zoreal-oauth2 for the JVM

Login with ZOREAL for JVM backends: the relying-party half of the flow that @zoreal/oauth2-react starts in the browser.

The browser SDK runs the pairing (QR or app link), and hands your frontend an authorization code plus the code_verifier and nonce it generated. Your frontend posts all three to your backend, and this library does the rest: the code exchange with your client authentication, ES256 verification of the ID token against the provider's JWKS, and the /userinfo read for personal claims.

com.zoreal:oauth2 (this library)   your backend: exchange, verify, userinfo
@zoreal/oauth2-react               your frontend: the button, the QR, the polling

Install

<dependency>
  <groupId>com.zoreal</groupId>
  <artifactId>oauth2</artifactId>
  <version>0.1.2</version>
</dependency>

The version above tracks this commit; the newest is always on the releases page and on Maven Central.

Java 17 or newer. One dependency: com.nimbusds:nimbus-jose-jwt.

Getting your credentials

Everything the builder needs comes from a ZOREAL asset.

1. Create an account at https://zoreal.com and open Assets.
2. Create an asset — a website (a domain you own) or an app bundle (a reverse-DNS bundle id). An asset is the thing users log in to; its token is your client_id and it looks like ast_....
3. On the asset, open the OAuth2 tab and set:
   • the redirect URIs and JavaScript origins your app uses (requests from anything not registered are rejected — this is the core control),
   • the scopes the client is allowed to request (see the catalogue below),
   • your client authentication: generate a client secret (client_secret_basic), or register a JWKS for private_key_jwt. A public client authenticates with PKCE alone and no secret.
4. A website asset must verify its domain (a DNS or meta-tag proof, shown in the dashboard) before it can request personal-data scopes or sign users in; the verified domain is what your users' sub is pairwise against.

The client_id is public (it ships in your frontend). The client secret is not — keep it in your server's secret store, never in the browser.

There is no test-identity sandbox — and that is deliberate

ZOREAL never issues fake or sandbox humans: a pool of test identities would be a fraud vector against the exact thing the product proves. So you always authenticate real ZOREAL IDs.

To develop and test, create a free ZOREAL ID for yourself (enrol in the ZOREAL ID app) and sign in with it. Mark your asset's environment sandbox in the dashboard while building — a sandbox asset may register http://localhost origins and redirect URIs that a production asset may not — and flip it to production when you ship. The identities are real either way; only the allowed origins differ.

Quick start

Build one client at boot and share it; it is immutable and thread-safe.

ZorealOAuth2Client zoreal = ZorealOAuth2Client.builder()
        .clientId(System.getenv("ZOREAL_CLIENT_ID"))                      // ast_...
        .auth(ClientAuth.clientSecretBasic(System.getenv("ZOREAL_CLIENT_SECRET")))
        .issuer(System.getenv().getOrDefault("ZOREAL_ISSUER", "https://id.zoreal.com"))
        .build();

The endpoint your frontend posts to:

Login login = zoreal.authenticate(
        body.code(),
        body.codeVerifier(),   // PKCE is mandatory; the SDK hands it over
        body.nonce());         // binds the ID token to this login

login.sub();            // "TC5X-JN7G-YTSE-6E63" — pairwise, stable for YOUR domain
login.acr();            // "zoreal.live" | "zoreal.device" | "zoreal.session"
login.assurance();      // uniqueness basis, verification month, chip liveness, trust tier
login.email();          // Optional, from /userinfo, when your client has the email scope
login.emailVerified();
login.name();           // Optional, from /userinfo, profile.name scope

Account matching, the shape that works:

User user = users.findByProviderUid("zoreal", login.sub());
if (user == null) {
    if (login.emailVerified()) {
        user = users.findByEmail(login.email().orElse(null));  // claim, don't collide
    }
    if (user == null) {
        user = users.create(login.email().orElse(null));
    }
    user.linkProvider("zoreal", login.sub());
}

Assurance levels — acr, and requiring a liveness check

What acr is

acr is an OpenID Connect standard claim — Authentication Context Class Reference. It is a single string in the ID token that says how strongly this particular login was authenticated. Every ZOREAL login carries one, and it is the difference between "someone who once enrolled this identity is behind this request" and "a live human, verified to be the right one, is behind this request right now".

It answers a question the sub cannot. sub tells you who (a stable, pairwise identifier for this person at your site). acr tells you how sure ZOREAL is that the person is really there for this login. A stolen, unlocked phone can still produce a sub; it cannot produce a fresh zoreal.live.

The three levels

Ordered weakest to strongest. Each is what actually happened, never what was requested — a login that could only reach a weaker level says so honestly rather than claiming the level you asked for.

acr	What the holder did	amr	What it proves	What it does not prove
zoreal.session	Nothing — a returning holder at a site they have used before, resumed silently from an existing ZOREAL session, no phone interaction	[]	Continuity: the same browser/session ZOREAL already knew	That the holder is present, or even awake
zoreal.device	Approved the login on their enrolled phone: a signature from a key in the phone's secure element, released by a local biometric or passcode unlock	["hwk","user"]	Possession of the enrolled device and a local unlock on it	That a live face was captured for this login — an unlocked phone in the wrong hands still signs
zoreal.live	All of the above plus a fresh face capture this login: a flash-plus-zoom video scored for presentation attacks and screen replay (moire), matched 1:1 against the government document read at enrolment	["hwk","face","user"]	A live, real, unique human, verified to be the enrolled person, at the moment of this login	— (this is the strongest level)

amr (Authentication Methods References) is the companion claim listing the factors used: hwk a hardware key, user a user-presence/unlock gesture, face a face biometric. zoreal.live is exactly zoreal.device with face added, because a live login is a device approval with a capture on top. Read it as a List<String> from login.amr().

The default is zoreal.device, never zoreal.session: a login that asks for nothing still requires the enrolled phone and a local unlock. Silence has to be explicitly asked for (prompt=none), and it succeeds only for a returning holder at a site whose consent they have already given.

When to require which

• zoreal.session — you never require this; it is what a returning holder gets for a low-stakes convenience re-auth when they ask for the silent path.
• zoreal.device (the default) — a forum, a community, a normal account login. Possession of the enrolled phone plus a local unlock is a high bar already; most sites want exactly this and should pass no required acr at all (the three-argument authenticate).
• zoreal.live — a bank onboarding, a high-value transaction, an age-gated purchase, a first login, a "confirm it is really you" step before a sensitive action. Anywhere a fresh, unforgeable proof of the live, right human is worth the few seconds a face capture costs.

Requesting versus verifying — the one rule that matters

Requesting a level and verifying it are two separate steps, and only the second is security:

1. Request it on the wire, in the frontend, with the SDK's acr_values: 'zoreal.live'. This is what makes the holder's ZOREAL ID app run the face capture before it will approve. It is advisory — it shapes what the holder is asked to do, nothing more. A browser is attacker-controlled; a value that only travels through it proves nothing.
2. Verify it here, at token exchange, by passing the required-acr argument to authenticate (the fourth parameter). The signed acr claim in the ID token — minted by ZOREAL, not by the browser — is the proof.

Login login = zoreal.authenticate(
        body.code(), body.codeVerifier(), body.nonce(),
        "zoreal.live");   // throws VerificationException unless the signed token says so

login.acr();                            // "zoreal.live" — what actually happened
login.live();                           // convenience: acr().equals("zoreal.live")
login.satisfiesAcr("zoreal.device");    // true (live is stronger than device)

The same fourth argument exists on verifyIdToken(idToken, nonce, requiredAcr) when you verify a token you already hold.

An RP that requests zoreal.live on the wire but never passes the required-acr argument here has checked nothing — it has only asked the holder nicely and then trusted a value it never validated.

How the check behaves

Verification satisfies upward: zoreal.session < zoreal.device < zoreal.live (the ordering the library exposes as ZorealOAuth2Client.ACR_ORDER), so a requirement of zoreal.device accepts a zoreal.live token — the holder gave you more assurance than you demanded. A token whose acr is below the requirement, missing entirely, or outside the vocabulary is refused with VerificationException. An unknown required value — a typo like "zoreal.liveness" — throws ConfigurationException instead, because that is a bug in your code, not a bad token, and failing every login silently is worse than saying so.

If you prefer to branch rather than throw, use the three-argument authenticate and inspect the result with satisfiesAcr:

Login login = zoreal.authenticate(body.code(), body.codeVerifier(), body.nonce());
if (!login.satisfiesAcr("zoreal.live")) {
    // step the user up, or refuse the sensitive action
}

acr versus the assurance block

Do not confuse acr with login.assurance(). acr grades this login event. The assurance block (login.assurance(), a Map of the ZOREAL assurance claims) describes the identity behind it — how the person was verified at enrolment: the uniqueness basis, the verification month, whether chip liveness was proven, the trust tier, and how the device's key is protected. One is about now; the other is about who they are. A high-value flow usually wants both: "zoreal.live" for presence, and the assurance block for the strength of the underlying identity proofing. Its schema is the assurance block section below.

What each call does

Call	What happens
authenticate(code, codeVerifier, nonce)	exchange + verifyIdToken, returns a Login
exchange(code, codeVerifier)	POST {issuer}/token with the configured client authentication
verifyIdToken(jwt, nonce)	ES256 against {issuer}/jwks, checks iss, aud, exp, and nonce when given
userinfo(accessToken)	GET {issuer}/userinfo with the Bearer token
Login#userinfo()	the above, once, memoized; an empty map when there is no access token

Login exposes every claim the scope catalogue can grant: sub(), acr(), amr(), assurance(), ageOver(int), nationality() from the ID token; email(), emailVerified(), name(), givenName(), familyName(), birthdate(), documentType(), documentNumber(), issuingCountry(), documentExpiresOn() and portrait() from /userinfo. Every /userinfo accessor returns an Optional (portrait() is registrable but not served by the provider yet, and stays empty until it is).

Client authentication

Four methods, matching what your client registers as its token_endpoint_auth_method. Pick the one from your asset's OAuth2 tab.

// Public client: PKCE is the only proof, and only Tier A scopes were ever possible.
ClientAuth.none()

// Confidential client, shared secret. The secret travels as HTTP Basic,
// never as a form field.
ClientAuth.clientSecretBasic("zcs_...")

// Confidential client, RFC 7523. The library builds and signs a fresh
// 60-second assertion per exchange (iss = sub = client id, aud =
// {issuer}/token, single-use jti); the key itself never travels. PKCS#8 PEM
// (-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----) or a JWK JSON string; P-256 signs ES256
// (preferred), RSA signs RS256.
ClientAuth.privateKeyJwt(Files.readString(Path.of("zoreal-key.pem")), "my-kid")

// Mutual TLS with the client certificate ZOREAL issued. The SSLContext
// carries the certificate and key; it is installed on the underlying
// java.net.http.HttpClient so the certificate is presented in the handshake.
ClientAuth.tlsClientAuth(sslContext)

tls_client_auth is registrable, but the provider does not accept it at the token endpoint yet: today the exchange answers 501 "tls_client_auth is not implemented at this endpoint yet", and this library surfaces that as the ExchangeException it is rather than pretending otherwise. Use private_key_jwt or client_secret_basic until it lands.

Scopes and claims

Scopes are requested in the frontend (the SDK's scope string, always starting with openid), consented to by the holder, and pre-authorized on your asset. What each grants and where it is delivered:

Scope	Claims	Delivered in	Tier	Requires
openid	sub, iss, aud, exp, iat, nonce, auth_time, acr, amr, and the assurance block	ID token	A	any client
zoreal.age	age_over_13/16/18/21/65 booleans — only the thresholds you registered, never an age or birthdate	ID token	A	any client
zoreal.nationality	nationality (ISO 3166-1 alpha-3)	ID token	A	any client
email	email, email_verified	/userinfo	B	confidential client + verified domain
profile.name	name, given_name, family_name	/userinfo	B	confidential client + verified domain
profile.birthdate	birthdate (full ISO 8601 date)	/userinfo	B	confidential client + verified domain
profile.document	document_type, document_number, issuing_country, document_expires_on	/userinfo	B	confidential client + verified domain
profile.portrait	portrait (the chip's facial image; GDPR Article 9 data)	/userinfo	C	confidential client + verified domain — registrable but not served yet

• Tier A rides in the ID token and is available to every client, so the no-backend browser button can use it. Tier B and C are personal data, served only from /userinfo to a confidential client on a domain you have verified, and never placed in a browser token.
• Age thresholds are a fixed set — 13, 16, 18, 21, 65 — that you register on the asset. login.ageOver(n) returns an empty Optional for a threshold you did not register (no claim was minted), which is different from Optional.of(false).

Error reference

exchange / authenticate throw ExchangeException, which carries the provider's own error code (getOauthError()) and reason (getDescription()) verbatim, plus the HTTP status (getStatus(), or 0 when the endpoint could not be reached). What you will actually see:

getOauthError()	Cause	Retryable?
invalid_grant	The code is spent — unknown, expired (60s), already used, PKCE mismatch, or the asset's domain verification lapsed mid-flow	No. Start a new login; the code cannot be reused
invalid_request	Client authentication failed — wrong secret, a bad private_key_jwt assertion, or tls_client_auth (not accepted at /token yet)	No. Fix your client configuration
unsupported_grant_type	Something other than authorization_code reached /token	No. A bug

Errors that surface in the frontend instead, before your backend is involved (from the SDK's onError / onNonOAuthError), so handle them there:

Where	Code	Meaning
/pair	invalid_scope	A scope not on the asset's allowed list, or a Tier B scope from a public client
/pair	invalid_request	Missing PKCE/nonce, an unverified sector, an unregistered redirect_uri, or an unknown acr_values
/pair	login_required	prompt=none with no silent session to resume — the expected quiet outcome, not a failure
pairing	request_denied	The holder declined in their ZOREAL ID app — not an error to alarm on; offer to try again
pairing	request_expired	The pairing window elapsed, or a required liveness the device could not meet — offer to try again

The library's own exceptions — all unchecked, all extending ZorealOAuth2Exception, and none of them ever containing a token value:

Exception	What it means
ConfigurationException	You built the client wrong (a blank client id or issuer, unparseable private_key_jwt material), or asked to verify an acr outside the vocabulary — a bug in your code, not a bad token
ExchangeException	The provider refused the code exchange; carries getOauthError(), getDescription() and getStatus() (see the tables above)
VerificationException	The ID token did not verify: signature, a non-ES256 algorithm, iss, aud, exp, nonce, or the acr floor
UserinfoException	The /userinfo call failed. A returning user matched on sub can survive a caught UserinfoException; a signup that needs the email cannot

The assurance block

login.assurance() is the ID token's zoreal claim — a Map describing the strength of the identity behind this login (distinct from acr, which grades the login event). Its keys and their value sets:

Key	Values	Meaning
uniqueness	personal_number | document | none	The anchor the holder is deduplicated on. personal_number (a national number from the chip) is strongest; none means no reliable anchor
verified_on	"YYYY-MM"	The month the underlying document was verified. Quantised to a month on purpose — a day-precision date is a cross-site correlator
chip_liveness_proven	true | false	Whether the passport chip's active-authentication challenge was proven (a genuine chip, not a clone)
trust_tier	high | standard	high when chip_liveness_proven, else standard
key_protection	secure_enclave | strongbox | tee | software	How the holder's device key is protected. software means no hardware attestation

A high-value flow usually pairs "zoreal.live" (fresh presence) with a check on the assurance block (identity strength) — e.g. requiring "personal_number".equals(login.assurance().get("uniqueness")) and "high".equals(login.assurance().get("trust_tier")).

A complete example

A Spring @RestController, end to end — the shape a real integration takes. The ZorealOAuth2Client is the singleton built at boot and injected here.

// The request body your frontend posts.
public record ZorealLoginRequest(String code, String codeVerifier, String nonce) {}

@RestController
public class SessionController {

    private static final Logger log = LoggerFactory.getLogger(SessionController.class);

    private final ZorealOAuth2Client zoreal;
    private final UserRepository users;

    public SessionController(ZorealOAuth2Client zoreal, UserRepository users) {
        this.zoreal = zoreal;
        this.users = users;
    }

    // Your frontend's ZorealLogin onSuccess posts { code, codeVerifier, nonce }
    // here over your own TLS. Protect this endpoint with your normal CSRF /
    // same-origin controls, exactly as you would any login endpoint — the ZOREAL
    // nonce protects the token, not your route.
    @PostMapping("/auth/zoreal")
    public ResponseEntity<Map<String, Object>> zoreal(
            @RequestBody ZorealLoginRequest body, HttpServletRequest request) {
        try {
            Login login = zoreal.authenticate(
                    body.code(), body.codeVerifier(), body.nonce());
            // For a step-up / high-value login, pass a required acr as the fourth
            // argument: zoreal.authenticate(..., "zoreal.live").

            User user = users.findByProviderUid("zoreal", login.sub());
            if (user == null) {
                // Claim an existing account that owns this verified email rather
                // than colliding on the unique index; otherwise create one.
                if (login.emailVerified()) {
                    user = users.findByEmail(login.email().orElse(null));
                }
                if (user == null) {
                    user = users.create(login.email().orElse(null), login.name().orElse(null));
                }
                user.linkProvider("zoreal", login.sub());
            }

            request.changeSessionId();                          // fixation defence
            request.getSession().setAttribute("userId", user.id());
            return ResponseEntity.ok(Map.of("ok", true));

        } catch (ExchangeException | VerificationException e) {
            // A spent code or a token that did not verify: the login must be restarted.
            log.warn("ZOREAL login failed: {}", e.getMessage());
            return ResponseEntity.status(HttpStatus.UNAUTHORIZED)
                    .body(Map.of("error", "sign_in_failed"));
        } catch (UserinfoException e) {
            // Personal data was unreachable. Fine for a returning user matched on
            // sub; fatal for a signup that needs the email.
            log.warn("ZOREAL userinfo failed: {}", e.getMessage());
            return ResponseEntity.status(HttpStatus.UNAUTHORIZED)
                    .body(Map.of("error", "sign_in_failed"));
        }
    }
}

Things worth knowing before you integrate

• The ID token never carries personal data. sub, timing, acr/amr, the assurance block, and — if registered — age_over_* booleans and nationality. Email, names, birthdate and document fields come only from /userinfo, which is why authenticate alone is not enough for a signup.
• The access token lives 10 minutes. Read /userinfo while handling the login; do not store the token for later.
• sub is pairwise per verified domain. It is the right account key and it is derived from your registered sector: changing your asset's domain rotates every sub you have stored. Plan domain changes as a migration.
• ES256 only. The provider signs with nothing else, and this library refuses other algorithms rather than negotiating.
• Always pass the nonce through, and protect your own endpoint too. The SDK generates the nonce and gives it to your frontend in onSuccess; passing it here lets the library confirm the ID token was minted for this login rather than substituted. Two things it does not do: it is not your endpoint's CSRF token (protect your /auth/zoreal route with your framework's normal CSRF / same-origin defence), and PKCE — not the nonce — is what proves whoever exchanges the code is whoever started the flow.
• Email is a deliberate choice. It is a Tier B scope precisely because a shared email defeats the unlinkability the pairwise sub provides. Request it because you need it, not because the checkbox is familiar.
• profile.portrait is registrable but not served yet. The scope can be granted and Login#portrait() exists, but the provider does not deliver the claim today; the accessor stays empty until it does, and starts returning it with no library change once it lands.
• The issuer must match the token's iss exactly — it is compared, not normalized. Production is https://id.zoreal.com; override issuer(...) only when pointing at a non-production provider you were given.

The ZOREAL OAuth2 library family

Repository	Package	Role
zoreal-oauth2-react	@zoreal/oauth2-react (npm)	React frontend: the button, the QR, the polling
zoreal-oauth2-js	@zoreal/oauth2-js (npm)	Framework-free browser core
zoreal-oauth2-react-native	@zoreal/oauth2-react-native (npm)	React Native frontend
zoreal-oauth2-node	@zoreal/oauth2-node (npm)	Node.js backend
zoreal-oauth2-ruby	zoreal-oauth2 (RubyGems)	Ruby backend
zoreal-oauth2-python	zoreal-oauth2 (PyPI)	Python backend
zoreal-oauth2-php	zoreal/oauth2 (Packagist)	PHP backend
zoreal-oauth2-go	github.com/Bynn-Intelligence/zoreal-oauth2-go	Go backend
zoreal-oauth2-java	com.zoreal:oauth2 (Maven Central)	JVM backend
zoreal-oauth2-dotnet	Zoreal.OAuth2 (NuGet)	.NET backend

License

MIT.