization applies only while that organization is
+          // active; an organization-less row applies everywhere. With a tenant
+          // the driver's scope already returns exactly those two classes. With
+          // none, the predicate below is that same scope, pushed into the read
+          // rather than filtered after it — after the `limit`, other
+          // organizations' copies could crowd out the global row this caller
+          // does hold.
+          const where = organizationId
+            ? { name: { $in: names } }
+            : { name: { $in: names }, organization_id: null };
           const rows = await ql.find(
             'sys_permission_set',
-            { where: { name: { $in: names } }, limit: Math.max(names.length * 4, 20) },
+            { where, limit: Math.max(names.length * 4, 20) },
             { context: seedCtx(organizationId) },
           );
           const fetched = permissionSetPageOrRefuse(rows, names);
@@ -1546,7 +1574,9 @@ export class SecurityPlugin implements Plugin {
           //
           // Preference order is unchanged and still closes the cross-tenant
           // bleed #11121 fixed: this organization's own row WINS wherever it
-          // exists, and a leftover is consulted only in its absence.
+          // exists, and a leftover is consulted only in its absence. With no
+          // active organization every row here is organization-less (the read
+          // above asked for nothing else), so `own` is one of those.
           const byName = new Map<string, any>();
           for (const name of new Set(names)) {
             const { own, organizationLessResidue } = resolveOwnOrganizationRow(