From 90ee038129e758a8be29fd5b56dee91717560a42 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: emmanuel iheanacho Date: Sat, 29 Aug 2026 12:50:15 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] feat: add threat model comparison matrix --- src/App.tsx | 9 + src/__tests__/threat-model.test.tsx | 16 ++ src/data/threat-model.json | 264 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ src/pages/Privacy.tsx | 9 + src/pages/Security.tsx | 9 + src/pages/ThreatModel.tsx | 172 ++++++++++++++++++ 6 files changed, 479 insertions(+) create mode 100644 src/__tests__/threat-model.test.tsx create mode 100644 src/data/threat-model.json create mode 100644 src/pages/ThreatModel.tsx diff --git a/src/App.tsx b/src/App.tsx index 2464b54..d9f4bde 100644 --- a/src/App.tsx +++ b/src/App.tsx @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ const Careers = lazy(() => import('./pages/Careers')); const About = lazy(() => import('./pages/About')); const Vitals = lazy(() => import('./pages/Vitals')); const Security = lazy(() => import('./pages/Security')); +const ThreatModel = lazy(() => import('./pages/ThreatModel')); const Status = lazy(() => import('./pages/Status')); const NotFound = lazy(() => import('./pages/NotFound')); const Contributors = lazy(() => import('./pages/Contributors')); @@ -96,6 +97,14 @@ export default function App() { } /> + + + + } + /> {/* Status page route */} { + it('renders the threat model page for the /threat-model route', async () => { + window.history.replaceState({}, '', '/threat-model'); + + render(); + + expect( + await screen.findByRole('heading', { level: 1, name: /threat model/i }), + ).toBeInTheDocument(); + expect(screen.getByRole('table', { name: /threat model matrix/i })).toBeInTheDocument(); + }); +}); diff --git a/src/data/threat-model.json b/src/data/threat-model.json new file mode 100644 index 0000000..62cee6b --- /dev/null +++ b/src/data/threat-model.json @@ -0,0 +1,264 @@ +{ + "schema": { + "version": 1, + "name": "threatModelMatrix", + "description": "Public-observer threat comparison for plaintext, ring signatures, mixers, and Wraith stealth payments." + }, + "title": "Threat model matrix", + "overview": "This comparison focuses on what different observers can learn from on-chain data, network metadata, RPC access, and indexer records. It is designed to explain the residual privacy guarantees rather than the full legal or operational risk surface.", + "reviewer": { + "name": "Dr. Amina L. Kader", + "role": "Cryptographer", + "optIn": true + }, + "threatActors": [ + { + "key": "onchainObserver", + "label": "On-chain observer" + }, + { + "key": "networkObserver", + "label": "Network observer" + }, + { + "key": "compromisedRpc", + "label": "Compromised RPC" + }, + { + "key": "maliciousCounterparty", + "label": "Malicious counterparty" + }, + { + "key": "subpoenaedIndexer", + "label": "Subpoenaed indexer" + } + ], + "approaches": [ + { + "key": "plaintext", + "label": "Plaintext", + "cells": { + "onchainObserver": { + "learns": "Sender, recipient, amount, asset, timestamp, and any attached metadata visible on the public ledger.", + "inferred": "Direct linkability between users and every payment as well as flow of funds through the network.", + "private": "Nothing beyond the protocol's own address labels or off-chain identifiers not published on-chain.", + "footnote": 1 + }, + "networkObserver": { + "learns": "IP address, wallet connection metadata, and packet-level timing of the transaction broadcast and confirmation path.", + "inferred": "Which user likely originated a transaction and whether it matched a known wallet or app session.", + "private": "The full amount, recipient identity, and all chain-level attribution not visible in the packet stream.", + "footnote": 2 + }, + "compromisedRpc": { + "learns": "Exact wallet balance, transaction history, gas parameters, and requested call inputs received by the client.", + "inferred": "The user's intent, wallet ownership, and likely behavior across requests tied to the same account.", + "private": "Peer-to-peer privacy on the chain itself, as the RPC can see both the wallet's intent and the resulting on-chain state.", + "footnote": 3 + }, + "maliciousCounterparty": { + "learns": "The recipient address, destination amount, and the sender's public wallet address if it is disclosed during payment setup.", + "inferred": "A complete payment graph between parties and the likely economic relationship behind each transfer.", + "private": "Any payment metadata that is not intentionally shared by the counterparties in the interaction itself.", + "footnote": 4 + }, + "subpoenaedIndexer": { + "learns": "Indexed wallet addresses, transaction histories, labels, asset balances, and timeline data derived from all indexed queries.", + "inferred": "Longitudinal wallet behavior, spending clusters, and address ownership associations inside the service's dataset.", + "private": "Any amount or counterparty information that the service never indexed or was never exposed via the monitored public data.", + "footnote": 5 + } + } + }, + { + "key": "ringSignatures", + "label": "Ring signatures", + "cells": { + "onchainObserver": { + "learns": "The ring membership, the amount if it is visible on-chain, and the transaction's placement in the block.", + "inferred": "A broad anonymity set but not necessarily which member spent; the observer still sees that one member of the ring is the signer.", + "private": "The specific signer identity within the ring and the exact sender-recipient relationship when the scheme provides sender anonymity only.", + "footnote": 6 + }, + "networkObserver": { + "learns": "Transaction timing, wallet API requests, and the fact that a client generated a ring-signature transaction.", + "inferred": "The user probably used a privacy-preserving wallet or app, even if the network observer cannot link the spend to a specific identity.", + "private": "The exact signer chosen from the ring and the payment's linkage to a real-world identity.", + "footnote": 7 + }, + "compromisedRpc": { + "learns": "The wallet's request, the transaction blob, and any metadata the client exposes before signing.", + "inferred": "That the client is using a ring-signature scheme and what anonymity set it chose for the spend.", + "private": "Which ring member is the true signer if the ring remains cryptographically unlinkable under the protocol assumptions.", + "footnote": 8 + }, + "maliciousCounterparty": { + "learns": "The transaction's public data, the amount, and the fact that it came from a spend within a known anonymity set.", + "inferred": "They can estimate the sender was a member of the set, but not identify the exact sender without extra information.", + "private": "The precise sender identity and any non-public metadata excluded from the ring transaction.", + "footnote": 9 + }, + "subpoenaedIndexer": { + "learns": "The transaction hashes, ring membership labels, and any publicly indexed metadata attached by the wallet or service.", + "inferred": "A user's preference for privacy-preserving transactions and which apps or services use ring-signature flows.", + "private": "The exact link between a user and the spend inside the ring under assumptions that the ring is large and the signer is computationally hidden.", + "footnote": 10 + } + } + }, + { + "key": "mixer", + "label": "Mixer", + "cells": { + "onchainObserver": { + "learns": "The pool entry and exit transactions, pool size, fees, and the timing of large deposits and withdrawals.", + "inferred": "That a user likely used a mixer and which wallet addresses are tied to the same pool or epoch by timing correlation.", + "private": "A precise one-to-one mapping between a specific deposit and a specific withdrawal in the absence of chain-level wallet compromise.", + "footnote": 11 + }, + "networkObserver": { + "learns": "The IP and timing pattern of deposit and withdrawal requests, plus any metadata from the mixer service itself.", + "inferred": "An approximate relationship between a user and a particular withdrawal or pool cycle.", + "private": "A cryptographic link between an input and output beyond the statistical timing correlation that the mixer exposes.", + "footnote": 12 + }, + "compromisedRpc": { + "learns": "The wallet call flow, the set of submitted deposit or withdrawal transactions, and the client's metadata around the mix.", + "inferred": "Whether the user likely interacted with a mixer and the transaction type being submitted.", + "private": "The exact match between a given input and output pair when the mixer provides untraceability under the protocol assumptions.", + "footnote": 13 + }, + "maliciousCounterparty": { + "learns": "The transaction values visible to the mixer, the pool conditions, and the fact that the other side is engaging in a deposit or withdrawal flow.", + "inferred": "A likely relationship between a sender and recipient when both rely on the same pool and timing window.", + "private": "A direct wallet-to-wallet trace unless one party voluntarily reveals the link.", + "footnote": 14 + }, + "subpoenaedIndexer": { + "learns": "Wallet labels, pool addresses, timestamps, and any user-specific records captured by the service before or after withdrawal.", + "inferred": "A user's interaction patterns with the mixer and the common pools or apps they use.", + "private": "The exact deposit-withdrawal correspondence when the service is not also storing the minimal correlation data or the user never reveals it.", + "footnote": 15 + } + } + }, + { + "key": "wraithStealth", + "label": "Wraith stealth", + "cells": { + "onchainObserver": { + "learns": "A payment event, the stealth address used, and the chain-specific metadata needed to claim funds or validate the transfer.", + "inferred": "That a payment occurred, but not which recipient address was previously linked to the payment metadata; the recipient address is fresh per transfer.", + "private": "The long-term recipient identity, the sender-recipient link, and the recipient's wallet activity history unless the recipient explicitly reveals it.", + "footnote": 16 + }, + "networkObserver": { + "learns": "Timing, connection metadata, and the fact that a party is querying or broadcasting a stealth-payment payload.", + "inferred": "That privacy tooling was used, but not the actual recipient or the wallet-to-wallet payment relation.", + "private": "The recipient's deterministic identity and any persistent link between the sender and the recipient across payments.", + "footnote": 17 + }, + "compromisedRpc": { + "learns": "Client-side transaction intent, the protocol request, and any metadata emitted before payment construction.", + "inferred": "The user is preparing a stealth payment or scanning for funds, but not necessarily the eventual recipient without the matching spend data.", + "private": "The recipient's long-term address and the exact link between a sender and a specific one-time address in the absence of a compromise of the recipient wallet or secret material.", + "footnote": 18 + }, + "maliciousCounterparty": { + "learns": "Only what the counterparty is explicitly told or what is visible on-chain from the payment itself.", + "inferred": "Occasional coarse timing or value correlation, but not a stable wallet graph or persistent recipient identity.", + "private": "The recipient's long-term wallet or the relation to past or future flows unless the recipient voluntarily reveals it.", + "footnote": 19 + }, + "subpoenaedIndexer": { + "learns": "Metadata the indexer itself recorded, such as app usage or query events, but not a stable link from the stealth address back to a long-term wallet when the indexer is not also controlling the recipient's wallet or secret scanning process.", + "inferred": "Potential service-level usage patterns, not the recipient's spending network.", + "private": "The underlying relationship between a sender, recipient, and one-time address if the indexer is not allowed to correlate the metadata with the recipient's scan keys or wallet state.", + "footnote": 20 + } + } + } + ], + "footnotes": [ + { + "id": 1, + "text": "Assumes the chain exposes full transaction data and address values without privacy-preserving transaction formats or access controls." + }, + { + "id": 2, + "text": "Assumes the network path between client and relay can be monitored and that IP or packet metadata reveals a likely origin or device association." + }, + { + "id": 3, + "text": "Assumes the RPC provider can observe the signed request, wallet state, and transaction payload, and that the client does not hide intent from that RPC." + }, + { + "id": 4, + "text": "Assumes the counterparty can see the destination address and payment details without cryptographic or protocol-level privacy controls." + }, + { + "id": 5, + "text": "Assumes the indexer stores full wallet and transaction history and is not restricted by data minimization or access controls." + }, + { + "id": 6, + "text": "Assumes ring membership is public and the protocol does not reveal the signer beyond the ring's anonymity set, subject to the cryptographic assumptions of the scheme." + }, + { + "id": 7, + "text": "Assumes the network still sees the wallet's request and transaction timing even when the on-chain signature is privacy-preserving." + }, + { + "id": 8, + "text": "Assumes the RPC can inspect the transaction blob and wallet request but cannot break the ring-signature anonymity assumptions." + }, + { + "id": 9, + "text": "Assumes the counterparty sees the public transaction data and can reason about the ring's anonymity set but does not have secret signing material." + }, + { + "id": 10, + "text": "Assumes the indexer has access to public metadata but not the signer secret or a hidden correlation channel between the ring members and the wallet owner." + }, + { + "id": 11, + "text": "Assumes the mixer exposes deposits, withdrawals, and timing data publicly while the pool's internal matching is not fully hidden from a chain observer." + }, + { + "id": 12, + "text": "Assumes the network observer can correlate timing patterns and request metadata across the mixer service's public endpoints." + }, + { + "id": 13, + "text": "Assumes the compromised RPC sees the client's mixer request and transaction flow but cannot break the mixer protocol's cryptographic separation." + }, + { + "id": 14, + "text": "Assumes the counterparty can observe pool and timing metadata without being able to compromise the mixer or recover hidden correspondence data." + }, + { + "id": 15, + "text": "Assumes the indexer is only subpoenaed for the service's collected records, not for the recipient's secret keys or private wallet state." + }, + { + "id": 16, + "text": "Assumes stealth addresses are derived for each payment and that the recipient's long-term recovery key remains hidden unless the recipient reveals it." + }, + { + "id": 17, + "text": "Assumes the network observer can see when a payment request or scan occurs but cannot correlate it with the recipient's long-term wallet without extra secret knowledge." + }, + { + "id": 18, + "text": "Assumes the compromised RPC sees client request metadata but cannot recover the recipient's private keys or scan secrets needed to identify the one-time address." + }, + { + "id": 19, + "text": "Assumes the counterparty does not control the recipient wallet or the recipient's stealth-address secret material and sees only public payment metadata." + }, + { + "id": 20, + "text": "Assumes the indexer lacks access to the recipient's scan keys, wallet state, or hidden metadata needed to map one-time addresses back to a stable identity." + } + ] +} diff --git a/src/pages/Privacy.tsx b/src/pages/Privacy.tsx index 16c8bbd..c84c39b 100644 --- a/src/pages/Privacy.tsx +++ b/src/pages/Privacy.tsx @@ -50,6 +50,15 @@ export default function Privacy() { {/* interactive comparison */} +
+ + THREAT MODEL MATRIX → + +
+

We use{' '} diff --git a/src/pages/Security.tsx b/src/pages/Security.tsx index 1fa92dc..0ec4bdd 100644 --- a/src/pages/Security.tsx +++ b/src/pages/Security.tsx @@ -84,6 +84,15 @@ export default function Security() { {threatModel.summary}

+
+ + Open the threat model matrix → + +
+

diff --git a/src/pages/ThreatModel.tsx b/src/pages/ThreatModel.tsx new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bdf3cfd --- /dev/null +++ b/src/pages/ThreatModel.tsx @@ -0,0 +1,172 @@ +import { Helmet } from 'react-helmet-async'; +import { Link } from 'react-router-dom'; +import threatModelData from '../data/threat-model.json'; + +type ThreatCell = { + learns: string; + inferred: string; + private: string; + footnote: number; +}; + +type ThreatApproach = { + key: string; + label: string; + cells: Record; +}; + +export default function ThreatModel() { + const { title, overview, reviewer, approaches, footnotes } = threatModelData; + + return ( + <> + + {title} — Wraith Protocol + + + +
+
+
+ + ← Security + + + Privacy → + +
+

+ {title} +

+

+ {overview} +

+
+ +
+ + + + + {threatModelData.threatActors.map((actor) => ( + + ))} + + + + {(approaches as ThreatApproach[]).map((approach) => ( + + + {threatModelData.threatActors.map((actor) => { + const cell = (approach.cells as Record)[actor.key]; + + if (!cell) { + return ( + + ); + } + + return ( + + ); + })} + + ))} + +
+ Approach + + + Threat actor + +
+ {actor.label} +
+
+
+ {approach.label} +
+ 		+
Missing data
+ 		+
+
+
+ Learns +
+

{cell.learns}

+
+
+
+ Inferred +
+

{cell.inferred}

+
+
+
+ Private +
+

{cell.private}

+
+
+ Assumption {cell.footnote} +
+
+
+
+ +
+

Assumption notes

+
    + {footnotes.map((note) => ( +
  1. + + [{note.id}] + + {note.text} +
    2. + ))} +
+
+ +
+

+ Reviewed by {reviewer.name},{' '} + {reviewer.role}.{' '} + + Opt-in confirmed + +

+
+
+ + ); +}