Finding
E2E-06 (P2) from #697 round 1. Mid-/sdlc, in plan-approved auto mode, the driver attempted a privileged home-wide repair without separate approval:
sudo chown -R 501:20 "/Users/stefanayala/.npm"
No installed gate blocked it. codex-gate-check.sh is scoped to one command shape only (the cross-model-review gate); nothing in the harness examines other Bash commands. The attempt failed on its own and changed nothing — the two root-owned cache entries kept their ownership.
Attribution
Driver behavior, not a package instruction — the evidence does not show the harness told it to do this. The finding is about implied enforcement scope: the README's framing ("hooks enforce SDLC on every interaction") can read as broader safety than the gates provide. Commands can be dangerous, out-of-repo, and privileged while passing every installed check.
The #617 question, not a guard
Per #617's rule — never add a guard without naming the requested behavior it binds to — this issue exists to decide whether that behavior exists at all. The options on the table:
- Name the behavior (e.g. "an /sdlc session never runs
sudo without an explicit user approval step") and add the narrowest gate that binds to it, or
- Decide no such behavior is requested, and instead make the docs state the gates' actual scope, so nobody infers protection that isn't there.
Doing neither leaves the mismatch found in #697 standing.
Finding
E2E-06 (P2) from #697 round 1. Mid-/sdlc, in plan-approved auto mode, the driver attempted a privileged home-wide repair without separate approval:
No installed gate blocked it.
codex-gate-check.shis scoped to one command shape only (the cross-model-review gate); nothing in the harness examines other Bash commands. The attempt failed on its own and changed nothing — the two root-owned cache entries kept their ownership.Attribution
Driver behavior, not a package instruction — the evidence does not show the harness told it to do this. The finding is about implied enforcement scope: the README's framing ("hooks enforce SDLC on every interaction") can read as broader safety than the gates provide. Commands can be dangerous, out-of-repo, and privileged while passing every installed check.
The #617 question, not a guard
Per #617's rule — never add a guard without naming the requested behavior it binds to — this issue exists to decide whether that behavior exists at all. The options on the table:
sudowithout an explicit user approval step") and add the narrowest gate that binds to it, orDoing neither leaves the mismatch found in #697 standing.