Only the main branch is supported.

• Sensitive issues: please use GitHub security advisories.
• Non-sensitive issues: open a regular issue.

Target response time: within 7 days for valid vulnerability reports. Best-effort, not a paid-support SLA.

EAP has three layers and a self-contained installer. The security-relevant surfaces are:

1. Installers — install.sh (curl | bash), install.ps1 (irm | iex), and bin/eap-install.mjs. Inspect them before running.
2. EAP-Runtime (layers/eap-runtime/) — an MCP server whose eap_execute tool runs a script in a subprocess. It is a policy control (network deny-list), not an OS sandbox; it inherits host credentials. Timeouts and output are bounded; OS resource isolation is an explicit later layer. See layers/eap-runtime/DESIGN.md → "Security (stated honestly)".
3. EAP-Context (layers/eap-context/) — an MCP server that indexes a code tree. It refuses out-of-tree symlinks, validates the on-disk cache as untrusted input (in-tree relative paths + integer line numbers only), confines the build root, and validates every MCP parameter at the boundary.

EAP states its security honestly (see the DESIGN docs). Known, bounded limitations are documented rather than hidden. The engines are zero third-party dependency (Node built-ins + Python stdlib), which keeps the supply-chain surface at zero. Every hardening fix carries a regression test.

Please inspect the installers and the two MCP servers before running.