diff --git a/.github/workflows/ci.yml b/.github/workflows/ci.yml
index 4fccc47..575ee23 100644
--- a/.github/workflows/ci.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/ci.yml
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ jobs:
           persist-credentials: false
 
       - name: Install cargo-binstall
-        uses: cargo-bins/cargo-binstall@75b4bfae1b2c753a6806bbce6e6cb89b602de33c # v1.22.0
+        uses: cargo-bins/cargo-binstall@b874e25ea559687bec77e281e9b271aa1367b624 # v1.23.0
 
       # Pin to match CARGO_DENY_VERSION in scripts/install-dev-tools.sh so CI and
       # local installs run the same version.
@@ -131,6 +131,6 @@ jobs:
         with:
           persist-credentials: false
 
-      - uses: zizmorcore/zizmor-action@70fb788f84895a7701f5643d103d587e460b5c99 # v0.6.3
+      - uses: zizmorcore/zizmor-action@cc914d7f3750a2d13d75c7f184a1060aa0e9d482 # v0.6.4
         with:
           advanced-security: false
diff --git a/.github/workflows/claude-review.yml b/.github/workflows/claude-review.yml
index 6d1c886..1fa7bc6 100644
--- a/.github/workflows/claude-review.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/claude-review.yml
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ jobs:
           gh pr comment "$PR" --repo "$REPO" --body '⚠️ **@claude is about to review a PR from an outside contributor.**
           The diff, commit messages, and comments here are **untrusted input** and may contain prompt-injection attempting to make the review agent read or leak CI secrets. The agent is instructed to treat all of it as data, never as instructions — but that is a mitigation, not a guarantee. **Review the diff yourself for injection before relying on the agent'\''s output, and do not merge on the agent'\''s say-so alone.**'
 
-      - uses: anthropics/claude-code-action@d75b94d5ad426cb8546e6628b6f5f19b84e5cce1 # v1.0.216
+      - uses: anthropics/claude-code-action@0a8d3c9443bbff909ab973b6a17a340b913f229f # v1.0.221
         with:
           anthropic_api_key: ${{ secrets.ANTHROPIC_API_KEY }}
           track_progress: true