@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ Both shapes are now judged row by row. An array insert judges each row on the im
 
 **What does not change.**
 
-- A by-id update and a single-row insert are judged exactly as before.
+- A single-row insert is judged exactly as before. A by-id update is not changed by this entry; its judgement on the row it stores is its own entry (#19989).
 - A predicate update still touches only the rows its scoped `where` selects. The check refuses a write; it never changes which rows are selected.
 - A predicate update or array insert whose rows all pass is admitted as before.
 - A system-context write is not gated.
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ A denormalised scoping field is exactly what an RLS predicate compares (ADR-0055
 
 Ruled 2026-09-07 (maintainer, verbatim 「同意」, director seat, summon #17, decision batch #3). The refused alternative — keep the order and write the contract that a checked field must arrive from the caller, plus an `os validate` rule to police it — institutionalises the contradiction and needs a permanent lint to hold it in place.
 
-**What changed, mechanically.** `OperationContext` gains `postHookWriteImageCheck` (`@objectstack/objectql`), an optional judgement an enforcement layer installs and `ObjectQL.insert` runs once the `beforeInsert` chain has produced the row — after the post-hook declared-field door, after the two value-changing strips (`stripRuntimeOwnedFields` and the static-`readonly` strip with its `defaultValue` re-default, both moved ahead of it), and before every producer with a side effect (the secret channel, the autonumber, validation, the statement), so a refusal still costs nothing. `@objectstack/plugin-security` installs its compiled `check` filter there for `insert` instead of matching it against `opCtx.data`; `update` is unchanged. The compiled filter is still built in the middleware, where the caller's permission sets, the ADR-0090 D10 delegator's, the staged membership and the request context are all resolved — only the IMAGE is deferred. A middleware that installed the judgement and finds the seam was never run refuses the write and logs at ERROR: an unjudged write is not an allowed one.
+**What changed, mechanically.** `OperationContext` gains `postHookWriteImageCheck` (`@objectstack/objectql`), an optional judgement an enforcement layer installs and `ObjectQL.insert` runs once the `beforeInsert` chain has produced the row — after the post-hook declared-field door, after the two value-changing strips (`stripRuntimeOwnedFields` and the static-`readonly` strip with its `defaultValue` re-default, both moved ahead of it), and before every producer with a side effect (the secret channel, the autonumber, validation, the statement), so a refusal still costs nothing. `@objectstack/plugin-security` installs its compiled `check` filter there for `insert` instead of matching it against `opCtx.data`; this entry leaves `update` unchanged, and the predicate and by-id updates move onto the same seam in their own entries (#19950, #19989). The compiled filter is still built in the middleware, where the caller's permission sets, the ADR-0090 D10 delegator's, the staged membership and the request context are all resolved — only the IMAGE is deferred. A middleware that installed the judgement and finds the seam was never run refuses the write and logs at ERROR: an unjudged write is not an allowed one.
 
 **Who is affected.** Only objects governed by a permission set that EXPLICITLY declares `check`, on single-row inserts by a non-system caller — the gate's existing scope, unchanged. Two behaviour changes to expect, and they are the two halves of the same correction: an insert that left a hook-stamped field off the payload now succeeds where it used to be refused, and an insert whose hook-stamped field lands outside the caller's scope is now refused where it used to be admitted. Callers that were duplicating the stamp to get past the gate keep working and may stop.