| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| 0.6.x | Yes (current releases; HTTPS broker on official VPS) |
| 0.5.x | Best-effort only — prefer latest 0.6.x |
| 0.4.x | Best-effort only |
| ≤ 0.3.x | No |
Security fixes are published as GitHub releases on Confetti3/SF4-Ember-Netplay.
Do not open public GitHub issues for exploitable security bugs.
Email or DM the maintainer (Katie / Confetti3) with:
- Description and impact
- Steps to reproduce
- Affected version
- Optional: suggested fix
We aim to acknowledge within 7 days and provide a fix or mitigation plan within 30 days for Critical/High issues.
In scope
- SF4 Ember Netplay (
Launcher.exe,Updater.exe,RelayHost.exe, shipped DLLs) - Official room broker and VPS relay operated for the project
- GitHub release packages (
sf4-ember-netplay-*.zip)
Out of scope
- Upstream sf4e on Codeberg (report to upstream)
- Ultra Street Fighter IV / Steam client vulnerabilities
- Cheating in ranked Steam matchmaking (sidecar replaces vanilla online by design)
- Physical access to a user's PC
- DDoS at scale against the public broker
This is an experimental unofficial port for casual friends-only netplay — not production-ready software:
- Official VPS broker uses HTTPS (
https://74-208-200-95.nip.io); custom broker URLs may still be HTTP (requiresSF4E_ALLOW_HTTP_BROKER=1on the client) - Room broker has no room authentication (friends-only codes)
- Room codes are short; active rooms may be listed publicly
- Sidecar.dll hash ensures matching builds between players; it is not anti-cheat or code signing
- Updates trust GitHub releases without separate code signatures
- Windows Defender may flag
Sidecar.dll/Launcher.exeasProgram:Win32/Wacapew.A!ml(heuristic false positive on unsigned game hooks). See docs/guides/WINDOWS_DEFENDER.md.
Use only with people you trust until room auth and signed releases are in place.
A full-stack launcher → VPS security audit was performed against v0.6.5 (2026-07-28). Critical WebView-era client issues (applyUpdate client URLs, unrestricted openUrl, default HTTP broker) are mitigated in the current Qt + HTTPS path. Follow-up hardening on this line closes session post-HELLO ACL gaps, broker queue/health rate limits, update redirect host checks, broker post-DNS SSRF filtering, optional relay-manager token + port allowlists, and dashboard cookie compare / body limits. Residual accepted risks remain as listed above (unsigned updates, room-code join model, plaintext game UDP). Detailed findings are kept private and are not published in this repository.
- Download only from official GitHub Releases
- If Defender quarantines files, verify release SHA256 hashes and follow docs/guides/WINDOWS_DEFENDER.md — do not weaken Defender with exclusions; wait for signed releases
- Keep
Launcher.exe,Sidecar.dll, and Qt runtime files together from the same zip - Do not point the broker URL at untrusted servers
- Close the game before applying in-app updates
We prefer coordinated disclosure. Credit will be given in release notes unless you request anonymity.