feat(java): detect non-literal container bind-mount source paths built by concatenation (CWE-22) - #186
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Detects docker/podman -v / --volume bind-mount arguments whose source path is assembled from a string concatenation of variables (build parameters, env expansions, metavariable-derived values) rather than a fixed literal. Attacker-influenceable values concatenated into a bind-mount source expose arbitrary host paths read-write inside a container (usually running as root) — e.g. mounting /var/run/docker.sock or secret files. Sanitized mounts (':ro' / ':Z' suffix appended to the concatenation) are excluded.
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