security: constrain READ_FILE to granted dirs; validate command paths before basename - #22
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… before basename Two low-severity file/command access gaps from the audit: - READ_FILE IPC handler (ipc/content-handlers.ts) ran only validateFilePath (length / '..'), so any absolute path outside the granted directories was readable. Add isPathWithinAllowedDirs (shared/file-access-types.ts) and gate the read on the FileAccessManager's granted directories. - validateCommand (utils/mcp-sanitizer.ts) checked ALLOWED_COMMANDS.has(basename) BEFORE the safe-directory rule, so /tmp/evil/python3 or ./evil/python3 passed just because the basename was allowlisted. The basename allowlist now applies ONLY to bare command names; any path is validated as a path (absolute → must be in a safe dir; relative → rejected). Tests (red before fix): mcp-sanitizer.test.ts (unsafe-dir / relative-path escapes), file-access-types.test.ts (isPathWithinAllowedDirs). Full suite green, tsc clean. Note: builds on the isPathSafe sibling-prefix fix (same branch family). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Ersetzt #20 (wurde beim Löschen des #18-Branches automatisch geschlossen; #18 ist inzwischen in main).
Was
Zwei Low-Findings zu Datei-/Command-Zugriff.
Änderungen
ipc/content-handlers.ts): geprüft wurde nurvalidateFilePath(Länge/..) → jeder absolute Pfad ausserhalb der Grants war lesbar. Neu:isPathWithinAllowedDirs(shared/file-access-types.ts) gated den Read gegen dieFileAccessManager-Grants.utils/mcp-sanitizer.ts):ALLOWED_COMMANDS.has(basename)lief vor der Safe-Dir-Regel →/tmp/evil/python3/./evil/python3passierten. Die Allowlist gilt jetzt nur für bare Namen; jeder Pfad wird als Pfad validiert.Tests
Die bestehenden mcp-sanitizer-Tests (validateCommand/Args/Env) bleiben erhalten und grün mit dem Fix; meine Escape-Tests +
isPathWithinAllowedDirs-Tests ergänzt. Volle Suite: 1325 passed,tscclean.Dokumentation
Security-Audit (2026-08-21), Mingly Low-Findings (READ_FILE, mcp-sanitizer).
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