@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
 // Copyright (c) 2026 ObjectStack. Licensed under the Apache-2.0 license.
 
 /**
- * #7987 (+ #8676) — `sys_account`'s credential columns must not come back on
+ * #7987 (+ commit d6e80b28b) — `sys_account`'s credential columns must not come back on
  * the generic data path.
  *
- * [#8676] The file was #7987's three OAuth columns; it now covers the object's
+ * [commit d6e80b28b] The file was #7987's three OAuth columns; it now covers the object's
  * other two credential columns as well — `password` and
  * `previous_password_hashes`, the one-way hashes of ADR-0100's third channel.
  * They belong here rather than in a fixture of their own because they are the
@@ -88,9 +88,9 @@ const PLANTED = {
 const TOKEN_COLUMNS = ['access_token', 'refresh_token', 'id_token'] as const;
 
 /**
- * [#8676] The two one-way password hashes on the same object — ADR-0100's third
+ * [commit d6e80b28b] The two one-way password hashes on the same object — ADR-0100's third
  * channel. They serialized on this very read path alongside the OAuth columns
- * (the #8676 key list was captured on this fixture's own ablation run), through
+ * (commit d6e80b28b's key list was captured on this fixture's own ablation run), through
  * the same two barriers that miss them: `collectMaskedReadFields` keys on the
  * field TYPE and exempts `managedBy: 'better-auth'`, while these are
  * `text` / `textarea`. Asserted through the SAME persona matrix below, because
@@ -277,7 +277,7 @@ describe('#7987: sys_account OAuth tokens never serialize on the generic data pa
       assertNoCredentialColumns(row);
     }
 
-    // [#8676] The same spelling attack aimed at the password hashes, from both
+    // [commit d6e80b28b] The same spelling attack aimed at the password hashes, from both
     // personas. The member's own row is the one that matters most here: the
     // `sys_account_self` policy grants the read, so this is a LEGAL request for
     // their own record that must still come back without the hash.
@@ -334,11 +334,11 @@ describe('#7987: sys_account OAuth tokens never serialize on the generic data pa
     // exactly one predicate — `internal === true` — so a column without the
     // flag is refused (ADR-0112 code + status).
     //
-    // ⚠️ Its instance changed with #8676, and only its instance. This test used
+    // ⚠️ Its instance changed with commit d6e80b28b, and only its instance. This test used
     // to spell the predicate with `password`, because #7987 deliberately left
     // that column unflagged and the test marked THAT card's scope boundary
     // ("a column that is **not flagged** … are deliberately NOT `internal`").
-    // #8676 flags it, so the premise of `password`-as-example disappears while
+    // Commit d6e80b28b flags it, so the premise of `password`-as-example disappears while
     // the proposition itself is untouched: `scope` is an ordinary unflagged
     // `sys_account` column and stands in as the example. What is NOT weakened
     // is the guard — no ADR-0100 carve-out was added, and the positive arm
@@ -361,7 +361,7 @@ describe('#7987: sys_account OAuth tokens never serialize on the generic data pa
   it('[#8676] `password` and `previous_password_hashes` are stripped, and reachable only through the accessor', async () => {
     // The card's own assertions, both directions. These are one-way password
     // hashes — ADR-0100's third channel — and they serialized on the generic
-    // data API before #8676: to an admin for every user's row, and to a member
+    // data API before commit d6e80b28b: to an admin for every user's row, and to a member
     // for their own.
     const rows: any[] = await ql.find('sys_account', {
       where: { id: memberAccountId },
 
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@
 //     hand-roll better-auth's signed-cookie contract with
 //     `/admin/stop-impersonating` and silently detach the #8243 bearer-rotation
 //     hook. It is a better-auth PLUGIN endpoint with only the authorization
-//     predicate replaced, and since #11686 that predicate is the consolidated
+//     predicate replaced, and since commit 7131f12bf that predicate is the consolidated
 //     authority `hasPlatformAdminStanding`. `has-permission` (#11900, ruled
 //     2026-08-25) is a third shape: a permission QUERY, raw-mounted WITHOUT
 //     the refusing judge — the platform admin's query is answered from the
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@
 //         then folds back into `positions[]`. A working "Set Platform Role"
 //         button would be a supported, gated, one-user-at-a-time channel for
 //         resurrecting the dual identity representation the 2026-08-18 Option-3
-//         veto killed. So the maintainer retired the CONSOLE ACTION (PR #11530)
+//         veto killed. So the maintainer retired the CONSOLE ACTION (commit 033a34c7c)
 //         and left the vendor ROUTE mounted and vendor-gated, byte for byte.
 //
 // ⛔ THEREFORE: a `403` from any of those eight is the system working. Do not
 
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@
 //     gate verdict and not a payload the server rejects for everyone.
 //
 //   `shaded-vendor-gate` (1 route: `remove-user`) — the two halves belong to
-//     DIFFERENT layers, which is why it is neither of its neighbours. #11477
+//     DIFFERENT layers, which is why it is neither of its neighbours. Commit 6dd3e6968
 //     gave the route the raw-mount shading `ban-user` already had, so an
 //     ObjectStack gate answers the refusal (member 403 PERMISSION_DENIED, anon
 //     401 UNAUTHENTICATED) — but the mount DELEGATES rather than
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@
 //     The both-sides contrast is therefore not a 2xx but a DIFFERENCE: the
 //     member and the admin hear two different refusals, which is what proves
 //     the member's 403 is an authorization verdict and not a blanket refusal.
-//     The bucket also carries the #11477 negative — a member must never again
+//     The bucket also carries commit 6dd3e6968's negative — a member must never again
 //     see the break-glass guard's `409 LAST_LOCAL_CREDENTIAL`, which before the
 //     shading was answered ahead of every authorization layer and VARIED WITH
 //     THE TARGET, disclosing per-record state to a caller entitled to none.
@@ -336,7 +336,7 @@ function expectationsFor(targetUserId: string): Record<string, RouteExpectation>
       body: { userId: targetUserId },
     },
 
-    // ── #11477 — shaded for ORDERING, still admitted by the vendor ─────────
+    // ── Commit 6dd3e6968 — shaded for ORDERING, still admitted by the vendor ─
     //
     // The only member of its bucket, and the bucket exists because this route
     // genuinely has a third shape rather than because the other two did not
@@ -345,7 +345,7 @@ function expectationsFor(targetUserId: string): Record<string, RouteExpectation>
     // owned by different layers:
     //
     //   refusal   → ObjectStack's gate (403 PERMISSION_DENIED), because the
-    //               mount answers first. That is #11477's whole point: the
+    //               mount answers first. That is commit 6dd3e6968's whole point: the
     //               break-glass `hooks.before` guard used to answer an
     //               authenticated non-admin BEFORE any authorization ran, and
     //               its 409 differed per target — a per-record disclosure.
@@ -634,7 +634,7 @@ describe('#9482 C9: every derived /admin/ route refuses a non-admin', () => {
   }, 600_000);
 
   it('the shaded vendor route refuses a non-admin from the ObjectStack gate, before the break-glass guard', async () => {
-    // #11477. The both-sides contrast here is NOT a 2xx — it is that the two
+    // Commit 6dd3e6968. The both-sides contrast here is NOT a 2xx — it is that the two
     // callers hear DIFFERENT refusals. A member is turned away by ObjectStack's
     // gate (`PERMISSION_DENIED`) and a platform admin gets past it only to be
     // turned away by the vendor's (`YOU_ARE_NOT_ALLOWED_*`, #9969). Two
@@ -653,7 +653,7 @@ describe('#9482 C9: every derived /admin/ route refuses a non-admin', () => {
       expect(member.status, `${route} member: ${member.body}`).toBe(403);
       expect(member.code, `${route} member code: ${member.body}`).toBe('PERMISSION_DENIED');
 
-      // ⛔ The load-bearing negative. Before #11477 the break-glass
+      // ⛔ The load-bearing negative. Before commit 6dd3e6968 the break-glass
       // `hooks.before` guard answered an authenticated non-admin ahead of every
       // authorization layer, and its answer varied with the TARGET — a
       // per-record disclosure to a caller entitled to nothing. A member must
@@ -720,7 +720,7 @@ describe('#9482 C9: every derived /admin/ route refuses a non-admin', () => {
       // transaction, so this route answers the authorization question like
       // every other member of the bucket and needs no exception.
       //
-      // ⚠️ #11477 moved `remove-user` OUT of this bucket entirely — its raw
+      // ⚠️ Commit 6dd3e6968 moved `remove-user` OUT of this bucket entirely — its raw
       // mount now answers a member from ObjectStack's gate
       // (`403 PERMISSION_DENIED`) before better-auth is reached at all, so the
       // vendor-vocabulary rule below no longer describes it. It lives in
 
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
 // "refused outright (#4757)", on the reasoning that "nothing was ever queried"
 // must not read as "nothing to authorize". `attachment-access-hooks.ts` carries
 // exactly that refusal, and `attachment-access-hooks.test.ts` pins it against a
-// wired engine (#9797). This file pins it END TO END, on the real stack, where
+// wired engine (commit 1258dcaee). This file pins it END TO END, on the real stack, where
 // RBAC and plugin-sharing are in the path and the session is a real one.
 //
 // ## History — this file's original verdict has been OVERTAKEN, twice
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
 // the `where === undefined` check. That was a PRODUCT gap (#9719), and this
 // file deliberately declined to pin the behaviour of the day.
 //
-// It has since been fixed. #9719/PR #9797 added an opt-in whole-operation
+// It has since been fixed. #9719/commit 1258dcaee added an opt-in whole-operation
 // dispatch to the engine, which #9974 renamed `dispatchUnscopedMultiWrite` when
 // it was ruled onto `beforeUpdate` as well. `attachment-access-hooks.ts`
 // declares it on both sys_attachment write registrations, so the #4757 refusal
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
 // properties that look identical on a fixture whose rows split entitled/not —
 // which is exactly the fixture the first block below uses. Measured on this
 // suite: with `dispatchUnscopedMultiWrite` removed from BOTH registrations and
-// service-storage rebuilt (the pre-#9797 world), the first block stays 5/5
+// service-storage rebuilt (the world before commit 1258dcaee), the first block stays 5/5
 // GREEN. It cannot see the refusal it is named for.
 //
 // So the second block seeds the ONE fixture that separates them: a caller who
@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ describe('sys_attachment delete gate under an unscoped multi-delete (#9483)', ()
 
   it('an unscoped multi-delete is refused OUTRIGHT — on its shape — and deletes NOTHING', async () => {
     // `{ multi: true }` with neither id nor where composes an AST over the whole
-    // table. Since #9797 the refusal that answers is #4757's whole-operation
+    // table. Since commit 1258dcaee the refusal that answers is #4757's whole-operation
     // one, dispatched BEFORE any row is resolved — not the per-row gate, which
     // on this fixture would also have refused (the member is the uploader of
     // one row and neither uploader nor parent-editor of the other).
@@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ describe('sys_attachment delete gate under an unscoped multi-delete (#9483)', ()
 
   it('an empty `where: {}` reaches the same verdict by a DIFFERENT rule — the per-row gate', async () => {
     // ⚠️ Same outcome, deliberately different mechanism, and the difference is
-    // load-bearing. #9797 scoped the whole-operation dispatch to a delete with
+    // load-bearing. Commit 1258dcaee scoped the whole-operation dispatch to a delete with
     // NO `where` at all; a match-all `where: {}` is a real query, so it is NOT
     // refused on shape — it is refused here only because this caller cannot
     // have the foreign row. Asserting the per-row message is what keeps that
@@ -259,7 +259,7 @@ describe('sys_attachment delete gate under an unscoped multi-delete (#9483)', ()
 // whole-operation rule or from the per-row gate, because that fixture holds one
 // row the caller may not touch. Here the caller uploaded BOTH rows, so the
 // per-row gate has nothing to refuse — anything that still refuses is refusing
-// the SHAPE. Pre-#9797 this exact call resolved and emptied the table.
+// the SHAPE. Before commit 1258dcaee this exact call resolved and emptied the table.
 // ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
 describe('sys_attachment unscoped multi-delete is refused on its SHAPE, not on entitlement (#9483)', () => {
@@ -352,7 +352,7 @@ describe('sys_attachment unscoped multi-delete is refused on its SHAPE, not on e
   });
 
   it('refuses `{ multi: true }` with no id and no where — even though the caller may delete every matched row', async () => {
-    // #9719's measured wipe, end to end: before PR #9797 this call RESOLVED and
+    // #9719's measured wipe, end to end: before commit 1258dcaee this call RESOLVED and
     // took both rows (2 -> 0). The per-row gate licenses each row individually,
     // so nothing but the whole-operation #4757 rule can refuse here — which is
     // what makes this the case that detects its removal.
 
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@
 // silencing that particular red costs an enforcement site rather than a
 // `covers` append on a row that records an absence.
 //
-// [#8711] That completeness is over ROUTES, not over primitives: a primitive
+// [commit 2ce1eb41b] That completeness is over ROUTES, not over primitives: a primitive
 // enforced by a predicate inside an existing resolver adds no entry point, so
 // it can be neither UNCLASSIFIED nor STALE. Measured against the rows below:
 // 44 of 51 carry no `covers` key at all (7 rows, 15 keys, every one an
@@ -390,12 +390,12 @@ export const AUTHZ_CONFORMANCE: AuthzPrimitive[] = [
   // mass-revoked) and the 0/1 storage shape the primary driver returns is
   // judged as well as a literal `false`.
   //
-  // [#8711] Both rows carry NO `covers`, and that is a statement about the
+  // [commit 60ade586e] Both rows carry NO `covers`, and that is a statement about the
   // RATCHET, not an omission: `discover()` enumerates HTTP entry points from a
   // curated per-file probe table, and a predicate inside an existing resolver
   // adds no entry point — so neither flag could ever have surfaced as
   // UNCLASSIFIED during the whole period it was inert. These two rows restore
-  // the ledger's stated invariant. [Resolved — maintainer ruling on #8711,
+  // the ledger's stated invariant. [Resolved — maintainer ruling (commit 2ce1eb41b),
   // 2026-08-15] The invariant's advertised SCOPE is narrowed to what the
   // ratchet can check, not the ratchet widened to reach in-resolver
   // predicates like this one — widening was measured unachievable in general
@@ -408,7 +408,7 @@ export const AUTHZ_CONFORMANCE: AuthzPrimitive[] = [
     enforcement: 'core/security/resolve-authz-context.ts step 6a — isRowActive gates BOTH halves, and only both hold it: (i) only ACTIVE position ids collect their `sys_position_permission_set` linkage, so a deactivated position carries no bound set; (ii) the deactivated NAME is dropped from `grants.positions`, because resolvePermissionSetsForContext requests positions as permission-set NAMES and a name left standing resolves the same grant one layer down',
     note: 'Only a name whose `sys_position` row is EXPLICITLY deactivated is dropped — a name with no row at all (`org_owner`, a membership-derived role, the built-in `everyone` audience anchor) has no flag to read and is untouched. Deliberately NOT a blanket revocation of the sets themselves: a set held via BOTH a deactivated position AND a direct user grant still resolves, since the direct grant is a different grant (resolve-authz-context.test.ts pins exactly that case). Symmetrically, the WRITE gates and blast-radius reads in plugin-security (assertAudienceAnchorBindingGate, setsBoundToPosition, the delegated-admin surfaces) stay UNFILTERED on purpose — dropping a deactivated row there would make a refused binding permitted, narrow a delegate\'s boundary, and make a deactivated position unmanageable. Unit-proven in core/security/resolve-authz-context.test.ts (a deactivated position stops granting its sets; an active one still grants; an absent column grants; the 0/1 shape deactivates; deactivating ONE position leaves the others granting) + core/security/row-active.test.ts. Not HIGH_RISK for the same reason as `permission-set-active`.' },
 
-  // ── ADR-0091 D1/D2 — grant validity windows (#8811) ───────────────────
+  // ── ADR-0091 D1/D2 — grant validity windows (commit d6e793507) ────────
   //
   // The sibling of the `active` switch above, and enforced at the same seam
   // for the same stated reason: a grant that is supposed to lapse on a date,
 
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
 // ADR-0056 D10 — the authorization conformance matrix is a CHECKED artifact,
 // within the scope the mechanism can see: routes are ratcheted, primitives are
 // hand-maintained (see the matrix's own header for the narrowed claim and the
-// measured numbers — #8711). Refactored onto the reusable ADR-0060
+// measured numbers — commit 2ce1eb41b). Refactored onto the reusable ADR-0060
 // `checkLedger` helper: one call asserts every shared invariant (valid state,
 // enforced-has-site, experimental/removed-has-note, proof-file-exists,
 // high-risk-has-proof). A row that regresses one of THOSE invariants, or a
 
@@ -431,9 +431,9 @@ export const PROBE_FILE_CENSUS: readonly ProbeFileReading[] = [
     // `this.routeManager.register(` reads 73 because the helper's forwarder is
     // one of them, and it is sliced out before counting.
     //
-    // [#13214] `enforceAuth` 61 -> 64. ⛔ RE-ANCHORED, not relaxed: the control
+    // [commit cc837dbfe] `enforceAuth` 61 -> 64. ⛔ RE-ANCHORED, not relaxed: the control
     // exists to prove this census is still reading the file it thinks it is, and
-    // a rising `enforceAuth` is precisely what the 2026-08-30 ruling on #13214
+    // a rising `enforceAuth` is precisely what the 2026-08-30 ruling (commit cc837dbfe)
     // was supposed to cause — `registerUiEndpoints` was the ONE route in this
     // file that resolved no identity, and it is now guarded. The move is +3 over
     // the whole file (`occurrences` counts the bare term, comments included):
@@ -445,9 +445,9 @@ export const PROBE_FILE_CENSUS: readonly ProbeFileReading[] = [
     // ⚠️ The three sibling numbers were re-derived and did NOT move, which is
     // what says this is a guard change and not a surface change: `population`
     // 80, `reachable` 19, `private register*Endpoints(` 17 and
-    // `this.routeManager.register(` 80 are all unchanged — #13214 added no route
+    // `this.routeManager.register(` 80 are all unchanged — commit cc837dbfe added no route
     // and no registrar. `blindSpot` therefore stays 61 as well.
-    // ⚠️ That last figure is the reading AS OF #13214 and is left as written:
+    // ⚠️ That last figure is the reading AS OF commit cc837dbfe and is left as written:
     // the control is 73 today for the spelling reason recorded above, and the
     // population it feeds is still 80. Do not "correct" the paragraph — it is a
     // dated measurement, not a live claim.