From b65137c03894eab115896824667fb25808feb208 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dave Jong <dave.jong@patchstack.com>
Date: Thu, 13 Aug 2026 09:41:52 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] protect: expose uploaded-file data so rules can inspect
 content
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The engine saw an upload's filename and the raw multipart blob, but not file
content as a first-class thing (file_contains was a no-op), so a polyglot — a
valid image with a malicious payload inside (the ImageMagick "PNG that isn't a
PNG" RCE class) — passed a filename rule.

Expose the DATA, keep the detection in rules. The multipart parser now captures
each file part as { filename, type, content }, and the resolver exposes:
  - files.<name>.content   the file bytes (contains/regex signature rules)
  - files.<name>.type      the part's declared content-type
  - files.<name>.filename  the filename (same as bare files.<name>)
Bare files.<name> still returns the filename, so existing filename rules are
unchanged. No detection heuristics live in the engine — "what's malicious"
(webshell signatures, declared-type-vs-content mismatch) is composed in rules
(see the triage-vpatch-npm upload template): e.g. mismatch = `files.f.type`
matches ^image/ AND `files.f.content` head is markup (`^\s*<`), two inclusive
conditions — which also avoids the false positive of <script> in an image's
EXIF/XMP metadata. Content rides inside the already-capped body.

Adds tests/protect/upload-inspection.test.ts; updates multipart shape assertions.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---
 src/protect/engine/fetch.js             |  7 ++-
 src/protect/engine/request.js           | 41 +++++++++++++--
 tests/protect/batch-hardening.test.ts   |  3 +-
 tests/protect/multipart.test.ts         |  3 +-
 tests/protect/upload-inspection.test.ts | 70 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
 5 files changed, 116 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 tests/protect/upload-inspection.test.ts

diff --git a/src/protect/engine/fetch.js b/src/protect/engine/fetch.js
index 33b06d4..af70470 100644
--- a/src/protect/engine/fetch.js
+++ b/src/protect/engine/fetch.js
@@ -165,7 +165,12 @@ export function parseMultipart(rawBody, boundary) {
     const content = part.slice(sep.index + sep[0].length).replace(/\r?\n$/, '');
     const filename = /filename="([^"]*)"/i.exec(disposition)?.[1];
     if (filename !== undefined) {
-      files[name] = name in files ? [].concat(files[name], filename) : filename;
+      // Capture the part's declared content-type and CONTENT (not just the filename), so rules can
+      // inspect an upload's bytes (files.<name>.content) and detect a declared-vs-actual type
+      // mismatch (files.<name>.mismatch). The content rides inside the already-capped rawBody.
+      const partType = /content-type:\s*([^\r\n;]+)/i.exec(rawHeaders)?.[1]?.trim() || '';
+      const file = { filename, type: partType, content };
+      files[name] = name in files ? [].concat(files[name], file) : file;
     } else {
       body[name] = name in body ? [].concat(body[name], content) : content;
     }
diff --git a/src/protect/engine/request.js b/src/protect/engine/request.js
index 5488270..fcb7e04 100644
--- a/src/protect/engine/request.js
+++ b/src/protect/engine/request.js
@@ -1,3 +1,12 @@
+// Resolvable DATA attributes of an uploaded file part (files.<name>.<attr>). The engine only exposes
+// the raw data — WHAT counts as a malicious upload (signatures, type-vs-content mismatch) is expressed
+// in rules (see the triage-vpatch-npm skill), not hardcoded here.
+const FILE_ATTRS = new Set(['content', 'filename', 'type']);
+
+// A captured file part is { filename, type, content }; tolerate the legacy bare-filename string.
+const fileFilename = (f) => (f && typeof f === 'object' ? f.filename : f);
+const fileAttribute = (f, attr) => (f && typeof f === 'object' ? f[attr] : attr === 'filename' ? f : undefined);
+
 // WinterCG-safe base64 decode: use Buffer on Node, fall back to atob/TextDecoder on
 // edge runtimes (Cloudflare Workers, Deno, Bun) where Buffer may be absent. Keeps the
 // engine hot path free of Node-only APIs (per the ADR engine-language decision).
@@ -253,16 +262,38 @@ export class RequestResolver {
 
   #resolveFiles(key) {
     const files = this.#req.files;
-    if (!files) {
+    if (!files || typeof files !== 'object') {
       return [];
     }
 
-    if (key.endsWith('*')) {
-      return this.#resolveWildcard(files, key);
+    // files.<name>.<attr> — content | filename | type. Fans out over multiple files uploaded under
+    // the same field name.
+    const dot = key.lastIndexOf('.');
+    if (dot !== -1 && FILE_ATTRS.has(key.slice(dot + 1)) && Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(files, key.slice(0, dot))) {
+      const attr = key.slice(dot + 1);
+      const entry = files[key.slice(0, dot)];
+      const list = Array.isArray(entry) ? entry : [entry];
+      const out = [];
+      for (const f of list) {
+        const v = fileAttribute(f, attr);
+        if (v !== undefined && v !== '') out.push(v);
+      }
+      return out;
     }
 
-    const value = files[key];
-    return value !== undefined ? [value] : [];
+    // Bare files.<name> (or wildcard) → the filename(s), preserving the legacy behavior that
+    // filename-scoped rules rely on (the parser now stores a { filename, type, content } object).
+    const filenamesOf = (entry) => (Array.isArray(entry) ? entry.map(fileFilename) : [fileFilename(entry)]);
+    if (key.endsWith('*')) {
+      const prefix = key.slice(0, -1);
+      const out = [];
+      for (const [k, entry] of Object.entries(files)) {
+        if (k.startsWith(prefix)) out.push(...filenamesOf(entry));
+      }
+      return out.filter((v) => v !== undefined);
+    }
+    if (!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(files, key)) return [];
+    return filenamesOf(files[key]).filter((v) => v !== undefined);
   }
 
   #resolveRaw() {
diff --git a/tests/protect/batch-hardening.test.ts b/tests/protect/batch-hardening.test.ts
index 8ab63c7..0d8020f 100644
--- a/tests/protect/batch-hardening.test.ts
+++ b/tests/protect/batch-hardening.test.ts
@@ -86,7 +86,8 @@ describe('item 3 — multipart on the node adapter + comparator coercion', () =>
       `--${b}\r\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name="avatar"; filename="x.png"\r\n\r\nBINARY\r\n--${b}--\r\n`;
     const shaped: any = fromNodeRequest({ method: 'POST', url: '/x', headers: { 'content-type': `multipart/form-data; boundary=${b}` } } as any, body);
     expect(shaped.body.comment).toBe('<script>alert(1)</script>');
-    expect(shaped.files.avatar).toBe('x.png');
+    // File parts are captured as { filename, type, content } for content inspection.
+    expect(shaped.files.avatar).toMatchObject({ filename: 'x.png', content: 'BINARY' });
   });
 
   it('in_array / array_in_array coerce numeric rule values to match string request values', () => {
diff --git a/tests/protect/multipart.test.ts b/tests/protect/multipart.test.ts
index ab507e3..de8dfd7 100644
--- a/tests/protect/multipart.test.ts
+++ b/tests/protect/multipart.test.ts
@@ -42,7 +42,8 @@ describe('multipart/form-data parsing', () => {
     );
     expect(shaped.body.title).toBe('<script>alert(1)</script>');
     expect(shaped.body['__proto__[polluted]']).toBe('yes');
-    expect(shaped.files.avatar).toBe('evil.svg');
+    // File parts are now captured as { filename, type, content } (content inspection), not a bare filename.
+    expect(shaped.files.avatar).toMatchObject({ filename: 'evil.svg', type: 'image/svg+xml', content: '<svg onload=alert(1)>' });
     expect(shaped._rawBody).toContain('__proto__');
   });
 
diff --git a/tests/protect/upload-inspection.test.ts b/tests/protect/upload-inspection.test.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..85ee838
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/protect/upload-inspection.test.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
+import { createProtection } from '../../src/protect/runtime.js';
+
+// File-upload content inspection: the engine exposes an upload's DATA
+// (files.<name>.content / .type / .filename); WHAT is malicious is expressed entirely in rules.
+// These tests show the rule-composed patterns (content signature + declared-type-vs-content
+// mismatch) and that bare files.<name> still returns the filename for existing filename rules.
+
+const B = '----PSXBOUNDARY';
+function upload(field: string, filename: string, type: string, content: string) {
+  const body =
+    `--${B}\r\nContent-Disposition: form-data; name="${field}"; filename="${filename}"\r\n` +
+    `Content-Type: ${type}\r\n\r\n${content}\r\n--${B}--\r\n`;
+  return new Request('https://app.com/upload', {
+    method: 'POST',
+    headers: { 'content-type': `multipart/form-data; boundary=${B}` },
+    body,
+  });
+}
+const mk = (rules: any[]) => createProtection({ mode: 'block', rules: { firewall: rules, whitelists: [], whitelist_keys: {} } as any });
+const blocks = async (p: any, req: Request) => (await p.fetch(() => new Response('ok'))(req)).status === 403;
+
+describe('files.<name>.content — signature inspection (pure rule)', () => {
+  it('matches a webshell / ImageMagick-MSL signature in the file bytes', async () => {
+    const p = await mk([
+      { id: 's', rule_v2: [{ parameter: 'files.f.content', match: { type: 'regex', value: '/<\\?php|<\\?=|<(?:read|write|msl)[\\s>]/i' } }] },
+    ]);
+    expect(await blocks(p, upload('f', 'cat.png', 'image/png', '\x89PNG\r\n<?php system($_GET[0]); ?>'))).toBe(true);
+    expect(await blocks(p, upload('f', 'x.jpg', 'image/jpeg', '<?xml version="1.0"?>'))).toBe(true);
+    expect(await blocks(p, upload('f', 'cat.png', 'image/png', '\x89PNG a normal image'))).toBe(false);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('type-vs-content mismatch — composed in a rule, not the engine', () => {
+  // "declared image AND content head is markup" — two inclusive (AND) conditions on the exposed data.
+  const mismatchRule = {
+    id: 'm',
+    rule_v2: [
+      { parameter: 'rules', rules: [
+        { parameter: 'files.f.type', mutations: [], match: { type: 'regex', value: '/^image\\//i' }, inclusive: true },
+        { parameter: 'files.f.content', match: { type: 'regex', value: '/^\\s*<[a-z!?]/i' }, inclusive: true },
+      ] },
+    ],
+  };
+
+  it('flags a raster image that is really text/markup (svg-as-png, php-as-png)', async () => {
+    const p = await mk([mismatchRule]);
+    expect(await blocks(p, upload('f', 'cat.png', 'image/png', '<?php echo 1; ?>'))).toBe(true);
+    expect(await blocks(p, upload('f', 'x.png', 'image/png', '<svg><script>alert(1)</script></svg>'))).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('does NOT flag a real image (binary head, markup only in metadata) — no false positive', async () => {
+    const p = await mk([mismatchRule]);
+    // Genuine binary image head; <script> only later in an EXIF/XMP-like text field.
+    expect(await blocks(p, upload('f', 'p.jpg', 'image/jpeg', '\xff\xd8\xff\xe1 EXIF <x:xmpmeta><dc:description><script>x</script></dc:description>'))).toBe(false);
+    expect(await blocks(p, upload('f', 'ok.png', 'image/png', '\x89PNG normal image bytes'))).toBe(false);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('backward compatibility', () => {
+  it('bare files.<name> still matches the filename', async () => {
+    const p = await mk([{ id: 'ext', rule_v2: [{ parameter: 'files.avatar', match: { type: 'contains', value: '.php' } }] }]);
+    expect(await blocks(p, upload('avatar', 'shell.php', 'application/octet-stream', 'x'))).toBe(true);
+    expect(await blocks(p, upload('avatar', 'ok.png', 'image/png', 'x'))).toBe(false);
+  });
+  it('exposes .type and .filename as sources', async () => {
+    const p = await mk([{ id: 't', rule_v2: [{ parameter: 'files.doc.type', match: { type: 'contains', value: 'application/x-httpd-php' } }] }]);
+    expect(await blocks(p, upload('doc', 'a.txt', 'application/x-httpd-php', 'x'))).toBe(true);
+  });
+});