| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| 1.2.x | Yes |
| < 1.2 | No |
Do not open a public issue for security vulnerabilities.
Use GitHub's private security advisory feature. Include:
- A clear description of the vulnerability
- NoteBloom version affected
- Steps to reproduce
- Potential impact
- A proof-of-concept if available
You can expect a response within 5 business days.
- Path traversal or unsafe file writes via Tauri IPC commands
- Privilege escalation through the Rust backend
- Arbitrary code execution triggered by note content
- Tauri capability over-permission (commands exposed beyond what is needed)
- Vulnerabilities in the OS, WebView2, or system WebKit
- Issues that require physical access to the machine
- User-caused data loss (e.g., manually deleting app data)
- Theoretical attacks with no practical path to exploitation
NoteBloom is intentionally local-only:
- No network requests are made at runtime
- No remote fonts, analytics, or telemetry
- No user accounts or credentials
- No external APIs
- CSP is set to
null— the app does not load external resources, so this is acceptable for a local-only app
The attack surface is limited to the Tauri IPC boundary and local file system operations.
If network features are added in a future version, the CSP will be reviewed and tightened before release.