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fix(transactions): prevent TTL index from deleting confirmed purchases and donations (#94) - #103

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samjay8:fix/issue-94-ttl-transactions
Aug 17, 2026
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fix(transactions): prevent TTL index from deleting confirmed purchases and donations (#94)#103
zeemscript merged 1 commit into
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samjay8:fix/issue-94-ttl-transactions

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@samjay8

@samjay8 samjay8 commented Aug 17, 2026

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Closes #94

Summary

  • Fixes a data-loss bug: confirmed on-chain purchases and donations were being permanently deleted ~30 minutes after creation by MongoDB's TTL reaper, because the Transaction collection had a blanket TTL index on expiresAt and the schema default stamped a 30-minute expiry on every row regardless of status.
  • Scopes the TTL index to status: "pending" via partialFilterExpression, makes the expiresAt default conditional on status, and adds a pre("save") schema hook that clears expiresAt for any terminal state — so reaping is structurally impossible for non-pending rows even if a future code path forgets.
  • Adds an idempotent backfill migration that rescues existing non-pending rows and rebuilds the index, plus docs/transaction-lifecycle.md documenting the status → expiresAt invariant.

Root cause

src/models/Transaction.js declared:

expiresAt: { type: Date, default: () => new Date(Date.now() + 30 * 60 * 1000) } // every row
transactionSchema.index({ expiresAt: 1 }, { expireAfterSeconds: 0 })            // blanket TTL

expiresAt defaults to now + 30 minutes and was never cleared when a transaction was confirmed. The intent was to garbage-collect abandoned pending checkouts, but the index made no distinction by status, so:

  • Confirmed purchases/donations were reaped ~30 minutes after creation — the row proving the buyer paid and the educator earned silently vanished.
  • Earnings linkage was orphaned, not deleted. recordSaleEarnings (src/services/payoutService.js) credits EducatorBalance and writes a LedgerEntry whose txRef is stellarTxHash || _id. When the source Transaction was TTL-reaped, the balance and ledger entry survived but pointed at a row that no longer exists — leaving unauditable, unreconcilable earnings and no proof-of-purchase for buyer access.
  • Worker-created confirmed rows were born doomed. createConfirmedDonation / createConfirmedPurchase (reconciliation service) built status: "confirmed" records without overriding expiresAt, so the schema default gave an already-confirmed record a 30-minute lifespan.

Changes

1. Partial TTL index (structural guarantee)

src/models/Transaction.js — the blanket index is now:

transactionSchema.index(
  { expiresAt: 1 },
  { expireAfterSeconds: 0, partialFilterExpression: { status: "pending" } }
);

MongoDB's TTL monitor only considers documents matching the partial filter, so a non-pending document is never a deletion candidate — even if it somehow still carries an expiresAt.

2. Conditional schema default

The expiresAt default only produces a timestamp when the status is pending (or unset at creation):

default: function () {
  return this.status === "pending" || !this.status
    ? new Date(Date.now() + 30 * 60 * 1000)
    : undefined;
}

Records created directly in a terminal state — e.g. worker-created confirmed donations/purchases — are never born with an expiry.

3. Pre-save hook (runtime defense in depth)

A pre("save") middleware clears expiresAt whenever a document is saved in a terminal status (confirmed, failed, expired, refunded, disputed). Even if a controller forgets to unset it explicitly, the model enforces the invariant — this is the key hardening added on top of the explicit $unsets.

4. Explicit $unset/expiresAt = undefined on every terminal transition

  • src/controllers/stellar/paymentController.jssubmitPayment: validation failure, Stellar error, verification failure, and confirmation paths; cancelTransaction: $set status to expired + $unset: { expiresAt: 1 }.
  • src/controllers/stellar/donationController.jssubmitDonation: same four terminal paths.
  • src/controllers/stellar/refundController.jssubmitRefund (→ refunded) and escalateDispute (→ disputed) via findByIdAndUpdate with $unset: { expiresAt: 1 }.
  • src/services/stellar/reconciliationService.jspromoteTransaction clears before save; createConfirmedDonation / createConfirmedPurchase explicitly pass expiresAt: undefined (belt-and-braces alongside the conditional default).
  • src/jobs/handlers.jsverifyPaymentOnChain clears on both the failed and confirmed paths.

5. Idempotent backfill migration

src/migrations/fixTtlTransactionExpiry.js (run via node src/migrations/fixTtlTransactionExpiry.js):

  1. $unsets expiresAt on every existing non-pending transaction so already-confirmed records that still carry an expiry are rescued before the next TTL sweep.
  2. Drops the blanket { expiresAt: 1 } TTL index (if present without the partial filter) and recreates it as the pending-scoped partial index. A schema .index() edit does not alter an already-built index, so this must be explicit.
  3. Idempotent: a second run touches no documents and the createIndex is a no-op.

6. Lifecycle documentation

docs/transaction-lifecycle.md — documents the invariant, the status → expiresAt mapping table, the three defense-in-depth layers, and migration instructions, so the guarantee is discoverable.

Testing

  • New test/ttlTransactionExpiry.test.js (MongoMemoryServer, mirrors test/reconciliation.test.js conventions) — 9 tests:
    • pending transactions get a 30-minute default expiry
    • direct creation in any terminal state (confirmed, failed, expired, refunded, disputed) produces no expiresAt
    • transient submitted/retrying states keep their expiry
    • the pre-save hook clears a stale/past expiresAt on transition to a terminal status (simulating a code path that forgets)
    • the migration unsets expiresAt on legacy non-pending rows (inserted directly to bypass hooks), keeps pending rows, and is idempotent (second run modifies 0)
    • the migration replaces a simulated blanket TTL index with the pending-scoped partial index, leaving exactly one expiresAt index
    • the index spec carries partialFilterExpression: { status: "pending" } and expireAfterSeconds: 0
    • a confirmed row survives past its original expiresAt (survival check asserts expiresAt unset + index scoping rather than triggering real TTL deletion)
  • Existing suites updated with confirm-path assertions:
    • test/reconciliation.test.js — asserts promoteTransaction (reconciliation path) leaves expiresAt undefined
    • test/stellarPaymentController.test.js — asserts the submitPayment confirm path leaves expiresAt undefined
  • Full suite: npm test33 suites, 323 tests passed (CI-green; the CI boot check also runs node --check on all sources and hits /health).

Related PR

This issue already has an implementation from ghzhost in #97. This PR is an independent take on the same fix, reviewed against the same acceptance criteria, that adds schema-level enforcement (pre-save hook) and explicit worker-created-row handling on top of the explicit $unsets, with the migration and tests built to match. Please compare the two and link them so the assignee's work is credited alongside — happy to fold in anything from #97 that reviewers prefer.

Checklist

  • Confirmed transaction survives past its original expiresAt (asserted via unset + index scoping; no fake-timer real-TTL trigger)
  • Confirming via both the submit path and the reconciliation path leaves expiresAt unset
  • Worker-created confirmed donations and purchases are created without an expiresAt
  • TTL index is partial on status: "pending"; test asserts the index spec
  • Backfill migration clears expiresAt on existing non-pending rows and is idempotent
  • Migration dropIndexes the blanket {expiresAt:1} index and createIndexes the partial one in the same run
  • CI stays green (33 suites / 323 tests passed; boot check)

…s and donations

The Transaction collection used a blanket TTL index on expiresAt with a
schema default that stamped a 30-minute expiry on every row regardless of
status. Because confirm paths never cleared expiresAt, confirmed on-chain
purchases and donations were permanently reaped ~30 minutes after creation,
deleting the proof of payment and orphaning recorded earnings.

Scope the TTL index to status: "pending" via partialFilterExpression, make
the expiresAt default conditional on status, add a pre-save hook that clears
expiresAt for any terminal state, explicitly unset expiresAt on every
terminal transition (submit, donation, refund, dispute, cancel, job handler,
reconciliation promotion), and add an idempotent migration that rescues
legacy non-pending rows and rebuilds the index.

Closes Deen-Bridge#94
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@zeemscript
zeemscript merged commit 11c2915 into Deen-Bridge:dev Aug 17, 2026
3 checks passed
zeemscript added a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 24, 2026
* stellar: validate signed XDR contents before submit; store expectedHa… (#51)

* stellar: validate signed XDR contents before submit; store expectedHash/memo; verify on-chain before granting access; add tests

* test: add validateSignedPaymentXdr to stellarService mock (new import in paymentController)

* test: expect expectedHash at payment init (XDR pre-validation stores it there)

---------

Co-authored-by: zeemscript <150973162+zeemscript@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(stellar): publish Soroban giving-escrow contract id in stellar.toml

Adds env-driven GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT (custom, non-SEP-1) so the deployed
On-Chain Giving escrow is discoverable from /.well-known/stellar.toml. Set
GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT_ID to enable. Includes test coverage.

* fix(stellar): resolve Horizon endpoints lazily + network-aware default

Horizon client was constructed at import time with a hardcoded testnet
fallback, so a mainnet deploy with HORIZON_URLS unset would silently talk to
testnet Horizon. Now the default is derived from STELLAR_NETWORK and the client
is built lazily on first use (after env is loaded). Explicit HORIZON_URLS still wins.

* feat(auth): authenticated change-password endpoint

PUT /api/auth/change-password (protected): verifies current password,
enforces the password policy, updates the hash, and signs out all other
sessions. Adds the auth.password_change audit action.

* feat(auth): harden authentication against login lockout, breached passwords, and signup abuse (#89) (#99)

* feat(auth): harden authentication against login lockout, breached passwords, and signup abuse (#89)

- Add progressive per-account login lockout (failedLoginAttempts + lockUntil) with env-configurable escalating backoff, generic 429 while locked, and AUTH_ACCOUNT_LOCKED audit emission.
- Add HaveIBeenPwned breached-password check (SHA-1 prefix k-anonymity, never transmits the password) at register and password reset; fails open on outage.
- Add per-email throttling on /register and /resend-verification (emailAuthLimiter, survives IP rotation, active in test env) plus a pluggable captcha gate (no-op when unconfigured).
- Add User lockout fields and document new env vars in .env.example.

* fix(auth): address CodeRabbit review on login lockout, HIBP, captcha, and JWT secret (#89)

- loginUser: locked accounts now return the same generic 401 'Invalid credentials'
  as a nonexistent account (no enumeration); failed-login counter incremented
  atomically via findByIdAndUpdate \, lock persisted via updateOne
- resetPassword: breached-password check moved to after successful OTP validation
  so unauthenticated callers cannot trigger HIBP lookups
- authController: refuse to start when JWT_SECRET is missing (no hardcoded fallback)
- hibp: request HIBP padding ('Add-Padding: true') and ignore zero-count records
- captcha: configurable CAPTCHA_TIMEOUT_MS (default 5s) passed to the provider call;
  captcha rejection now returns the standard { success, message, data: null } shape
- tests: assert escalating backoff magnitude (120s on 6th failure) and the 24h cap;
  locked-account test expects 401; per-email limiter buckets reset between tests;
  outage test routed through mockHibp so the shared spy is cleaned up; added
  padding-record and cap coverage

* Feat/93 idempotency keys (#100)

* feat(stellar): publish Soroban giving-escrow contract id in stellar.toml

Adds env-driven GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT (custom, non-SEP-1) so the deployed
On-Chain Giving escrow is discoverable from /.well-known/stellar.toml. Set
GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT_ID to enable. Includes test coverage.

* fix(stellar): resolve Horizon endpoints lazily + network-aware default

Horizon client was constructed at import time with a hardcoded testnet
fallback, so a mainnet deploy with HORIZON_URLS unset would silently talk to
testnet Horizon. Now the default is derived from STELLAR_NETWORK and the client
is built lazily on first use (after env is loaded). Explicit HORIZON_URLS still wins.

* feat(auth): authenticated change-password endpoint

PUT /api/auth/change-password (protected): verifies current password,
enforces the password policy, updates the hash, and signs out all other
sessions. Adds the auth.password_change audit action.

* feat(payment): add request-level idempotency keys to payment endpoints (#93)

* test: complement stellarService mock exports in idempotency test

* test: refine idempotency middleware concurrency lock test (#93)

* fix(stellar): export validateSignedPaymentXdr and complement test mock (#93)

* fix(stellar): remove duplicate validateSignedPaymentXdr export (#93)

---------

Co-authored-by: zeemscript <150973162+zeemscript@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(auth): enforce resource ownership across mutating endpoints (#88) (#105)

Add a centralized authorization layer that verifies the authenticated
user owns the target resource (or is an admin) before any mutating
handler runs, replacing the ad-hoc inline checks scattered across
controllers.

- add authorizeOwnership + authorizeReviewOwnership middleware
  (src/middlewares/authorize.js); on success the loaded doc is attached
  to req so handlers can reuse it
- apply the guards to book delete, course update, space update/delete,
  and review update/delete on books and courses; review create stays
  purchase-gated
- record ownership denials to the audit log (authz.ownership.denied)
- remove the now-redundant inline ownership checks from the book,
  course, space, and review controllers
- document the resource x action x role matrix (docs/authorization-matrix.md)
  and cover it with an integration test suite (test/ownershipAuthz.test.js)

Closes #88

Co-authored-by: BountySpaghetti <286941608+BountySpaghetti@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(security): stop logging OTP codes and verification tokens in email bodies (#104)

The NODE_ENV === "test" branch of sendMail logged the full rendered email
body — including the password-reset OTP span and the verification link's
token query param — and pino's redact config cannot censor values baked
into interpolated strings, so the leak bypassed the app-wide redaction.

Remove the body from every log statement (log only recipient, subject, and
template id via structured fields), and give tests a sanctioned in-memory
outbox hook instead of log scraping. sendOtpEmail/sendVerificationEmail/
sendReceiptEmail now return the sendMail result so callers can capture it.

Closes #95

* fix(transactions): prevent TTL index from deleting confirmed purchases and donations (#103)

The Transaction collection used a blanket TTL index on expiresAt with a
schema default that stamped a 30-minute expiry on every row regardless of
status. Because confirm paths never cleared expiresAt, confirmed on-chain
purchases and donations were permanently reaped ~30 minutes after creation,
deleting the proof of payment and orphaning recorded earnings.

Scope the TTL index to status: "pending" via partialFilterExpression, make
the expiresAt default conditional on status, add a pre-save hook that clears
expiresAt for any terminal state, explicitly unset expiresAt on every
terminal transition (submit, donation, refund, dispute, cancel, job handler,
reconciliation promotion), and add an idempotent migration that rescues
legacy non-pending rows and rebuilds the index.

Closes #94

* feat(security): implement educator verification pipeline and content-creation gating (#92) (#102)

* feat(security): implement educator verification pipeline and content-creation gating (#92)

- Add EducatorVerification model with legal state-machine transitions
  (draft -> pending -> approved/rejected, resubmit from rejected)
- Add verifiedEducator durable flag on User, set atomically on approval
- Add AUDIT_ACTIONS: EDUCATOR_VERIFY_SUBMIT/_RESUBMIT/_APPROVE/_REJECT
  with metadata allowlist entries in auditService
- requireVerifiedEducator middleware (403 for unverified, admin bypass)
- Applicant API: submit/resubmit app, get own app, signed doc URLs,
  signed Cloudinary upload-signature for private credential uploads
- Admin review queue: list+filter pending, view signed docs,
  approve/reject with notes (Mongo transaction for verifiedEducator grant)
- Gate all content-creation routes:
  * POST /api/courses  (courseRoutes.js)
  * POST /api/books    (bookRoutes.js)
  * POST /api/spaces   (spaceRoutes.js — live sessions per issue)
- Wire routes: /api/educator-verification + /api/admin/educator-verification
- Comprehensive test suite in test/educatorVerification.test.js
  (state-machine, middleware gating, submit/resubmit, approve/reject,
  content 403/2xx, both full lifecycles submit->pending->approve and
  reject->resubmit->approve, signed URL security, admin-only gating,
  audit log instrumentation)

Verification Results:
  app.test.js: 22/22 PASS (CI boot + endpoint health)
  auditLog.test.js: 21/21 PASS (append-only, redaction, admin gate)

Closes #92

* fix(ci): resolve educator verification pipeline test failures

- Remove redundant catchAsync double-wrap in educator-verification routes
  (controllers are already pre-wrapped; the outer wrap called .catch() on
  undefined, returning 500 for every new endpoint)
- Use MongoMemoryReplSet in educatorVerification.test.js so the approve/reject
  MongoDB transaction can run (standalone MongoMemoryServer cannot)
- Use AuditLog.collection.deleteMany in test cleanup to bypass append-only
  pre-hooks
- Return recordAudit's promise so callers can await durability; await it in
  submitApplication and performReview to eliminate the fire-and-forget
  audit-race in tests
- Fix testAuth.js password overwrite: destructure password out of the
  override spread so the hashed value is not clobbered by plaintext
- Seed bookUpload test user as a verifiedEducator mentor so the new content
  gate lets it through

---------

Co-authored-by: abimbolaalabi <abimbolaalabi@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(auth): signed service-to-service authentication for the AI service (#91) (#106)

Give the backend a real machine-to-machine auth channel for the AI
service (dnb-ai) — signed, scoped, rotatable keys instead of a single
static shared secret.

- add requireServiceAuth middleware (src/middlewares/serviceAuth.js):
  HMAC-SHA256 over a canonical method/path/timestamp/body-digest string,
  a ±300s replay window, constant-time signature comparison, per-key
  scope enforcement, and req.service on success
- key store (src/config/serviceKeys.js): multiple active keys keyed by
  kid for zero-downtime rotation; resilient env parsing, never throws
- mount a real internal route GET /api/internal/ai/whoami guarded by the
  guard (scope ai:read-content), plus raw-body capture in app.js
- migrate /admin/jobs off raw !== to a length-guarded timingSafeEqual
- audit denials (service_auth.denied), require AI_SERVICE_KEYS in prod
  (fail-fast), document the signing contract + rotation runbook
- cover the full accept/reject matrix in test/serviceAuth.test.js

Closes #91

Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <304024794+Lspnjr1@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(webhooks): signed outbound webhook event system (#45) (#107)

Add an outbound webhook/event system so external consumers can subscribe
to payment and enrollment lifecycle events over HMAC-signed HTTP
callbacks, with retries, dead-lettering, and redelivery.

- models: WebhookEndpoint (encrypted secret at rest, subscribed events,
  auto-disable counters) and WebhookDelivery (all scheduling state in the
  doc: status, attemptCount, nextAttemptAt indexed)
- webhookService.emitEvent: typed event catalog, per-event id for
  consumer idempotency, strict payload allowlist (no secrets/emails/user
  docs); persists a delivery per subscribed endpoint after the txn
  commits, never blocks or fails the request path, no-ops when the DB is
  unavailable
- signing: X-DeenBridge-Signature v1=hmac-sha256(secret, `${ts}.${body}`)
  over the exact sent bytes; timing-safe verify + 5-min staleness window
- deliveryWorker: atomic findOneAndUpdate claim (no double-send),
  exponential backoff + jitter, dead-letter after max attempts, endpoint
  auto-disable after sustained failures
- management API (/api/webhooks, admin-gated): endpoint CRUD, rotate
  secret, list deliveries, redeliver (atomic $set), and ping
- SSRF guard: https-only in prod, reject loopback/RFC-1918/link-local
- wire emitters into payment (initialized/confirmed/failed/expired),
  enrollment, and wallet connect/disconnect; migrate /admin/jobs to a
  timing-safe token compare
- docs/webhooks.md consumer verifier + full offline test suite

Closes #45

Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <304024794+Lspnjr1@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(security): implement TOTP two-factor authentication for admins a… (#98)

* feat(stellar): publish Soroban giving-escrow contract id in stellar.toml

Adds env-driven GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT (custom, non-SEP-1) so the deployed
On-Chain Giving escrow is discoverable from /.well-known/stellar.toml. Set
GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT_ID to enable. Includes test coverage.

* fix(stellar): resolve Horizon endpoints lazily + network-aware default

Horizon client was constructed at import time with a hardcoded testnet
fallback, so a mainnet deploy with HORIZON_URLS unset would silently talk to
testnet Horizon. Now the default is derived from STELLAR_NETWORK and the client
is built lazily on first use (after env is loaded). Explicit HORIZON_URLS still wins.

* feat(auth): authenticated change-password endpoint

PUT /api/auth/change-password (protected): verifies current password,
enforces the password policy, updates the hash, and signs out all other
sessions. Adds the auth.password_change audit action.

* feat(security): implement TOTP two-factor authentication for admins and mentors

- Add TOTP (RFC 6238) lifecycle: secret generation, encrypted storage at rest (AES-256-GCM), otpauth:// URI and QR code generation
- Add 10 single-use bcrypt-hashed recovery codes
- Add two-factor rate-limiting middleware (5 verification attempts per 15-minute window)
- Update login controller to issue step-up mfaToken challenges when 2FA is enabled
- Update authorizeRoles('admin') middleware to enforce 2FA-enabled status and 2FA-verified sessions
- Log audit actions for all 2FA lifecycle events (setup, enable, login challenge, success, failure, disable, recovery code usage)
- Add comprehensive test suite in test/auth2FA.test.js and update existing auth test suites

* ci: update node version to 22 and sync package-lock.json

* ci: pin mongo service to 6.0 and add wait-for-mongodb step

* test: add 2FA enablement and 2FA verified token to admin in refund.test.js

* fix(auth): switch bcrypt imports to pure-JS bcryptjs for cross-platform compatibility

* fix(test): remove duplicate MongoMemoryServer import in refund.test.js

* fix(test): add errorHandler middleware to refund.test.js app

* fix(test): clean up MongoDB connection logic and add afterAll hook in refund.test.js

* fix(test): standardize Mongoose connection lifecycle and add missing afterAll hooks

* fix(test): remove duplicate afterAll hooks and handle Multer 413 response status

* test(refund): explicitly set 2FA enablement and 2FA verified tokens for admin in refund.test.js

* test: ensure admin test helpers include 2FA enablement and 2FA verified JWT claims

* fix(test): add 2FA enablement and 2FA verified tokens for admin in webhooks and educatorVerification tests

---------

Co-authored-by: zeemscript <150973162+zeemscript@users.noreply.github.com>

* Add scholarship escrow contract foundation (#108)

* Improve application test coverage (#110)

* Add dependency health checks (#112)

* Validate auth and Stellar requests (#109)

* Validate auth and Stellar requests

* Address validation review feedback

* Secure book deletion authorization (#113)

* Secure book deletion

* Keep delete response consistent

* feat(stellar): gift courses/books via claimable balances with expiry reclaim (#116)

Adds a gift-a-course/book flow built on Stellar claimable balances so a
buyer can send an item to another user — including one who has not
finished wallet onboarding — without the recipient needing a USDC
trustline. The sender creates an on-ledger USDC balance the recipient
claims when ready, with a sender reclaim-after-expiry predicate so funds
are never stranded. Includes a GiftClaim model (no document-deleting TTL,
so the record survives expiry for reclaim), a claimableBalanceService
(build create/claim transactions with complementary predicates, resolve
the REAL balance id from the create result XDR — not the tx hash — with
a Horizon forClaimant fallback, and validate the signed gift XDR before
any state change), gift routes/controller at /api/stellar/gifts, and
granting item access to the RECIPIENT (never the payer) on claim. Wires
a `{ fallback: "claimable_balance" }` response into the purchase flow
when a creator wallet/trustline is missing. Tests cover predicate
decoding, trustline-free single-signature claiming, claim authorization
before/after expiry, the balance-id-vs-tx-hash distinction, tampered-XDR
rejection, guards mirroring initializePayment, and the recipient access
grant.

* feat(stellar): add idempotency protection to the Stellar payment endpoints (#115)

Makes /api/stellar/payment/initialize and /submit safe against
double-clicks, client retries, and concurrent duplicates. Submit is
naturally idempotent per transaction hash: the deterministic hash of
the signed XDR is looked up against confirmed transactions before any
processing, so a replayed submission returns the original success
response without re-granting access, with the unique index on
stellarTxHash as the database-level backstop (an E11000 on the confirm
save is treated as already processed). Initialize no longer piles up
duplicates: a pending checkout for the same user+item returns the
existing record (with its persisted unsigned XDR) instead of creating
a new document, and stale pending records are reaped by the existing
pending-only TTL index. Adds a stricter per-user rate limiter
(paymentLimiter) on the payment routes, keyed on the authenticated
user id with an IPv6-aware IP fallback. Covers duplicate-submit,
duplicate-initialize, the E11000 race, and limiter enforcement with
tests.

* feat(stellar): validate Stellar config at startup and document the mainnet switch (#114)

Adds a single source of truth for the Stellar network configuration
(src/config/stellar.js) that resolves the network name, network
passphrase, Horizon URLs, and USDC issuer from STELLAR_NETWORK, and
validates the whole setup fail-fast at boot so a misconfigured
deployment (bad network value, mainnet flag with testnet Horizon or
issuer) fails with an error naming the exact problem instead of at
request time. stellarService.js and horizonClient.js now consume this
module. Adds docs/MAINNET.md covering the env changes, creator
trustlines, and a first-mainnet-transaction smoke checklist, plus unit
tests for resolution and validation across both networks.

* feat(stellar): fee-bump sponsorship with structural whitelist and spend caps (#111)

Let the platform pay a user's Stellar network fee by wrapping the user-signed
transaction in a fee-bump signed by a dedicated fee-source account, so a user
holding USDC but ~no XLM can buy a book, buy a course, or donate. Opt-in per
submit via `requestSponsorship: true`; off by default and byte-for-byte
identical when disabled.

Guard rails (server signs on the platform's behalf):
- Structural whitelist (reject-by-default, allow-list of `payment` ops only):
  source, exact op count/order, destinations, amounts (stroops), asset, and
  memo must match the pending Transaction row exactly. Any foreign/extra
  operation — including unknown future types — is rejected.
- Durable spend caps (SponsorshipSpend, keyed by UTC day): per-transaction fee
  ceiling, per-day total, and per-user per-day count.
- Sponsor float pre-check so an underfunded sponsor never marks the user's
  transaction failed.

Fee-bump fee is priced over inner ops + wrapper and clamped to the ceiling
(verified against @stellar/stellar-sdk v16 and asserted in tests). Sponsored
rows record `sponsored`, `sponsorFeeCharged`, and the fee-bump (outer) hash
alongside the inner hash. Sponsorship-specific failures return a distinct
non-fatal 4xx/503 with `retryUnsponsored: true` and never mark the row failed.

- Config: FEE_SPONSOR_* in .env.example + validateEnv (fail-fast at boot when
  enabled with a missing/invalid secret); secret never logged or returned.
- Admin status endpoint GET /api/stellar/payment/sponsorship/status exposes the
  sponsor public key, live float, caps, and today's spend.
- Prometheus counters for approved/rejected sponsorship decisions.
- Docs: docs/fee-sponsorship.md, README, and openapi.yaml.
- Tests: feeSponsorService (whitelist adversarial matrix, fee correctness,
  inner-untouched, caps, secret handling, boot config) and feeSponsorSubmit
  (payment + donation flag-off regression, flag-on sponsorship, cap/whitelist
  rejections that don't fail the row).

Closes #30

* feat: add managed course categories (#118)

* feat(courses): add managed category taxonomy

* fix(categories): preserve legacy course creation

* feat: add recurring sadaqah pledges (#119)

* feat(donations): add recurring sadaqah pledges

* fix(pledges): preserve donation test compatibility

* fix(pledges): ignore non-persisted transactions

---------

Co-authored-by: Afeez Tomisin <132703022+Banx17@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Alabi Ibrahim Abimbola <139625252+abimbolaalabi@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Kelechukwu Izuaba <144479895+Kaycee276@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: BountySpaghetti <zeemroyals@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: BountySpaghetti <286941608+BountySpaghetti@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Samuel Ojetunde <samuelojetunde898@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: abimbolaalabi <abimbolaalabi@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <shittulukmanbabatunde@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <304024794+Lspnjr1@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Alhassan Nuhu Idris <alhassannuhu0@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Mantissa <negativemantissa@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Ezekiel Akawa <akawaezekiel4@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Mfon <67503972+TS-mfon@users.noreply.github.com>
zeemscript added a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 24, 2026
* Merge dev into main (#117)

* stellar: validate signed XDR contents before submit; store expectedHa… (#51)

* stellar: validate signed XDR contents before submit; store expectedHash/memo; verify on-chain before granting access; add tests

* test: add validateSignedPaymentXdr to stellarService mock (new import in paymentController)

* test: expect expectedHash at payment init (XDR pre-validation stores it there)

---------

Co-authored-by: zeemscript <150973162+zeemscript@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(stellar): publish Soroban giving-escrow contract id in stellar.toml

Adds env-driven GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT (custom, non-SEP-1) so the deployed
On-Chain Giving escrow is discoverable from /.well-known/stellar.toml. Set
GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT_ID to enable. Includes test coverage.

* fix(stellar): resolve Horizon endpoints lazily + network-aware default

Horizon client was constructed at import time with a hardcoded testnet
fallback, so a mainnet deploy with HORIZON_URLS unset would silently talk to
testnet Horizon. Now the default is derived from STELLAR_NETWORK and the client
is built lazily on first use (after env is loaded). Explicit HORIZON_URLS still wins.

* feat(auth): authenticated change-password endpoint

PUT /api/auth/change-password (protected): verifies current password,
enforces the password policy, updates the hash, and signs out all other
sessions. Adds the auth.password_change audit action.

* feat(auth): harden authentication against login lockout, breached passwords, and signup abuse (#89) (#99)

* feat(auth): harden authentication against login lockout, breached passwords, and signup abuse (#89)

- Add progressive per-account login lockout (failedLoginAttempts + lockUntil) with env-configurable escalating backoff, generic 429 while locked, and AUTH_ACCOUNT_LOCKED audit emission.
- Add HaveIBeenPwned breached-password check (SHA-1 prefix k-anonymity, never transmits the password) at register and password reset; fails open on outage.
- Add per-email throttling on /register and /resend-verification (emailAuthLimiter, survives IP rotation, active in test env) plus a pluggable captcha gate (no-op when unconfigured).
- Add User lockout fields and document new env vars in .env.example.

* fix(auth): address CodeRabbit review on login lockout, HIBP, captcha, and JWT secret (#89)

- loginUser: locked accounts now return the same generic 401 'Invalid credentials'
  as a nonexistent account (no enumeration); failed-login counter incremented
  atomically via findByIdAndUpdate \, lock persisted via updateOne
- resetPassword: breached-password check moved to after successful OTP validation
  so unauthenticated callers cannot trigger HIBP lookups
- authController: refuse to start when JWT_SECRET is missing (no hardcoded fallback)
- hibp: request HIBP padding ('Add-Padding: true') and ignore zero-count records
- captcha: configurable CAPTCHA_TIMEOUT_MS (default 5s) passed to the provider call;
  captcha rejection now returns the standard { success, message, data: null } shape
- tests: assert escalating backoff magnitude (120s on 6th failure) and the 24h cap;
  locked-account test expects 401; per-email limiter buckets reset between tests;
  outage test routed through mockHibp so the shared spy is cleaned up; added
  padding-record and cap coverage

* Feat/93 idempotency keys (#100)

* feat(stellar): publish Soroban giving-escrow contract id in stellar.toml

Adds env-driven GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT (custom, non-SEP-1) so the deployed
On-Chain Giving escrow is discoverable from /.well-known/stellar.toml. Set
GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT_ID to enable. Includes test coverage.

* fix(stellar): resolve Horizon endpoints lazily + network-aware default

Horizon client was constructed at import time with a hardcoded testnet
fallback, so a mainnet deploy with HORIZON_URLS unset would silently talk to
testnet Horizon. Now the default is derived from STELLAR_NETWORK and the client
is built lazily on first use (after env is loaded). Explicit HORIZON_URLS still wins.

* feat(auth): authenticated change-password endpoint

PUT /api/auth/change-password (protected): verifies current password,
enforces the password policy, updates the hash, and signs out all other
sessions. Adds the auth.password_change audit action.

* feat(payment): add request-level idempotency keys to payment endpoints (#93)

* test: complement stellarService mock exports in idempotency test

* test: refine idempotency middleware concurrency lock test (#93)

* fix(stellar): export validateSignedPaymentXdr and complement test mock (#93)

* fix(stellar): remove duplicate validateSignedPaymentXdr export (#93)

---------

Co-authored-by: zeemscript <150973162+zeemscript@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(auth): enforce resource ownership across mutating endpoints (#88) (#105)

Add a centralized authorization layer that verifies the authenticated
user owns the target resource (or is an admin) before any mutating
handler runs, replacing the ad-hoc inline checks scattered across
controllers.

- add authorizeOwnership + authorizeReviewOwnership middleware
  (src/middlewares/authorize.js); on success the loaded doc is attached
  to req so handlers can reuse it
- apply the guards to book delete, course update, space update/delete,
  and review update/delete on books and courses; review create stays
  purchase-gated
- record ownership denials to the audit log (authz.ownership.denied)
- remove the now-redundant inline ownership checks from the book,
  course, space, and review controllers
- document the resource x action x role matrix (docs/authorization-matrix.md)
  and cover it with an integration test suite (test/ownershipAuthz.test.js)

Closes #88

Co-authored-by: BountySpaghetti <286941608+BountySpaghetti@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(security): stop logging OTP codes and verification tokens in email bodies (#104)

The NODE_ENV === "test" branch of sendMail logged the full rendered email
body — including the password-reset OTP span and the verification link's
token query param — and pino's redact config cannot censor values baked
into interpolated strings, so the leak bypassed the app-wide redaction.

Remove the body from every log statement (log only recipient, subject, and
template id via structured fields), and give tests a sanctioned in-memory
outbox hook instead of log scraping. sendOtpEmail/sendVerificationEmail/
sendReceiptEmail now return the sendMail result so callers can capture it.

Closes #95

* fix(transactions): prevent TTL index from deleting confirmed purchases and donations (#103)

The Transaction collection used a blanket TTL index on expiresAt with a
schema default that stamped a 30-minute expiry on every row regardless of
status. Because confirm paths never cleared expiresAt, confirmed on-chain
purchases and donations were permanently reaped ~30 minutes after creation,
deleting the proof of payment and orphaning recorded earnings.

Scope the TTL index to status: "pending" via partialFilterExpression, make
the expiresAt default conditional on status, add a pre-save hook that clears
expiresAt for any terminal state, explicitly unset expiresAt on every
terminal transition (submit, donation, refund, dispute, cancel, job handler,
reconciliation promotion), and add an idempotent migration that rescues
legacy non-pending rows and rebuilds the index.

Closes #94

* feat(security): implement educator verification pipeline and content-creation gating (#92) (#102)

* feat(security): implement educator verification pipeline and content-creation gating (#92)

- Add EducatorVerification model with legal state-machine transitions
  (draft -> pending -> approved/rejected, resubmit from rejected)
- Add verifiedEducator durable flag on User, set atomically on approval
- Add AUDIT_ACTIONS: EDUCATOR_VERIFY_SUBMIT/_RESUBMIT/_APPROVE/_REJECT
  with metadata allowlist entries in auditService
- requireVerifiedEducator middleware (403 for unverified, admin bypass)
- Applicant API: submit/resubmit app, get own app, signed doc URLs,
  signed Cloudinary upload-signature for private credential uploads
- Admin review queue: list+filter pending, view signed docs,
  approve/reject with notes (Mongo transaction for verifiedEducator grant)
- Gate all content-creation routes:
  * POST /api/courses  (courseRoutes.js)
  * POST /api/books    (bookRoutes.js)
  * POST /api/spaces   (spaceRoutes.js — live sessions per issue)
- Wire routes: /api/educator-verification + /api/admin/educator-verification
- Comprehensive test suite in test/educatorVerification.test.js
  (state-machine, middleware gating, submit/resubmit, approve/reject,
  content 403/2xx, both full lifecycles submit->pending->approve and
  reject->resubmit->approve, signed URL security, admin-only gating,
  audit log instrumentation)

Verification Results:
  app.test.js: 22/22 PASS (CI boot + endpoint health)
  auditLog.test.js: 21/21 PASS (append-only, redaction, admin gate)

Closes #92

* fix(ci): resolve educator verification pipeline test failures

- Remove redundant catchAsync double-wrap in educator-verification routes
  (controllers are already pre-wrapped; the outer wrap called .catch() on
  undefined, returning 500 for every new endpoint)
- Use MongoMemoryReplSet in educatorVerification.test.js so the approve/reject
  MongoDB transaction can run (standalone MongoMemoryServer cannot)
- Use AuditLog.collection.deleteMany in test cleanup to bypass append-only
  pre-hooks
- Return recordAudit's promise so callers can await durability; await it in
  submitApplication and performReview to eliminate the fire-and-forget
  audit-race in tests
- Fix testAuth.js password overwrite: destructure password out of the
  override spread so the hashed value is not clobbered by plaintext
- Seed bookUpload test user as a verifiedEducator mentor so the new content
  gate lets it through

---------

Co-authored-by: abimbolaalabi <abimbolaalabi@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(auth): signed service-to-service authentication for the AI service (#91) (#106)

Give the backend a real machine-to-machine auth channel for the AI
service (dnb-ai) — signed, scoped, rotatable keys instead of a single
static shared secret.

- add requireServiceAuth middleware (src/middlewares/serviceAuth.js):
  HMAC-SHA256 over a canonical method/path/timestamp/body-digest string,
  a ±300s replay window, constant-time signature comparison, per-key
  scope enforcement, and req.service on success
- key store (src/config/serviceKeys.js): multiple active keys keyed by
  kid for zero-downtime rotation; resilient env parsing, never throws
- mount a real internal route GET /api/internal/ai/whoami guarded by the
  guard (scope ai:read-content), plus raw-body capture in app.js
- migrate /admin/jobs off raw !== to a length-guarded timingSafeEqual
- audit denials (service_auth.denied), require AI_SERVICE_KEYS in prod
  (fail-fast), document the signing contract + rotation runbook
- cover the full accept/reject matrix in test/serviceAuth.test.js

Closes #91

Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <304024794+Lspnjr1@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(webhooks): signed outbound webhook event system (#45) (#107)

Add an outbound webhook/event system so external consumers can subscribe
to payment and enrollment lifecycle events over HMAC-signed HTTP
callbacks, with retries, dead-lettering, and redelivery.

- models: WebhookEndpoint (encrypted secret at rest, subscribed events,
  auto-disable counters) and WebhookDelivery (all scheduling state in the
  doc: status, attemptCount, nextAttemptAt indexed)
- webhookService.emitEvent: typed event catalog, per-event id for
  consumer idempotency, strict payload allowlist (no secrets/emails/user
  docs); persists a delivery per subscribed endpoint after the txn
  commits, never blocks or fails the request path, no-ops when the DB is
  unavailable
- signing: X-DeenBridge-Signature v1=hmac-sha256(secret, `${ts}.${body}`)
  over the exact sent bytes; timing-safe verify + 5-min staleness window
- deliveryWorker: atomic findOneAndUpdate claim (no double-send),
  exponential backoff + jitter, dead-letter after max attempts, endpoint
  auto-disable after sustained failures
- management API (/api/webhooks, admin-gated): endpoint CRUD, rotate
  secret, list deliveries, redeliver (atomic $set), and ping
- SSRF guard: https-only in prod, reject loopback/RFC-1918/link-local
- wire emitters into payment (initialized/confirmed/failed/expired),
  enrollment, and wallet connect/disconnect; migrate /admin/jobs to a
  timing-safe token compare
- docs/webhooks.md consumer verifier + full offline test suite

Closes #45

Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <304024794+Lspnjr1@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(security): implement TOTP two-factor authentication for admins a… (#98)

* feat(stellar): publish Soroban giving-escrow contract id in stellar.toml

Adds env-driven GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT (custom, non-SEP-1) so the deployed
On-Chain Giving escrow is discoverable from /.well-known/stellar.toml. Set
GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT_ID to enable. Includes test coverage.

* fix(stellar): resolve Horizon endpoints lazily + network-aware default

Horizon client was constructed at import time with a hardcoded testnet
fallback, so a mainnet deploy with HORIZON_URLS unset would silently talk to
testnet Horizon. Now the default is derived from STELLAR_NETWORK and the client
is built lazily on first use (after env is loaded). Explicit HORIZON_URLS still wins.

* feat(auth): authenticated change-password endpoint

PUT /api/auth/change-password (protected): verifies current password,
enforces the password policy, updates the hash, and signs out all other
sessions. Adds the auth.password_change audit action.

* feat(security): implement TOTP two-factor authentication for admins and mentors

- Add TOTP (RFC 6238) lifecycle: secret generation, encrypted storage at rest (AES-256-GCM), otpauth:// URI and QR code generation
- Add 10 single-use bcrypt-hashed recovery codes
- Add two-factor rate-limiting middleware (5 verification attempts per 15-minute window)
- Update login controller to issue step-up mfaToken challenges when 2FA is enabled
- Update authorizeRoles('admin') middleware to enforce 2FA-enabled status and 2FA-verified sessions
- Log audit actions for all 2FA lifecycle events (setup, enable, login challenge, success, failure, disable, recovery code usage)
- Add comprehensive test suite in test/auth2FA.test.js and update existing auth test suites

* ci: update node version to 22 and sync package-lock.json

* ci: pin mongo service to 6.0 and add wait-for-mongodb step

* test: add 2FA enablement and 2FA verified token to admin in refund.test.js

* fix(auth): switch bcrypt imports to pure-JS bcryptjs for cross-platform compatibility

* fix(test): remove duplicate MongoMemoryServer import in refund.test.js

* fix(test): add errorHandler middleware to refund.test.js app

* fix(test): clean up MongoDB connection logic and add afterAll hook in refund.test.js

* fix(test): standardize Mongoose connection lifecycle and add missing afterAll hooks

* fix(test): remove duplicate afterAll hooks and handle Multer 413 response status

* test(refund): explicitly set 2FA enablement and 2FA verified tokens for admin in refund.test.js

* test: ensure admin test helpers include 2FA enablement and 2FA verified JWT claims

* fix(test): add 2FA enablement and 2FA verified tokens for admin in webhooks and educatorVerification tests

---------

Co-authored-by: zeemscript <150973162+zeemscript@users.noreply.github.com>

* Add scholarship escrow contract foundation (#108)

* Improve application test coverage (#110)

* Add dependency health checks (#112)

* Validate auth and Stellar requests (#109)

* Validate auth and Stellar requests

* Address validation review feedback

* Secure book deletion authorization (#113)

* Secure book deletion

* Keep delete response consistent

* feat(stellar): gift courses/books via claimable balances with expiry reclaim (#116)

Adds a gift-a-course/book flow built on Stellar claimable balances so a
buyer can send an item to another user — including one who has not
finished wallet onboarding — without the recipient needing a USDC
trustline. The sender creates an on-ledger USDC balance the recipient
claims when ready, with a sender reclaim-after-expiry predicate so funds
are never stranded. Includes a GiftClaim model (no document-deleting TTL,
so the record survives expiry for reclaim), a claimableBalanceService
(build create/claim transactions with complementary predicates, resolve
the REAL balance id from the create result XDR — not the tx hash — with
a Horizon forClaimant fallback, and validate the signed gift XDR before
any state change), gift routes/controller at /api/stellar/gifts, and
granting item access to the RECIPIENT (never the payer) on claim. Wires
a `{ fallback: "claimable_balance" }` response into the purchase flow
when a creator wallet/trustline is missing. Tests cover predicate
decoding, trustline-free single-signature claiming, claim authorization
before/after expiry, the balance-id-vs-tx-hash distinction, tampered-XDR
rejection, guards mirroring initializePayment, and the recipient access
grant.

* feat(stellar): add idempotency protection to the Stellar payment endpoints (#115)

Makes /api/stellar/payment/initialize and /submit safe against
double-clicks, client retries, and concurrent duplicates. Submit is
naturally idempotent per transaction hash: the deterministic hash of
the signed XDR is looked up against confirmed transactions before any
processing, so a replayed submission returns the original success
response without re-granting access, with the unique index on
stellarTxHash as the database-level backstop (an E11000 on the confirm
save is treated as already processed). Initialize no longer piles up
duplicates: a pending checkout for the same user+item returns the
existing record (with its persisted unsigned XDR) instead of creating
a new document, and stale pending records are reaped by the existing
pending-only TTL index. Adds a stricter per-user rate limiter
(paymentLimiter) on the payment routes, keyed on the authenticated
user id with an IPv6-aware IP fallback. Covers duplicate-submit,
duplicate-initialize, the E11000 race, and limiter enforcement with
tests.

* feat(stellar): validate Stellar config at startup and document the mainnet switch (#114)

Adds a single source of truth for the Stellar network configuration
(src/config/stellar.js) that resolves the network name, network
passphrase, Horizon URLs, and USDC issuer from STELLAR_NETWORK, and
validates the whole setup fail-fast at boot so a misconfigured
deployment (bad network value, mainnet flag with testnet Horizon or
issuer) fails with an error naming the exact problem instead of at
request time. stellarService.js and horizonClient.js now consume this
module. Adds docs/MAINNET.md covering the env changes, creator
trustlines, and a first-mainnet-transaction smoke checklist, plus unit
tests for resolution and validation across both networks.

* feat(stellar): fee-bump sponsorship with structural whitelist and spend caps (#111)

Let the platform pay a user's Stellar network fee by wrapping the user-signed
transaction in a fee-bump signed by a dedicated fee-source account, so a user
holding USDC but ~no XLM can buy a book, buy a course, or donate. Opt-in per
submit via `requestSponsorship: true`; off by default and byte-for-byte
identical when disabled.

Guard rails (server signs on the platform's behalf):
- Structural whitelist (reject-by-default, allow-list of `payment` ops only):
  source, exact op count/order, destinations, amounts (stroops), asset, and
  memo must match the pending Transaction row exactly. Any foreign/extra
  operation — including unknown future types — is rejected.
- Durable spend caps (SponsorshipSpend, keyed by UTC day): per-transaction fee
  ceiling, per-day total, and per-user per-day count.
- Sponsor float pre-check so an underfunded sponsor never marks the user's
  transaction failed.

Fee-bump fee is priced over inner ops + wrapper and clamped to the ceiling
(verified against @stellar/stellar-sdk v16 and asserted in tests). Sponsored
rows record `sponsored`, `sponsorFeeCharged`, and the fee-bump (outer) hash
alongside the inner hash. Sponsorship-specific failures return a distinct
non-fatal 4xx/503 with `retryUnsponsored: true` and never mark the row failed.

- Config: FEE_SPONSOR_* in .env.example + validateEnv (fail-fast at boot when
  enabled with a missing/invalid secret); secret never logged or returned.
- Admin status endpoint GET /api/stellar/payment/sponsorship/status exposes the
  sponsor public key, live float, caps, and today's spend.
- Prometheus counters for approved/rejected sponsorship decisions.
- Docs: docs/fee-sponsorship.md, README, and openapi.yaml.
- Tests: feeSponsorService (whitelist adversarial matrix, fee correctness,
  inner-untouched, caps, secret handling, boot config) and feeSponsorSubmit
  (payment + donation flag-off regression, flag-on sponsorship, cap/whitelist
  rejections that don't fail the row).

Closes #30

* feat: add managed course categories (#118)

* feat(courses): add managed category taxonomy

* fix(categories): preserve legacy course creation

* feat: add recurring sadaqah pledges (#119)

* feat(donations): add recurring sadaqah pledges

* fix(pledges): preserve donation test compatibility

* fix(pledges): ignore non-persisted transactions

---------

Co-authored-by: Afeez Tomisin <132703022+Banx17@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Alabi Ibrahim Abimbola <139625252+abimbolaalabi@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Kelechukwu Izuaba <144479895+Kaycee276@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: BountySpaghetti <zeemroyals@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: BountySpaghetti <286941608+BountySpaghetti@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Samuel Ojetunde <samuelojetunde898@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: abimbolaalabi <abimbolaalabi@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <shittulukmanbabatunde@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <304024794+Lspnjr1@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Alhassan Nuhu Idris <alhassannuhu0@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Mantissa <negativemantissa@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Ezekiel Akawa <akawaezekiel4@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Mfon <67503972+TS-mfon@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(api): serve interactive Swagger UI at /api-docs

- src/config/swagger.js loads root openapi.yaml via js-yaml
- src/routes/api-docs.js mounts swagger-ui-express with
  persistAuthorization for testing protected endpoints
- Deen-Bridge branding via embedded custom CSS
- mounted outside rate limiters alongside /.well-known

---------

Co-authored-by: Sakariyah Abdulhazeem <150973162+zeemscript@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Afeez Tomisin <132703022+Banx17@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Alabi Ibrahim Abimbola <139625252+abimbolaalabi@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Kelechukwu Izuaba <144479895+Kaycee276@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: BountySpaghetti <zeemroyals@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: BountySpaghetti <286941608+BountySpaghetti@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Samuel Ojetunde <samuelojetunde898@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: abimbolaalabi <abimbolaalabi@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <shittulukmanbabatunde@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <304024794+Lspnjr1@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Alhassan Nuhu Idris <alhassannuhu0@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Mantissa <negativemantissa@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Ezekiel Akawa <akawaezekiel4@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Mfon <67503972+TS-mfon@users.noreply.github.com>
zeemscript added a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 24, 2026
* stellar: validate signed XDR contents before submit; store expectedHa… (#51)

* stellar: validate signed XDR contents before submit; store expectedHash/memo; verify on-chain before granting access; add tests

* test: add validateSignedPaymentXdr to stellarService mock (new import in paymentController)

* test: expect expectedHash at payment init (XDR pre-validation stores it there)

---------

Co-authored-by: zeemscript <150973162+zeemscript@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(stellar): publish Soroban giving-escrow contract id in stellar.toml

Adds env-driven GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT (custom, non-SEP-1) so the deployed
On-Chain Giving escrow is discoverable from /.well-known/stellar.toml. Set
GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT_ID to enable. Includes test coverage.

* fix(stellar): resolve Horizon endpoints lazily + network-aware default

Horizon client was constructed at import time with a hardcoded testnet
fallback, so a mainnet deploy with HORIZON_URLS unset would silently talk to
testnet Horizon. Now the default is derived from STELLAR_NETWORK and the client
is built lazily on first use (after env is loaded). Explicit HORIZON_URLS still wins.

* feat(auth): authenticated change-password endpoint

PUT /api/auth/change-password (protected): verifies current password,
enforces the password policy, updates the hash, and signs out all other
sessions. Adds the auth.password_change audit action.

* feat(auth): harden authentication against login lockout, breached passwords, and signup abuse (#89) (#99)

* feat(auth): harden authentication against login lockout, breached passwords, and signup abuse (#89)

- Add progressive per-account login lockout (failedLoginAttempts + lockUntil) with env-configurable escalating backoff, generic 429 while locked, and AUTH_ACCOUNT_LOCKED audit emission.
- Add HaveIBeenPwned breached-password check (SHA-1 prefix k-anonymity, never transmits the password) at register and password reset; fails open on outage.
- Add per-email throttling on /register and /resend-verification (emailAuthLimiter, survives IP rotation, active in test env) plus a pluggable captcha gate (no-op when unconfigured).
- Add User lockout fields and document new env vars in .env.example.

* fix(auth): address CodeRabbit review on login lockout, HIBP, captcha, and JWT secret (#89)

- loginUser: locked accounts now return the same generic 401 'Invalid credentials'
  as a nonexistent account (no enumeration); failed-login counter incremented
  atomically via findByIdAndUpdate \, lock persisted via updateOne
- resetPassword: breached-password check moved to after successful OTP validation
  so unauthenticated callers cannot trigger HIBP lookups
- authController: refuse to start when JWT_SECRET is missing (no hardcoded fallback)
- hibp: request HIBP padding ('Add-Padding: true') and ignore zero-count records
- captcha: configurable CAPTCHA_TIMEOUT_MS (default 5s) passed to the provider call;
  captcha rejection now returns the standard { success, message, data: null } shape
- tests: assert escalating backoff magnitude (120s on 6th failure) and the 24h cap;
  locked-account test expects 401; per-email limiter buckets reset between tests;
  outage test routed through mockHibp so the shared spy is cleaned up; added
  padding-record and cap coverage

* Feat/93 idempotency keys (#100)

* feat(stellar): publish Soroban giving-escrow contract id in stellar.toml

Adds env-driven GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT (custom, non-SEP-1) so the deployed
On-Chain Giving escrow is discoverable from /.well-known/stellar.toml. Set
GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT_ID to enable. Includes test coverage.

* fix(stellar): resolve Horizon endpoints lazily + network-aware default

Horizon client was constructed at import time with a hardcoded testnet
fallback, so a mainnet deploy with HORIZON_URLS unset would silently talk to
testnet Horizon. Now the default is derived from STELLAR_NETWORK and the client
is built lazily on first use (after env is loaded). Explicit HORIZON_URLS still wins.

* feat(auth): authenticated change-password endpoint

PUT /api/auth/change-password (protected): verifies current password,
enforces the password policy, updates the hash, and signs out all other
sessions. Adds the auth.password_change audit action.

* feat(payment): add request-level idempotency keys to payment endpoints (#93)

* test: complement stellarService mock exports in idempotency test

* test: refine idempotency middleware concurrency lock test (#93)

* fix(stellar): export validateSignedPaymentXdr and complement test mock (#93)

* fix(stellar): remove duplicate validateSignedPaymentXdr export (#93)

---------

Co-authored-by: zeemscript <150973162+zeemscript@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(auth): enforce resource ownership across mutating endpoints (#88) (#105)

Add a centralized authorization layer that verifies the authenticated
user owns the target resource (or is an admin) before any mutating
handler runs, replacing the ad-hoc inline checks scattered across
controllers.

- add authorizeOwnership + authorizeReviewOwnership middleware
  (src/middlewares/authorize.js); on success the loaded doc is attached
  to req so handlers can reuse it
- apply the guards to book delete, course update, space update/delete,
  and review update/delete on books and courses; review create stays
  purchase-gated
- record ownership denials to the audit log (authz.ownership.denied)
- remove the now-redundant inline ownership checks from the book,
  course, space, and review controllers
- document the resource x action x role matrix (docs/authorization-matrix.md)
  and cover it with an integration test suite (test/ownershipAuthz.test.js)

Closes #88

Co-authored-by: BountySpaghetti <286941608+BountySpaghetti@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(security): stop logging OTP codes and verification tokens in email bodies (#104)

The NODE_ENV === "test" branch of sendMail logged the full rendered email
body — including the password-reset OTP span and the verification link's
token query param — and pino's redact config cannot censor values baked
into interpolated strings, so the leak bypassed the app-wide redaction.

Remove the body from every log statement (log only recipient, subject, and
template id via structured fields), and give tests a sanctioned in-memory
outbox hook instead of log scraping. sendOtpEmail/sendVerificationEmail/
sendReceiptEmail now return the sendMail result so callers can capture it.

Closes #95

* fix(transactions): prevent TTL index from deleting confirmed purchases and donations (#103)

The Transaction collection used a blanket TTL index on expiresAt with a
schema default that stamped a 30-minute expiry on every row regardless of
status. Because confirm paths never cleared expiresAt, confirmed on-chain
purchases and donations were permanently reaped ~30 minutes after creation,
deleting the proof of payment and orphaning recorded earnings.

Scope the TTL index to status: "pending" via partialFilterExpression, make
the expiresAt default conditional on status, add a pre-save hook that clears
expiresAt for any terminal state, explicitly unset expiresAt on every
terminal transition (submit, donation, refund, dispute, cancel, job handler,
reconciliation promotion), and add an idempotent migration that rescues
legacy non-pending rows and rebuilds the index.

Closes #94

* feat(security): implement educator verification pipeline and content-creation gating (#92) (#102)

* feat(security): implement educator verification pipeline and content-creation gating (#92)

- Add EducatorVerification model with legal state-machine transitions
  (draft -> pending -> approved/rejected, resubmit from rejected)
- Add verifiedEducator durable flag on User, set atomically on approval
- Add AUDIT_ACTIONS: EDUCATOR_VERIFY_SUBMIT/_RESUBMIT/_APPROVE/_REJECT
  with metadata allowlist entries in auditService
- requireVerifiedEducator middleware (403 for unverified, admin bypass)
- Applicant API: submit/resubmit app, get own app, signed doc URLs,
  signed Cloudinary upload-signature for private credential uploads
- Admin review queue: list+filter pending, view signed docs,
  approve/reject with notes (Mongo transaction for verifiedEducator grant)
- Gate all content-creation routes:
  * POST /api/courses  (courseRoutes.js)
  * POST /api/books    (bookRoutes.js)
  * POST /api/spaces   (spaceRoutes.js — live sessions per issue)
- Wire routes: /api/educator-verification + /api/admin/educator-verification
- Comprehensive test suite in test/educatorVerification.test.js
  (state-machine, middleware gating, submit/resubmit, approve/reject,
  content 403/2xx, both full lifecycles submit->pending->approve and
  reject->resubmit->approve, signed URL security, admin-only gating,
  audit log instrumentation)

Verification Results:
  app.test.js: 22/22 PASS (CI boot + endpoint health)
  auditLog.test.js: 21/21 PASS (append-only, redaction, admin gate)

Closes #92

* fix(ci): resolve educator verification pipeline test failures

- Remove redundant catchAsync double-wrap in educator-verification routes
  (controllers are already pre-wrapped; the outer wrap called .catch() on
  undefined, returning 500 for every new endpoint)
- Use MongoMemoryReplSet in educatorVerification.test.js so the approve/reject
  MongoDB transaction can run (standalone MongoMemoryServer cannot)
- Use AuditLog.collection.deleteMany in test cleanup to bypass append-only
  pre-hooks
- Return recordAudit's promise so callers can await durability; await it in
  submitApplication and performReview to eliminate the fire-and-forget
  audit-race in tests
- Fix testAuth.js password overwrite: destructure password out of the
  override spread so the hashed value is not clobbered by plaintext
- Seed bookUpload test user as a verifiedEducator mentor so the new content
  gate lets it through

---------

Co-authored-by: abimbolaalabi <abimbolaalabi@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(auth): signed service-to-service authentication for the AI service (#91) (#106)

Give the backend a real machine-to-machine auth channel for the AI
service (dnb-ai) — signed, scoped, rotatable keys instead of a single
static shared secret.

- add requireServiceAuth middleware (src/middlewares/serviceAuth.js):
  HMAC-SHA256 over a canonical method/path/timestamp/body-digest string,
  a ±300s replay window, constant-time signature comparison, per-key
  scope enforcement, and req.service on success
- key store (src/config/serviceKeys.js): multiple active keys keyed by
  kid for zero-downtime rotation; resilient env parsing, never throws
- mount a real internal route GET /api/internal/ai/whoami guarded by the
  guard (scope ai:read-content), plus raw-body capture in app.js
- migrate /admin/jobs off raw !== to a length-guarded timingSafeEqual
- audit denials (service_auth.denied), require AI_SERVICE_KEYS in prod
  (fail-fast), document the signing contract + rotation runbook
- cover the full accept/reject matrix in test/serviceAuth.test.js

Closes #91

Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <304024794+Lspnjr1@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(webhooks): signed outbound webhook event system (#45) (#107)

Add an outbound webhook/event system so external consumers can subscribe
to payment and enrollment lifecycle events over HMAC-signed HTTP
callbacks, with retries, dead-lettering, and redelivery.

- models: WebhookEndpoint (encrypted secret at rest, subscribed events,
  auto-disable counters) and WebhookDelivery (all scheduling state in the
  doc: status, attemptCount, nextAttemptAt indexed)
- webhookService.emitEvent: typed event catalog, per-event id for
  consumer idempotency, strict payload allowlist (no secrets/emails/user
  docs); persists a delivery per subscribed endpoint after the txn
  commits, never blocks or fails the request path, no-ops when the DB is
  unavailable
- signing: X-DeenBridge-Signature v1=hmac-sha256(secret, `${ts}.${body}`)
  over the exact sent bytes; timing-safe verify + 5-min staleness window
- deliveryWorker: atomic findOneAndUpdate claim (no double-send),
  exponential backoff + jitter, dead-letter after max attempts, endpoint
  auto-disable after sustained failures
- management API (/api/webhooks, admin-gated): endpoint CRUD, rotate
  secret, list deliveries, redeliver (atomic $set), and ping
- SSRF guard: https-only in prod, reject loopback/RFC-1918/link-local
- wire emitters into payment (initialized/confirmed/failed/expired),
  enrollment, and wallet connect/disconnect; migrate /admin/jobs to a
  timing-safe token compare
- docs/webhooks.md consumer verifier + full offline test suite

Closes #45

Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <304024794+Lspnjr1@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(security): implement TOTP two-factor authentication for admins a… (#98)

* feat(stellar): publish Soroban giving-escrow contract id in stellar.toml

Adds env-driven GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT (custom, non-SEP-1) so the deployed
On-Chain Giving escrow is discoverable from /.well-known/stellar.toml. Set
GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT_ID to enable. Includes test coverage.

* fix(stellar): resolve Horizon endpoints lazily + network-aware default

Horizon client was constructed at import time with a hardcoded testnet
fallback, so a mainnet deploy with HORIZON_URLS unset would silently talk to
testnet Horizon. Now the default is derived from STELLAR_NETWORK and the client
is built lazily on first use (after env is loaded). Explicit HORIZON_URLS still wins.

* feat(auth): authenticated change-password endpoint

PUT /api/auth/change-password (protected): verifies current password,
enforces the password policy, updates the hash, and signs out all other
sessions. Adds the auth.password_change audit action.

* feat(security): implement TOTP two-factor authentication for admins and mentors

- Add TOTP (RFC 6238) lifecycle: secret generation, encrypted storage at rest (AES-256-GCM), otpauth:// URI and QR code generation
- Add 10 single-use bcrypt-hashed recovery codes
- Add two-factor rate-limiting middleware (5 verification attempts per 15-minute window)
- Update login controller to issue step-up mfaToken challenges when 2FA is enabled
- Update authorizeRoles('admin') middleware to enforce 2FA-enabled status and 2FA-verified sessions
- Log audit actions for all 2FA lifecycle events (setup, enable, login challenge, success, failure, disable, recovery code usage)
- Add comprehensive test suite in test/auth2FA.test.js and update existing auth test suites

* ci: update node version to 22 and sync package-lock.json

* ci: pin mongo service to 6.0 and add wait-for-mongodb step

* test: add 2FA enablement and 2FA verified token to admin in refund.test.js

* fix(auth): switch bcrypt imports to pure-JS bcryptjs for cross-platform compatibility

* fix(test): remove duplicate MongoMemoryServer import in refund.test.js

* fix(test): add errorHandler middleware to refund.test.js app

* fix(test): clean up MongoDB connection logic and add afterAll hook in refund.test.js

* fix(test): standardize Mongoose connection lifecycle and add missing afterAll hooks

* fix(test): remove duplicate afterAll hooks and handle Multer 413 response status

* test(refund): explicitly set 2FA enablement and 2FA verified tokens for admin in refund.test.js

* test: ensure admin test helpers include 2FA enablement and 2FA verified JWT claims

* fix(test): add 2FA enablement and 2FA verified tokens for admin in webhooks and educatorVerification tests

---------

Co-authored-by: zeemscript <150973162+zeemscript@users.noreply.github.com>

* Add scholarship escrow contract foundation (#108)

* Improve application test coverage (#110)

* Add dependency health checks (#112)

* Validate auth and Stellar requests (#109)

* Validate auth and Stellar requests

* Address validation review feedback

* Secure book deletion authorization (#113)

* Secure book deletion

* Keep delete response consistent

* feat(stellar): gift courses/books via claimable balances with expiry reclaim (#116)

Adds a gift-a-course/book flow built on Stellar claimable balances so a
buyer can send an item to another user — including one who has not
finished wallet onboarding — without the recipient needing a USDC
trustline. The sender creates an on-ledger USDC balance the recipient
claims when ready, with a sender reclaim-after-expiry predicate so funds
are never stranded. Includes a GiftClaim model (no document-deleting TTL,
so the record survives expiry for reclaim), a claimableBalanceService
(build create/claim transactions with complementary predicates, resolve
the REAL balance id from the create result XDR — not the tx hash — with
a Horizon forClaimant fallback, and validate the signed gift XDR before
any state change), gift routes/controller at /api/stellar/gifts, and
granting item access to the RECIPIENT (never the payer) on claim. Wires
a `{ fallback: "claimable_balance" }` response into the purchase flow
when a creator wallet/trustline is missing. Tests cover predicate
decoding, trustline-free single-signature claiming, claim authorization
before/after expiry, the balance-id-vs-tx-hash distinction, tampered-XDR
rejection, guards mirroring initializePayment, and the recipient access
grant.

* feat(stellar): add idempotency protection to the Stellar payment endpoints (#115)

Makes /api/stellar/payment/initialize and /submit safe against
double-clicks, client retries, and concurrent duplicates. Submit is
naturally idempotent per transaction hash: the deterministic hash of
the signed XDR is looked up against confirmed transactions before any
processing, so a replayed submission returns the original success
response without re-granting access, with the unique index on
stellarTxHash as the database-level backstop (an E11000 on the confirm
save is treated as already processed). Initialize no longer piles up
duplicates: a pending checkout for the same user+item returns the
existing record (with its persisted unsigned XDR) instead of creating
a new document, and stale pending records are reaped by the existing
pending-only TTL index. Adds a stricter per-user rate limiter
(paymentLimiter) on the payment routes, keyed on the authenticated
user id with an IPv6-aware IP fallback. Covers duplicate-submit,
duplicate-initialize, the E11000 race, and limiter enforcement with
tests.

* feat(stellar): validate Stellar config at startup and document the mainnet switch (#114)

Adds a single source of truth for the Stellar network configuration
(src/config/stellar.js) that resolves the network name, network
passphrase, Horizon URLs, and USDC issuer from STELLAR_NETWORK, and
validates the whole setup fail-fast at boot so a misconfigured
deployment (bad network value, mainnet flag with testnet Horizon or
issuer) fails with an error naming the exact problem instead of at
request time. stellarService.js and horizonClient.js now consume this
module. Adds docs/MAINNET.md covering the env changes, creator
trustlines, and a first-mainnet-transaction smoke checklist, plus unit
tests for resolution and validation across both networks.

* feat(stellar): fee-bump sponsorship with structural whitelist and spend caps (#111)

Let the platform pay a user's Stellar network fee by wrapping the user-signed
transaction in a fee-bump signed by a dedicated fee-source account, so a user
holding USDC but ~no XLM can buy a book, buy a course, or donate. Opt-in per
submit via `requestSponsorship: true`; off by default and byte-for-byte
identical when disabled.

Guard rails (server signs on the platform's behalf):
- Structural whitelist (reject-by-default, allow-list of `payment` ops only):
  source, exact op count/order, destinations, amounts (stroops), asset, and
  memo must match the pending Transaction row exactly. Any foreign/extra
  operation — including unknown future types — is rejected.
- Durable spend caps (SponsorshipSpend, keyed by UTC day): per-transaction fee
  ceiling, per-day total, and per-user per-day count.
- Sponsor float pre-check so an underfunded sponsor never marks the user's
  transaction failed.

Fee-bump fee is priced over inner ops + wrapper and clamped to the ceiling
(verified against @stellar/stellar-sdk v16 and asserted in tests). Sponsored
rows record `sponsored`, `sponsorFeeCharged`, and the fee-bump (outer) hash
alongside the inner hash. Sponsorship-specific failures return a distinct
non-fatal 4xx/503 with `retryUnsponsored: true` and never mark the row failed.

- Config: FEE_SPONSOR_* in .env.example + validateEnv (fail-fast at boot when
  enabled with a missing/invalid secret); secret never logged or returned.
- Admin status endpoint GET /api/stellar/payment/sponsorship/status exposes the
  sponsor public key, live float, caps, and today's spend.
- Prometheus counters for approved/rejected sponsorship decisions.
- Docs: docs/fee-sponsorship.md, README, and openapi.yaml.
- Tests: feeSponsorService (whitelist adversarial matrix, fee correctness,
  inner-untouched, caps, secret handling, boot config) and feeSponsorSubmit
  (payment + donation flag-off regression, flag-on sponsorship, cap/whitelist
  rejections that don't fail the row).

Closes #30

* feat: add managed course categories (#118)

* feat(courses): add managed category taxonomy

* fix(categories): preserve legacy course creation

* feat: add recurring sadaqah pledges (#119)

* feat(donations): add recurring sadaqah pledges

* fix(pledges): preserve donation test compatibility

* fix(pledges): ignore non-persisted transactions

* refactor(db): scaffold /mongo data-layer structure (closes #167)

---------

Co-authored-by: Afeez Tomisin <132703022+Banx17@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: zeemscript <150973162+zeemscript@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Alabi Ibrahim Abimbola <139625252+abimbolaalabi@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Kelechukwu Izuaba <144479895+Kaycee276@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: BountySpaghetti <zeemroyals@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: BountySpaghetti <286941608+BountySpaghetti@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Samuel Ojetunde <samuelojetunde898@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: abimbolaalabi <abimbolaalabi@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <shittulukmanbabatunde@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <304024794+Lspnjr1@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Alhassan Nuhu Idris <alhassannuhu0@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Mantissa <negativemantissa@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Ezekiel Akawa <akawaezekiel4@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Mfon <67503972+TS-mfon@users.noreply.github.com>
zeemscript added a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 24, 2026
* stellar: validate signed XDR contents before submit; store expectedHa… (#51)

* stellar: validate signed XDR contents before submit; store expectedHash/memo; verify on-chain before granting access; add tests

* test: add validateSignedPaymentXdr to stellarService mock (new import in paymentController)

* test: expect expectedHash at payment init (XDR pre-validation stores it there)

---------

Co-authored-by: zeemscript <150973162+zeemscript@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(stellar): publish Soroban giving-escrow contract id in stellar.toml

Adds env-driven GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT (custom, non-SEP-1) so the deployed
On-Chain Giving escrow is discoverable from /.well-known/stellar.toml. Set
GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT_ID to enable. Includes test coverage.

* fix(stellar): resolve Horizon endpoints lazily + network-aware default

Horizon client was constructed at import time with a hardcoded testnet
fallback, so a mainnet deploy with HORIZON_URLS unset would silently talk to
testnet Horizon. Now the default is derived from STELLAR_NETWORK and the client
is built lazily on first use (after env is loaded). Explicit HORIZON_URLS still wins.

* feat(auth): authenticated change-password endpoint

PUT /api/auth/change-password (protected): verifies current password,
enforces the password policy, updates the hash, and signs out all other
sessions. Adds the auth.password_change audit action.

* feat(auth): harden authentication against login lockout, breached passwords, and signup abuse (#89) (#99)

* feat(auth): harden authentication against login lockout, breached passwords, and signup abuse (#89)

- Add progressive per-account login lockout (failedLoginAttempts + lockUntil) with env-configurable escalating backoff, generic 429 while locked, and AUTH_ACCOUNT_LOCKED audit emission.
- Add HaveIBeenPwned breached-password check (SHA-1 prefix k-anonymity, never transmits the password) at register and password reset; fails open on outage.
- Add per-email throttling on /register and /resend-verification (emailAuthLimiter, survives IP rotation, active in test env) plus a pluggable captcha gate (no-op when unconfigured).
- Add User lockout fields and document new env vars in .env.example.

* fix(auth): address CodeRabbit review on login lockout, HIBP, captcha, and JWT secret (#89)

- loginUser: locked accounts now return the same generic 401 'Invalid credentials'
  as a nonexistent account (no enumeration); failed-login counter incremented
  atomically via findByIdAndUpdate \, lock persisted via updateOne
- resetPassword: breached-password check moved to after successful OTP validation
  so unauthenticated callers cannot trigger HIBP lookups
- authController: refuse to start when JWT_SECRET is missing (no hardcoded fallback)
- hibp: request HIBP padding ('Add-Padding: true') and ignore zero-count records
- captcha: configurable CAPTCHA_TIMEOUT_MS (default 5s) passed to the provider call;
  captcha rejection now returns the standard { success, message, data: null } shape
- tests: assert escalating backoff magnitude (120s on 6th failure) and the 24h cap;
  locked-account test expects 401; per-email limiter buckets reset between tests;
  outage test routed through mockHibp so the shared spy is cleaned up; added
  padding-record and cap coverage

* Feat/93 idempotency keys (#100)

* feat(stellar): publish Soroban giving-escrow contract id in stellar.toml

Adds env-driven GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT (custom, non-SEP-1) so the deployed
On-Chain Giving escrow is discoverable from /.well-known/stellar.toml. Set
GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT_ID to enable. Includes test coverage.

* fix(stellar): resolve Horizon endpoints lazily + network-aware default

Horizon client was constructed at import time with a hardcoded testnet
fallback, so a mainnet deploy with HORIZON_URLS unset would silently talk to
testnet Horizon. Now the default is derived from STELLAR_NETWORK and the client
is built lazily on first use (after env is loaded). Explicit HORIZON_URLS still wins.

* feat(auth): authenticated change-password endpoint

PUT /api/auth/change-password (protected): verifies current password,
enforces the password policy, updates the hash, and signs out all other
sessions. Adds the auth.password_change audit action.

* feat(payment): add request-level idempotency keys to payment endpoints (#93)

* test: complement stellarService mock exports in idempotency test

* test: refine idempotency middleware concurrency lock test (#93)

* fix(stellar): export validateSignedPaymentXdr and complement test mock (#93)

* fix(stellar): remove duplicate validateSignedPaymentXdr export (#93)

---------

Co-authored-by: zeemscript <150973162+zeemscript@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(auth): enforce resource ownership across mutating endpoints (#88) (#105)

Add a centralized authorization layer that verifies the authenticated
user owns the target resource (or is an admin) before any mutating
handler runs, replacing the ad-hoc inline checks scattered across
controllers.

- add authorizeOwnership + authorizeReviewOwnership middleware
  (src/middlewares/authorize.js); on success the loaded doc is attached
  to req so handlers can reuse it
- apply the guards to book delete, course update, space update/delete,
  and review update/delete on books and courses; review create stays
  purchase-gated
- record ownership denials to the audit log (authz.ownership.denied)
- remove the now-redundant inline ownership checks from the book,
  course, space, and review controllers
- document the resource x action x role matrix (docs/authorization-matrix.md)
  and cover it with an integration test suite (test/ownershipAuthz.test.js)

Closes #88

Co-authored-by: BountySpaghetti <286941608+BountySpaghetti@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(security): stop logging OTP codes and verification tokens in email bodies (#104)

The NODE_ENV === "test" branch of sendMail logged the full rendered email
body — including the password-reset OTP span and the verification link's
token query param — and pino's redact config cannot censor values baked
into interpolated strings, so the leak bypassed the app-wide redaction.

Remove the body from every log statement (log only recipient, subject, and
template id via structured fields), and give tests a sanctioned in-memory
outbox hook instead of log scraping. sendOtpEmail/sendVerificationEmail/
sendReceiptEmail now return the sendMail result so callers can capture it.

Closes #95

* fix(transactions): prevent TTL index from deleting confirmed purchases and donations (#103)

The Transaction collection used a blanket TTL index on expiresAt with a
schema default that stamped a 30-minute expiry on every row regardless of
status. Because confirm paths never cleared expiresAt, confirmed on-chain
purchases and donations were permanently reaped ~30 minutes after creation,
deleting the proof of payment and orphaning recorded earnings.

Scope the TTL index to status: "pending" via partialFilterExpression, make
the expiresAt default conditional on status, add a pre-save hook that clears
expiresAt for any terminal state, explicitly unset expiresAt on every
terminal transition (submit, donation, refund, dispute, cancel, job handler,
reconciliation promotion), and add an idempotent migration that rescues
legacy non-pending rows and rebuilds the index.

Closes #94

* feat(security): implement educator verification pipeline and content-creation gating (#92) (#102)

* feat(security): implement educator verification pipeline and content-creation gating (#92)

- Add EducatorVerification model with legal state-machine transitions
  (draft -> pending -> approved/rejected, resubmit from rejected)
- Add verifiedEducator durable flag on User, set atomically on approval
- Add AUDIT_ACTIONS: EDUCATOR_VERIFY_SUBMIT/_RESUBMIT/_APPROVE/_REJECT
  with metadata allowlist entries in auditService
- requireVerifiedEducator middleware (403 for unverified, admin bypass)
- Applicant API: submit/resubmit app, get own app, signed doc URLs,
  signed Cloudinary upload-signature for private credential uploads
- Admin review queue: list+filter pending, view signed docs,
  approve/reject with notes (Mongo transaction for verifiedEducator grant)
- Gate all content-creation routes:
  * POST /api/courses  (courseRoutes.js)
  * POST /api/books    (bookRoutes.js)
  * POST /api/spaces   (spaceRoutes.js — live sessions per issue)
- Wire routes: /api/educator-verification + /api/admin/educator-verification
- Comprehensive test suite in test/educatorVerification.test.js
  (state-machine, middleware gating, submit/resubmit, approve/reject,
  content 403/2xx, both full lifecycles submit->pending->approve and
  reject->resubmit->approve, signed URL security, admin-only gating,
  audit log instrumentation)

Verification Results:
  app.test.js: 22/22 PASS (CI boot + endpoint health)
  auditLog.test.js: 21/21 PASS (append-only, redaction, admin gate)

Closes #92

* fix(ci): resolve educator verification pipeline test failures

- Remove redundant catchAsync double-wrap in educator-verification routes
  (controllers are already pre-wrapped; the outer wrap called .catch() on
  undefined, returning 500 for every new endpoint)
- Use MongoMemoryReplSet in educatorVerification.test.js so the approve/reject
  MongoDB transaction can run (standalone MongoMemoryServer cannot)
- Use AuditLog.collection.deleteMany in test cleanup to bypass append-only
  pre-hooks
- Return recordAudit's promise so callers can await durability; await it in
  submitApplication and performReview to eliminate the fire-and-forget
  audit-race in tests
- Fix testAuth.js password overwrite: destructure password out of the
  override spread so the hashed value is not clobbered by plaintext
- Seed bookUpload test user as a verifiedEducator mentor so the new content
  gate lets it through

---------

Co-authored-by: abimbolaalabi <abimbolaalabi@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(auth): signed service-to-service authentication for the AI service (#91) (#106)

Give the backend a real machine-to-machine auth channel for the AI
service (dnb-ai) — signed, scoped, rotatable keys instead of a single
static shared secret.

- add requireServiceAuth middleware (src/middlewares/serviceAuth.js):
  HMAC-SHA256 over a canonical method/path/timestamp/body-digest string,
  a ±300s replay window, constant-time signature comparison, per-key
  scope enforcement, and req.service on success
- key store (src/config/serviceKeys.js): multiple active keys keyed by
  kid for zero-downtime rotation; resilient env parsing, never throws
- mount a real internal route GET /api/internal/ai/whoami guarded by the
  guard (scope ai:read-content), plus raw-body capture in app.js
- migrate /admin/jobs off raw !== to a length-guarded timingSafeEqual
- audit denials (service_auth.denied), require AI_SERVICE_KEYS in prod
  (fail-fast), document the signing contract + rotation runbook
- cover the full accept/reject matrix in test/serviceAuth.test.js

Closes #91

Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <304024794+Lspnjr1@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(webhooks): signed outbound webhook event system (#45) (#107)

Add an outbound webhook/event system so external consumers can subscribe
to payment and enrollment lifecycle events over HMAC-signed HTTP
callbacks, with retries, dead-lettering, and redelivery.

- models: WebhookEndpoint (encrypted secret at rest, subscribed events,
  auto-disable counters) and WebhookDelivery (all scheduling state in the
  doc: status, attemptCount, nextAttemptAt indexed)
- webhookService.emitEvent: typed event catalog, per-event id for
  consumer idempotency, strict payload allowlist (no secrets/emails/user
  docs); persists a delivery per subscribed endpoint after the txn
  commits, never blocks or fails the request path, no-ops when the DB is
  unavailable
- signing: X-DeenBridge-Signature v1=hmac-sha256(secret, `${ts}.${body}`)
  over the exact sent bytes; timing-safe verify + 5-min staleness window
- deliveryWorker: atomic findOneAndUpdate claim (no double-send),
  exponential backoff + jitter, dead-letter after max attempts, endpoint
  auto-disable after sustained failures
- management API (/api/webhooks, admin-gated): endpoint CRUD, rotate
  secret, list deliveries, redeliver (atomic $set), and ping
- SSRF guard: https-only in prod, reject loopback/RFC-1918/link-local
- wire emitters into payment (initialized/confirmed/failed/expired),
  enrollment, and wallet connect/disconnect; migrate /admin/jobs to a
  timing-safe token compare
- docs/webhooks.md consumer verifier + full offline test suite

Closes #45

Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <304024794+Lspnjr1@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(security): implement TOTP two-factor authentication for admins a… (#98)

* feat(stellar): publish Soroban giving-escrow contract id in stellar.toml

Adds env-driven GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT (custom, non-SEP-1) so the deployed
On-Chain Giving escrow is discoverable from /.well-known/stellar.toml. Set
GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT_ID to enable. Includes test coverage.

* fix(stellar): resolve Horizon endpoints lazily + network-aware default

Horizon client was constructed at import time with a hardcoded testnet
fallback, so a mainnet deploy with HORIZON_URLS unset would silently talk to
testnet Horizon. Now the default is derived from STELLAR_NETWORK and the client
is built lazily on first use (after env is loaded). Explicit HORIZON_URLS still wins.

* feat(auth): authenticated change-password endpoint

PUT /api/auth/change-password (protected): verifies current password,
enforces the password policy, updates the hash, and signs out all other
sessions. Adds the auth.password_change audit action.

* feat(security): implement TOTP two-factor authentication for admins and mentors

- Add TOTP (RFC 6238) lifecycle: secret generation, encrypted storage at rest (AES-256-GCM), otpauth:// URI and QR code generation
- Add 10 single-use bcrypt-hashed recovery codes
- Add two-factor rate-limiting middleware (5 verification attempts per 15-minute window)
- Update login controller to issue step-up mfaToken challenges when 2FA is enabled
- Update authorizeRoles('admin') middleware to enforce 2FA-enabled status and 2FA-verified sessions
- Log audit actions for all 2FA lifecycle events (setup, enable, login challenge, success, failure, disable, recovery code usage)
- Add comprehensive test suite in test/auth2FA.test.js and update existing auth test suites

* ci: update node version to 22 and sync package-lock.json

* ci: pin mongo service to 6.0 and add wait-for-mongodb step

* test: add 2FA enablement and 2FA verified token to admin in refund.test.js

* fix(auth): switch bcrypt imports to pure-JS bcryptjs for cross-platform compatibility

* fix(test): remove duplicate MongoMemoryServer import in refund.test.js

* fix(test): add errorHandler middleware to refund.test.js app

* fix(test): clean up MongoDB connection logic and add afterAll hook in refund.test.js

* fix(test): standardize Mongoose connection lifecycle and add missing afterAll hooks

* fix(test): remove duplicate afterAll hooks and handle Multer 413 response status

* test(refund): explicitly set 2FA enablement and 2FA verified tokens for admin in refund.test.js

* test: ensure admin test helpers include 2FA enablement and 2FA verified JWT claims

* fix(test): add 2FA enablement and 2FA verified tokens for admin in webhooks and educatorVerification tests

---------

Co-authored-by: zeemscript <150973162+zeemscript@users.noreply.github.com>

* Add scholarship escrow contract foundation (#108)

* Improve application test coverage (#110)

* Add dependency health checks (#112)

* Validate auth and Stellar requests (#109)

* Validate auth and Stellar requests

* Address validation review feedback

* Secure book deletion authorization (#113)

* Secure book deletion

* Keep delete response consistent

* feat(stellar): gift courses/books via claimable balances with expiry reclaim (#116)

Adds a gift-a-course/book flow built on Stellar claimable balances so a
buyer can send an item to another user — including one who has not
finished wallet onboarding — without the recipient needing a USDC
trustline. The sender creates an on-ledger USDC balance the recipient
claims when ready, with a sender reclaim-after-expiry predicate so funds
are never stranded. Includes a GiftClaim model (no document-deleting TTL,
so the record survives expiry for reclaim), a claimableBalanceService
(build create/claim transactions with complementary predicates, resolve
the REAL balance id from the create result XDR — not the tx hash — with
a Horizon forClaimant fallback, and validate the signed gift XDR before
any state change), gift routes/controller at /api/stellar/gifts, and
granting item access to the RECIPIENT (never the payer) on claim. Wires
a `{ fallback: "claimable_balance" }` response into the purchase flow
when a creator wallet/trustline is missing. Tests cover predicate
decoding, trustline-free single-signature claiming, claim authorization
before/after expiry, the balance-id-vs-tx-hash distinction, tampered-XDR
rejection, guards mirroring initializePayment, and the recipient access
grant.

* feat(stellar): add idempotency protection to the Stellar payment endpoints (#115)

Makes /api/stellar/payment/initialize and /submit safe against
double-clicks, client retries, and concurrent duplicates. Submit is
naturally idempotent per transaction hash: the deterministic hash of
the signed XDR is looked up against confirmed transactions before any
processing, so a replayed submission returns the original success
response without re-granting access, with the unique index on
stellarTxHash as the database-level backstop (an E11000 on the confirm
save is treated as already processed). Initialize no longer piles up
duplicates: a pending checkout for the same user+item returns the
existing record (with its persisted unsigned XDR) instead of creating
a new document, and stale pending records are reaped by the existing
pending-only TTL index. Adds a stricter per-user rate limiter
(paymentLimiter) on the payment routes, keyed on the authenticated
user id with an IPv6-aware IP fallback. Covers duplicate-submit,
duplicate-initialize, the E11000 race, and limiter enforcement with
tests.

* feat(stellar): validate Stellar config at startup and document the mainnet switch (#114)

Adds a single source of truth for the Stellar network configuration
(src/config/stellar.js) that resolves the network name, network
passphrase, Horizon URLs, and USDC issuer from STELLAR_NETWORK, and
validates the whole setup fail-fast at boot so a misconfigured
deployment (bad network value, mainnet flag with testnet Horizon or
issuer) fails with an error naming the exact problem instead of at
request time. stellarService.js and horizonClient.js now consume this
module. Adds docs/MAINNET.md covering the env changes, creator
trustlines, and a first-mainnet-transaction smoke checklist, plus unit
tests for resolution and validation across both networks.

* feat(stellar): fee-bump sponsorship with structural whitelist and spend caps (#111)

Let the platform pay a user's Stellar network fee by wrapping the user-signed
transaction in a fee-bump signed by a dedicated fee-source account, so a user
holding USDC but ~no XLM can buy a book, buy a course, or donate. Opt-in per
submit via `requestSponsorship: true`; off by default and byte-for-byte
identical when disabled.

Guard rails (server signs on the platform's behalf):
- Structural whitelist (reject-by-default, allow-list of `payment` ops only):
  source, exact op count/order, destinations, amounts (stroops), asset, and
  memo must match the pending Transaction row exactly. Any foreign/extra
  operation — including unknown future types — is rejected.
- Durable spend caps (SponsorshipSpend, keyed by UTC day): per-transaction fee
  ceiling, per-day total, and per-user per-day count.
- Sponsor float pre-check so an underfunded sponsor never marks the user's
  transaction failed.

Fee-bump fee is priced over inner ops + wrapper and clamped to the ceiling
(verified against @stellar/stellar-sdk v16 and asserted in tests). Sponsored
rows record `sponsored`, `sponsorFeeCharged`, and the fee-bump (outer) hash
alongside the inner hash. Sponsorship-specific failures return a distinct
non-fatal 4xx/503 with `retryUnsponsored: true` and never mark the row failed.

- Config: FEE_SPONSOR_* in .env.example + validateEnv (fail-fast at boot when
  enabled with a missing/invalid secret); secret never logged or returned.
- Admin status endpoint GET /api/stellar/payment/sponsorship/status exposes the
  sponsor public key, live float, caps, and today's spend.
- Prometheus counters for approved/rejected sponsorship decisions.
- Docs: docs/fee-sponsorship.md, README, and openapi.yaml.
- Tests: feeSponsorService (whitelist adversarial matrix, fee correctness,
  inner-untouched, caps, secret handling, boot config) and feeSponsorSubmit
  (payment + donation flag-off regression, flag-on sponsorship, cap/whitelist
  rejections that don't fail the row).

Closes #30

* feat: add managed course categories (#118)

* feat(courses): add managed category taxonomy

* fix(categories): preserve legacy course creation

* feat: add recurring sadaqah pledges (#119)

* feat(donations): add recurring sadaqah pledges

* fix(pledges): preserve donation test compatibility

* fix(pledges): ignore non-persisted transactions

* feat(stellar): add loyalty points Soroban contract and service (closes #161)

---------

Co-authored-by: Afeez Tomisin <132703022+Banx17@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: zeemscript <150973162+zeemscript@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Alabi Ibrahim Abimbola <139625252+abimbolaalabi@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Kelechukwu Izuaba <144479895+Kaycee276@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: BountySpaghetti <zeemroyals@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: BountySpaghetti <286941608+BountySpaghetti@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Samuel Ojetunde <samuelojetunde898@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: abimbolaalabi <abimbolaalabi@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <shittulukmanbabatunde@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <304024794+Lspnjr1@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Alhassan Nuhu Idris <alhassannuhu0@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Mantissa <negativemantissa@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Ezekiel Akawa <akawaezekiel4@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Mfon <67503972+TS-mfon@users.noreply.github.com>
zeemscript added a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 24, 2026
* Merge dev into main (#117)

* stellar: validate signed XDR contents before submit; store expectedHa… (#51)

* stellar: validate signed XDR contents before submit; store expectedHash/memo; verify on-chain before granting access; add tests

* test: add validateSignedPaymentXdr to stellarService mock (new import in paymentController)

* test: expect expectedHash at payment init (XDR pre-validation stores it there)

---------

Co-authored-by: zeemscript <150973162+zeemscript@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(stellar): publish Soroban giving-escrow contract id in stellar.toml

Adds env-driven GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT (custom, non-SEP-1) so the deployed
On-Chain Giving escrow is discoverable from /.well-known/stellar.toml. Set
GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT_ID to enable. Includes test coverage.

* fix(stellar): resolve Horizon endpoints lazily + network-aware default

Horizon client was constructed at import time with a hardcoded testnet
fallback, so a mainnet deploy with HORIZON_URLS unset would silently talk to
testnet Horizon. Now the default is derived from STELLAR_NETWORK and the client
is built lazily on first use (after env is loaded). Explicit HORIZON_URLS still wins.

* feat(auth): authenticated change-password endpoint

PUT /api/auth/change-password (protected): verifies current password,
enforces the password policy, updates the hash, and signs out all other
sessions. Adds the auth.password_change audit action.

* feat(auth): harden authentication against login lockout, breached passwords, and signup abuse (#89) (#99)

* feat(auth): harden authentication against login lockout, breached passwords, and signup abuse (#89)

- Add progressive per-account login lockout (failedLoginAttempts + lockUntil) with env-configurable escalating backoff, generic 429 while locked, and AUTH_ACCOUNT_LOCKED audit emission.
- Add HaveIBeenPwned breached-password check (SHA-1 prefix k-anonymity, never transmits the password) at register and password reset; fails open on outage.
- Add per-email throttling on /register and /resend-verification (emailAuthLimiter, survives IP rotation, active in test env) plus a pluggable captcha gate (no-op when unconfigured).
- Add User lockout fields and document new env vars in .env.example.

* fix(auth): address CodeRabbit review on login lockout, HIBP, captcha, and JWT secret (#89)

- loginUser: locked accounts now return the same generic 401 'Invalid credentials'
  as a nonexistent account (no enumeration); failed-login counter incremented
  atomically via findByIdAndUpdate \, lock persisted via updateOne
- resetPassword: breached-password check moved to after successful OTP validation
  so unauthenticated callers cannot trigger HIBP lookups
- authController: refuse to start when JWT_SECRET is missing (no hardcoded fallback)
- hibp: request HIBP padding ('Add-Padding: true') and ignore zero-count records
- captcha: configurable CAPTCHA_TIMEOUT_MS (default 5s) passed to the provider call;
  captcha rejection now returns the standard { success, message, data: null } shape
- tests: assert escalating backoff magnitude (120s on 6th failure) and the 24h cap;
  locked-account test expects 401; per-email limiter buckets reset between tests;
  outage test routed through mockHibp so the shared spy is cleaned up; added
  padding-record and cap coverage

* Feat/93 idempotency keys (#100)

* feat(stellar): publish Soroban giving-escrow contract id in stellar.toml

Adds env-driven GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT (custom, non-SEP-1) so the deployed
On-Chain Giving escrow is discoverable from /.well-known/stellar.toml. Set
GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT_ID to enable. Includes test coverage.

* fix(stellar): resolve Horizon endpoints lazily + network-aware default

Horizon client was constructed at import time with a hardcoded testnet
fallback, so a mainnet deploy with HORIZON_URLS unset would silently talk to
testnet Horizon. Now the default is derived from STELLAR_NETWORK and the client
is built lazily on first use (after env is loaded). Explicit HORIZON_URLS still wins.

* feat(auth): authenticated change-password endpoint

PUT /api/auth/change-password (protected): verifies current password,
enforces the password policy, updates the hash, and signs out all other
sessions. Adds the auth.password_change audit action.

* feat(payment): add request-level idempotency keys to payment endpoints (#93)

* test: complement stellarService mock exports in idempotency test

* test: refine idempotency middleware concurrency lock test (#93)

* fix(stellar): export validateSignedPaymentXdr and complement test mock (#93)

* fix(stellar): remove duplicate validateSignedPaymentXdr export (#93)

---------

Co-authored-by: zeemscript <150973162+zeemscript@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(auth): enforce resource ownership across mutating endpoints (#88) (#105)

Add a centralized authorization layer that verifies the authenticated
user owns the target resource (or is an admin) before any mutating
handler runs, replacing the ad-hoc inline checks scattered across
controllers.

- add authorizeOwnership + authorizeReviewOwnership middleware
  (src/middlewares/authorize.js); on success the loaded doc is attached
  to req so handlers can reuse it
- apply the guards to book delete, course update, space update/delete,
  and review update/delete on books and courses; review create stays
  purchase-gated
- record ownership denials to the audit log (authz.ownership.denied)
- remove the now-redundant inline ownership checks from the book,
  course, space, and review controllers
- document the resource x action x role matrix (docs/authorization-matrix.md)
  and cover it with an integration test suite (test/ownershipAuthz.test.js)

Closes #88

Co-authored-by: BountySpaghetti <286941608+BountySpaghetti@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(security): stop logging OTP codes and verification tokens in email bodies (#104)

The NODE_ENV === "test" branch of sendMail logged the full rendered email
body — including the password-reset OTP span and the verification link's
token query param — and pino's redact config cannot censor values baked
into interpolated strings, so the leak bypassed the app-wide redaction.

Remove the body from every log statement (log only recipient, subject, and
template id via structured fields), and give tests a sanctioned in-memory
outbox hook instead of log scraping. sendOtpEmail/sendVerificationEmail/
sendReceiptEmail now return the sendMail result so callers can capture it.

Closes #95

* fix(transactions): prevent TTL index from deleting confirmed purchases and donations (#103)

The Transaction collection used a blanket TTL index on expiresAt with a
schema default that stamped a 30-minute expiry on every row regardless of
status. Because confirm paths never cleared expiresAt, confirmed on-chain
purchases and donations were permanently reaped ~30 minutes after creation,
deleting the proof of payment and orphaning recorded earnings.

Scope the TTL index to status: "pending" via partialFilterExpression, make
the expiresAt default conditional on status, add a pre-save hook that clears
expiresAt for any terminal state, explicitly unset expiresAt on every
terminal transition (submit, donation, refund, dispute, cancel, job handler,
reconciliation promotion), and add an idempotent migration that rescues
legacy non-pending rows and rebuilds the index.

Closes #94

* feat(security): implement educator verification pipeline and content-creation gating (#92) (#102)

* feat(security): implement educator verification pipeline and content-creation gating (#92)

- Add EducatorVerification model with legal state-machine transitions
  (draft -> pending -> approved/rejected, resubmit from rejected)
- Add verifiedEducator durable flag on User, set atomically on approval
- Add AUDIT_ACTIONS: EDUCATOR_VERIFY_SUBMIT/_RESUBMIT/_APPROVE/_REJECT
  with metadata allowlist entries in auditService
- requireVerifiedEducator middleware (403 for unverified, admin bypass)
- Applicant API: submit/resubmit app, get own app, signed doc URLs,
  signed Cloudinary upload-signature for private credential uploads
- Admin review queue: list+filter pending, view signed docs,
  approve/reject with notes (Mongo transaction for verifiedEducator grant)
- Gate all content-creation routes:
  * POST /api/courses  (courseRoutes.js)
  * POST /api/books    (bookRoutes.js)
  * POST /api/spaces   (spaceRoutes.js — live sessions per issue)
- Wire routes: /api/educator-verification + /api/admin/educator-verification
- Comprehensive test suite in test/educatorVerification.test.js
  (state-machine, middleware gating, submit/resubmit, approve/reject,
  content 403/2xx, both full lifecycles submit->pending->approve and
  reject->resubmit->approve, signed URL security, admin-only gating,
  audit log instrumentation)

Verification Results:
  app.test.js: 22/22 PASS (CI boot + endpoint health)
  auditLog.test.js: 21/21 PASS (append-only, redaction, admin gate)

Closes #92

* fix(ci): resolve educator verification pipeline test failures

- Remove redundant catchAsync double-wrap in educator-verification routes
  (controllers are already pre-wrapped; the outer wrap called .catch() on
  undefined, returning 500 for every new endpoint)
- Use MongoMemoryReplSet in educatorVerification.test.js so the approve/reject
  MongoDB transaction can run (standalone MongoMemoryServer cannot)
- Use AuditLog.collection.deleteMany in test cleanup to bypass append-only
  pre-hooks
- Return recordAudit's promise so callers can await durability; await it in
  submitApplication and performReview to eliminate the fire-and-forget
  audit-race in tests
- Fix testAuth.js password overwrite: destructure password out of the
  override spread so the hashed value is not clobbered by plaintext
- Seed bookUpload test user as a verifiedEducator mentor so the new content
  gate lets it through

---------

Co-authored-by: abimbolaalabi <abimbolaalabi@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(auth): signed service-to-service authentication for the AI service (#91) (#106)

Give the backend a real machine-to-machine auth channel for the AI
service (dnb-ai) — signed, scoped, rotatable keys instead of a single
static shared secret.

- add requireServiceAuth middleware (src/middlewares/serviceAuth.js):
  HMAC-SHA256 over a canonical method/path/timestamp/body-digest string,
  a ±300s replay window, constant-time signature comparison, per-key
  scope enforcement, and req.service on success
- key store (src/config/serviceKeys.js): multiple active keys keyed by
  kid for zero-downtime rotation; resilient env parsing, never throws
- mount a real internal route GET /api/internal/ai/whoami guarded by the
  guard (scope ai:read-content), plus raw-body capture in app.js
- migrate /admin/jobs off raw !== to a length-guarded timingSafeEqual
- audit denials (service_auth.denied), require AI_SERVICE_KEYS in prod
  (fail-fast), document the signing contract + rotation runbook
- cover the full accept/reject matrix in test/serviceAuth.test.js

Closes #91

Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <304024794+Lspnjr1@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(webhooks): signed outbound webhook event system (#45) (#107)

Add an outbound webhook/event system so external consumers can subscribe
to payment and enrollment lifecycle events over HMAC-signed HTTP
callbacks, with retries, dead-lettering, and redelivery.

- models: WebhookEndpoint (encrypted secret at rest, subscribed events,
  auto-disable counters) and WebhookDelivery (all scheduling state in the
  doc: status, attemptCount, nextAttemptAt indexed)
- webhookService.emitEvent: typed event catalog, per-event id for
  consumer idempotency, strict payload allowlist (no secrets/emails/user
  docs); persists a delivery per subscribed endpoint after the txn
  commits, never blocks or fails the request path, no-ops when the DB is
  unavailable
- signing: X-DeenBridge-Signature v1=hmac-sha256(secret, `${ts}.${body}`)
  over the exact sent bytes; timing-safe verify + 5-min staleness window
- deliveryWorker: atomic findOneAndUpdate claim (no double-send),
  exponential backoff + jitter, dead-letter after max attempts, endpoint
  auto-disable after sustained failures
- management API (/api/webhooks, admin-gated): endpoint CRUD, rotate
  secret, list deliveries, redeliver (atomic $set), and ping
- SSRF guard: https-only in prod, reject loopback/RFC-1918/link-local
- wire emitters into payment (initialized/confirmed/failed/expired),
  enrollment, and wallet connect/disconnect; migrate /admin/jobs to a
  timing-safe token compare
- docs/webhooks.md consumer verifier + full offline test suite

Closes #45

Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <304024794+Lspnjr1@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(security): implement TOTP two-factor authentication for admins a… (#98)

* feat(stellar): publish Soroban giving-escrow contract id in stellar.toml

Adds env-driven GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT (custom, non-SEP-1) so the deployed
On-Chain Giving escrow is discoverable from /.well-known/stellar.toml. Set
GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT_ID to enable. Includes test coverage.

* fix(stellar): resolve Horizon endpoints lazily + network-aware default

Horizon client was constructed at import time with a hardcoded testnet
fallback, so a mainnet deploy with HORIZON_URLS unset would silently talk to
testnet Horizon. Now the default is derived from STELLAR_NETWORK and the client
is built lazily on first use (after env is loaded). Explicit HORIZON_URLS still wins.

* feat(auth): authenticated change-password endpoint

PUT /api/auth/change-password (protected): verifies current password,
enforces the password policy, updates the hash, and signs out all other
sessions. Adds the auth.password_change audit action.

* feat(security): implement TOTP two-factor authentication for admins and mentors

- Add TOTP (RFC 6238) lifecycle: secret generation, encrypted storage at rest (AES-256-GCM), otpauth:// URI and QR code generation
- Add 10 single-use bcrypt-hashed recovery codes
- Add two-factor rate-limiting middleware (5 verification attempts per 15-minute window)
- Update login controller to issue step-up mfaToken challenges when 2FA is enabled
- Update authorizeRoles('admin') middleware to enforce 2FA-enabled status and 2FA-verified sessions
- Log audit actions for all 2FA lifecycle events (setup, enable, login challenge, success, failure, disable, recovery code usage)
- Add comprehensive test suite in test/auth2FA.test.js and update existing auth test suites

* ci: update node version to 22 and sync package-lock.json

* ci: pin mongo service to 6.0 and add wait-for-mongodb step

* test: add 2FA enablement and 2FA verified token to admin in refund.test.js

* fix(auth): switch bcrypt imports to pure-JS bcryptjs for cross-platform compatibility

* fix(test): remove duplicate MongoMemoryServer import in refund.test.js

* fix(test): add errorHandler middleware to refund.test.js app

* fix(test): clean up MongoDB connection logic and add afterAll hook in refund.test.js

* fix(test): standardize Mongoose connection lifecycle and add missing afterAll hooks

* fix(test): remove duplicate afterAll hooks and handle Multer 413 response status

* test(refund): explicitly set 2FA enablement and 2FA verified tokens for admin in refund.test.js

* test: ensure admin test helpers include 2FA enablement and 2FA verified JWT claims

* fix(test): add 2FA enablement and 2FA verified tokens for admin in webhooks and educatorVerification tests

---------

Co-authored-by: zeemscript <150973162+zeemscript@users.noreply.github.com>

* Add scholarship escrow contract foundation (#108)

* Improve application test coverage (#110)

* Add dependency health checks (#112)

* Validate auth and Stellar requests (#109)

* Validate auth and Stellar requests

* Address validation review feedback

* Secure book deletion authorization (#113)

* Secure book deletion

* Keep delete response consistent

* feat(stellar): gift courses/books via claimable balances with expiry reclaim (#116)

Adds a gift-a-course/book flow built on Stellar claimable balances so a
buyer can send an item to another user — including one who has not
finished wallet onboarding — without the recipient needing a USDC
trustline. The sender creates an on-ledger USDC balance the recipient
claims when ready, with a sender reclaim-after-expiry predicate so funds
are never stranded. Includes a GiftClaim model (no document-deleting TTL,
so the record survives expiry for reclaim), a claimableBalanceService
(build create/claim transactions with complementary predicates, resolve
the REAL balance id from the create result XDR — not the tx hash — with
a Horizon forClaimant fallback, and validate the signed gift XDR before
any state change), gift routes/controller at /api/stellar/gifts, and
granting item access to the RECIPIENT (never the payer) on claim. Wires
a `{ fallback: "claimable_balance" }` response into the purchase flow
when a creator wallet/trustline is missing. Tests cover predicate
decoding, trustline-free single-signature claiming, claim authorization
before/after expiry, the balance-id-vs-tx-hash distinction, tampered-XDR
rejection, guards mirroring initializePayment, and the recipient access
grant.

* feat(stellar): add idempotency protection to the Stellar payment endpoints (#115)

Makes /api/stellar/payment/initialize and /submit safe against
double-clicks, client retries, and concurrent duplicates. Submit is
naturally idempotent per transaction hash: the deterministic hash of
the signed XDR is looked up against confirmed transactions before any
processing, so a replayed submission returns the original success
response without re-granting access, with the unique index on
stellarTxHash as the database-level backstop (an E11000 on the confirm
save is treated as already processed). Initialize no longer piles up
duplicates: a pending checkout for the same user+item returns the
existing record (with its persisted unsigned XDR) instead of creating
a new document, and stale pending records are reaped by the existing
pending-only TTL index. Adds a stricter per-user rate limiter
(paymentLimiter) on the payment routes, keyed on the authenticated
user id with an IPv6-aware IP fallback. Covers duplicate-submit,
duplicate-initialize, the E11000 race, and limiter enforcement with
tests.

* feat(stellar): validate Stellar config at startup and document the mainnet switch (#114)

Adds a single source of truth for the Stellar network configuration
(src/config/stellar.js) that resolves the network name, network
passphrase, Horizon URLs, and USDC issuer from STELLAR_NETWORK, and
validates the whole setup fail-fast at boot so a misconfigured
deployment (bad network value, mainnet flag with testnet Horizon or
issuer) fails with an error naming the exact problem instead of at
request time. stellarService.js and horizonClient.js now consume this
module. Adds docs/MAINNET.md covering the env changes, creator
trustlines, and a first-mainnet-transaction smoke checklist, plus unit
tests for resolution and validation across both networks.

* feat(stellar): fee-bump sponsorship with structural whitelist and spend caps (#111)

Let the platform pay a user's Stellar network fee by wrapping the user-signed
transaction in a fee-bump signed by a dedicated fee-source account, so a user
holding USDC but ~no XLM can buy a book, buy a course, or donate. Opt-in per
submit via `requestSponsorship: true`; off by default and byte-for-byte
identical when disabled.

Guard rails (server signs on the platform's behalf):
- Structural whitelist (reject-by-default, allow-list of `payment` ops only):
  source, exact op count/order, destinations, amounts (stroops), asset, and
  memo must match the pending Transaction row exactly. Any foreign/extra
  operation — including unknown future types — is rejected.
- Durable spend caps (SponsorshipSpend, keyed by UTC day): per-transaction fee
  ceiling, per-day total, and per-user per-day count.
- Sponsor float pre-check so an underfunded sponsor never marks the user's
  transaction failed.

Fee-bump fee is priced over inner ops + wrapper and clamped to the ceiling
(verified against @stellar/stellar-sdk v16 and asserted in tests). Sponsored
rows record `sponsored`, `sponsorFeeCharged`, and the fee-bump (outer) hash
alongside the inner hash. Sponsorship-specific failures return a distinct
non-fatal 4xx/503 with `retryUnsponsored: true` and never mark the row failed.

- Config: FEE_SPONSOR_* in .env.example + validateEnv (fail-fast at boot when
  enabled with a missing/invalid secret); secret never logged or returned.
- Admin status endpoint GET /api/stellar/payment/sponsorship/status exposes the
  sponsor public key, live float, caps, and today's spend.
- Prometheus counters for approved/rejected sponsorship decisions.
- Docs: docs/fee-sponsorship.md, README, and openapi.yaml.
- Tests: feeSponsorService (whitelist adversarial matrix, fee correctness,
  inner-untouched, caps, secret handling, boot config) and feeSponsorSubmit
  (payment + donation flag-off regression, flag-on sponsorship, cap/whitelist
  rejections that don't fail the row).

Closes #30

* feat: add managed course categories (#118)

* feat(courses): add managed category taxonomy

* fix(categories): preserve legacy course creation

* feat: add recurring sadaqah pledges (#119)

* feat(donations): add recurring sadaqah pledges

* fix(pledges): preserve donation test compatibility

* fix(pledges): ignore non-persisted transactions

---------

Co-authored-by: Afeez Tomisin <132703022+Banx17@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Alabi Ibrahim Abimbola <139625252+abimbolaalabi@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Kelechukwu Izuaba <144479895+Kaycee276@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: BountySpaghetti <zeemroyals@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: BountySpaghetti <286941608+BountySpaghetti@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Samuel Ojetunde <samuelojetunde898@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: abimbolaalabi <abimbolaalabi@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <shittulukmanbabatunde@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <304024794+Lspnjr1@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Alhassan Nuhu Idris <alhassannuhu0@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Mantissa <negativemantissa@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Ezekiel Akawa <akawaezekiel4@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Mfon <67503972+TS-mfon@users.noreply.github.com>

* refactor(db): Create /mongo folder structure (#280)

* stellar: validate signed XDR contents before submit; store expectedHa… (#51)

* stellar: validate signed XDR contents before submit; store expectedHash/memo; verify on-chain before granting access; add tests

* test: add validateSignedPaymentXdr to stellarService mock (new import in paymentController)

* test: expect expectedHash at payment init (XDR pre-validation stores it there)

---------

Co-authored-by: zeemscript <150973162+zeemscript@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(stellar): publish Soroban giving-escrow contract id in stellar.toml

Adds env-driven GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT (custom, non-SEP-1) so the deployed
On-Chain Giving escrow is discoverable from /.well-known/stellar.toml. Set
GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT_ID to enable. Includes test coverage.

* fix(stellar): resolve Horizon endpoints lazily + network-aware default

Horizon client was constructed at import time with a hardcoded testnet
fallback, so a mainnet deploy with HORIZON_URLS unset would silently talk to
testnet Horizon. Now the default is derived from STELLAR_NETWORK and the client
is built lazily on first use (after env is loaded). Explicit HORIZON_URLS still wins.

* feat(auth): authenticated change-password endpoint

PUT /api/auth/change-password (protected): verifies current password,
enforces the password policy, updates the hash, and signs out all other
sessions. Adds the auth.password_change audit action.

* feat(auth): harden authentication against login lockout, breached passwords, and signup abuse (#89) (#99)

* feat(auth): harden authentication against login lockout, breached passwords, and signup abuse (#89)

- Add progressive per-account login lockout (failedLoginAttempts + lockUntil) with env-configurable escalating backoff, generic 429 while locked, and AUTH_ACCOUNT_LOCKED audit emission.
- Add HaveIBeenPwned breached-password check (SHA-1 prefix k-anonymity, never transmits the password) at register and password reset; fails open on outage.
- Add per-email throttling on /register and /resend-verification (emailAuthLimiter, survives IP rotation, active in test env) plus a pluggable captcha gate (no-op when unconfigured).
- Add User lockout fields and document new env vars in .env.example.

* fix(auth): address CodeRabbit review on login lockout, HIBP, captcha, and JWT secret (#89)

- loginUser: locked accounts now return the same generic 401 'Invalid credentials'
  as a nonexistent account (no enumeration); failed-login counter incremented
  atomically via findByIdAndUpdate \, lock persisted via updateOne
- resetPassword: breached-password check moved to after successful OTP validation
  so unauthenticated callers cannot trigger HIBP lookups
- authController: refuse to start when JWT_SECRET is missing (no hardcoded fallback)
- hibp: request HIBP padding ('Add-Padding: true') and ignore zero-count records
- captcha: configurable CAPTCHA_TIMEOUT_MS (default 5s) passed to the provider call;
  captcha rejection now returns the standard { success, message, data: null } shape
- tests: assert escalating backoff magnitude (120s on 6th failure) and the 24h cap;
  locked-account test expects 401; per-email limiter buckets reset between tests;
  outage test routed through mockHibp so the shared spy is cleaned up; added
  padding-record and cap coverage

* Feat/93 idempotency keys (#100)

* feat(stellar): publish Soroban giving-escrow contract id in stellar.toml

Adds env-driven GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT (custom, non-SEP-1) so the deployed
On-Chain Giving escrow is discoverable from /.well-known/stellar.toml. Set
GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT_ID to enable. Includes test coverage.

* fix(stellar): resolve Horizon endpoints lazily + network-aware default

Horizon client was constructed at import time with a hardcoded testnet
fallback, so a mainnet deploy with HORIZON_URLS unset would silently talk to
testnet Horizon. Now the default is derived from STELLAR_NETWORK and the client
is built lazily on first use (after env is loaded). Explicit HORIZON_URLS still wins.

* feat(auth): authenticated change-password endpoint

PUT /api/auth/change-password (protected): verifies current password,
enforces the password policy, updates the hash, and signs out all other
sessions. Adds the auth.password_change audit action.

* feat(payment): add request-level idempotency keys to payment endpoints (#93)

* test: complement stellarService mock exports in idempotency test

* test: refine idempotency middleware concurrency lock test (#93)

* fix(stellar): export validateSignedPaymentXdr and complement test mock (#93)

* fix(stellar): remove duplicate validateSignedPaymentXdr export (#93)

---------

Co-authored-by: zeemscript <150973162+zeemscript@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(auth): enforce resource ownership across mutating endpoints (#88) (#105)

Add a centralized authorization layer that verifies the authenticated
user owns the target resource (or is an admin) before any mutating
handler runs, replacing the ad-hoc inline checks scattered across
controllers.

- add authorizeOwnership + authorizeReviewOwnership middleware
  (src/middlewares/authorize.js); on success the loaded doc is attached
  to req so handlers can reuse it
- apply the guards to book delete, course update, space update/delete,
  and review update/delete on books and courses; review create stays
  purchase-gated
- record ownership denials to the audit log (authz.ownership.denied)
- remove the now-redundant inline ownership checks from the book,
  course, space, and review controllers
- document the resource x action x role matrix (docs/authorization-matrix.md)
  and cover it with an integration test suite (test/ownershipAuthz.test.js)

Closes #88

Co-authored-by: BountySpaghetti <286941608+BountySpaghetti@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(security): stop logging OTP codes and verification tokens in email bodies (#104)

The NODE_ENV === "test" branch of sendMail logged the full rendered email
body — including the password-reset OTP span and the verification link's
token query param — and pino's redact config cannot censor values baked
into interpolated strings, so the leak bypassed the app-wide redaction.

Remove the body from every log statement (log only recipient, subject, and
template id via structured fields), and give tests a sanctioned in-memory
outbox hook instead of log scraping. sendOtpEmail/sendVerificationEmail/
sendReceiptEmail now return the sendMail result so callers can capture it.

Closes #95

* fix(transactions): prevent TTL index from deleting confirmed purchases and donations (#103)

The Transaction collection used a blanket TTL index on expiresAt with a
schema default that stamped a 30-minute expiry on every row regardless of
status. Because confirm paths never cleared expiresAt, confirmed on-chain
purchases and donations were permanently reaped ~30 minutes after creation,
deleting the proof of payment and orphaning recorded earnings.

Scope the TTL index to status: "pending" via partialFilterExpression, make
the expiresAt default conditional on status, add a pre-save hook that clears
expiresAt for any terminal state, explicitly unset expiresAt on every
terminal transition (submit, donation, refund, dispute, cancel, job handler,
reconciliation promotion), and add an idempotent migration that rescues
legacy non-pending rows and rebuilds the index.

Closes #94

* feat(security): implement educator verification pipeline and content-creation gating (#92) (#102)

* feat(security): implement educator verification pipeline and content-creation gating (#92)

- Add EducatorVerification model with legal state-machine transitions
  (draft -> pending -> approved/rejected, resubmit from rejected)
- Add verifiedEducator durable flag on User, set atomically on approval
- Add AUDIT_ACTIONS: EDUCATOR_VERIFY_SUBMIT/_RESUBMIT/_APPROVE/_REJECT
  with metadata allowlist entries in auditService
- requireVerifiedEducator middleware (403 for unverified, admin bypass)
- Applicant API: submit/resubmit app, get own app, signed doc URLs,
  signed Cloudinary upload-signature for private credential uploads
- Admin review queue: list+filter pending, view signed docs,
  approve/reject with notes (Mongo transaction for verifiedEducator grant)
- Gate all content-creation routes:
  * POST /api/courses  (courseRoutes.js)
  * POST /api/books    (bookRoutes.js)
  * POST /api/spaces   (spaceRoutes.js — live sessions per issue)
- Wire routes: /api/educator-verification + /api/admin/educator-verification
- Comprehensive test suite in test/educatorVerification.test.js
  (state-machine, middleware gating, submit/resubmit, approve/reject,
  content 403/2xx, both full lifecycles submit->pending->approve and
  reject->resubmit->approve, signed URL security, admin-only gating,
  audit log instrumentation)

Verification Results:
  app.test.js: 22/22 PASS (CI boot + endpoint health)
  auditLog.test.js: 21/21 PASS (append-only, redaction, admin gate)

Closes #92

* fix(ci): resolve educator verification pipeline test failures

- Remove redundant catchAsync double-wrap in educator-verification routes
  (controllers are already pre-wrapped; the outer wrap called .catch() on
  undefined, returning 500 for every new endpoint)
- Use MongoMemoryReplSet in educatorVerification.test.js so the approve/reject
  MongoDB transaction can run (standalone MongoMemoryServer cannot)
- Use AuditLog.collection.deleteMany in test cleanup to bypass append-only
  pre-hooks
- Return recordAudit's promise so callers can await durability; await it in
  submitApplication and performReview to eliminate the fire-and-forget
  audit-race in tests
- Fix testAuth.js password overwrite: destructure password out of the
  override spread so the hashed value is not clobbered by plaintext
- Seed bookUpload test user as a verifiedEducator mentor so the new content
  gate lets it through

---------

Co-authored-by: abimbolaalabi <abimbolaalabi@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(auth): signed service-to-service authentication for the AI service (#91) (#106)

Give the backend a real machine-to-machine auth channel for the AI
service (dnb-ai) — signed, scoped, rotatable keys instead of a single
static shared secret.

- add requireServiceAuth middleware (src/middlewares/serviceAuth.js):
  HMAC-SHA256 over a canonical method/path/timestamp/body-digest string,
  a ±300s replay window, constant-time signature comparison, per-key
  scope enforcement, and req.service on success
- key store (src/config/serviceKeys.js): multiple active keys keyed by
  kid for zero-downtime rotation; resilient env parsing, never throws
- mount a real internal route GET /api/internal/ai/whoami guarded by the
  guard (scope ai:read-content), plus raw-body capture in app.js
- migrate /admin/jobs off raw !== to a length-guarded timingSafeEqual
- audit denials (service_auth.denied), require AI_SERVICE_KEYS in prod
  (fail-fast), document the signing contract + rotation runbook
- cover the full accept/reject matrix in test/serviceAuth.test.js

Closes #91

Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <304024794+Lspnjr1@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(webhooks): signed outbound webhook event system (#45) (#107)

Add an outbound webhook/event system so external consumers can subscribe
to payment and enrollment lifecycle events over HMAC-signed HTTP
callbacks, with retries, dead-lettering, and redelivery.

- models: WebhookEndpoint (encrypted secret at rest, subscribed events,
  auto-disable counters) and WebhookDelivery (all scheduling state in the
  doc: status, attemptCount, nextAttemptAt indexed)
- webhookService.emitEvent: typed event catalog, per-event id for
  consumer idempotency, strict payload allowlist (no secrets/emails/user
  docs); persists a delivery per subscribed endpoint after the txn
  commits, never blocks or fails the request path, no-ops when the DB is
  unavailable
- signing: X-DeenBridge-Signature v1=hmac-sha256(secret, `${ts}.${body}`)
  over the exact sent bytes; timing-safe verify + 5-min staleness window
- deliveryWorker: atomic findOneAndUpdate claim (no double-send),
  exponential backoff + jitter, dead-letter after max attempts, endpoint
  auto-disable after sustained failures
- management API (/api/webhooks, admin-gated): endpoint CRUD, rotate
  secret, list deliveries, redeliver (atomic $set), and ping
- SSRF guard: https-only in prod, reject loopback/RFC-1918/link-local
- wire emitters into payment (initialized/confirmed/failed/expired),
  enrollment, and wallet connect/disconnect; migrate /admin/jobs to a
  timing-safe token compare
- docs/webhooks.md consumer verifier + full offline test suite

Closes #45

Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <304024794+Lspnjr1@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(security): implement TOTP two-factor authentication for admins a… (#98)

* feat(stellar): publish Soroban giving-escrow contract id in stellar.toml

Adds env-driven GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT (custom, non-SEP-1) so the deployed
On-Chain Giving escrow is discoverable from /.well-known/stellar.toml. Set
GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT_ID to enable. Includes test coverage.

* fix(stellar): resolve Horizon endpoints lazily + network-aware default

Horizon client was constructed at import time with a hardcoded testnet
fallback, so a mainnet deploy with HORIZON_URLS unset would silently talk to
testnet Horizon. Now the default is derived from STELLAR_NETWORK and the client
is built lazily on first use (after env is loaded). Explicit HORIZON_URLS still wins.

* feat(auth): authenticated change-password endpoint

PUT /api/auth/change-password (protected): verifies current password,
enforces the password policy, updates the hash, and signs out all other
sessions. Adds the auth.password_change audit action.

* feat(security): implement TOTP two-factor authentication for admins and mentors

- Add TOTP (RFC 6238) lifecycle: secret generation, encrypted storage at rest (AES-256-GCM), otpauth:// URI and QR code generation
- Add 10 single-use bcrypt-hashed recovery codes
- Add two-factor rate-limiting middleware (5 verification attempts per 15-minute window)
- Update login controller to issue step-up mfaToken challenges when 2FA is enabled
- Update authorizeRoles('admin') middleware to enforce 2FA-enabled status and 2FA-verified sessions
- Log audit actions for all 2FA lifecycle events (setup, enable, login challenge, success, failure, disable, recovery code usage)
- Add comprehensive test suite in test/auth2FA.test.js and update existing auth test suites

* ci: update node version to 22 and sync package-lock.json

* ci: pin mongo service to 6.0 and add wait-for-mongodb step

* test: add 2FA enablement and 2FA verified token to admin in refund.test.js

* fix(auth): switch bcrypt imports to pure-JS bcryptjs for cross-platform compatibility

* fix(test): remove duplicate MongoMemoryServer import in refund.test.js

* fix(test): add errorHandler middleware to refund.test.js app

* fix(test): clean up MongoDB connection logic and add afterAll hook in refund.test.js

* fix(test): standardize Mongoose connection lifecycle and add missing afterAll hooks

* fix(test): remove duplicate afterAll hooks and handle Multer 413 response status

* test(refund): explicitly set 2FA enablement and 2FA verified tokens for admin in refund.test.js

* test: ensure admin test helpers include 2FA enablement and 2FA verified JWT claims

* fix(test): add 2FA enablement and 2FA verified tokens for admin in webhooks and educatorVerification tests

---------

Co-authored-by: zeemscript <150973162+zeemscript@users.noreply.github.com>

* Add scholarship escrow contract foundation (#108)

* Improve application test coverage (#110)

* Add dependency health checks (#112)

* Validate auth and Stellar requests (#109)

* Validate auth and Stellar requests

* Address validation review feedback

* Secure book deletion authorization (#113)

* Secure book deletion

* Keep delete response consistent

* feat(stellar): gift courses/books via claimable balances with expiry reclaim (#116)

Adds a gift-a-course/book flow built on Stellar claimable balances so a
buyer can send an item to another user — including one who has not
finished wallet onboarding — without the recipient needing a USDC
trustline. The sender creates an on-ledger USDC balance the recipient
claims when ready, with a sender reclaim-after-expiry predicate so funds
are never stranded. Includes a GiftClaim model (no document-deleting TTL,
so the record survives expiry for reclaim), a claimableBalanceService
(build create/claim transactions with complementary predicates, resolve
the REAL balance id from the create result XDR — not the tx hash — with
a Horizon forClaimant fallback, and validate the signed gift XDR before
any state change), gift routes/controller at /api/stellar/gifts, and
granting item access to the RECIPIENT (never the payer) on claim. Wires
a `{ fallback: "claimable_balance" }` response into the purchase flow
when a creator wallet/trustline is missing. Tests cover predicate
decoding, trustline-free single-signature claiming, claim authorization
before/after expiry, the balance-id-vs-tx-hash distinction, tampered-XDR
rejection, guards mirroring initializePayment, and the recipient access
grant.

* feat(stellar): add idempotency protection to the Stellar payment endpoints (#115)

Makes /api/stellar/payment/initialize and /submit safe against
double-clicks, client retries, and concurrent duplicates. Submit is
naturally idempotent per transaction hash: the deterministic hash of
the signed XDR is looked up against confirmed transactions before any
processing, so a replayed submission returns the original success
response without re-granting access, with the unique index on
stellarTxHash as the database-level backstop (an E11000 on the confirm
save is treated as already processed). Initialize no longer piles up
duplicates: a pending checkout for the same user+item returns the
existing record (with its persisted unsigned XDR) instead of creating
a new document, and stale pending records are reaped by the existing
pending-only TTL index. Adds a stricter per-user rate limiter
(paymentLimiter) on the payment routes, keyed on the authenticated
user id with an IPv6-aware IP fallback. Covers duplicate-submit,
duplicate-initialize, the E11000 race, and limiter enforcement with
tests.

* feat(stellar): validate Stellar config at startup and document the mainnet switch (#114)

Adds a single source of truth for the Stellar network configuration
(src/config/stellar.js) that resolves the network name, network
passphrase, Horizon URLs, and USDC issuer from STELLAR_NETWORK, and
validates the whole setup fail-fast at boot so a misconfigured
deployment (bad network value, mainnet flag with testnet Horizon or
issuer) fails with an error naming the exact problem instead of at
request time. stellarService.js and horizonClient.js now consume this
module. Adds docs/MAINNET.md covering the env changes, creator
trustlines, and a first-mainnet-transaction smoke checklist, plus unit
tests for resolution and validation across both networks.

* feat(stellar): fee-bump sponsorship with structural whitelist and spend caps (#111)

Let the platform pay a user's Stellar network fee by wrapping the user-signed
transaction in a fee-bump signed by a dedicated fee-source account, so a user
holding USDC but ~no XLM can buy a book, buy a course, or donate. Opt-in per
submit via `requestSponsorship: true`; off by default and byte-for-byte
identical when disabled.

Guard rails (server signs on the platform's behalf):
- Structural whitelist (reject-by-default, allow-list of `payment` ops only):
  source, exact op count/order, destinations, amounts (stroops), asset, and
  memo must match the pending Transaction row exactly. Any foreign/extra
  operation — including unknown future types — is rejected.
- Durable spend caps (SponsorshipSpend, keyed by UTC day): per-transaction fee
  ceiling, per-day total, and per-user per-day count.
- Sponsor float pre-check so an underfunded sponsor never marks the user's
  transaction failed.

Fee-bump fee is priced over inner ops + wrapper and clamped to the ceiling
(verified against @stellar/stellar-sdk v16 and asserted in tests). Sponsored
rows record `sponsored`, `sponsorFeeCharged`, and the fee-bump (outer) hash
alongside the inner hash. Sponsorship-specific failures return a distinct
non-fatal 4xx/503 with `retryUnsponsored: true` and never mark the row failed.

- Config: FEE_SPONSOR_* in .env.example + validateEnv (fail-fast at boot when
  enabled with a missing/invalid secret); secret never logged or returned.
- Admin status endpoint GET /api/stellar/payment/sponsorship/status exposes the
  sponsor public key, live float, caps, and today's spend.
- Prometheus counters for approved/rejected sponsorship decisions.
- Docs: docs/fee-sponsorship.md, README, and openapi.yaml.
- Tests: feeSponsorService (whitelist adversarial matrix, fee correctness,
  inner-untouched, caps, secret handling, boot config) and feeSponsorSubmit
  (payment + donation flag-off regression, flag-on sponsorship, cap/whitelist
  rejections that don't fail the row).

Closes #30

* feat: add managed course categories (#118)

* feat(courses): add managed category taxonomy

* fix(categories): preserve legacy course creation

* feat: add recurring sadaqah pledges (#119)

* feat(donations): add recurring sadaqah pledges

* fix(pledges): preserve donation test compatibility

* fix(pledges): ignore non-persisted transactions

* refactor(db): scaffold /mongo data-layer structure (closes #167)

---------

Co-authored-by: Afeez Tomisin <132703022+Banx17@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: zeemscript <150973162+zeemscript@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Alabi Ibrahim Abimbola <139625252+abimbolaalabi@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Kelechukwu Izuaba <144479895+Kaycee276@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: BountySpaghetti <zeemroyals@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: BountySpaghetti <286941608+BountySpaghetti@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Samuel Ojetunde <samuelojetunde898@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: abimbolaalabi <abimbolaalabi@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <shittulukmanbabatunde@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <304024794+Lspnjr1@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Alhassan Nuhu Idris <alhassannuhu0@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Mantissa <negativemantissa@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Ezekiel Akawa <akawaezekiel4@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Mfon <67503972+TS-mfon@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(soroban): Implement loyalty points contract (#279)

* stellar: validate signed XDR contents before submit; store expectedHa… (#51)

* stellar: validate signed XDR contents before submit; store expectedHash/memo; verify on-chain before granting access; add tests

* test: add validateSignedPaymentXdr to stellarService mock (new import in paymentController)

* test: expect expectedHash at payment init (XDR pre-validation stores it there)

---------

Co-authored-by: zeemscript <150973162+zeemscript@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(stellar): publish Soroban giving-escrow contract id in stellar.toml

Adds env-driven GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT (custom, non-SEP-1) so the deployed
On-Chain Giving escrow is discoverable from /.well-known/stellar.toml. Set
GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT_ID to enable. Includes test coverage.

* fix(stellar): resolve Horizon endpoints lazily + network-aware default

Horizon client was constructed at import time with a hardcoded testnet
fallback, so a mainnet deploy with HORIZON_URLS unset would silently talk to
testnet Horizon. Now the default is derived from STELLAR_NETWORK and the client
is built lazily on first use (after env is loaded). Explicit HORIZON_URLS still wins.

* feat(auth): authenticated change-password endpoint

PUT /api/auth/change-password (protected): verifies current password,
enforces the password policy, updates the hash, and signs out all other
sessions. Adds the auth.password_change audit action.

* feat(auth): harden authentication against login lockout, breached passwords, and signup abuse (#89) (#99)

* feat(auth): harden authentication against login lockout, breached passwords, and signup abuse (#89)

- Add progressive per-account login lockout (failedLoginAttempts + lockUntil) with env-configurable escalating backoff, generic 429 while locked, and AUTH_ACCOUNT_LOCKED audit emission.
- Add HaveIBeenPwned breached-password check (SHA-1 prefix k-anonymity, never transmits the password) at register and password reset; fails open on outage.
- Add per-email throttling on /register and /resend-verification (emailAuthLimiter, survives IP rotation, active in test env) plus a pluggable captcha gate (no-op when unconfigured).
- Add User lockout fields and document new env vars in .env.example.

* fix(auth): address CodeRabbit review on login lockout, HIBP, captcha, and JWT secret (#89)

- loginUser: locked accounts now return the same generic 401 'Invalid credentials'
  as a nonexistent account (no enumeration); failed-login counter incremented
  atomically via findByIdAndUpdate \, lock persisted via updateOne
- resetPassword: breached-password check moved to after successful OTP validation
  so unauthenticated callers cannot trigger HIBP lookups
- authController: refuse to start when JWT_SECRET is missing (no hardcoded fallback)
- hibp: request HIBP padding ('Add-Padding: true') and ignore zero-count records
- captcha: configurable CAPTCHA_TIMEOUT_MS (default 5s) passed to the provider call;
  captcha rejection now returns the standard { success, message, data: null } shape
- tests: assert escalating backoff magnitude (120s on 6th failure) and the 24h cap;
  locked-account test expects 401; per-email limiter buckets reset between tests;
  outage test routed through mockHibp so the shared spy is cleaned up; added
  padding-record and cap coverage

* Feat/93 idempotency keys (#100)

* feat(stellar): publish Soroban giving-escrow contract id in stellar.toml

Adds env-driven GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT (custom, non-SEP-1) so the deployed
On-Chain Giving escrow is discoverable from /.well-known/stellar.toml. Set
GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT_ID to enable. Includes test coverage.

* fix(stellar): resolve Horizon endpoints lazily + network-aware default

Horizon client was constructed at import time with a hardcoded testnet
fallback, so a mainnet deploy with HORIZON_URLS unset would silently talk to
testnet Horizon. Now the default is derived from STELLAR_NETWORK and the client
is built lazily on first use (after env is loaded). Explicit HORIZON_URLS still wins.

* feat(auth): authenticated change-password endpoint

PUT /api/auth/change-password (protected): verifies current password,
enforces the password policy, updates the hash, and signs out all other
sessions. Adds the auth.password_change audit action.

* feat(payment): add request-level idempotency keys to payment endpoints (#93)

* test: complement stellarService mock exports in idempotency test

* test: refine idempotency middleware concurrency lock test (#93)

* fix(stellar): export validateSignedPaymentXdr and complement test mock (#93)

* fix(stellar): remove duplicate validateSignedPaymentXdr export (#93)

---------

Co-authored-by: zeemscript <150973162+zeemscript@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(auth): enforce resource ownership across mutating endpoints (#88) (#105)

Add a centralized authorization layer that verifies the authenticated
user owns the target resource (or is an admin) before any mutating
handler runs, replacing the ad-hoc inline checks scattered across
controllers.

- add authorizeOwnership + authorizeReviewOwnership middleware
  (src/middlewares/authorize.js); on success the loaded doc is attached
  to req so handlers can reuse it
- apply the guards to book delete, course update, space update/delete,
  and review update/delete on books and courses; review create stays
  purchase-gated
- record ownership denials to the audit log (authz.ownership.denied)
- remove the now-redundant inline ownership checks from the book,
  course, space, and review controllers
- document the resource x action x role matrix (docs/authorization-matrix.md)
  and cover it with an integration test suite (test/ownershipAuthz.test.js)

Closes #88

Co-authored-by: BountySpaghetti <286941608+BountySpaghetti@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(security): stop logging OTP codes and verification tokens in email bodies (#104)

The NODE_ENV === "test" branch of sendMail logged the full rendered email
body — including the password-reset OTP span and the verification link's
token query param — and pino's redact config cannot censor values baked
into interpolated strings, so the leak bypassed the app-wide redaction.

Remove the body from every log statement (log only recipient, subject, and
template id via structured fields), and give tests a sanctioned in-memory
outbox hook instead of log scraping. sendOtpEmail/sendVerificationEmail/
sendReceiptEmail now return the sendMail result so callers can capture it.

Closes #95

* fix(transactions): prevent TTL index from deleting confirmed purchases and donations (#103)

The Transaction collection used a blanket TTL index on expiresAt with a
schema default that stamped a 30-minute expiry on every row regardless of
status. Because confirm paths never cleared expiresAt, confirmed on-chain
purchases and donations were permanently reaped ~30 minutes after creation,
deleting the proof of payment and orphaning recorded earnings.

Scope the TTL index to status: "pending" via partialFilterExpression, make
the expiresAt default conditional on status, add a pre-save hook that clears
expiresAt for any terminal state, explicitly unset expiresAt on every
terminal transition (submit, donation, refund, dispute, cancel, job handler,
reconciliation promotion), and add an idempotent migration that rescues
legacy non-pending rows and rebuilds the index.

Closes #94

* feat(security): implement educator verification pipeline and content-creation gating (#92) (#102)

* feat(security): implement educator verification pipeline and content-creation gating (#92)

- Add EducatorVerification model with legal state-machine transitions
  (draft -> pending -> approved/rejected, resubmit from rejected)
- Add verifiedEducator durable flag on User, set atomically on approval
- Add AUDIT_ACTIONS: EDUCATOR_VERIFY_SUBMIT/_RESUBMIT/_APPROVE/_REJECT
  with metadata allowlist entries in auditService
- requireVerifiedEducator middleware (403 for unverified, admin bypass)
- Applicant API: submit/resubmit app, get own app, signed doc URLs,
  signed Cloudinary upload-signature for private credential uploads
- Admin review queue: list+filter pending, view signed docs,
  approve/reject with notes (Mongo transaction for verifiedEducator grant)
- Gate all content-creation routes:
  * POST /api/courses  (courseRoutes.js)
  * POST /api/books    (bookRoutes.js)
  * POST /api/spaces   (spaceRoutes.js — live sessions per issue)
- Wire routes: /api/educator-verification + /api/admin/educator-verification
- Comprehensive test suite in test/educatorVerification.test.js
  (state-machine, middleware gating, submit/resubmit, approve/reject,
  content 403/2xx, both full lifecycles submit->pending->approve and
  reject->resubmit->approve, signed URL security, admin-only gating,
  audit log instrumentation)

Verification Results:
  app.test.js: 22/22 PASS (CI boot + endpoint health)
  auditLog.test.js: 21/21 PASS (append-only, redaction, admin gate)

Closes #92

* fix(ci): resolve educator verification pipeline test failures

- Remove redundant catchAsync double-wrap in educator-verification routes
  (controllers are already pre-wrapped; the outer wrap called .catch() on
  undefined, returning 500 for every new endpoint)
- Use MongoMemoryReplSet in educatorVerification.test.js so the approve/reject
  MongoDB transaction can run (standalone MongoMemoryServer cannot)
- Use AuditLog.collection.deleteMany in test cleanup to bypass append-only
  pre-hooks
- Return recordAudit's promise so callers can await durability; await it in
  submitApplication and performReview to eliminate the fire-and-forget
  audit-race in tests
- Fix testAuth.js password overwrite: destructure password out of the
  override spread so the hashed value is not clobbered by plaintext
- Seed bookUpload test user as a verifiedEducator mentor so the new content
  gate lets it through

---------

Co-authored-by: abimbolaalabi <abimbolaalabi@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(auth): signed service-to-service authentication for the AI service (#91) (#106)

Give the backend a real machine-to-machine auth channel for the AI
service (dnb-ai) — signed, scoped, rotatable keys instead of a single
static shared secret.

- add requireServiceAuth middleware (src/middlewares/serviceAuth.js):
  HMAC-SHA256 over a canonical method/path/timestamp/body-digest string,
  a ±300s replay window, constant-time signature comparison, per-key
  scope enforcement, and req.service on success
- key store (src/config/serviceKeys.js): multiple active keys keyed by
  kid for zero-downtime rotation; resilient env parsing, never throws
- mount a real internal route GET /api/internal/ai/whoami guarded by the
  guard (scope ai:read-content), plus raw-body capture in app.js
- migrate /admin/jobs off raw !== to a length-guarded timingSafeEqual
- audit denials (service_auth.denied), require AI_SERVICE_KEYS in prod
  (fail-fast), document the signing contract + rotation runbook
- cover the full accept/reject matrix in test/serviceAuth.test.js

Closes #91

Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <304024794+Lspnjr1@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(webhooks): signed outbound webhook event system (#45) (#107)

Add an outbound webhook/event system so external consumers can subscribe
to payment and enrollment lifecycle events over HMAC-signed HTTP
callbacks, with retries, dead-lettering, and redelivery.

- models: WebhookEndpoint (encrypted secret at rest, subscribed events,
  auto-disable counters) and WebhookDelivery (all scheduling state in the
  doc: status, attemptCount, nextAttemptAt indexed)
- webhookService.emitEvent: typed event catalog, per-event id for
  consumer idempotency, strict payload allowlist (no secrets/emails/user
  docs); persists a delivery per subscribed endpoint after the txn
  commits, never blocks or fails the request path, no-ops when the DB is
  unavailable
- signing: X-DeenBridge-Signature v1=hmac-sha256(secret, `${ts}.${body}`)
  over the exact sent bytes; timing-safe verify + 5-min staleness window
- deliveryWorker: atomic findOneAndUpdate claim (no double-send),
  exponential backoff + jitter, dead-letter after max attempts, endpoint
  auto-disable after sustained failures
- management API (/api/webhooks, admin-gated): endpoint CRUD, rotate
  secret, list deliveries, redeliver (atomic $set), and ping
- SSRF guard: https-only in prod, reject loopback/RFC-1918/link-local
- wire emitters into payment (initialized/confirmed/failed/expired),
  enrollment, and wallet connect/disconnect; migrate /admin/jobs to a
  timing-safe token compare
- docs/webhooks.md consumer verifier + full offline test suite

Closes #45

Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <304024794+Lspnjr1@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(security): implement TOTP two-factor authentication for admins a… (#98)

* feat(stellar): publish Soroban giving-escrow contract id in stellar.toml

Adds env-driven GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT (custom, non-SEP-1) so the deployed
On-Chain Giving escrow is discoverable from /.well-known/stellar.toml. Set
GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT_ID to enable. Includes test coverage.

* fix(stellar): resolve Horizon endpoints lazily + network-aware default

Horizon client was constructed at import time with a hardcoded testnet
fallback, so a mainnet deploy with HORIZON_URLS unset would silently talk to
testnet Horizon. Now the default is derived from STELLAR_NETWORK and the client
is built lazily on first use (after env is loaded). Explicit HORIZON_URLS still wins.

* feat(auth): authenticated change-password endpoint

PUT /api/auth/change-password (protected): verifies current password,
enforces the password policy, updates the hash, and signs out all other
sessions. Adds the auth.password_change audit action.

* feat(security): implement TOTP two-factor authentication for admins and mentors

- Add TOTP (RFC 6238) lifecycle: secret generation, encrypted storage at rest (AES-256-GCM), otpauth:// URI and QR code generation
- Add 10 single-use bcrypt-hashed recovery codes
- Add two-factor rate-limiting middleware (5 verification attempts per 15-minute window)
- Update login controller to issue step-up mfaToken challenges when 2FA is enabled
- Update authorizeRoles('admin') middleware to enforce 2FA-enabled status and 2FA-verified sessions
- Log audit actions for all 2FA lifecycle events (setup, enable, login challenge, success, failure, disable, recovery code usage)
- Add comprehensive test suite in test/auth2FA.test.js and update existing auth test suites

* ci: update node version to 22 and sync package-lock.json

* ci: pin mongo service to 6.0 and add wait-for-mongodb step

* test: add 2FA enablement and 2FA verified token to admin in refund.test.js

* fix(auth): switch bcrypt imports to pure-JS bcryptjs for cross-platform compatibility

* fix(test): remove duplicate MongoMemoryServer import in refund.test.js

* fix(test): add errorHandler middleware to refund.test.js app

* fix(test): clean up MongoDB connection logic and add afterAll hook in refund.test.js

* fix(test): standardize Mongoose connection lifecycle and add missing afterAll hooks

* fix(test): remove duplicate afterAll hooks and handle Multer 413 response status

* test(refund): explicitly set 2FA enablement and 2FA verified tokens for admin in refund.test.js

* test: ensure admin test helpers include 2FA enablement and 2FA verified JWT claims

* fix(test): add 2FA enablement and 2FA verified tokens for admin in webhooks and educatorVerification tests

---------

Co-authored-by: zeemscript <150973162+zeemscript@users.noreply.github.com>

* Add scholarship escrow contract foundation (#108)

* Improve application test coverage (#110)

* Add dependency health checks (#112)

* Validate auth and Stellar requests (#109)

* Validate auth and Stellar requests

* Address validation review feedback

* Secure book deletion authorization (#113)

* Secure book deletion

* Keep delete response consistent

* feat(stellar): gift courses/books via claimable balances with expiry reclaim (#116)

Adds a gift-a-course/book flow built on Stellar claimable balances so a
buyer can send an item to another user — including one who has not
finished wallet onboarding — without the recipient needing a USDC
trustline. The sender creates an on-ledger USDC balance the recipient
claims when ready, with a sender reclaim-after-expiry predicate so funds
are never stranded. Includes a GiftClaim model (no document-deleting TTL,
so the record survives expiry for reclaim), a claimableBalanceService
(build create/claim transactions with complementary predicates, resolve
the REAL balance id from the create result XDR — not the tx hash — with
a Horizon forClaimant fallback, and validate the signed gift XDR before
any state change), gift routes/controller at /api/stellar/gifts, and
granting item access to the RECIPIENT (never the payer) on claim. Wires
a `{ fallback: "claimable_balance" }` response into the purchase flow
when a creator wallet/trustline is missing. Tests cover predicate
decoding, trustline-free single-signature claiming, claim authorization
before/after expiry, the balance-id-vs-tx-hash distinction, tampered-XDR
rejection, guards mirroring initializePayment, and the recipient access
grant.

* feat(stellar): add idempotency protection to the Stellar payment endpoints (#115)

Makes /api/stellar/payment/initialize and /submit safe against
double-clicks, client retries, and concurrent duplicates. Submit is
naturally idempotent per transaction hash: the deterministic hash of
the signed XDR is looked up against confirmed transactions before any
processing, so a replayed submission returns the original success
response without re-granting access, with the unique index on
stellarTxHash as the database-level backstop (an E11000 on the confirm
save is treated as already processed). Initialize no longer piles up
duplicates: a pending checkout for the same user+item returns the
existing record (with its persisted unsigned XDR) instead of creating
a new document, and stale pending records are reaped by the existing
pending-only TTL index. Adds a stricter per-user rate limiter
(paymentLimiter) on the payment routes, keyed on the authenticated
user id with an IPv6-aware IP fallback. Covers duplicate-submit,
duplicate-initialize, the E11000 race, and limiter enforcement with
tests.

* feat(stellar): validate Stellar config at startup and document the mainnet switch (#114)

Adds a single source of truth for the Stellar network configuration
(src/config/stellar.js) that resolves the network name, network
passphrase, Horizon URLs, and USDC issuer from STELLAR_NETWORK, and
validates the whole setup fail-fast at boot so a misconfigured
deployment (bad network value, mainnet flag with testnet Horizon or
issuer) fails with an error naming the exact problem instead of at
request time. stellarService.js and horizonClient.js now consume this
module. Adds docs/MAINNET.md covering the env changes, creator
trustlines, and a first-mainnet-transaction smoke checklist, plus unit
tests for resolution and validation across both networks.

* feat(stellar): fee-bump sponsorship with structural whitelist and spend caps (#111)

Let the platform pay a user's Stellar network fee by wrapping the user-signed
transaction in a fee-bump signed by a dedicated fee-source account, so a user
holding USDC but ~no XLM can buy a book, buy a course, or donate. Opt-in per
submit via `requestSponsorship: true`; off by default and byte-for-byte
identical when disabled.

Guard rails (server signs on the platform's behalf):
- Structural whitelist (reject-by-default, allow-list of `payment` ops only):
  source, exact op count/order, destinations, amounts (stroops), asset, and
  memo must match the pending Transaction row exactly. Any foreign/extra
  operation — including unknown future types — is rejected.
- Durable spend caps (SponsorshipSpend, keyed by UTC day): per-transaction fee
  ceiling, per-day total, and per-user per-day count.
- Sponsor float pre-check so an underfunded sponsor never marks the user's
  transaction failed.

Fee-bump fee is priced over inner ops + wrapper and clamped to the ceiling
(verified against @stellar/stellar-sdk v16 and asserted in tests). Sponsored
rows record `sponsored`, `sponsorFeeCharged`, and the fee-bump (outer) hash
alongside the inner hash. Sponsorship-specific failures return a distinct
non-fatal 4xx/503 with `retryUnsponsored: true` and never mark the row failed.

- Config: FEE_SPONSOR_* in .env.example + validateEnv (fail-fast at boot …
zeemscript added a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 24, 2026
…283)

* Merge dev into main (#117)

* stellar: validate signed XDR contents before submit; store expectedHa… (#51)

* stellar: validate signed XDR contents before submit; store expectedHash/memo; verify on-chain before granting access; add tests

* test: add validateSignedPaymentXdr to stellarService mock (new import in paymentController)

* test: expect expectedHash at payment init (XDR pre-validation stores it there)

---------

Co-authored-by: zeemscript <150973162+zeemscript@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(stellar): publish Soroban giving-escrow contract id in stellar.toml

Adds env-driven GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT (custom, non-SEP-1) so the deployed
On-Chain Giving escrow is discoverable from /.well-known/stellar.toml. Set
GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT_ID to enable. Includes test coverage.

* fix(stellar): resolve Horizon endpoints lazily + network-aware default

Horizon client was constructed at import time with a hardcoded testnet
fallback, so a mainnet deploy with HORIZON_URLS unset would silently talk to
testnet Horizon. Now the default is derived from STELLAR_NETWORK and the client
is built lazily on first use (after env is loaded). Explicit HORIZON_URLS still wins.

* feat(auth): authenticated change-password endpoint

PUT /api/auth/change-password (protected): verifies current password,
enforces the password policy, updates the hash, and signs out all other
sessions. Adds the auth.password_change audit action.

* feat(auth): harden authentication against login lockout, breached passwords, and signup abuse (#89) (#99)

* feat(auth): harden authentication against login lockout, breached passwords, and signup abuse (#89)

- Add progressive per-account login lockout (failedLoginAttempts + lockUntil) with env-configurable escalating backoff, generic 429 while locked, and AUTH_ACCOUNT_LOCKED audit emission.
- Add HaveIBeenPwned breached-password check (SHA-1 prefix k-anonymity, never transmits the password) at register and password reset; fails open on outage.
- Add per-email throttling on /register and /resend-verification (emailAuthLimiter, survives IP rotation, active in test env) plus a pluggable captcha gate (no-op when unconfigured).
- Add User lockout fields and document new env vars in .env.example.

* fix(auth): address CodeRabbit review on login lockout, HIBP, captcha, and JWT secret (#89)

- loginUser: locked accounts now return the same generic 401 'Invalid credentials'
  as a nonexistent account (no enumeration); failed-login counter incremented
  atomically via findByIdAndUpdate \, lock persisted via updateOne
- resetPassword: breached-password check moved to after successful OTP validation
  so unauthenticated callers cannot trigger HIBP lookups
- authController: refuse to start when JWT_SECRET is missing (no hardcoded fallback)
- hibp: request HIBP padding ('Add-Padding: true') and ignore zero-count records
- captcha: configurable CAPTCHA_TIMEOUT_MS (default 5s) passed to the provider call;
  captcha rejection now returns the standard { success, message, data: null } shape
- tests: assert escalating backoff magnitude (120s on 6th failure) and the 24h cap;
  locked-account test expects 401; per-email limiter buckets reset between tests;
  outage test routed through mockHibp so the shared spy is cleaned up; added
  padding-record and cap coverage

* Feat/93 idempotency keys (#100)

* feat(stellar): publish Soroban giving-escrow contract id in stellar.toml

Adds env-driven GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT (custom, non-SEP-1) so the deployed
On-Chain Giving escrow is discoverable from /.well-known/stellar.toml. Set
GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT_ID to enable. Includes test coverage.

* fix(stellar): resolve Horizon endpoints lazily + network-aware default

Horizon client was constructed at import time with a hardcoded testnet
fallback, so a mainnet deploy with HORIZON_URLS unset would silently talk to
testnet Horizon. Now the default is derived from STELLAR_NETWORK and the client
is built lazily on first use (after env is loaded). Explicit HORIZON_URLS still wins.

* feat(auth): authenticated change-password endpoint

PUT /api/auth/change-password (protected): verifies current password,
enforces the password policy, updates the hash, and signs out all other
sessions. Adds the auth.password_change audit action.

* feat(payment): add request-level idempotency keys to payment endpoints (#93)

* test: complement stellarService mock exports in idempotency test

* test: refine idempotency middleware concurrency lock test (#93)

* fix(stellar): export validateSignedPaymentXdr and complement test mock (#93)

* fix(stellar): remove duplicate validateSignedPaymentXdr export (#93)

---------

Co-authored-by: zeemscript <150973162+zeemscript@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(auth): enforce resource ownership across mutating endpoints (#88) (#105)

Add a centralized authorization layer that verifies the authenticated
user owns the target resource (or is an admin) before any mutating
handler runs, replacing the ad-hoc inline checks scattered across
controllers.

- add authorizeOwnership + authorizeReviewOwnership middleware
  (src/middlewares/authorize.js); on success the loaded doc is attached
  to req so handlers can reuse it
- apply the guards to book delete, course update, space update/delete,
  and review update/delete on books and courses; review create stays
  purchase-gated
- record ownership denials to the audit log (authz.ownership.denied)
- remove the now-redundant inline ownership checks from the book,
  course, space, and review controllers
- document the resource x action x role matrix (docs/authorization-matrix.md)
  and cover it with an integration test suite (test/ownershipAuthz.test.js)

Closes #88

Co-authored-by: BountySpaghetti <286941608+BountySpaghetti@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(security): stop logging OTP codes and verification tokens in email bodies (#104)

The NODE_ENV === "test" branch of sendMail logged the full rendered email
body — including the password-reset OTP span and the verification link's
token query param — and pino's redact config cannot censor values baked
into interpolated strings, so the leak bypassed the app-wide redaction.

Remove the body from every log statement (log only recipient, subject, and
template id via structured fields), and give tests a sanctioned in-memory
outbox hook instead of log scraping. sendOtpEmail/sendVerificationEmail/
sendReceiptEmail now return the sendMail result so callers can capture it.

Closes #95

* fix(transactions): prevent TTL index from deleting confirmed purchases and donations (#103)

The Transaction collection used a blanket TTL index on expiresAt with a
schema default that stamped a 30-minute expiry on every row regardless of
status. Because confirm paths never cleared expiresAt, confirmed on-chain
purchases and donations were permanently reaped ~30 minutes after creation,
deleting the proof of payment and orphaning recorded earnings.

Scope the TTL index to status: "pending" via partialFilterExpression, make
the expiresAt default conditional on status, add a pre-save hook that clears
expiresAt for any terminal state, explicitly unset expiresAt on every
terminal transition (submit, donation, refund, dispute, cancel, job handler,
reconciliation promotion), and add an idempotent migration that rescues
legacy non-pending rows and rebuilds the index.

Closes #94

* feat(security): implement educator verification pipeline and content-creation gating (#92) (#102)

* feat(security): implement educator verification pipeline and content-creation gating (#92)

- Add EducatorVerification model with legal state-machine transitions
  (draft -> pending -> approved/rejected, resubmit from rejected)
- Add verifiedEducator durable flag on User, set atomically on approval
- Add AUDIT_ACTIONS: EDUCATOR_VERIFY_SUBMIT/_RESUBMIT/_APPROVE/_REJECT
  with metadata allowlist entries in auditService
- requireVerifiedEducator middleware (403 for unverified, admin bypass)
- Applicant API: submit/resubmit app, get own app, signed doc URLs,
  signed Cloudinary upload-signature for private credential uploads
- Admin review queue: list+filter pending, view signed docs,
  approve/reject with notes (Mongo transaction for verifiedEducator grant)
- Gate all content-creation routes:
  * POST /api/courses  (courseRoutes.js)
  * POST /api/books    (bookRoutes.js)
  * POST /api/spaces   (spaceRoutes.js — live sessions per issue)
- Wire routes: /api/educator-verification + /api/admin/educator-verification
- Comprehensive test suite in test/educatorVerification.test.js
  (state-machine, middleware gating, submit/resubmit, approve/reject,
  content 403/2xx, both full lifecycles submit->pending->approve and
  reject->resubmit->approve, signed URL security, admin-only gating,
  audit log instrumentation)

Verification Results:
  app.test.js: 22/22 PASS (CI boot + endpoint health)
  auditLog.test.js: 21/21 PASS (append-only, redaction, admin gate)

Closes #92

* fix(ci): resolve educator verification pipeline test failures

- Remove redundant catchAsync double-wrap in educator-verification routes
  (controllers are already pre-wrapped; the outer wrap called .catch() on
  undefined, returning 500 for every new endpoint)
- Use MongoMemoryReplSet in educatorVerification.test.js so the approve/reject
  MongoDB transaction can run (standalone MongoMemoryServer cannot)
- Use AuditLog.collection.deleteMany in test cleanup to bypass append-only
  pre-hooks
- Return recordAudit's promise so callers can await durability; await it in
  submitApplication and performReview to eliminate the fire-and-forget
  audit-race in tests
- Fix testAuth.js password overwrite: destructure password out of the
  override spread so the hashed value is not clobbered by plaintext
- Seed bookUpload test user as a verifiedEducator mentor so the new content
  gate lets it through

---------

Co-authored-by: abimbolaalabi <abimbolaalabi@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(auth): signed service-to-service authentication for the AI service (#91) (#106)

Give the backend a real machine-to-machine auth channel for the AI
service (dnb-ai) — signed, scoped, rotatable keys instead of a single
static shared secret.

- add requireServiceAuth middleware (src/middlewares/serviceAuth.js):
  HMAC-SHA256 over a canonical method/path/timestamp/body-digest string,
  a ±300s replay window, constant-time signature comparison, per-key
  scope enforcement, and req.service on success
- key store (src/config/serviceKeys.js): multiple active keys keyed by
  kid for zero-downtime rotation; resilient env parsing, never throws
- mount a real internal route GET /api/internal/ai/whoami guarded by the
  guard (scope ai:read-content), plus raw-body capture in app.js
- migrate /admin/jobs off raw !== to a length-guarded timingSafeEqual
- audit denials (service_auth.denied), require AI_SERVICE_KEYS in prod
  (fail-fast), document the signing contract + rotation runbook
- cover the full accept/reject matrix in test/serviceAuth.test.js

Closes #91

Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <304024794+Lspnjr1@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(webhooks): signed outbound webhook event system (#45) (#107)

Add an outbound webhook/event system so external consumers can subscribe
to payment and enrollment lifecycle events over HMAC-signed HTTP
callbacks, with retries, dead-lettering, and redelivery.

- models: WebhookEndpoint (encrypted secret at rest, subscribed events,
  auto-disable counters) and WebhookDelivery (all scheduling state in the
  doc: status, attemptCount, nextAttemptAt indexed)
- webhookService.emitEvent: typed event catalog, per-event id for
  consumer idempotency, strict payload allowlist (no secrets/emails/user
  docs); persists a delivery per subscribed endpoint after the txn
  commits, never blocks or fails the request path, no-ops when the DB is
  unavailable
- signing: X-DeenBridge-Signature v1=hmac-sha256(secret, `${ts}.${body}`)
  over the exact sent bytes; timing-safe verify + 5-min staleness window
- deliveryWorker: atomic findOneAndUpdate claim (no double-send),
  exponential backoff + jitter, dead-letter after max attempts, endpoint
  auto-disable after sustained failures
- management API (/api/webhooks, admin-gated): endpoint CRUD, rotate
  secret, list deliveries, redeliver (atomic $set), and ping
- SSRF guard: https-only in prod, reject loopback/RFC-1918/link-local
- wire emitters into payment (initialized/confirmed/failed/expired),
  enrollment, and wallet connect/disconnect; migrate /admin/jobs to a
  timing-safe token compare
- docs/webhooks.md consumer verifier + full offline test suite

Closes #45

Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <304024794+Lspnjr1@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(security): implement TOTP two-factor authentication for admins a… (#98)

* feat(stellar): publish Soroban giving-escrow contract id in stellar.toml

Adds env-driven GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT (custom, non-SEP-1) so the deployed
On-Chain Giving escrow is discoverable from /.well-known/stellar.toml. Set
GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT_ID to enable. Includes test coverage.

* fix(stellar): resolve Horizon endpoints lazily + network-aware default

Horizon client was constructed at import time with a hardcoded testnet
fallback, so a mainnet deploy with HORIZON_URLS unset would silently talk to
testnet Horizon. Now the default is derived from STELLAR_NETWORK and the client
is built lazily on first use (after env is loaded). Explicit HORIZON_URLS still wins.

* feat(auth): authenticated change-password endpoint

PUT /api/auth/change-password (protected): verifies current password,
enforces the password policy, updates the hash, and signs out all other
sessions. Adds the auth.password_change audit action.

* feat(security): implement TOTP two-factor authentication for admins and mentors

- Add TOTP (RFC 6238) lifecycle: secret generation, encrypted storage at rest (AES-256-GCM), otpauth:// URI and QR code generation
- Add 10 single-use bcrypt-hashed recovery codes
- Add two-factor rate-limiting middleware (5 verification attempts per 15-minute window)
- Update login controller to issue step-up mfaToken challenges when 2FA is enabled
- Update authorizeRoles('admin') middleware to enforce 2FA-enabled status and 2FA-verified sessions
- Log audit actions for all 2FA lifecycle events (setup, enable, login challenge, success, failure, disable, recovery code usage)
- Add comprehensive test suite in test/auth2FA.test.js and update existing auth test suites

* ci: update node version to 22 and sync package-lock.json

* ci: pin mongo service to 6.0 and add wait-for-mongodb step

* test: add 2FA enablement and 2FA verified token to admin in refund.test.js

* fix(auth): switch bcrypt imports to pure-JS bcryptjs for cross-platform compatibility

* fix(test): remove duplicate MongoMemoryServer import in refund.test.js

* fix(test): add errorHandler middleware to refund.test.js app

* fix(test): clean up MongoDB connection logic and add afterAll hook in refund.test.js

* fix(test): standardize Mongoose connection lifecycle and add missing afterAll hooks

* fix(test): remove duplicate afterAll hooks and handle Multer 413 response status

* test(refund): explicitly set 2FA enablement and 2FA verified tokens for admin in refund.test.js

* test: ensure admin test helpers include 2FA enablement and 2FA verified JWT claims

* fix(test): add 2FA enablement and 2FA verified tokens for admin in webhooks and educatorVerification tests

---------

Co-authored-by: zeemscript <150973162+zeemscript@users.noreply.github.com>

* Add scholarship escrow contract foundation (#108)

* Improve application test coverage (#110)

* Add dependency health checks (#112)

* Validate auth and Stellar requests (#109)

* Validate auth and Stellar requests

* Address validation review feedback

* Secure book deletion authorization (#113)

* Secure book deletion

* Keep delete response consistent

* feat(stellar): gift courses/books via claimable balances with expiry reclaim (#116)

Adds a gift-a-course/book flow built on Stellar claimable balances so a
buyer can send an item to another user — including one who has not
finished wallet onboarding — without the recipient needing a USDC
trustline. The sender creates an on-ledger USDC balance the recipient
claims when ready, with a sender reclaim-after-expiry predicate so funds
are never stranded. Includes a GiftClaim model (no document-deleting TTL,
so the record survives expiry for reclaim), a claimableBalanceService
(build create/claim transactions with complementary predicates, resolve
the REAL balance id from the create result XDR — not the tx hash — with
a Horizon forClaimant fallback, and validate the signed gift XDR before
any state change), gift routes/controller at /api/stellar/gifts, and
granting item access to the RECIPIENT (never the payer) on claim. Wires
a `{ fallback: "claimable_balance" }` response into the purchase flow
when a creator wallet/trustline is missing. Tests cover predicate
decoding, trustline-free single-signature claiming, claim authorization
before/after expiry, the balance-id-vs-tx-hash distinction, tampered-XDR
rejection, guards mirroring initializePayment, and the recipient access
grant.

* feat(stellar): add idempotency protection to the Stellar payment endpoints (#115)

Makes /api/stellar/payment/initialize and /submit safe against
double-clicks, client retries, and concurrent duplicates. Submit is
naturally idempotent per transaction hash: the deterministic hash of
the signed XDR is looked up against confirmed transactions before any
processing, so a replayed submission returns the original success
response without re-granting access, with the unique index on
stellarTxHash as the database-level backstop (an E11000 on the confirm
save is treated as already processed). Initialize no longer piles up
duplicates: a pending checkout for the same user+item returns the
existing record (with its persisted unsigned XDR) instead of creating
a new document, and stale pending records are reaped by the existing
pending-only TTL index. Adds a stricter per-user rate limiter
(paymentLimiter) on the payment routes, keyed on the authenticated
user id with an IPv6-aware IP fallback. Covers duplicate-submit,
duplicate-initialize, the E11000 race, and limiter enforcement with
tests.

* feat(stellar): validate Stellar config at startup and document the mainnet switch (#114)

Adds a single source of truth for the Stellar network configuration
(src/config/stellar.js) that resolves the network name, network
passphrase, Horizon URLs, and USDC issuer from STELLAR_NETWORK, and
validates the whole setup fail-fast at boot so a misconfigured
deployment (bad network value, mainnet flag with testnet Horizon or
issuer) fails with an error naming the exact problem instead of at
request time. stellarService.js and horizonClient.js now consume this
module. Adds docs/MAINNET.md covering the env changes, creator
trustlines, and a first-mainnet-transaction smoke checklist, plus unit
tests for resolution and validation across both networks.

* feat(stellar): fee-bump sponsorship with structural whitelist and spend caps (#111)

Let the platform pay a user's Stellar network fee by wrapping the user-signed
transaction in a fee-bump signed by a dedicated fee-source account, so a user
holding USDC but ~no XLM can buy a book, buy a course, or donate. Opt-in per
submit via `requestSponsorship: true`; off by default and byte-for-byte
identical when disabled.

Guard rails (server signs on the platform's behalf):
- Structural whitelist (reject-by-default, allow-list of `payment` ops only):
  source, exact op count/order, destinations, amounts (stroops), asset, and
  memo must match the pending Transaction row exactly. Any foreign/extra
  operation — including unknown future types — is rejected.
- Durable spend caps (SponsorshipSpend, keyed by UTC day): per-transaction fee
  ceiling, per-day total, and per-user per-day count.
- Sponsor float pre-check so an underfunded sponsor never marks the user's
  transaction failed.

Fee-bump fee is priced over inner ops + wrapper and clamped to the ceiling
(verified against @stellar/stellar-sdk v16 and asserted in tests). Sponsored
rows record `sponsored`, `sponsorFeeCharged`, and the fee-bump (outer) hash
alongside the inner hash. Sponsorship-specific failures return a distinct
non-fatal 4xx/503 with `retryUnsponsored: true` and never mark the row failed.

- Config: FEE_SPONSOR_* in .env.example + validateEnv (fail-fast at boot when
  enabled with a missing/invalid secret); secret never logged or returned.
- Admin status endpoint GET /api/stellar/payment/sponsorship/status exposes the
  sponsor public key, live float, caps, and today's spend.
- Prometheus counters for approved/rejected sponsorship decisions.
- Docs: docs/fee-sponsorship.md, README, and openapi.yaml.
- Tests: feeSponsorService (whitelist adversarial matrix, fee correctness,
  inner-untouched, caps, secret handling, boot config) and feeSponsorSubmit
  (payment + donation flag-off regression, flag-on sponsorship, cap/whitelist
  rejections that don't fail the row).

Closes #30

* feat: add managed course categories (#118)

* feat(courses): add managed category taxonomy

* fix(categories): preserve legacy course creation

* feat: add recurring sadaqah pledges (#119)

* feat(donations): add recurring sadaqah pledges

* fix(pledges): preserve donation test compatibility

* fix(pledges): ignore non-persisted transactions

---------

Co-authored-by: Afeez Tomisin <132703022+Banx17@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Alabi Ibrahim Abimbola <139625252+abimbolaalabi@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Kelechukwu Izuaba <144479895+Kaycee276@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: BountySpaghetti <zeemroyals@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: BountySpaghetti <286941608+BountySpaghetti@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Samuel Ojetunde <samuelojetunde898@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: abimbolaalabi <abimbolaalabi@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <shittulukmanbabatunde@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <304024794+Lspnjr1@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Alhassan Nuhu Idris <alhassannuhu0@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Mantissa <negativemantissa@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Ezekiel Akawa <akawaezekiel4@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Mfon <67503972+TS-mfon@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(stellar): add loyalty points Soroban contract and service (closes #161)

* refactor(db): Create /mongo folder structure (#280)

* stellar: validate signed XDR contents before submit; store expectedHa… (#51)

* stellar: validate signed XDR contents before submit; store expectedHash/memo; verify on-chain before granting access; add tests

* test: add validateSignedPaymentXdr to stellarService mock (new import in paymentController)

* test: expect expectedHash at payment init (XDR pre-validation stores it there)

---------

Co-authored-by: zeemscript <150973162+zeemscript@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(stellar): publish Soroban giving-escrow contract id in stellar.toml

Adds env-driven GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT (custom, non-SEP-1) so the deployed
On-Chain Giving escrow is discoverable from /.well-known/stellar.toml. Set
GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT_ID to enable. Includes test coverage.

* fix(stellar): resolve Horizon endpoints lazily + network-aware default

Horizon client was constructed at import time with a hardcoded testnet
fallback, so a mainnet deploy with HORIZON_URLS unset would silently talk to
testnet Horizon. Now the default is derived from STELLAR_NETWORK and the client
is built lazily on first use (after env is loaded). Explicit HORIZON_URLS still wins.

* feat(auth): authenticated change-password endpoint

PUT /api/auth/change-password (protected): verifies current password,
enforces the password policy, updates the hash, and signs out all other
sessions. Adds the auth.password_change audit action.

* feat(auth): harden authentication against login lockout, breached passwords, and signup abuse (#89) (#99)

* feat(auth): harden authentication against login lockout, breached passwords, and signup abuse (#89)

- Add progressive per-account login lockout (failedLoginAttempts + lockUntil) with env-configurable escalating backoff, generic 429 while locked, and AUTH_ACCOUNT_LOCKED audit emission.
- Add HaveIBeenPwned breached-password check (SHA-1 prefix k-anonymity, never transmits the password) at register and password reset; fails open on outage.
- Add per-email throttling on /register and /resend-verification (emailAuthLimiter, survives IP rotation, active in test env) plus a pluggable captcha gate (no-op when unconfigured).
- Add User lockout fields and document new env vars in .env.example.

* fix(auth): address CodeRabbit review on login lockout, HIBP, captcha, and JWT secret (#89)

- loginUser: locked accounts now return the same generic 401 'Invalid credentials'
  as a nonexistent account (no enumeration); failed-login counter incremented
  atomically via findByIdAndUpdate \, lock persisted via updateOne
- resetPassword: breached-password check moved to after successful OTP validation
  so unauthenticated callers cannot trigger HIBP lookups
- authController: refuse to start when JWT_SECRET is missing (no hardcoded fallback)
- hibp: request HIBP padding ('Add-Padding: true') and ignore zero-count records
- captcha: configurable CAPTCHA_TIMEOUT_MS (default 5s) passed to the provider call;
  captcha rejection now returns the standard { success, message, data: null } shape
- tests: assert escalating backoff magnitude (120s on 6th failure) and the 24h cap;
  locked-account test expects 401; per-email limiter buckets reset between tests;
  outage test routed through mockHibp so the shared spy is cleaned up; added
  padding-record and cap coverage

* Feat/93 idempotency keys (#100)

* feat(stellar): publish Soroban giving-escrow contract id in stellar.toml

Adds env-driven GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT (custom, non-SEP-1) so the deployed
On-Chain Giving escrow is discoverable from /.well-known/stellar.toml. Set
GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT_ID to enable. Includes test coverage.

* fix(stellar): resolve Horizon endpoints lazily + network-aware default

Horizon client was constructed at import time with a hardcoded testnet
fallback, so a mainnet deploy with HORIZON_URLS unset would silently talk to
testnet Horizon. Now the default is derived from STELLAR_NETWORK and the client
is built lazily on first use (after env is loaded). Explicit HORIZON_URLS still wins.

* feat(auth): authenticated change-password endpoint

PUT /api/auth/change-password (protected): verifies current password,
enforces the password policy, updates the hash, and signs out all other
sessions. Adds the auth.password_change audit action.

* feat(payment): add request-level idempotency keys to payment endpoints (#93)

* test: complement stellarService mock exports in idempotency test

* test: refine idempotency middleware concurrency lock test (#93)

* fix(stellar): export validateSignedPaymentXdr and complement test mock (#93)

* fix(stellar): remove duplicate validateSignedPaymentXdr export (#93)

---------

Co-authored-by: zeemscript <150973162+zeemscript@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(auth): enforce resource ownership across mutating endpoints (#88) (#105)

Add a centralized authorization layer that verifies the authenticated
user owns the target resource (or is an admin) before any mutating
handler runs, replacing the ad-hoc inline checks scattered across
controllers.

- add authorizeOwnership + authorizeReviewOwnership middleware
  (src/middlewares/authorize.js); on success the loaded doc is attached
  to req so handlers can reuse it
- apply the guards to book delete, course update, space update/delete,
  and review update/delete on books and courses; review create stays
  purchase-gated
- record ownership denials to the audit log (authz.ownership.denied)
- remove the now-redundant inline ownership checks from the book,
  course, space, and review controllers
- document the resource x action x role matrix (docs/authorization-matrix.md)
  and cover it with an integration test suite (test/ownershipAuthz.test.js)

Closes #88

Co-authored-by: BountySpaghetti <286941608+BountySpaghetti@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(security): stop logging OTP codes and verification tokens in email bodies (#104)

The NODE_ENV === "test" branch of sendMail logged the full rendered email
body — including the password-reset OTP span and the verification link's
token query param — and pino's redact config cannot censor values baked
into interpolated strings, so the leak bypassed the app-wide redaction.

Remove the body from every log statement (log only recipient, subject, and
template id via structured fields), and give tests a sanctioned in-memory
outbox hook instead of log scraping. sendOtpEmail/sendVerificationEmail/
sendReceiptEmail now return the sendMail result so callers can capture it.

Closes #95

* fix(transactions): prevent TTL index from deleting confirmed purchases and donations (#103)

The Transaction collection used a blanket TTL index on expiresAt with a
schema default that stamped a 30-minute expiry on every row regardless of
status. Because confirm paths never cleared expiresAt, confirmed on-chain
purchases and donations were permanently reaped ~30 minutes after creation,
deleting the proof of payment and orphaning recorded earnings.

Scope the TTL index to status: "pending" via partialFilterExpression, make
the expiresAt default conditional on status, add a pre-save hook that clears
expiresAt for any terminal state, explicitly unset expiresAt on every
terminal transition (submit, donation, refund, dispute, cancel, job handler,
reconciliation promotion), and add an idempotent migration that rescues
legacy non-pending rows and rebuilds the index.

Closes #94

* feat(security): implement educator verification pipeline and content-creation gating (#92) (#102)

* feat(security): implement educator verification pipeline and content-creation gating (#92)

- Add EducatorVerification model with legal state-machine transitions
  (draft -> pending -> approved/rejected, resubmit from rejected)
- Add verifiedEducator durable flag on User, set atomically on approval
- Add AUDIT_ACTIONS: EDUCATOR_VERIFY_SUBMIT/_RESUBMIT/_APPROVE/_REJECT
  with metadata allowlist entries in auditService
- requireVerifiedEducator middleware (403 for unverified, admin bypass)
- Applicant API: submit/resubmit app, get own app, signed doc URLs,
  signed Cloudinary upload-signature for private credential uploads
- Admin review queue: list+filter pending, view signed docs,
  approve/reject with notes (Mongo transaction for verifiedEducator grant)
- Gate all content-creation routes:
  * POST /api/courses  (courseRoutes.js)
  * POST /api/books    (bookRoutes.js)
  * POST /api/spaces   (spaceRoutes.js — live sessions per issue)
- Wire routes: /api/educator-verification + /api/admin/educator-verification
- Comprehensive test suite in test/educatorVerification.test.js
  (state-machine, middleware gating, submit/resubmit, approve/reject,
  content 403/2xx, both full lifecycles submit->pending->approve and
  reject->resubmit->approve, signed URL security, admin-only gating,
  audit log instrumentation)

Verification Results:
  app.test.js: 22/22 PASS (CI boot + endpoint health)
  auditLog.test.js: 21/21 PASS (append-only, redaction, admin gate)

Closes #92

* fix(ci): resolve educator verification pipeline test failures

- Remove redundant catchAsync double-wrap in educator-verification routes
  (controllers are already pre-wrapped; the outer wrap called .catch() on
  undefined, returning 500 for every new endpoint)
- Use MongoMemoryReplSet in educatorVerification.test.js so the approve/reject
  MongoDB transaction can run (standalone MongoMemoryServer cannot)
- Use AuditLog.collection.deleteMany in test cleanup to bypass append-only
  pre-hooks
- Return recordAudit's promise so callers can await durability; await it in
  submitApplication and performReview to eliminate the fire-and-forget
  audit-race in tests
- Fix testAuth.js password overwrite: destructure password out of the
  override spread so the hashed value is not clobbered by plaintext
- Seed bookUpload test user as a verifiedEducator mentor so the new content
  gate lets it through

---------

Co-authored-by: abimbolaalabi <abimbolaalabi@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(auth): signed service-to-service authentication for the AI service (#91) (#106)

Give the backend a real machine-to-machine auth channel for the AI
service (dnb-ai) — signed, scoped, rotatable keys instead of a single
static shared secret.

- add requireServiceAuth middleware (src/middlewares/serviceAuth.js):
  HMAC-SHA256 over a canonical method/path/timestamp/body-digest string,
  a ±300s replay window, constant-time signature comparison, per-key
  scope enforcement, and req.service on success
- key store (src/config/serviceKeys.js): multiple active keys keyed by
  kid for zero-downtime rotation; resilient env parsing, never throws
- mount a real internal route GET /api/internal/ai/whoami guarded by the
  guard (scope ai:read-content), plus raw-body capture in app.js
- migrate /admin/jobs off raw !== to a length-guarded timingSafeEqual
- audit denials (service_auth.denied), require AI_SERVICE_KEYS in prod
  (fail-fast), document the signing contract + rotation runbook
- cover the full accept/reject matrix in test/serviceAuth.test.js

Closes #91

Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <304024794+Lspnjr1@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(webhooks): signed outbound webhook event system (#45) (#107)

Add an outbound webhook/event system so external consumers can subscribe
to payment and enrollment lifecycle events over HMAC-signed HTTP
callbacks, with retries, dead-lettering, and redelivery.

- models: WebhookEndpoint (encrypted secret at rest, subscribed events,
  auto-disable counters) and WebhookDelivery (all scheduling state in the
  doc: status, attemptCount, nextAttemptAt indexed)
- webhookService.emitEvent: typed event catalog, per-event id for
  consumer idempotency, strict payload allowlist (no secrets/emails/user
  docs); persists a delivery per subscribed endpoint after the txn
  commits, never blocks or fails the request path, no-ops when the DB is
  unavailable
- signing: X-DeenBridge-Signature v1=hmac-sha256(secret, `${ts}.${body}`)
  over the exact sent bytes; timing-safe verify + 5-min staleness window
- deliveryWorker: atomic findOneAndUpdate claim (no double-send),
  exponential backoff + jitter, dead-letter after max attempts, endpoint
  auto-disable after sustained failures
- management API (/api/webhooks, admin-gated): endpoint CRUD, rotate
  secret, list deliveries, redeliver (atomic $set), and ping
- SSRF guard: https-only in prod, reject loopback/RFC-1918/link-local
- wire emitters into payment (initialized/confirmed/failed/expired),
  enrollment, and wallet connect/disconnect; migrate /admin/jobs to a
  timing-safe token compare
- docs/webhooks.md consumer verifier + full offline test suite

Closes #45

Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <304024794+Lspnjr1@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(security): implement TOTP two-factor authentication for admins a… (#98)

* feat(stellar): publish Soroban giving-escrow contract id in stellar.toml

Adds env-driven GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT (custom, non-SEP-1) so the deployed
On-Chain Giving escrow is discoverable from /.well-known/stellar.toml. Set
GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT_ID to enable. Includes test coverage.

* fix(stellar): resolve Horizon endpoints lazily + network-aware default

Horizon client was constructed at import time with a hardcoded testnet
fallback, so a mainnet deploy with HORIZON_URLS unset would silently talk to
testnet Horizon. Now the default is derived from STELLAR_NETWORK and the client
is built lazily on first use (after env is loaded). Explicit HORIZON_URLS still wins.

* feat(auth): authenticated change-password endpoint

PUT /api/auth/change-password (protected): verifies current password,
enforces the password policy, updates the hash, and signs out all other
sessions. Adds the auth.password_change audit action.

* feat(security): implement TOTP two-factor authentication for admins and mentors

- Add TOTP (RFC 6238) lifecycle: secret generation, encrypted storage at rest (AES-256-GCM), otpauth:// URI and QR code generation
- Add 10 single-use bcrypt-hashed recovery codes
- Add two-factor rate-limiting middleware (5 verification attempts per 15-minute window)
- Update login controller to issue step-up mfaToken challenges when 2FA is enabled
- Update authorizeRoles('admin') middleware to enforce 2FA-enabled status and 2FA-verified sessions
- Log audit actions for all 2FA lifecycle events (setup, enable, login challenge, success, failure, disable, recovery code usage)
- Add comprehensive test suite in test/auth2FA.test.js and update existing auth test suites

* ci: update node version to 22 and sync package-lock.json

* ci: pin mongo service to 6.0 and add wait-for-mongodb step

* test: add 2FA enablement and 2FA verified token to admin in refund.test.js

* fix(auth): switch bcrypt imports to pure-JS bcryptjs for cross-platform compatibility

* fix(test): remove duplicate MongoMemoryServer import in refund.test.js

* fix(test): add errorHandler middleware to refund.test.js app

* fix(test): clean up MongoDB connection logic and add afterAll hook in refund.test.js

* fix(test): standardize Mongoose connection lifecycle and add missing afterAll hooks

* fix(test): remove duplicate afterAll hooks and handle Multer 413 response status

* test(refund): explicitly set 2FA enablement and 2FA verified tokens for admin in refund.test.js

* test: ensure admin test helpers include 2FA enablement and 2FA verified JWT claims

* fix(test): add 2FA enablement and 2FA verified tokens for admin in webhooks and educatorVerification tests

---------

Co-authored-by: zeemscript <150973162+zeemscript@users.noreply.github.com>

* Add scholarship escrow contract foundation (#108)

* Improve application test coverage (#110)

* Add dependency health checks (#112)

* Validate auth and Stellar requests (#109)

* Validate auth and Stellar requests

* Address validation review feedback

* Secure book deletion authorization (#113)

* Secure book deletion

* Keep delete response consistent

* feat(stellar): gift courses/books via claimable balances with expiry reclaim (#116)

Adds a gift-a-course/book flow built on Stellar claimable balances so a
buyer can send an item to another user — including one who has not
finished wallet onboarding — without the recipient needing a USDC
trustline. The sender creates an on-ledger USDC balance the recipient
claims when ready, with a sender reclaim-after-expiry predicate so funds
are never stranded. Includes a GiftClaim model (no document-deleting TTL,
so the record survives expiry for reclaim), a claimableBalanceService
(build create/claim transactions with complementary predicates, resolve
the REAL balance id from the create result XDR — not the tx hash — with
a Horizon forClaimant fallback, and validate the signed gift XDR before
any state change), gift routes/controller at /api/stellar/gifts, and
granting item access to the RECIPIENT (never the payer) on claim. Wires
a `{ fallback: "claimable_balance" }` response into the purchase flow
when a creator wallet/trustline is missing. Tests cover predicate
decoding, trustline-free single-signature claiming, claim authorization
before/after expiry, the balance-id-vs-tx-hash distinction, tampered-XDR
rejection, guards mirroring initializePayment, and the recipient access
grant.

* feat(stellar): add idempotency protection to the Stellar payment endpoints (#115)

Makes /api/stellar/payment/initialize and /submit safe against
double-clicks, client retries, and concurrent duplicates. Submit is
naturally idempotent per transaction hash: the deterministic hash of
the signed XDR is looked up against confirmed transactions before any
processing, so a replayed submission returns the original success
response without re-granting access, with the unique index on
stellarTxHash as the database-level backstop (an E11000 on the confirm
save is treated as already processed). Initialize no longer piles up
duplicates: a pending checkout for the same user+item returns the
existing record (with its persisted unsigned XDR) instead of creating
a new document, and stale pending records are reaped by the existing
pending-only TTL index. Adds a stricter per-user rate limiter
(paymentLimiter) on the payment routes, keyed on the authenticated
user id with an IPv6-aware IP fallback. Covers duplicate-submit,
duplicate-initialize, the E11000 race, and limiter enforcement with
tests.

* feat(stellar): validate Stellar config at startup and document the mainnet switch (#114)

Adds a single source of truth for the Stellar network configuration
(src/config/stellar.js) that resolves the network name, network
passphrase, Horizon URLs, and USDC issuer from STELLAR_NETWORK, and
validates the whole setup fail-fast at boot so a misconfigured
deployment (bad network value, mainnet flag with testnet Horizon or
issuer) fails with an error naming the exact problem instead of at
request time. stellarService.js and horizonClient.js now consume this
module. Adds docs/MAINNET.md covering the env changes, creator
trustlines, and a first-mainnet-transaction smoke checklist, plus unit
tests for resolution and validation across both networks.

* feat(stellar): fee-bump sponsorship with structural whitelist and spend caps (#111)

Let the platform pay a user's Stellar network fee by wrapping the user-signed
transaction in a fee-bump signed by a dedicated fee-source account, so a user
holding USDC but ~no XLM can buy a book, buy a course, or donate. Opt-in per
submit via `requestSponsorship: true`; off by default and byte-for-byte
identical when disabled.

Guard rails (server signs on the platform's behalf):
- Structural whitelist (reject-by-default, allow-list of `payment` ops only):
  source, exact op count/order, destinations, amounts (stroops), asset, and
  memo must match the pending Transaction row exactly. Any foreign/extra
  operation — including unknown future types — is rejected.
- Durable spend caps (SponsorshipSpend, keyed by UTC day): per-transaction fee
  ceiling, per-day total, and per-user per-day count.
- Sponsor float pre-check so an underfunded sponsor never marks the user's
  transaction failed.

Fee-bump fee is priced over inner ops + wrapper and clamped to the ceiling
(verified against @stellar/stellar-sdk v16 and asserted in tests). Sponsored
rows record `sponsored`, `sponsorFeeCharged`, and the fee-bump (outer) hash
alongside the inner hash. Sponsorship-specific failures return a distinct
non-fatal 4xx/503 with `retryUnsponsored: true` and never mark the row failed.

- Config: FEE_SPONSOR_* in .env.example + validateEnv (fail-fast at boot when
  enabled with a missing/invalid secret); secret never logged or returned.
- Admin status endpoint GET /api/stellar/payment/sponsorship/status exposes the
  sponsor public key, live float, caps, and today's spend.
- Prometheus counters for approved/rejected sponsorship decisions.
- Docs: docs/fee-sponsorship.md, README, and openapi.yaml.
- Tests: feeSponsorService (whitelist adversarial matrix, fee correctness,
  inner-untouched, caps, secret handling, boot config) and feeSponsorSubmit
  (payment + donation flag-off regression, flag-on sponsorship, cap/whitelist
  rejections that don't fail the row).

Closes #30

* feat: add managed course categories (#118)

* feat(courses): add managed category taxonomy

* fix(categories): preserve legacy course creation

* feat: add recurring sadaqah pledges (#119)

* feat(donations): add recurring sadaqah pledges

* fix(pledges): preserve donation test compatibility

* fix(pledges): ignore non-persisted transactions

* refactor(db): scaffold /mongo data-layer structure (closes #167)

---------

Co-authored-by: Afeez Tomisin <132703022+Banx17@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: zeemscript <150973162+zeemscript@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Alabi Ibrahim Abimbola <139625252+abimbolaalabi@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Kelechukwu Izuaba <144479895+Kaycee276@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: BountySpaghetti <zeemroyals@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: BountySpaghetti <286941608+BountySpaghetti@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Samuel Ojetunde <samuelojetunde898@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: abimbolaalabi <abimbolaalabi@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <shittulukmanbabatunde@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <304024794+Lspnjr1@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Alhassan Nuhu Idris <alhassannuhu0@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Mantissa <negativemantissa@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Ezekiel Akawa <akawaezekiel4@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Mfon <67503972+TS-mfon@users.noreply.github.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Sakariyah Abdulhazeem <150973162+zeemscript@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Afeez Tomisin <132703022+Banx17@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Alabi Ibrahim Abimbola <139625252+abimbolaalabi@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Kelechukwu Izuaba <144479895+Kaycee276@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: BountySpaghetti <zeemroyals@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: BountySpaghetti <286941608+BountySpaghetti@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Samuel Ojetunde <samuelojetunde898@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: abimbolaalabi <abimbolaalabi@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <shittulukmanbabatunde@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <304024794+Lspnjr1@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Alhassan Nuhu Idris <alhassannuhu0@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Mantissa <negativemantissa@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Ezekiel Akawa <akawaezekiel4@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Mfon <67503972+TS-mfon@users.noreply.github.com>
zeemscript added a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 24, 2026
* Merge dev into main (#117)

* stellar: validate signed XDR contents before submit; store expectedHa… (#51)

* stellar: validate signed XDR contents before submit; store expectedHash/memo; verify on-chain before granting access; add tests

* test: add validateSignedPaymentXdr to stellarService mock (new import in paymentController)

* test: expect expectedHash at payment init (XDR pre-validation stores it there)

---------

Co-authored-by: zeemscript <150973162+zeemscript@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(stellar): publish Soroban giving-escrow contract id in stellar.toml

Adds env-driven GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT (custom, non-SEP-1) so the deployed
On-Chain Giving escrow is discoverable from /.well-known/stellar.toml. Set
GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT_ID to enable. Includes test coverage.

* fix(stellar): resolve Horizon endpoints lazily + network-aware default

Horizon client was constructed at import time with a hardcoded testnet
fallback, so a mainnet deploy with HORIZON_URLS unset would silently talk to
testnet Horizon. Now the default is derived from STELLAR_NETWORK and the client
is built lazily on first use (after env is loaded). Explicit HORIZON_URLS still wins.

* feat(auth): authenticated change-password endpoint

PUT /api/auth/change-password (protected): verifies current password,
enforces the password policy, updates the hash, and signs out all other
sessions. Adds the auth.password_change audit action.

* feat(auth): harden authentication against login lockout, breached passwords, and signup abuse (#89) (#99)

* feat(auth): harden authentication against login lockout, breached passwords, and signup abuse (#89)

- Add progressive per-account login lockout (failedLoginAttempts + lockUntil) with env-configurable escalating backoff, generic 429 while locked, and AUTH_ACCOUNT_LOCKED audit emission.
- Add HaveIBeenPwned breached-password check (SHA-1 prefix k-anonymity, never transmits the password) at register and password reset; fails open on outage.
- Add per-email throttling on /register and /resend-verification (emailAuthLimiter, survives IP rotation, active in test env) plus a pluggable captcha gate (no-op when unconfigured).
- Add User lockout fields and document new env vars in .env.example.

* fix(auth): address CodeRabbit review on login lockout, HIBP, captcha, and JWT secret (#89)

- loginUser: locked accounts now return the same generic 401 'Invalid credentials'
  as a nonexistent account (no enumeration); failed-login counter incremented
  atomically via findByIdAndUpdate \, lock persisted via updateOne
- resetPassword: breached-password check moved to after successful OTP validation
  so unauthenticated callers cannot trigger HIBP lookups
- authController: refuse to start when JWT_SECRET is missing (no hardcoded fallback)
- hibp: request HIBP padding ('Add-Padding: true') and ignore zero-count records
- captcha: configurable CAPTCHA_TIMEOUT_MS (default 5s) passed to the provider call;
  captcha rejection now returns the standard { success, message, data: null } shape
- tests: assert escalating backoff magnitude (120s on 6th failure) and the 24h cap;
  locked-account test expects 401; per-email limiter buckets reset between tests;
  outage test routed through mockHibp so the shared spy is cleaned up; added
  padding-record and cap coverage

* Feat/93 idempotency keys (#100)

* feat(stellar): publish Soroban giving-escrow contract id in stellar.toml

Adds env-driven GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT (custom, non-SEP-1) so the deployed
On-Chain Giving escrow is discoverable from /.well-known/stellar.toml. Set
GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT_ID to enable. Includes test coverage.

* fix(stellar): resolve Horizon endpoints lazily + network-aware default

Horizon client was constructed at import time with a hardcoded testnet
fallback, so a mainnet deploy with HORIZON_URLS unset would silently talk to
testnet Horizon. Now the default is derived from STELLAR_NETWORK and the client
is built lazily on first use (after env is loaded). Explicit HORIZON_URLS still wins.

* feat(auth): authenticated change-password endpoint

PUT /api/auth/change-password (protected): verifies current password,
enforces the password policy, updates the hash, and signs out all other
sessions. Adds the auth.password_change audit action.

* feat(payment): add request-level idempotency keys to payment endpoints (#93)

* test: complement stellarService mock exports in idempotency test

* test: refine idempotency middleware concurrency lock test (#93)

* fix(stellar): export validateSignedPaymentXdr and complement test mock (#93)

* fix(stellar): remove duplicate validateSignedPaymentXdr export (#93)

---------

Co-authored-by: zeemscript <150973162+zeemscript@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(auth): enforce resource ownership across mutating endpoints (#88) (#105)

Add a centralized authorization layer that verifies the authenticated
user owns the target resource (or is an admin) before any mutating
handler runs, replacing the ad-hoc inline checks scattered across
controllers.

- add authorizeOwnership + authorizeReviewOwnership middleware
  (src/middlewares/authorize.js); on success the loaded doc is attached
  to req so handlers can reuse it
- apply the guards to book delete, course update, space update/delete,
  and review update/delete on books and courses; review create stays
  purchase-gated
- record ownership denials to the audit log (authz.ownership.denied)
- remove the now-redundant inline ownership checks from the book,
  course, space, and review controllers
- document the resource x action x role matrix (docs/authorization-matrix.md)
  and cover it with an integration test suite (test/ownershipAuthz.test.js)

Closes #88

Co-authored-by: BountySpaghetti <286941608+BountySpaghetti@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(security): stop logging OTP codes and verification tokens in email bodies (#104)

The NODE_ENV === "test" branch of sendMail logged the full rendered email
body — including the password-reset OTP span and the verification link's
token query param — and pino's redact config cannot censor values baked
into interpolated strings, so the leak bypassed the app-wide redaction.

Remove the body from every log statement (log only recipient, subject, and
template id via structured fields), and give tests a sanctioned in-memory
outbox hook instead of log scraping. sendOtpEmail/sendVerificationEmail/
sendReceiptEmail now return the sendMail result so callers can capture it.

Closes #95

* fix(transactions): prevent TTL index from deleting confirmed purchases and donations (#103)

The Transaction collection used a blanket TTL index on expiresAt with a
schema default that stamped a 30-minute expiry on every row regardless of
status. Because confirm paths never cleared expiresAt, confirmed on-chain
purchases and donations were permanently reaped ~30 minutes after creation,
deleting the proof of payment and orphaning recorded earnings.

Scope the TTL index to status: "pending" via partialFilterExpression, make
the expiresAt default conditional on status, add a pre-save hook that clears
expiresAt for any terminal state, explicitly unset expiresAt on every
terminal transition (submit, donation, refund, dispute, cancel, job handler,
reconciliation promotion), and add an idempotent migration that rescues
legacy non-pending rows and rebuilds the index.

Closes #94

* feat(security): implement educator verification pipeline and content-creation gating (#92) (#102)

* feat(security): implement educator verification pipeline and content-creation gating (#92)

- Add EducatorVerification model with legal state-machine transitions
  (draft -> pending -> approved/rejected, resubmit from rejected)
- Add verifiedEducator durable flag on User, set atomically on approval
- Add AUDIT_ACTIONS: EDUCATOR_VERIFY_SUBMIT/_RESUBMIT/_APPROVE/_REJECT
  with metadata allowlist entries in auditService
- requireVerifiedEducator middleware (403 for unverified, admin bypass)
- Applicant API: submit/resubmit app, get own app, signed doc URLs,
  signed Cloudinary upload-signature for private credential uploads
- Admin review queue: list+filter pending, view signed docs,
  approve/reject with notes (Mongo transaction for verifiedEducator grant)
- Gate all content-creation routes:
  * POST /api/courses  (courseRoutes.js)
  * POST /api/books    (bookRoutes.js)
  * POST /api/spaces   (spaceRoutes.js — live sessions per issue)
- Wire routes: /api/educator-verification + /api/admin/educator-verification
- Comprehensive test suite in test/educatorVerification.test.js
  (state-machine, middleware gating, submit/resubmit, approve/reject,
  content 403/2xx, both full lifecycles submit->pending->approve and
  reject->resubmit->approve, signed URL security, admin-only gating,
  audit log instrumentation)

Verification Results:
  app.test.js: 22/22 PASS (CI boot + endpoint health)
  auditLog.test.js: 21/21 PASS (append-only, redaction, admin gate)

Closes #92

* fix(ci): resolve educator verification pipeline test failures

- Remove redundant catchAsync double-wrap in educator-verification routes
  (controllers are already pre-wrapped; the outer wrap called .catch() on
  undefined, returning 500 for every new endpoint)
- Use MongoMemoryReplSet in educatorVerification.test.js so the approve/reject
  MongoDB transaction can run (standalone MongoMemoryServer cannot)
- Use AuditLog.collection.deleteMany in test cleanup to bypass append-only
  pre-hooks
- Return recordAudit's promise so callers can await durability; await it in
  submitApplication and performReview to eliminate the fire-and-forget
  audit-race in tests
- Fix testAuth.js password overwrite: destructure password out of the
  override spread so the hashed value is not clobbered by plaintext
- Seed bookUpload test user as a verifiedEducator mentor so the new content
  gate lets it through

---------

Co-authored-by: abimbolaalabi <abimbolaalabi@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(auth): signed service-to-service authentication for the AI service (#91) (#106)

Give the backend a real machine-to-machine auth channel for the AI
service (dnb-ai) — signed, scoped, rotatable keys instead of a single
static shared secret.

- add requireServiceAuth middleware (src/middlewares/serviceAuth.js):
  HMAC-SHA256 over a canonical method/path/timestamp/body-digest string,
  a ±300s replay window, constant-time signature comparison, per-key
  scope enforcement, and req.service on success
- key store (src/config/serviceKeys.js): multiple active keys keyed by
  kid for zero-downtime rotation; resilient env parsing, never throws
- mount a real internal route GET /api/internal/ai/whoami guarded by the
  guard (scope ai:read-content), plus raw-body capture in app.js
- migrate /admin/jobs off raw !== to a length-guarded timingSafeEqual
- audit denials (service_auth.denied), require AI_SERVICE_KEYS in prod
  (fail-fast), document the signing contract + rotation runbook
- cover the full accept/reject matrix in test/serviceAuth.test.js

Closes #91

Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <304024794+Lspnjr1@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(webhooks): signed outbound webhook event system (#45) (#107)

Add an outbound webhook/event system so external consumers can subscribe
to payment and enrollment lifecycle events over HMAC-signed HTTP
callbacks, with retries, dead-lettering, and redelivery.

- models: WebhookEndpoint (encrypted secret at rest, subscribed events,
  auto-disable counters) and WebhookDelivery (all scheduling state in the
  doc: status, attemptCount, nextAttemptAt indexed)
- webhookService.emitEvent: typed event catalog, per-event id for
  consumer idempotency, strict payload allowlist (no secrets/emails/user
  docs); persists a delivery per subscribed endpoint after the txn
  commits, never blocks or fails the request path, no-ops when the DB is
  unavailable
- signing: X-DeenBridge-Signature v1=hmac-sha256(secret, `${ts}.${body}`)
  over the exact sent bytes; timing-safe verify + 5-min staleness window
- deliveryWorker: atomic findOneAndUpdate claim (no double-send),
  exponential backoff + jitter, dead-letter after max attempts, endpoint
  auto-disable after sustained failures
- management API (/api/webhooks, admin-gated): endpoint CRUD, rotate
  secret, list deliveries, redeliver (atomic $set), and ping
- SSRF guard: https-only in prod, reject loopback/RFC-1918/link-local
- wire emitters into payment (initialized/confirmed/failed/expired),
  enrollment, and wallet connect/disconnect; migrate /admin/jobs to a
  timing-safe token compare
- docs/webhooks.md consumer verifier + full offline test suite

Closes #45

Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <304024794+Lspnjr1@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(security): implement TOTP two-factor authentication for admins a… (#98)

* feat(stellar): publish Soroban giving-escrow contract id in stellar.toml

Adds env-driven GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT (custom, non-SEP-1) so the deployed
On-Chain Giving escrow is discoverable from /.well-known/stellar.toml. Set
GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT_ID to enable. Includes test coverage.

* fix(stellar): resolve Horizon endpoints lazily + network-aware default

Horizon client was constructed at import time with a hardcoded testnet
fallback, so a mainnet deploy with HORIZON_URLS unset would silently talk to
testnet Horizon. Now the default is derived from STELLAR_NETWORK and the client
is built lazily on first use (after env is loaded). Explicit HORIZON_URLS still wins.

* feat(auth): authenticated change-password endpoint

PUT /api/auth/change-password (protected): verifies current password,
enforces the password policy, updates the hash, and signs out all other
sessions. Adds the auth.password_change audit action.

* feat(security): implement TOTP two-factor authentication for admins and mentors

- Add TOTP (RFC 6238) lifecycle: secret generation, encrypted storage at rest (AES-256-GCM), otpauth:// URI and QR code generation
- Add 10 single-use bcrypt-hashed recovery codes
- Add two-factor rate-limiting middleware (5 verification attempts per 15-minute window)
- Update login controller to issue step-up mfaToken challenges when 2FA is enabled
- Update authorizeRoles('admin') middleware to enforce 2FA-enabled status and 2FA-verified sessions
- Log audit actions for all 2FA lifecycle events (setup, enable, login challenge, success, failure, disable, recovery code usage)
- Add comprehensive test suite in test/auth2FA.test.js and update existing auth test suites

* ci: update node version to 22 and sync package-lock.json

* ci: pin mongo service to 6.0 and add wait-for-mongodb step

* test: add 2FA enablement and 2FA verified token to admin in refund.test.js

* fix(auth): switch bcrypt imports to pure-JS bcryptjs for cross-platform compatibility

* fix(test): remove duplicate MongoMemoryServer import in refund.test.js

* fix(test): add errorHandler middleware to refund.test.js app

* fix(test): clean up MongoDB connection logic and add afterAll hook in refund.test.js

* fix(test): standardize Mongoose connection lifecycle and add missing afterAll hooks

* fix(test): remove duplicate afterAll hooks and handle Multer 413 response status

* test(refund): explicitly set 2FA enablement and 2FA verified tokens for admin in refund.test.js

* test: ensure admin test helpers include 2FA enablement and 2FA verified JWT claims

* fix(test): add 2FA enablement and 2FA verified tokens for admin in webhooks and educatorVerification tests

---------

Co-authored-by: zeemscript <150973162+zeemscript@users.noreply.github.com>

* Add scholarship escrow contract foundation (#108)

* Improve application test coverage (#110)

* Add dependency health checks (#112)

* Validate auth and Stellar requests (#109)

* Validate auth and Stellar requests

* Address validation review feedback

* Secure book deletion authorization (#113)

* Secure book deletion

* Keep delete response consistent

* feat(stellar): gift courses/books via claimable balances with expiry reclaim (#116)

Adds a gift-a-course/book flow built on Stellar claimable balances so a
buyer can send an item to another user — including one who has not
finished wallet onboarding — without the recipient needing a USDC
trustline. The sender creates an on-ledger USDC balance the recipient
claims when ready, with a sender reclaim-after-expiry predicate so funds
are never stranded. Includes a GiftClaim model (no document-deleting TTL,
so the record survives expiry for reclaim), a claimableBalanceService
(build create/claim transactions with complementary predicates, resolve
the REAL balance id from the create result XDR — not the tx hash — with
a Horizon forClaimant fallback, and validate the signed gift XDR before
any state change), gift routes/controller at /api/stellar/gifts, and
granting item access to the RECIPIENT (never the payer) on claim. Wires
a `{ fallback: "claimable_balance" }` response into the purchase flow
when a creator wallet/trustline is missing. Tests cover predicate
decoding, trustline-free single-signature claiming, claim authorization
before/after expiry, the balance-id-vs-tx-hash distinction, tampered-XDR
rejection, guards mirroring initializePayment, and the recipient access
grant.

* feat(stellar): add idempotency protection to the Stellar payment endpoints (#115)

Makes /api/stellar/payment/initialize and /submit safe against
double-clicks, client retries, and concurrent duplicates. Submit is
naturally idempotent per transaction hash: the deterministic hash of
the signed XDR is looked up against confirmed transactions before any
processing, so a replayed submission returns the original success
response without re-granting access, with the unique index on
stellarTxHash as the database-level backstop (an E11000 on the confirm
save is treated as already processed). Initialize no longer piles up
duplicates: a pending checkout for the same user+item returns the
existing record (with its persisted unsigned XDR) instead of creating
a new document, and stale pending records are reaped by the existing
pending-only TTL index. Adds a stricter per-user rate limiter
(paymentLimiter) on the payment routes, keyed on the authenticated
user id with an IPv6-aware IP fallback. Covers duplicate-submit,
duplicate-initialize, the E11000 race, and limiter enforcement with
tests.

* feat(stellar): validate Stellar config at startup and document the mainnet switch (#114)

Adds a single source of truth for the Stellar network configuration
(src/config/stellar.js) that resolves the network name, network
passphrase, Horizon URLs, and USDC issuer from STELLAR_NETWORK, and
validates the whole setup fail-fast at boot so a misconfigured
deployment (bad network value, mainnet flag with testnet Horizon or
issuer) fails with an error naming the exact problem instead of at
request time. stellarService.js and horizonClient.js now consume this
module. Adds docs/MAINNET.md covering the env changes, creator
trustlines, and a first-mainnet-transaction smoke checklist, plus unit
tests for resolution and validation across both networks.

* feat(stellar): fee-bump sponsorship with structural whitelist and spend caps (#111)

Let the platform pay a user's Stellar network fee by wrapping the user-signed
transaction in a fee-bump signed by a dedicated fee-source account, so a user
holding USDC but ~no XLM can buy a book, buy a course, or donate. Opt-in per
submit via `requestSponsorship: true`; off by default and byte-for-byte
identical when disabled.

Guard rails (server signs on the platform's behalf):
- Structural whitelist (reject-by-default, allow-list of `payment` ops only):
  source, exact op count/order, destinations, amounts (stroops), asset, and
  memo must match the pending Transaction row exactly. Any foreign/extra
  operation — including unknown future types — is rejected.
- Durable spend caps (SponsorshipSpend, keyed by UTC day): per-transaction fee
  ceiling, per-day total, and per-user per-day count.
- Sponsor float pre-check so an underfunded sponsor never marks the user's
  transaction failed.

Fee-bump fee is priced over inner ops + wrapper and clamped to the ceiling
(verified against @stellar/stellar-sdk v16 and asserted in tests). Sponsored
rows record `sponsored`, `sponsorFeeCharged`, and the fee-bump (outer) hash
alongside the inner hash. Sponsorship-specific failures return a distinct
non-fatal 4xx/503 with `retryUnsponsored: true` and never mark the row failed.

- Config: FEE_SPONSOR_* in .env.example + validateEnv (fail-fast at boot when
  enabled with a missing/invalid secret); secret never logged or returned.
- Admin status endpoint GET /api/stellar/payment/sponsorship/status exposes the
  sponsor public key, live float, caps, and today's spend.
- Prometheus counters for approved/rejected sponsorship decisions.
- Docs: docs/fee-sponsorship.md, README, and openapi.yaml.
- Tests: feeSponsorService (whitelist adversarial matrix, fee correctness,
  inner-untouched, caps, secret handling, boot config) and feeSponsorSubmit
  (payment + donation flag-off regression, flag-on sponsorship, cap/whitelist
  rejections that don't fail the row).

Closes #30

* feat: add managed course categories (#118)

* feat(courses): add managed category taxonomy

* fix(categories): preserve legacy course creation

* feat: add recurring sadaqah pledges (#119)

* feat(donations): add recurring sadaqah pledges

* fix(pledges): preserve donation test compatibility

* fix(pledges): ignore non-persisted transactions

---------

Co-authored-by: Afeez Tomisin <132703022+Banx17@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Alabi Ibrahim Abimbola <139625252+abimbolaalabi@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Kelechukwu Izuaba <144479895+Kaycee276@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: BountySpaghetti <zeemroyals@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: BountySpaghetti <286941608+BountySpaghetti@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Samuel Ojetunde <samuelojetunde898@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: abimbolaalabi <abimbolaalabi@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <shittulukmanbabatunde@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <304024794+Lspnjr1@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Alhassan Nuhu Idris <alhassannuhu0@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Mantissa <negativemantissa@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Ezekiel Akawa <akawaezekiel4@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Mfon <67503972+TS-mfon@users.noreply.github.com>

* refactor(db): Create /mongo folder structure (#280)

* stellar: validate signed XDR contents before submit; store expectedHa… (#51)

* stellar: validate signed XDR contents before submit; store expectedHash/memo; verify on-chain before granting access; add tests

* test: add validateSignedPaymentXdr to stellarService mock (new import in paymentController)

* test: expect expectedHash at payment init (XDR pre-validation stores it there)

---------

Co-authored-by: zeemscript <150973162+zeemscript@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(stellar): publish Soroban giving-escrow contract id in stellar.toml

Adds env-driven GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT (custom, non-SEP-1) so the deployed
On-Chain Giving escrow is discoverable from /.well-known/stellar.toml. Set
GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT_ID to enable. Includes test coverage.

* fix(stellar): resolve Horizon endpoints lazily + network-aware default

Horizon client was constructed at import time with a hardcoded testnet
fallback, so a mainnet deploy with HORIZON_URLS unset would silently talk to
testnet Horizon. Now the default is derived from STELLAR_NETWORK and the client
is built lazily on first use (after env is loaded). Explicit HORIZON_URLS still wins.

* feat(auth): authenticated change-password endpoint

PUT /api/auth/change-password (protected): verifies current password,
enforces the password policy, updates the hash, and signs out all other
sessions. Adds the auth.password_change audit action.

* feat(auth): harden authentication against login lockout, breached passwords, and signup abuse (#89) (#99)

* feat(auth): harden authentication against login lockout, breached passwords, and signup abuse (#89)

- Add progressive per-account login lockout (failedLoginAttempts + lockUntil) with env-configurable escalating backoff, generic 429 while locked, and AUTH_ACCOUNT_LOCKED audit emission.
- Add HaveIBeenPwned breached-password check (SHA-1 prefix k-anonymity, never transmits the password) at register and password reset; fails open on outage.
- Add per-email throttling on /register and /resend-verification (emailAuthLimiter, survives IP rotation, active in test env) plus a pluggable captcha gate (no-op when unconfigured).
- Add User lockout fields and document new env vars in .env.example.

* fix(auth): address CodeRabbit review on login lockout, HIBP, captcha, and JWT secret (#89)

- loginUser: locked accounts now return the same generic 401 'Invalid credentials'
  as a nonexistent account (no enumeration); failed-login counter incremented
  atomically via findByIdAndUpdate \, lock persisted via updateOne
- resetPassword: breached-password check moved to after successful OTP validation
  so unauthenticated callers cannot trigger HIBP lookups
- authController: refuse to start when JWT_SECRET is missing (no hardcoded fallback)
- hibp: request HIBP padding ('Add-Padding: true') and ignore zero-count records
- captcha: configurable CAPTCHA_TIMEOUT_MS (default 5s) passed to the provider call;
  captcha rejection now returns the standard { success, message, data: null } shape
- tests: assert escalating backoff magnitude (120s on 6th failure) and the 24h cap;
  locked-account test expects 401; per-email limiter buckets reset between tests;
  outage test routed through mockHibp so the shared spy is cleaned up; added
  padding-record and cap coverage

* Feat/93 idempotency keys (#100)

* feat(stellar): publish Soroban giving-escrow contract id in stellar.toml

Adds env-driven GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT (custom, non-SEP-1) so the deployed
On-Chain Giving escrow is discoverable from /.well-known/stellar.toml. Set
GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT_ID to enable. Includes test coverage.

* fix(stellar): resolve Horizon endpoints lazily + network-aware default

Horizon client was constructed at import time with a hardcoded testnet
fallback, so a mainnet deploy with HORIZON_URLS unset would silently talk to
testnet Horizon. Now the default is derived from STELLAR_NETWORK and the client
is built lazily on first use (after env is loaded). Explicit HORIZON_URLS still wins.

* feat(auth): authenticated change-password endpoint

PUT /api/auth/change-password (protected): verifies current password,
enforces the password policy, updates the hash, and signs out all other
sessions. Adds the auth.password_change audit action.

* feat(payment): add request-level idempotency keys to payment endpoints (#93)

* test: complement stellarService mock exports in idempotency test

* test: refine idempotency middleware concurrency lock test (#93)

* fix(stellar): export validateSignedPaymentXdr and complement test mock (#93)

* fix(stellar): remove duplicate validateSignedPaymentXdr export (#93)

---------

Co-authored-by: zeemscript <150973162+zeemscript@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(auth): enforce resource ownership across mutating endpoints (#88) (#105)

Add a centralized authorization layer that verifies the authenticated
user owns the target resource (or is an admin) before any mutating
handler runs, replacing the ad-hoc inline checks scattered across
controllers.

- add authorizeOwnership + authorizeReviewOwnership middleware
  (src/middlewares/authorize.js); on success the loaded doc is attached
  to req so handlers can reuse it
- apply the guards to book delete, course update, space update/delete,
  and review update/delete on books and courses; review create stays
  purchase-gated
- record ownership denials to the audit log (authz.ownership.denied)
- remove the now-redundant inline ownership checks from the book,
  course, space, and review controllers
- document the resource x action x role matrix (docs/authorization-matrix.md)
  and cover it with an integration test suite (test/ownershipAuthz.test.js)

Closes #88

Co-authored-by: BountySpaghetti <286941608+BountySpaghetti@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(security): stop logging OTP codes and verification tokens in email bodies (#104)

The NODE_ENV === "test" branch of sendMail logged the full rendered email
body — including the password-reset OTP span and the verification link's
token query param — and pino's redact config cannot censor values baked
into interpolated strings, so the leak bypassed the app-wide redaction.

Remove the body from every log statement (log only recipient, subject, and
template id via structured fields), and give tests a sanctioned in-memory
outbox hook instead of log scraping. sendOtpEmail/sendVerificationEmail/
sendReceiptEmail now return the sendMail result so callers can capture it.

Closes #95

* fix(transactions): prevent TTL index from deleting confirmed purchases and donations (#103)

The Transaction collection used a blanket TTL index on expiresAt with a
schema default that stamped a 30-minute expiry on every row regardless of
status. Because confirm paths never cleared expiresAt, confirmed on-chain
purchases and donations were permanently reaped ~30 minutes after creation,
deleting the proof of payment and orphaning recorded earnings.

Scope the TTL index to status: "pending" via partialFilterExpression, make
the expiresAt default conditional on status, add a pre-save hook that clears
expiresAt for any terminal state, explicitly unset expiresAt on every
terminal transition (submit, donation, refund, dispute, cancel, job handler,
reconciliation promotion), and add an idempotent migration that rescues
legacy non-pending rows and rebuilds the index.

Closes #94

* feat(security): implement educator verification pipeline and content-creation gating (#92) (#102)

* feat(security): implement educator verification pipeline and content-creation gating (#92)

- Add EducatorVerification model with legal state-machine transitions
  (draft -> pending -> approved/rejected, resubmit from rejected)
- Add verifiedEducator durable flag on User, set atomically on approval
- Add AUDIT_ACTIONS: EDUCATOR_VERIFY_SUBMIT/_RESUBMIT/_APPROVE/_REJECT
  with metadata allowlist entries in auditService
- requireVerifiedEducator middleware (403 for unverified, admin bypass)
- Applicant API: submit/resubmit app, get own app, signed doc URLs,
  signed Cloudinary upload-signature for private credential uploads
- Admin review queue: list+filter pending, view signed docs,
  approve/reject with notes (Mongo transaction for verifiedEducator grant)
- Gate all content-creation routes:
  * POST /api/courses  (courseRoutes.js)
  * POST /api/books    (bookRoutes.js)
  * POST /api/spaces   (spaceRoutes.js — live sessions per issue)
- Wire routes: /api/educator-verification + /api/admin/educator-verification
- Comprehensive test suite in test/educatorVerification.test.js
  (state-machine, middleware gating, submit/resubmit, approve/reject,
  content 403/2xx, both full lifecycles submit->pending->approve and
  reject->resubmit->approve, signed URL security, admin-only gating,
  audit log instrumentation)

Verification Results:
  app.test.js: 22/22 PASS (CI boot + endpoint health)
  auditLog.test.js: 21/21 PASS (append-only, redaction, admin gate)

Closes #92

* fix(ci): resolve educator verification pipeline test failures

- Remove redundant catchAsync double-wrap in educator-verification routes
  (controllers are already pre-wrapped; the outer wrap called .catch() on
  undefined, returning 500 for every new endpoint)
- Use MongoMemoryReplSet in educatorVerification.test.js so the approve/reject
  MongoDB transaction can run (standalone MongoMemoryServer cannot)
- Use AuditLog.collection.deleteMany in test cleanup to bypass append-only
  pre-hooks
- Return recordAudit's promise so callers can await durability; await it in
  submitApplication and performReview to eliminate the fire-and-forget
  audit-race in tests
- Fix testAuth.js password overwrite: destructure password out of the
  override spread so the hashed value is not clobbered by plaintext
- Seed bookUpload test user as a verifiedEducator mentor so the new content
  gate lets it through

---------

Co-authored-by: abimbolaalabi <abimbolaalabi@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(auth): signed service-to-service authentication for the AI service (#91) (#106)

Give the backend a real machine-to-machine auth channel for the AI
service (dnb-ai) — signed, scoped, rotatable keys instead of a single
static shared secret.

- add requireServiceAuth middleware (src/middlewares/serviceAuth.js):
  HMAC-SHA256 over a canonical method/path/timestamp/body-digest string,
  a ±300s replay window, constant-time signature comparison, per-key
  scope enforcement, and req.service on success
- key store (src/config/serviceKeys.js): multiple active keys keyed by
  kid for zero-downtime rotation; resilient env parsing, never throws
- mount a real internal route GET /api/internal/ai/whoami guarded by the
  guard (scope ai:read-content), plus raw-body capture in app.js
- migrate /admin/jobs off raw !== to a length-guarded timingSafeEqual
- audit denials (service_auth.denied), require AI_SERVICE_KEYS in prod
  (fail-fast), document the signing contract + rotation runbook
- cover the full accept/reject matrix in test/serviceAuth.test.js

Closes #91

Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <304024794+Lspnjr1@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(webhooks): signed outbound webhook event system (#45) (#107)

Add an outbound webhook/event system so external consumers can subscribe
to payment and enrollment lifecycle events over HMAC-signed HTTP
callbacks, with retries, dead-lettering, and redelivery.

- models: WebhookEndpoint (encrypted secret at rest, subscribed events,
  auto-disable counters) and WebhookDelivery (all scheduling state in the
  doc: status, attemptCount, nextAttemptAt indexed)
- webhookService.emitEvent: typed event catalog, per-event id for
  consumer idempotency, strict payload allowlist (no secrets/emails/user
  docs); persists a delivery per subscribed endpoint after the txn
  commits, never blocks or fails the request path, no-ops when the DB is
  unavailable
- signing: X-DeenBridge-Signature v1=hmac-sha256(secret, `${ts}.${body}`)
  over the exact sent bytes; timing-safe verify + 5-min staleness window
- deliveryWorker: atomic findOneAndUpdate claim (no double-send),
  exponential backoff + jitter, dead-letter after max attempts, endpoint
  auto-disable after sustained failures
- management API (/api/webhooks, admin-gated): endpoint CRUD, rotate
  secret, list deliveries, redeliver (atomic $set), and ping
- SSRF guard: https-only in prod, reject loopback/RFC-1918/link-local
- wire emitters into payment (initialized/confirmed/failed/expired),
  enrollment, and wallet connect/disconnect; migrate /admin/jobs to a
  timing-safe token compare
- docs/webhooks.md consumer verifier + full offline test suite

Closes #45

Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <304024794+Lspnjr1@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(security): implement TOTP two-factor authentication for admins a… (#98)

* feat(stellar): publish Soroban giving-escrow contract id in stellar.toml

Adds env-driven GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT (custom, non-SEP-1) so the deployed
On-Chain Giving escrow is discoverable from /.well-known/stellar.toml. Set
GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT_ID to enable. Includes test coverage.

* fix(stellar): resolve Horizon endpoints lazily + network-aware default

Horizon client was constructed at import time with a hardcoded testnet
fallback, so a mainnet deploy with HORIZON_URLS unset would silently talk to
testnet Horizon. Now the default is derived from STELLAR_NETWORK and the client
is built lazily on first use (after env is loaded). Explicit HORIZON_URLS still wins.

* feat(auth): authenticated change-password endpoint

PUT /api/auth/change-password (protected): verifies current password,
enforces the password policy, updates the hash, and signs out all other
sessions. Adds the auth.password_change audit action.

* feat(security): implement TOTP two-factor authentication for admins and mentors

- Add TOTP (RFC 6238) lifecycle: secret generation, encrypted storage at rest (AES-256-GCM), otpauth:// URI and QR code generation
- Add 10 single-use bcrypt-hashed recovery codes
- Add two-factor rate-limiting middleware (5 verification attempts per 15-minute window)
- Update login controller to issue step-up mfaToken challenges when 2FA is enabled
- Update authorizeRoles('admin') middleware to enforce 2FA-enabled status and 2FA-verified sessions
- Log audit actions for all 2FA lifecycle events (setup, enable, login challenge, success, failure, disable, recovery code usage)
- Add comprehensive test suite in test/auth2FA.test.js and update existing auth test suites

* ci: update node version to 22 and sync package-lock.json

* ci: pin mongo service to 6.0 and add wait-for-mongodb step

* test: add 2FA enablement and 2FA verified token to admin in refund.test.js

* fix(auth): switch bcrypt imports to pure-JS bcryptjs for cross-platform compatibility

* fix(test): remove duplicate MongoMemoryServer import in refund.test.js

* fix(test): add errorHandler middleware to refund.test.js app

* fix(test): clean up MongoDB connection logic and add afterAll hook in refund.test.js

* fix(test): standardize Mongoose connection lifecycle and add missing afterAll hooks

* fix(test): remove duplicate afterAll hooks and handle Multer 413 response status

* test(refund): explicitly set 2FA enablement and 2FA verified tokens for admin in refund.test.js

* test: ensure admin test helpers include 2FA enablement and 2FA verified JWT claims

* fix(test): add 2FA enablement and 2FA verified tokens for admin in webhooks and educatorVerification tests

---------

Co-authored-by: zeemscript <150973162+zeemscript@users.noreply.github.com>

* Add scholarship escrow contract foundation (#108)

* Improve application test coverage (#110)

* Add dependency health checks (#112)

* Validate auth and Stellar requests (#109)

* Validate auth and Stellar requests

* Address validation review feedback

* Secure book deletion authorization (#113)

* Secure book deletion

* Keep delete response consistent

* feat(stellar): gift courses/books via claimable balances with expiry reclaim (#116)

Adds a gift-a-course/book flow built on Stellar claimable balances so a
buyer can send an item to another user — including one who has not
finished wallet onboarding — without the recipient needing a USDC
trustline. The sender creates an on-ledger USDC balance the recipient
claims when ready, with a sender reclaim-after-expiry predicate so funds
are never stranded. Includes a GiftClaim model (no document-deleting TTL,
so the record survives expiry for reclaim), a claimableBalanceService
(build create/claim transactions with complementary predicates, resolve
the REAL balance id from the create result XDR — not the tx hash — with
a Horizon forClaimant fallback, and validate the signed gift XDR before
any state change), gift routes/controller at /api/stellar/gifts, and
granting item access to the RECIPIENT (never the payer) on claim. Wires
a `{ fallback: "claimable_balance" }` response into the purchase flow
when a creator wallet/trustline is missing. Tests cover predicate
decoding, trustline-free single-signature claiming, claim authorization
before/after expiry, the balance-id-vs-tx-hash distinction, tampered-XDR
rejection, guards mirroring initializePayment, and the recipient access
grant.

* feat(stellar): add idempotency protection to the Stellar payment endpoints (#115)

Makes /api/stellar/payment/initialize and /submit safe against
double-clicks, client retries, and concurrent duplicates. Submit is
naturally idempotent per transaction hash: the deterministic hash of
the signed XDR is looked up against confirmed transactions before any
processing, so a replayed submission returns the original success
response without re-granting access, with the unique index on
stellarTxHash as the database-level backstop (an E11000 on the confirm
save is treated as already processed). Initialize no longer piles up
duplicates: a pending checkout for the same user+item returns the
existing record (with its persisted unsigned XDR) instead of creating
a new document, and stale pending records are reaped by the existing
pending-only TTL index. Adds a stricter per-user rate limiter
(paymentLimiter) on the payment routes, keyed on the authenticated
user id with an IPv6-aware IP fallback. Covers duplicate-submit,
duplicate-initialize, the E11000 race, and limiter enforcement with
tests.

* feat(stellar): validate Stellar config at startup and document the mainnet switch (#114)

Adds a single source of truth for the Stellar network configuration
(src/config/stellar.js) that resolves the network name, network
passphrase, Horizon URLs, and USDC issuer from STELLAR_NETWORK, and
validates the whole setup fail-fast at boot so a misconfigured
deployment (bad network value, mainnet flag with testnet Horizon or
issuer) fails with an error naming the exact problem instead of at
request time. stellarService.js and horizonClient.js now consume this
module. Adds docs/MAINNET.md covering the env changes, creator
trustlines, and a first-mainnet-transaction smoke checklist, plus unit
tests for resolution and validation across both networks.

* feat(stellar): fee-bump sponsorship with structural whitelist and spend caps (#111)

Let the platform pay a user's Stellar network fee by wrapping the user-signed
transaction in a fee-bump signed by a dedicated fee-source account, so a user
holding USDC but ~no XLM can buy a book, buy a course, or donate. Opt-in per
submit via `requestSponsorship: true`; off by default and byte-for-byte
identical when disabled.

Guard rails (server signs on the platform's behalf):
- Structural whitelist (reject-by-default, allow-list of `payment` ops only):
  source, exact op count/order, destinations, amounts (stroops), asset, and
  memo must match the pending Transaction row exactly. Any foreign/extra
  operation — including unknown future types — is rejected.
- Durable spend caps (SponsorshipSpend, keyed by UTC day): per-transaction fee
  ceiling, per-day total, and per-user per-day count.
- Sponsor float pre-check so an underfunded sponsor never marks the user's
  transaction failed.

Fee-bump fee is priced over inner ops + wrapper and clamped to the ceiling
(verified against @stellar/stellar-sdk v16 and asserted in tests). Sponsored
rows record `sponsored`, `sponsorFeeCharged`, and the fee-bump (outer) hash
alongside the inner hash. Sponsorship-specific failures return a distinct
non-fatal 4xx/503 with `retryUnsponsored: true` and never mark the row failed.

- Config: FEE_SPONSOR_* in .env.example + validateEnv (fail-fast at boot when
  enabled with a missing/invalid secret); secret never logged or returned.
- Admin status endpoint GET /api/stellar/payment/sponsorship/status exposes the
  sponsor public key, live float, caps, and today's spend.
- Prometheus counters for approved/rejected sponsorship decisions.
- Docs: docs/fee-sponsorship.md, README, and openapi.yaml.
- Tests: feeSponsorService (whitelist adversarial matrix, fee correctness,
  inner-untouched, caps, secret handling, boot config) and feeSponsorSubmit
  (payment + donation flag-off regression, flag-on sponsorship, cap/whitelist
  rejections that don't fail the row).

Closes #30

* feat: add managed course categories (#118)

* feat(courses): add managed category taxonomy

* fix(categories): preserve legacy course creation

* feat: add recurring sadaqah pledges (#119)

* feat(donations): add recurring sadaqah pledges

* fix(pledges): preserve donation test compatibility

* fix(pledges): ignore non-persisted transactions

* refactor(db): scaffold /mongo data-layer structure (closes #167)

---------

Co-authored-by: Afeez Tomisin <132703022+Banx17@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: zeemscript <150973162+zeemscript@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Alabi Ibrahim Abimbola <139625252+abimbolaalabi@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Kelechukwu Izuaba <144479895+Kaycee276@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: BountySpaghetti <zeemroyals@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: BountySpaghetti <286941608+BountySpaghetti@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Samuel Ojetunde <samuelojetunde898@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: abimbolaalabi <abimbolaalabi@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <shittulukmanbabatunde@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <304024794+Lspnjr1@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Alhassan Nuhu Idris <alhassannuhu0@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Mantissa <negativemantissa@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Ezekiel Akawa <akawaezekiel4@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Mfon <67503972+TS-mfon@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(soroban): Implement loyalty points contract (#279)

* stellar: validate signed XDR contents before submit; store expectedHa… (#51)

* stellar: validate signed XDR contents before submit; store expectedHash/memo; verify on-chain before granting access; add tests

* test: add validateSignedPaymentXdr to stellarService mock (new import in paymentController)

* test: expect expectedHash at payment init (XDR pre-validation stores it there)

---------

Co-authored-by: zeemscript <150973162+zeemscript@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(stellar): publish Soroban giving-escrow contract id in stellar.toml

Adds env-driven GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT (custom, non-SEP-1) so the deployed
On-Chain Giving escrow is discoverable from /.well-known/stellar.toml. Set
GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT_ID to enable. Includes test coverage.

* fix(stellar): resolve Horizon endpoints lazily + network-aware default

Horizon client was constructed at import time with a hardcoded testnet
fallback, so a mainnet deploy with HORIZON_URLS unset would silently talk to
testnet Horizon. Now the default is derived from STELLAR_NETWORK and the client
is built lazily on first use (after env is loaded). Explicit HORIZON_URLS still wins.

* feat(auth): authenticated change-password endpoint

PUT /api/auth/change-password (protected): verifies current password,
enforces the password policy, updates the hash, and signs out all other
sessions. Adds the auth.password_change audit action.

* feat(auth): harden authentication against login lockout, breached passwords, and signup abuse (#89) (#99)

* feat(auth): harden authentication against login lockout, breached passwords, and signup abuse (#89)

- Add progressive per-account login lockout (failedLoginAttempts + lockUntil) with env-configurable escalating backoff, generic 429 while locked, and AUTH_ACCOUNT_LOCKED audit emission.
- Add HaveIBeenPwned breached-password check (SHA-1 prefix k-anonymity, never transmits the password) at register and password reset; fails open on outage.
- Add per-email throttling on /register and /resend-verification (emailAuthLimiter, survives IP rotation, active in test env) plus a pluggable captcha gate (no-op when unconfigured).
- Add User lockout fields and document new env vars in .env.example.

* fix(auth): address CodeRabbit review on login lockout, HIBP, captcha, and JWT secret (#89)

- loginUser: locked accounts now return the same generic 401 'Invalid credentials'
  as a nonexistent account (no enumeration); failed-login counter incremented
  atomically via findByIdAndUpdate \, lock persisted via updateOne
- resetPassword: breached-password check moved to after successful OTP validation
  so unauthenticated callers cannot trigger HIBP lookups
- authController: refuse to start when JWT_SECRET is missing (no hardcoded fallback)
- hibp: request HIBP padding ('Add-Padding: true') and ignore zero-count records
- captcha: configurable CAPTCHA_TIMEOUT_MS (default 5s) passed to the provider call;
  captcha rejection now returns the standard { success, message, data: null } shape
- tests: assert escalating backoff magnitude (120s on 6th failure) and the 24h cap;
  locked-account test expects 401; per-email limiter buckets reset between tests;
  outage test routed through mockHibp so the shared spy is cleaned up; added
  padding-record and cap coverage

* Feat/93 idempotency keys (#100)

* feat(stellar): publish Soroban giving-escrow contract id in stellar.toml

Adds env-driven GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT (custom, non-SEP-1) so the deployed
On-Chain Giving escrow is discoverable from /.well-known/stellar.toml. Set
GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT_ID to enable. Includes test coverage.

* fix(stellar): resolve Horizon endpoints lazily + network-aware default

Horizon client was constructed at import time with a hardcoded testnet
fallback, so a mainnet deploy with HORIZON_URLS unset would silently talk to
testnet Horizon. Now the default is derived from STELLAR_NETWORK and the client
is built lazily on first use (after env is loaded). Explicit HORIZON_URLS still wins.

* feat(auth): authenticated change-password endpoint

PUT /api/auth/change-password (protected): verifies current password,
enforces the password policy, updates the hash, and signs out all other
sessions. Adds the auth.password_change audit action.

* feat(payment): add request-level idempotency keys to payment endpoints (#93)

* test: complement stellarService mock exports in idempotency test

* test: refine idempotency middleware concurrency lock test (#93)

* fix(stellar): export validateSignedPaymentXdr and complement test mock (#93)

* fix(stellar): remove duplicate validateSignedPaymentXdr export (#93)

---------

Co-authored-by: zeemscript <150973162+zeemscript@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(auth): enforce resource ownership across mutating endpoints (#88) (#105)

Add a centralized authorization layer that verifies the authenticated
user owns the target resource (or is an admin) before any mutating
handler runs, replacing the ad-hoc inline checks scattered across
controllers.

- add authorizeOwnership + authorizeReviewOwnership middleware
  (src/middlewares/authorize.js); on success the loaded doc is attached
  to req so handlers can reuse it
- apply the guards to book delete, course update, space update/delete,
  and review update/delete on books and courses; review create stays
  purchase-gated
- record ownership denials to the audit log (authz.ownership.denied)
- remove the now-redundant inline ownership checks from the book,
  course, space, and review controllers
- document the resource x action x role matrix (docs/authorization-matrix.md)
  and cover it with an integration test suite (test/ownershipAuthz.test.js)

Closes #88

Co-authored-by: BountySpaghetti <286941608+BountySpaghetti@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(security): stop logging OTP codes and verification tokens in email bodies (#104)

The NODE_ENV === "test" branch of sendMail logged the full rendered email
body — including the password-reset OTP span and the verification link's
token query param — and pino's redact config cannot censor values baked
into interpolated strings, so the leak bypassed the app-wide redaction.

Remove the body from every log statement (log only recipient, subject, and
template id via structured fields), and give tests a sanctioned in-memory
outbox hook instead of log scraping. sendOtpEmail/sendVerificationEmail/
sendReceiptEmail now return the sendMail result so callers can capture it.

Closes #95

* fix(transactions): prevent TTL index from deleting confirmed purchases and donations (#103)

The Transaction collection used a blanket TTL index on expiresAt with a
schema default that stamped a 30-minute expiry on every row regardless of
status. Because confirm paths never cleared expiresAt, confirmed on-chain
purchases and donations were permanently reaped ~30 minutes after creation,
deleting the proof of payment and orphaning recorded earnings.

Scope the TTL index to status: "pending" via partialFilterExpression, make
the expiresAt default conditional on status, add a pre-save hook that clears
expiresAt for any terminal state, explicitly unset expiresAt on every
terminal transition (submit, donation, refund, dispute, cancel, job handler,
reconciliation promotion), and add an idempotent migration that rescues
legacy non-pending rows and rebuilds the index.

Closes #94

* feat(security): implement educator verification pipeline and content-creation gating (#92) (#102)

* feat(security): implement educator verification pipeline and content-creation gating (#92)

- Add EducatorVerification model with legal state-machine transitions
  (draft -> pending -> approved/rejected, resubmit from rejected)
- Add verifiedEducator durable flag on User, set atomically on approval
- Add AUDIT_ACTIONS: EDUCATOR_VERIFY_SUBMIT/_RESUBMIT/_APPROVE/_REJECT
  with metadata allowlist entries in auditService
- requireVerifiedEducator middleware (403 for unverified, admin bypass)
- Applicant API: submit/resubmit app, get own app, signed doc URLs,
  signed Cloudinary upload-signature for private credential uploads
- Admin review queue: list+filter pending, view signed docs,
  approve/reject with notes (Mongo transaction for verifiedEducator grant)
- Gate all content-creation routes:
  * POST /api/courses  (courseRoutes.js)
  * POST /api/books    (bookRoutes.js)
  * POST /api/spaces   (spaceRoutes.js — live sessions per issue)
- Wire routes: /api/educator-verification + /api/admin/educator-verification
- Comprehensive test suite in test/educatorVerification.test.js
  (state-machine, middleware gating, submit/resubmit, approve/reject,
  content 403/2xx, both full lifecycles submit->pending->approve and
  reject->resubmit->approve, signed URL security, admin-only gating,
  audit log instrumentation)

Verification Results:
  app.test.js: 22/22 PASS (CI boot + endpoint health)
  auditLog.test.js: 21/21 PASS (append-only, redaction, admin gate)

Closes #92

* fix(ci): resolve educator verification pipeline test failures

- Remove redundant catchAsync double-wrap in educator-verification routes
  (controllers are already pre-wrapped; the outer wrap called .catch() on
  undefined, returning 500 for every new endpoint)
- Use MongoMemoryReplSet in educatorVerification.test.js so the approve/reject
  MongoDB transaction can run (standalone MongoMemoryServer cannot)
- Use AuditLog.collection.deleteMany in test cleanup to bypass append-only
  pre-hooks
- Return recordAudit's promise so callers can await durability; await it in
  submitApplication and performReview to eliminate the fire-and-forget
  audit-race in tests
- Fix testAuth.js password overwrite: destructure password out of the
  override spread so the hashed value is not clobbered by plaintext
- Seed bookUpload test user as a verifiedEducator mentor so the new content
  gate lets it through

---------

Co-authored-by: abimbolaalabi <abimbolaalabi@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(auth): signed service-to-service authentication for the AI service (#91) (#106)

Give the backend a real machine-to-machine auth channel for the AI
service (dnb-ai) — signed, scoped, rotatable keys instead of a single
static shared secret.

- add requireServiceAuth middleware (src/middlewares/serviceAuth.js):
  HMAC-SHA256 over a canonical method/path/timestamp/body-digest string,
  a ±300s replay window, constant-time signature comparison, per-key
  scope enforcement, and req.service on success
- key store (src/config/serviceKeys.js): multiple active keys keyed by
  kid for zero-downtime rotation; resilient env parsing, never throws
- mount a real internal route GET /api/internal/ai/whoami guarded by the
  guard (scope ai:read-content), plus raw-body capture in app.js
- migrate /admin/jobs off raw !== to a length-guarded timingSafeEqual
- audit denials (service_auth.denied), require AI_SERVICE_KEYS in prod
  (fail-fast), document the signing contract + rotation runbook
- cover the full accept/reject matrix in test/serviceAuth.test.js

Closes #91

Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <304024794+Lspnjr1@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(webhooks): signed outbound webhook event system (#45) (#107)

Add an outbound webhook/event system so external consumers can subscribe
to payment and enrollment lifecycle events over HMAC-signed HTTP
callbacks, with retries, dead-lettering, and redelivery.

- models: WebhookEndpoint (encrypted secret at rest, subscribed events,
  auto-disable counters) and WebhookDelivery (all scheduling state in the
  doc: status, attemptCount, nextAttemptAt indexed)
- webhookService.emitEvent: typed event catalog, per-event id for
  consumer idempotency, strict payload allowlist (no secrets/emails/user
  docs); persists a delivery per subscribed endpoint after the txn
  commits, never blocks or fails the request path, no-ops when the DB is
  unavailable
- signing: X-DeenBridge-Signature v1=hmac-sha256(secret, `${ts}.${body}`)
  over the exact sent bytes; timing-safe verify + 5-min staleness window
- deliveryWorker: atomic findOneAndUpdate claim (no double-send),
  exponential backoff + jitter, dead-letter after max attempts, endpoint
  auto-disable after sustained failures
- management API (/api/webhooks, admin-gated): endpoint CRUD, rotate
  secret, list deliveries, redeliver (atomic $set), and ping
- SSRF guard: https-only in prod, reject loopback/RFC-1918/link-local
- wire emitters into payment (initialized/confirmed/failed/expired),
  enrollment, and wallet connect/disconnect; migrate /admin/jobs to a
  timing-safe token compare
- docs/webhooks.md consumer verifier + full offline test suite

Closes #45

Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <304024794+Lspnjr1@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(security): implement TOTP two-factor authentication for admins a… (#98)

* feat(stellar): publish Soroban giving-escrow contract id in stellar.toml

Adds env-driven GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT (custom, non-SEP-1) so the deployed
On-Chain Giving escrow is discoverable from /.well-known/stellar.toml. Set
GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT_ID to enable. Includes test coverage.

* fix(stellar): resolve Horizon endpoints lazily + network-aware default

Horizon client was constructed at import time with a hardcoded testnet
fallback, so a mainnet deploy with HORIZON_URLS unset would silently talk to
testnet Horizon. Now the default is derived from STELLAR_NETWORK and the client
is built lazily on first use (after env is loaded). Explicit HORIZON_URLS still wins.

* feat(auth): authenticated change-password endpoint

PUT /api/auth/change-password (protected): verifies current password,
enforces the password policy, updates the hash, and signs out all other
sessions. Adds the auth.password_change audit action.

* feat(security): implement TOTP two-factor authentication for admins and mentors

- Add TOTP (RFC 6238) lifecycle: secret generation, encrypted storage at rest (AES-256-GCM), otpauth:// URI and QR code generation
- Add 10 single-use bcrypt-hashed recovery codes
- Add two-factor rate-limiting middleware (5 verification attempts per 15-minute window)
- Update login controller to issue step-up mfaToken challenges when 2FA is enabled
- Update authorizeRoles('admin') middleware to enforce 2FA-enabled status and 2FA-verified sessions
- Log audit actions for all 2FA lifecycle events (setup, enable, login challenge, success, failure, disable, recovery code usage)
- Add comprehensive test suite in test/auth2FA.test.js and update existing auth test suites

* ci: update node version to 22 and sync package-lock.json

* ci: pin mongo service to 6.0 and add wait-for-mongodb step

* test: add 2FA enablement and 2FA verified token to admin in refund.test.js

* fix(auth): switch bcrypt imports to pure-JS bcryptjs for cross-platform compatibility

* fix(test): remove duplicate MongoMemoryServer import in refund.test.js

* fix(test): add errorHandler middleware to refund.test.js app

* fix(test): clean up MongoDB connection logic and add afterAll hook in refund.test.js

* fix(test): standardize Mongoose connection lifecycle and add missing afterAll hooks

* fix(test): remove duplicate afterAll hooks and handle Multer 413 response status

* test(refund): explicitly set 2FA enablement and 2FA verified tokens for admin in refund.test.js

* test: ensure admin test helpers include 2FA enablement and 2FA verified JWT claims

* fix(test): add 2FA enablement and 2FA verified tokens for admin in webhooks and educatorVerification tests

---------

Co-authored-by: zeemscript <150973162+zeemscript@users.noreply.github.com>

* Add scholarship escrow contract foundation (#108)

* Improve application test coverage (#110)

* Add dependency health checks (#112)

* Validate auth and Stellar requests (#109)

* Validate auth and Stellar requests

* Address validation review feedback

* Secure book deletion authorization (#113)

* Secure book deletion

* Keep delete response consistent

* feat(stellar): gift courses/books via claimable balances with expiry reclaim (#116)

Adds a gift-a-course/book flow built on Stellar claimable balances so a
buyer can send an item to another user — including one who has not
finished wallet onboarding — without the recipient needing a USDC
trustline. The sender creates an on-ledger USDC balance the recipient
claims when ready, with a sender reclaim-after-expiry predicate so funds
are never stranded. Includes a GiftClaim model (no document-deleting TTL,
so the record survives expiry for reclaim), a claimableBalanceService
(build create/claim transactions with complementary predicates, resolve
the REAL balance id from the create result XDR — not the tx hash — with
a Horizon forClaimant fallback, and validate the signed gift XDR before
any state change), gift routes/controller at /api/stellar/gifts, and
granting item access to the RECIPIENT (never the payer) on claim. Wires
a `{ fallback: "claimable_balance" }` response into the purchase flow
when a creator wallet/trustline is missing. Tests cover predicate
decoding, trustline-free single-signature claiming, claim authorization
before/after expiry, the balance-id-vs-tx-hash distinction, tampered-XDR
rejection, guards mirroring initializePayment, and the recipient access
grant.

* feat(stellar): add idempotency protection to the Stellar payment endpoints (#115)

Makes /api/stellar/payment/initialize and /submit safe against
double-clicks, client retries, and concurrent duplicates. Submit is
naturally idempotent per transaction hash: the deterministic hash of
the signed XDR is looked up against confirmed transactions before any
processing, so a replayed submission returns the original success
response without re-granting access, with the unique index on
stellarTxHash as the database-level backstop (an E11000 on the confirm
save is treated as already processed). Initialize no longer piles up
duplicates: a pending checkout for the same user+item returns the
existing record (with its persisted unsigned XDR) instead of creating
a new document, and stale pending records are reaped by the existing
pending-only TTL index. Adds a stricter per-user rate limiter
(paymentLimiter) on the payment routes, keyed on the authenticated
user id with an IPv6-aware IP fallback. Covers duplicate-submit,
duplicate-initialize, the E11000 race, and limiter enforcement with
tests.

* feat(stellar): validate Stellar config at startup and document the mainnet switch (#114)

Adds a single source of truth for the Stellar network configuration
(src/config/stellar.js) that resolves the network name, network
passphrase, Horizon URLs, and USDC issuer from STELLAR_NETWORK, and
validates the whole setup fail-fast at boot so a misconfigured
deployment (bad network value, mainnet flag with testnet Horizon or
issuer) fails with an error naming the exact problem instead of at
request time. stellarService.js and horizonClient.js now consume this
module. Adds docs/MAINNET.md covering the env changes, creator
trustlines, and a first-mainnet-transaction smoke checklist, plus unit
tests for resolution and validation across both networks.

* feat(stellar): fee-bump sponsorship with structural whitelist and spend caps (#111)

Let the platform pay a user's Stellar network fee by wrapping the user-signed
transaction in a fee-bump signed by a dedicated fee-source account, so a user
holding USDC but ~no XLM can buy a book, buy a course, or donate. Opt-in per
submit via `requestSponsorship: true`; off by default and byte-for-byte
identical when disabled.

Guard rails (server signs on the platform's behalf):
- Structural whitelist (reject-by-default, allow-list of `payment` ops only):
  source, exact op count/order, destinations, amounts (stroops), asset, and
  memo must match the pending Transaction row exactly. Any foreign/extra
  operation — including unknown future types — is rejected.
- Durable spend caps (SponsorshipSpend, keyed by UTC day): per-transaction fee
  ceiling, per-day total, and per-user per-day count.
- Sponsor float pre-check so an underfunded sponsor never marks the user's
  transaction failed.

Fee-bump fee is priced over inner ops + wrapper and clamped to the ceiling
(verified against @stellar/stellar-sdk v16 and asserted in tests). Sponsored
rows record `sponsored`, `sponsorFeeCharged`, and the fee-bump (outer) hash
alongside the inner hash. Sponsorship-specific failures return a distinct
non-fatal 4xx/503 with `retryUnsponsored: true` and never mark the row failed.

- Config: FEE_SPONSOR_* in .env.example + validateEnv (fail-fa…
zeemscript added a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 24, 2026
* Merge dev into main (#117)

* stellar: validate signed XDR contents before submit; store expectedHa… (#51)

* stellar: validate signed XDR contents before submit; store expectedHash/memo; verify on-chain before granting access; add tests

* test: add validateSignedPaymentXdr to stellarService mock (new import in paymentController)

* test: expect expectedHash at payment init (XDR pre-validation stores it there)

---------

Co-authored-by: zeemscript <150973162+zeemscript@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(stellar): publish Soroban giving-escrow contract id in stellar.toml

Adds env-driven GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT (custom, non-SEP-1) so the deployed
On-Chain Giving escrow is discoverable from /.well-known/stellar.toml. Set
GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT_ID to enable. Includes test coverage.

* fix(stellar): resolve Horizon endpoints lazily + network-aware default

Horizon client was constructed at import time with a hardcoded testnet
fallback, so a mainnet deploy with HORIZON_URLS unset would silently talk to
testnet Horizon. Now the default is derived from STELLAR_NETWORK and the client
is built lazily on first use (after env is loaded). Explicit HORIZON_URLS still wins.

* feat(auth): authenticated change-password endpoint

PUT /api/auth/change-password (protected): verifies current password,
enforces the password policy, updates the hash, and signs out all other
sessions. Adds the auth.password_change audit action.

* feat(auth): harden authentication against login lockout, breached passwords, and signup abuse (#89) (#99)

* feat(auth): harden authentication against login lockout, breached passwords, and signup abuse (#89)

- Add progressive per-account login lockout (failedLoginAttempts + lockUntil) with env-configurable escalating backoff, generic 429 while locked, and AUTH_ACCOUNT_LOCKED audit emission.
- Add HaveIBeenPwned breached-password check (SHA-1 prefix k-anonymity, never transmits the password) at register and password reset; fails open on outage.
- Add per-email throttling on /register and /resend-verification (emailAuthLimiter, survives IP rotation, active in test env) plus a pluggable captcha gate (no-op when unconfigured).
- Add User lockout fields and document new env vars in .env.example.

* fix(auth): address CodeRabbit review on login lockout, HIBP, captcha, and JWT secret (#89)

- loginUser: locked accounts now return the same generic 401 'Invalid credentials'
  as a nonexistent account (no enumeration); failed-login counter incremented
  atomically via findByIdAndUpdate \, lock persisted via updateOne
- resetPassword: breached-password check moved to after successful OTP validation
  so unauthenticated callers cannot trigger HIBP lookups
- authController: refuse to start when JWT_SECRET is missing (no hardcoded fallback)
- hibp: request HIBP padding ('Add-Padding: true') and ignore zero-count records
- captcha: configurable CAPTCHA_TIMEOUT_MS (default 5s) passed to the provider call;
  captcha rejection now returns the standard { success, message, data: null } shape
- tests: assert escalating backoff magnitude (120s on 6th failure) and the 24h cap;
  locked-account test expects 401; per-email limiter buckets reset between tests;
  outage test routed through mockHibp so the shared spy is cleaned up; added
  padding-record and cap coverage

* Feat/93 idempotency keys (#100)

* feat(stellar): publish Soroban giving-escrow contract id in stellar.toml

Adds env-driven GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT (custom, non-SEP-1) so the deployed
On-Chain Giving escrow is discoverable from /.well-known/stellar.toml. Set
GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT_ID to enable. Includes test coverage.

* fix(stellar): resolve Horizon endpoints lazily + network-aware default

Horizon client was constructed at import time with a hardcoded testnet
fallback, so a mainnet deploy with HORIZON_URLS unset would silently talk to
testnet Horizon. Now the default is derived from STELLAR_NETWORK and the client
is built lazily on first use (after env is loaded). Explicit HORIZON_URLS still wins.

* feat(auth): authenticated change-password endpoint

PUT /api/auth/change-password (protected): verifies current password,
enforces the password policy, updates the hash, and signs out all other
sessions. Adds the auth.password_change audit action.

* feat(payment): add request-level idempotency keys to payment endpoints (#93)

* test: complement stellarService mock exports in idempotency test

* test: refine idempotency middleware concurrency lock test (#93)

* fix(stellar): export validateSignedPaymentXdr and complement test mock (#93)

* fix(stellar): remove duplicate validateSignedPaymentXdr export (#93)

---------

Co-authored-by: zeemscript <150973162+zeemscript@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(auth): enforce resource ownership across mutating endpoints (#88) (#105)

Add a centralized authorization layer that verifies the authenticated
user owns the target resource (or is an admin) before any mutating
handler runs, replacing the ad-hoc inline checks scattered across
controllers.

- add authorizeOwnership + authorizeReviewOwnership middleware
  (src/middlewares/authorize.js); on success the loaded doc is attached
  to req so handlers can reuse it
- apply the guards to book delete, course update, space update/delete,
  and review update/delete on books and courses; review create stays
  purchase-gated
- record ownership denials to the audit log (authz.ownership.denied)
- remove the now-redundant inline ownership checks from the book,
  course, space, and review controllers
- document the resource x action x role matrix (docs/authorization-matrix.md)
  and cover it with an integration test suite (test/ownershipAuthz.test.js)

Closes #88

Co-authored-by: BountySpaghetti <286941608+BountySpaghetti@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(security): stop logging OTP codes and verification tokens in email bodies (#104)

The NODE_ENV === "test" branch of sendMail logged the full rendered email
body — including the password-reset OTP span and the verification link's
token query param — and pino's redact config cannot censor values baked
into interpolated strings, so the leak bypassed the app-wide redaction.

Remove the body from every log statement (log only recipient, subject, and
template id via structured fields), and give tests a sanctioned in-memory
outbox hook instead of log scraping. sendOtpEmail/sendVerificationEmail/
sendReceiptEmail now return the sendMail result so callers can capture it.

Closes #95

* fix(transactions): prevent TTL index from deleting confirmed purchases and donations (#103)

The Transaction collection used a blanket TTL index on expiresAt with a
schema default that stamped a 30-minute expiry on every row regardless of
status. Because confirm paths never cleared expiresAt, confirmed on-chain
purchases and donations were permanently reaped ~30 minutes after creation,
deleting the proof of payment and orphaning recorded earnings.

Scope the TTL index to status: "pending" via partialFilterExpression, make
the expiresAt default conditional on status, add a pre-save hook that clears
expiresAt for any terminal state, explicitly unset expiresAt on every
terminal transition (submit, donation, refund, dispute, cancel, job handler,
reconciliation promotion), and add an idempotent migration that rescues
legacy non-pending rows and rebuilds the index.

Closes #94

* feat(security): implement educator verification pipeline and content-creation gating (#92) (#102)

* feat(security): implement educator verification pipeline and content-creation gating (#92)

- Add EducatorVerification model with legal state-machine transitions
  (draft -> pending -> approved/rejected, resubmit from rejected)
- Add verifiedEducator durable flag on User, set atomically on approval
- Add AUDIT_ACTIONS: EDUCATOR_VERIFY_SUBMIT/_RESUBMIT/_APPROVE/_REJECT
  with metadata allowlist entries in auditService
- requireVerifiedEducator middleware (403 for unverified, admin bypass)
- Applicant API: submit/resubmit app, get own app, signed doc URLs,
  signed Cloudinary upload-signature for private credential uploads
- Admin review queue: list+filter pending, view signed docs,
  approve/reject with notes (Mongo transaction for verifiedEducator grant)
- Gate all content-creation routes:
  * POST /api/courses  (courseRoutes.js)
  * POST /api/books    (bookRoutes.js)
  * POST /api/spaces   (spaceRoutes.js — live sessions per issue)
- Wire routes: /api/educator-verification + /api/admin/educator-verification
- Comprehensive test suite in test/educatorVerification.test.js
  (state-machine, middleware gating, submit/resubmit, approve/reject,
  content 403/2xx, both full lifecycles submit->pending->approve and
  reject->resubmit->approve, signed URL security, admin-only gating,
  audit log instrumentation)

Verification Results:
  app.test.js: 22/22 PASS (CI boot + endpoint health)
  auditLog.test.js: 21/21 PASS (append-only, redaction, admin gate)

Closes #92

* fix(ci): resolve educator verification pipeline test failures

- Remove redundant catchAsync double-wrap in educator-verification routes
  (controllers are already pre-wrapped; the outer wrap called .catch() on
  undefined, returning 500 for every new endpoint)
- Use MongoMemoryReplSet in educatorVerification.test.js so the approve/reject
  MongoDB transaction can run (standalone MongoMemoryServer cannot)
- Use AuditLog.collection.deleteMany in test cleanup to bypass append-only
  pre-hooks
- Return recordAudit's promise so callers can await durability; await it in
  submitApplication and performReview to eliminate the fire-and-forget
  audit-race in tests
- Fix testAuth.js password overwrite: destructure password out of the
  override spread so the hashed value is not clobbered by plaintext
- Seed bookUpload test user as a verifiedEducator mentor so the new content
  gate lets it through

---------

Co-authored-by: abimbolaalabi <abimbolaalabi@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(auth): signed service-to-service authentication for the AI service (#91) (#106)

Give the backend a real machine-to-machine auth channel for the AI
service (dnb-ai) — signed, scoped, rotatable keys instead of a single
static shared secret.

- add requireServiceAuth middleware (src/middlewares/serviceAuth.js):
  HMAC-SHA256 over a canonical method/path/timestamp/body-digest string,
  a ±300s replay window, constant-time signature comparison, per-key
  scope enforcement, and req.service on success
- key store (src/config/serviceKeys.js): multiple active keys keyed by
  kid for zero-downtime rotation; resilient env parsing, never throws
- mount a real internal route GET /api/internal/ai/whoami guarded by the
  guard (scope ai:read-content), plus raw-body capture in app.js
- migrate /admin/jobs off raw !== to a length-guarded timingSafeEqual
- audit denials (service_auth.denied), require AI_SERVICE_KEYS in prod
  (fail-fast), document the signing contract + rotation runbook
- cover the full accept/reject matrix in test/serviceAuth.test.js

Closes #91

Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <304024794+Lspnjr1@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(webhooks): signed outbound webhook event system (#45) (#107)

Add an outbound webhook/event system so external consumers can subscribe
to payment and enrollment lifecycle events over HMAC-signed HTTP
callbacks, with retries, dead-lettering, and redelivery.

- models: WebhookEndpoint (encrypted secret at rest, subscribed events,
  auto-disable counters) and WebhookDelivery (all scheduling state in the
  doc: status, attemptCount, nextAttemptAt indexed)
- webhookService.emitEvent: typed event catalog, per-event id for
  consumer idempotency, strict payload allowlist (no secrets/emails/user
  docs); persists a delivery per subscribed endpoint after the txn
  commits, never blocks or fails the request path, no-ops when the DB is
  unavailable
- signing: X-DeenBridge-Signature v1=hmac-sha256(secret, `${ts}.${body}`)
  over the exact sent bytes; timing-safe verify + 5-min staleness window
- deliveryWorker: atomic findOneAndUpdate claim (no double-send),
  exponential backoff + jitter, dead-letter after max attempts, endpoint
  auto-disable after sustained failures
- management API (/api/webhooks, admin-gated): endpoint CRUD, rotate
  secret, list deliveries, redeliver (atomic $set), and ping
- SSRF guard: https-only in prod, reject loopback/RFC-1918/link-local
- wire emitters into payment (initialized/confirmed/failed/expired),
  enrollment, and wallet connect/disconnect; migrate /admin/jobs to a
  timing-safe token compare
- docs/webhooks.md consumer verifier + full offline test suite

Closes #45

Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <304024794+Lspnjr1@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(security): implement TOTP two-factor authentication for admins a… (#98)

* feat(stellar): publish Soroban giving-escrow contract id in stellar.toml

Adds env-driven GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT (custom, non-SEP-1) so the deployed
On-Chain Giving escrow is discoverable from /.well-known/stellar.toml. Set
GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT_ID to enable. Includes test coverage.

* fix(stellar): resolve Horizon endpoints lazily + network-aware default

Horizon client was constructed at import time with a hardcoded testnet
fallback, so a mainnet deploy with HORIZON_URLS unset would silently talk to
testnet Horizon. Now the default is derived from STELLAR_NETWORK and the client
is built lazily on first use (after env is loaded). Explicit HORIZON_URLS still wins.

* feat(auth): authenticated change-password endpoint

PUT /api/auth/change-password (protected): verifies current password,
enforces the password policy, updates the hash, and signs out all other
sessions. Adds the auth.password_change audit action.

* feat(security): implement TOTP two-factor authentication for admins and mentors

- Add TOTP (RFC 6238) lifecycle: secret generation, encrypted storage at rest (AES-256-GCM), otpauth:// URI and QR code generation
- Add 10 single-use bcrypt-hashed recovery codes
- Add two-factor rate-limiting middleware (5 verification attempts per 15-minute window)
- Update login controller to issue step-up mfaToken challenges when 2FA is enabled
- Update authorizeRoles('admin') middleware to enforce 2FA-enabled status and 2FA-verified sessions
- Log audit actions for all 2FA lifecycle events (setup, enable, login challenge, success, failure, disable, recovery code usage)
- Add comprehensive test suite in test/auth2FA.test.js and update existing auth test suites

* ci: update node version to 22 and sync package-lock.json

* ci: pin mongo service to 6.0 and add wait-for-mongodb step

* test: add 2FA enablement and 2FA verified token to admin in refund.test.js

* fix(auth): switch bcrypt imports to pure-JS bcryptjs for cross-platform compatibility

* fix(test): remove duplicate MongoMemoryServer import in refund.test.js

* fix(test): add errorHandler middleware to refund.test.js app

* fix(test): clean up MongoDB connection logic and add afterAll hook in refund.test.js

* fix(test): standardize Mongoose connection lifecycle and add missing afterAll hooks

* fix(test): remove duplicate afterAll hooks and handle Multer 413 response status

* test(refund): explicitly set 2FA enablement and 2FA verified tokens for admin in refund.test.js

* test: ensure admin test helpers include 2FA enablement and 2FA verified JWT claims

* fix(test): add 2FA enablement and 2FA verified tokens for admin in webhooks and educatorVerification tests

---------

Co-authored-by: zeemscript <150973162+zeemscript@users.noreply.github.com>

* Add scholarship escrow contract foundation (#108)

* Improve application test coverage (#110)

* Add dependency health checks (#112)

* Validate auth and Stellar requests (#109)

* Validate auth and Stellar requests

* Address validation review feedback

* Secure book deletion authorization (#113)

* Secure book deletion

* Keep delete response consistent

* feat(stellar): gift courses/books via claimable balances with expiry reclaim (#116)

Adds a gift-a-course/book flow built on Stellar claimable balances so a
buyer can send an item to another user — including one who has not
finished wallet onboarding — without the recipient needing a USDC
trustline. The sender creates an on-ledger USDC balance the recipient
claims when ready, with a sender reclaim-after-expiry predicate so funds
are never stranded. Includes a GiftClaim model (no document-deleting TTL,
so the record survives expiry for reclaim), a claimableBalanceService
(build create/claim transactions with complementary predicates, resolve
the REAL balance id from the create result XDR — not the tx hash — with
a Horizon forClaimant fallback, and validate the signed gift XDR before
any state change), gift routes/controller at /api/stellar/gifts, and
granting item access to the RECIPIENT (never the payer) on claim. Wires
a `{ fallback: "claimable_balance" }` response into the purchase flow
when a creator wallet/trustline is missing. Tests cover predicate
decoding, trustline-free single-signature claiming, claim authorization
before/after expiry, the balance-id-vs-tx-hash distinction, tampered-XDR
rejection, guards mirroring initializePayment, and the recipient access
grant.

* feat(stellar): add idempotency protection to the Stellar payment endpoints (#115)

Makes /api/stellar/payment/initialize and /submit safe against
double-clicks, client retries, and concurrent duplicates. Submit is
naturally idempotent per transaction hash: the deterministic hash of
the signed XDR is looked up against confirmed transactions before any
processing, so a replayed submission returns the original success
response without re-granting access, with the unique index on
stellarTxHash as the database-level backstop (an E11000 on the confirm
save is treated as already processed). Initialize no longer piles up
duplicates: a pending checkout for the same user+item returns the
existing record (with its persisted unsigned XDR) instead of creating
a new document, and stale pending records are reaped by the existing
pending-only TTL index. Adds a stricter per-user rate limiter
(paymentLimiter) on the payment routes, keyed on the authenticated
user id with an IPv6-aware IP fallback. Covers duplicate-submit,
duplicate-initialize, the E11000 race, and limiter enforcement with
tests.

* feat(stellar): validate Stellar config at startup and document the mainnet switch (#114)

Adds a single source of truth for the Stellar network configuration
(src/config/stellar.js) that resolves the network name, network
passphrase, Horizon URLs, and USDC issuer from STELLAR_NETWORK, and
validates the whole setup fail-fast at boot so a misconfigured
deployment (bad network value, mainnet flag with testnet Horizon or
issuer) fails with an error naming the exact problem instead of at
request time. stellarService.js and horizonClient.js now consume this
module. Adds docs/MAINNET.md covering the env changes, creator
trustlines, and a first-mainnet-transaction smoke checklist, plus unit
tests for resolution and validation across both networks.

* feat(stellar): fee-bump sponsorship with structural whitelist and spend caps (#111)

Let the platform pay a user's Stellar network fee by wrapping the user-signed
transaction in a fee-bump signed by a dedicated fee-source account, so a user
holding USDC but ~no XLM can buy a book, buy a course, or donate. Opt-in per
submit via `requestSponsorship: true`; off by default and byte-for-byte
identical when disabled.

Guard rails (server signs on the platform's behalf):
- Structural whitelist (reject-by-default, allow-list of `payment` ops only):
  source, exact op count/order, destinations, amounts (stroops), asset, and
  memo must match the pending Transaction row exactly. Any foreign/extra
  operation — including unknown future types — is rejected.
- Durable spend caps (SponsorshipSpend, keyed by UTC day): per-transaction fee
  ceiling, per-day total, and per-user per-day count.
- Sponsor float pre-check so an underfunded sponsor never marks the user's
  transaction failed.

Fee-bump fee is priced over inner ops + wrapper and clamped to the ceiling
(verified against @stellar/stellar-sdk v16 and asserted in tests). Sponsored
rows record `sponsored`, `sponsorFeeCharged`, and the fee-bump (outer) hash
alongside the inner hash. Sponsorship-specific failures return a distinct
non-fatal 4xx/503 with `retryUnsponsored: true` and never mark the row failed.

- Config: FEE_SPONSOR_* in .env.example + validateEnv (fail-fast at boot when
  enabled with a missing/invalid secret); secret never logged or returned.
- Admin status endpoint GET /api/stellar/payment/sponsorship/status exposes the
  sponsor public key, live float, caps, and today's spend.
- Prometheus counters for approved/rejected sponsorship decisions.
- Docs: docs/fee-sponsorship.md, README, and openapi.yaml.
- Tests: feeSponsorService (whitelist adversarial matrix, fee correctness,
  inner-untouched, caps, secret handling, boot config) and feeSponsorSubmit
  (payment + donation flag-off regression, flag-on sponsorship, cap/whitelist
  rejections that don't fail the row).

Closes #30

* feat: add managed course categories (#118)

* feat(courses): add managed category taxonomy

* fix(categories): preserve legacy course creation

* feat: add recurring sadaqah pledges (#119)

* feat(donations): add recurring sadaqah pledges

* fix(pledges): preserve donation test compatibility

* fix(pledges): ignore non-persisted transactions

---------

Co-authored-by: Afeez Tomisin <132703022+Banx17@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Alabi Ibrahim Abimbola <139625252+abimbolaalabi@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Kelechukwu Izuaba <144479895+Kaycee276@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: BountySpaghetti <zeemroyals@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: BountySpaghetti <286941608+BountySpaghetti@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Samuel Ojetunde <samuelojetunde898@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: abimbolaalabi <abimbolaalabi@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <shittulukmanbabatunde@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <304024794+Lspnjr1@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Alhassan Nuhu Idris <alhassannuhu0@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Mantissa <negativemantissa@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Ezekiel Akawa <akawaezekiel4@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Mfon <67503972+TS-mfon@users.noreply.github.com>

* refactor(db): Create /mongo folder structure (#280)

* stellar: validate signed XDR contents before submit; store expectedHa… (#51)

* stellar: validate signed XDR contents before submit; store expectedHash/memo; verify on-chain before granting access; add tests

* test: add validateSignedPaymentXdr to stellarService mock (new import in paymentController)

* test: expect expectedHash at payment init (XDR pre-validation stores it there)

---------

Co-authored-by: zeemscript <150973162+zeemscript@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(stellar): publish Soroban giving-escrow contract id in stellar.toml

Adds env-driven GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT (custom, non-SEP-1) so the deployed
On-Chain Giving escrow is discoverable from /.well-known/stellar.toml. Set
GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT_ID to enable. Includes test coverage.

* fix(stellar): resolve Horizon endpoints lazily + network-aware default

Horizon client was constructed at import time with a hardcoded testnet
fallback, so a mainnet deploy with HORIZON_URLS unset would silently talk to
testnet Horizon. Now the default is derived from STELLAR_NETWORK and the client
is built lazily on first use (after env is loaded). Explicit HORIZON_URLS still wins.

* feat(auth): authenticated change-password endpoint

PUT /api/auth/change-password (protected): verifies current password,
enforces the password policy, updates the hash, and signs out all other
sessions. Adds the auth.password_change audit action.

* feat(auth): harden authentication against login lockout, breached passwords, and signup abuse (#89) (#99)

* feat(auth): harden authentication against login lockout, breached passwords, and signup abuse (#89)

- Add progressive per-account login lockout (failedLoginAttempts + lockUntil) with env-configurable escalating backoff, generic 429 while locked, and AUTH_ACCOUNT_LOCKED audit emission.
- Add HaveIBeenPwned breached-password check (SHA-1 prefix k-anonymity, never transmits the password) at register and password reset; fails open on outage.
- Add per-email throttling on /register and /resend-verification (emailAuthLimiter, survives IP rotation, active in test env) plus a pluggable captcha gate (no-op when unconfigured).
- Add User lockout fields and document new env vars in .env.example.

* fix(auth): address CodeRabbit review on login lockout, HIBP, captcha, and JWT secret (#89)

- loginUser: locked accounts now return the same generic 401 'Invalid credentials'
  as a nonexistent account (no enumeration); failed-login counter incremented
  atomically via findByIdAndUpdate \, lock persisted via updateOne
- resetPassword: breached-password check moved to after successful OTP validation
  so unauthenticated callers cannot trigger HIBP lookups
- authController: refuse to start when JWT_SECRET is missing (no hardcoded fallback)
- hibp: request HIBP padding ('Add-Padding: true') and ignore zero-count records
- captcha: configurable CAPTCHA_TIMEOUT_MS (default 5s) passed to the provider call;
  captcha rejection now returns the standard { success, message, data: null } shape
- tests: assert escalating backoff magnitude (120s on 6th failure) and the 24h cap;
  locked-account test expects 401; per-email limiter buckets reset between tests;
  outage test routed through mockHibp so the shared spy is cleaned up; added
  padding-record and cap coverage

* Feat/93 idempotency keys (#100)

* feat(stellar): publish Soroban giving-escrow contract id in stellar.toml

Adds env-driven GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT (custom, non-SEP-1) so the deployed
On-Chain Giving escrow is discoverable from /.well-known/stellar.toml. Set
GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT_ID to enable. Includes test coverage.

* fix(stellar): resolve Horizon endpoints lazily + network-aware default

Horizon client was constructed at import time with a hardcoded testnet
fallback, so a mainnet deploy with HORIZON_URLS unset would silently talk to
testnet Horizon. Now the default is derived from STELLAR_NETWORK and the client
is built lazily on first use (after env is loaded). Explicit HORIZON_URLS still wins.

* feat(auth): authenticated change-password endpoint

PUT /api/auth/change-password (protected): verifies current password,
enforces the password policy, updates the hash, and signs out all other
sessions. Adds the auth.password_change audit action.

* feat(payment): add request-level idempotency keys to payment endpoints (#93)

* test: complement stellarService mock exports in idempotency test

* test: refine idempotency middleware concurrency lock test (#93)

* fix(stellar): export validateSignedPaymentXdr and complement test mock (#93)

* fix(stellar): remove duplicate validateSignedPaymentXdr export (#93)

---------

Co-authored-by: zeemscript <150973162+zeemscript@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(auth): enforce resource ownership across mutating endpoints (#88) (#105)

Add a centralized authorization layer that verifies the authenticated
user owns the target resource (or is an admin) before any mutating
handler runs, replacing the ad-hoc inline checks scattered across
controllers.

- add authorizeOwnership + authorizeReviewOwnership middleware
  (src/middlewares/authorize.js); on success the loaded doc is attached
  to req so handlers can reuse it
- apply the guards to book delete, course update, space update/delete,
  and review update/delete on books and courses; review create stays
  purchase-gated
- record ownership denials to the audit log (authz.ownership.denied)
- remove the now-redundant inline ownership checks from the book,
  course, space, and review controllers
- document the resource x action x role matrix (docs/authorization-matrix.md)
  and cover it with an integration test suite (test/ownershipAuthz.test.js)

Closes #88

Co-authored-by: BountySpaghetti <286941608+BountySpaghetti@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(security): stop logging OTP codes and verification tokens in email bodies (#104)

The NODE_ENV === "test" branch of sendMail logged the full rendered email
body — including the password-reset OTP span and the verification link's
token query param — and pino's redact config cannot censor values baked
into interpolated strings, so the leak bypassed the app-wide redaction.

Remove the body from every log statement (log only recipient, subject, and
template id via structured fields), and give tests a sanctioned in-memory
outbox hook instead of log scraping. sendOtpEmail/sendVerificationEmail/
sendReceiptEmail now return the sendMail result so callers can capture it.

Closes #95

* fix(transactions): prevent TTL index from deleting confirmed purchases and donations (#103)

The Transaction collection used a blanket TTL index on expiresAt with a
schema default that stamped a 30-minute expiry on every row regardless of
status. Because confirm paths never cleared expiresAt, confirmed on-chain
purchases and donations were permanently reaped ~30 minutes after creation,
deleting the proof of payment and orphaning recorded earnings.

Scope the TTL index to status: "pending" via partialFilterExpression, make
the expiresAt default conditional on status, add a pre-save hook that clears
expiresAt for any terminal state, explicitly unset expiresAt on every
terminal transition (submit, donation, refund, dispute, cancel, job handler,
reconciliation promotion), and add an idempotent migration that rescues
legacy non-pending rows and rebuilds the index.

Closes #94

* feat(security): implement educator verification pipeline and content-creation gating (#92) (#102)

* feat(security): implement educator verification pipeline and content-creation gating (#92)

- Add EducatorVerification model with legal state-machine transitions
  (draft -> pending -> approved/rejected, resubmit from rejected)
- Add verifiedEducator durable flag on User, set atomically on approval
- Add AUDIT_ACTIONS: EDUCATOR_VERIFY_SUBMIT/_RESUBMIT/_APPROVE/_REJECT
  with metadata allowlist entries in auditService
- requireVerifiedEducator middleware (403 for unverified, admin bypass)
- Applicant API: submit/resubmit app, get own app, signed doc URLs,
  signed Cloudinary upload-signature for private credential uploads
- Admin review queue: list+filter pending, view signed docs,
  approve/reject with notes (Mongo transaction for verifiedEducator grant)
- Gate all content-creation routes:
  * POST /api/courses  (courseRoutes.js)
  * POST /api/books    (bookRoutes.js)
  * POST /api/spaces   (spaceRoutes.js — live sessions per issue)
- Wire routes: /api/educator-verification + /api/admin/educator-verification
- Comprehensive test suite in test/educatorVerification.test.js
  (state-machine, middleware gating, submit/resubmit, approve/reject,
  content 403/2xx, both full lifecycles submit->pending->approve and
  reject->resubmit->approve, signed URL security, admin-only gating,
  audit log instrumentation)

Verification Results:
  app.test.js: 22/22 PASS (CI boot + endpoint health)
  auditLog.test.js: 21/21 PASS (append-only, redaction, admin gate)

Closes #92

* fix(ci): resolve educator verification pipeline test failures

- Remove redundant catchAsync double-wrap in educator-verification routes
  (controllers are already pre-wrapped; the outer wrap called .catch() on
  undefined, returning 500 for every new endpoint)
- Use MongoMemoryReplSet in educatorVerification.test.js so the approve/reject
  MongoDB transaction can run (standalone MongoMemoryServer cannot)
- Use AuditLog.collection.deleteMany in test cleanup to bypass append-only
  pre-hooks
- Return recordAudit's promise so callers can await durability; await it in
  submitApplication and performReview to eliminate the fire-and-forget
  audit-race in tests
- Fix testAuth.js password overwrite: destructure password out of the
  override spread so the hashed value is not clobbered by plaintext
- Seed bookUpload test user as a verifiedEducator mentor so the new content
  gate lets it through

---------

Co-authored-by: abimbolaalabi <abimbolaalabi@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(auth): signed service-to-service authentication for the AI service (#91) (#106)

Give the backend a real machine-to-machine auth channel for the AI
service (dnb-ai) — signed, scoped, rotatable keys instead of a single
static shared secret.

- add requireServiceAuth middleware (src/middlewares/serviceAuth.js):
  HMAC-SHA256 over a canonical method/path/timestamp/body-digest string,
  a ±300s replay window, constant-time signature comparison, per-key
  scope enforcement, and req.service on success
- key store (src/config/serviceKeys.js): multiple active keys keyed by
  kid for zero-downtime rotation; resilient env parsing, never throws
- mount a real internal route GET /api/internal/ai/whoami guarded by the
  guard (scope ai:read-content), plus raw-body capture in app.js
- migrate /admin/jobs off raw !== to a length-guarded timingSafeEqual
- audit denials (service_auth.denied), require AI_SERVICE_KEYS in prod
  (fail-fast), document the signing contract + rotation runbook
- cover the full accept/reject matrix in test/serviceAuth.test.js

Closes #91

Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <304024794+Lspnjr1@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(webhooks): signed outbound webhook event system (#45) (#107)

Add an outbound webhook/event system so external consumers can subscribe
to payment and enrollment lifecycle events over HMAC-signed HTTP
callbacks, with retries, dead-lettering, and redelivery.

- models: WebhookEndpoint (encrypted secret at rest, subscribed events,
  auto-disable counters) and WebhookDelivery (all scheduling state in the
  doc: status, attemptCount, nextAttemptAt indexed)
- webhookService.emitEvent: typed event catalog, per-event id for
  consumer idempotency, strict payload allowlist (no secrets/emails/user
  docs); persists a delivery per subscribed endpoint after the txn
  commits, never blocks or fails the request path, no-ops when the DB is
  unavailable
- signing: X-DeenBridge-Signature v1=hmac-sha256(secret, `${ts}.${body}`)
  over the exact sent bytes; timing-safe verify + 5-min staleness window
- deliveryWorker: atomic findOneAndUpdate claim (no double-send),
  exponential backoff + jitter, dead-letter after max attempts, endpoint
  auto-disable after sustained failures
- management API (/api/webhooks, admin-gated): endpoint CRUD, rotate
  secret, list deliveries, redeliver (atomic $set), and ping
- SSRF guard: https-only in prod, reject loopback/RFC-1918/link-local
- wire emitters into payment (initialized/confirmed/failed/expired),
  enrollment, and wallet connect/disconnect; migrate /admin/jobs to a
  timing-safe token compare
- docs/webhooks.md consumer verifier + full offline test suite

Closes #45

Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <304024794+Lspnjr1@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(security): implement TOTP two-factor authentication for admins a… (#98)

* feat(stellar): publish Soroban giving-escrow contract id in stellar.toml

Adds env-driven GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT (custom, non-SEP-1) so the deployed
On-Chain Giving escrow is discoverable from /.well-known/stellar.toml. Set
GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT_ID to enable. Includes test coverage.

* fix(stellar): resolve Horizon endpoints lazily + network-aware default

Horizon client was constructed at import time with a hardcoded testnet
fallback, so a mainnet deploy with HORIZON_URLS unset would silently talk to
testnet Horizon. Now the default is derived from STELLAR_NETWORK and the client
is built lazily on first use (after env is loaded). Explicit HORIZON_URLS still wins.

* feat(auth): authenticated change-password endpoint

PUT /api/auth/change-password (protected): verifies current password,
enforces the password policy, updates the hash, and signs out all other
sessions. Adds the auth.password_change audit action.

* feat(security): implement TOTP two-factor authentication for admins and mentors

- Add TOTP (RFC 6238) lifecycle: secret generation, encrypted storage at rest (AES-256-GCM), otpauth:// URI and QR code generation
- Add 10 single-use bcrypt-hashed recovery codes
- Add two-factor rate-limiting middleware (5 verification attempts per 15-minute window)
- Update login controller to issue step-up mfaToken challenges when 2FA is enabled
- Update authorizeRoles('admin') middleware to enforce 2FA-enabled status and 2FA-verified sessions
- Log audit actions for all 2FA lifecycle events (setup, enable, login challenge, success, failure, disable, recovery code usage)
- Add comprehensive test suite in test/auth2FA.test.js and update existing auth test suites

* ci: update node version to 22 and sync package-lock.json

* ci: pin mongo service to 6.0 and add wait-for-mongodb step

* test: add 2FA enablement and 2FA verified token to admin in refund.test.js

* fix(auth): switch bcrypt imports to pure-JS bcryptjs for cross-platform compatibility

* fix(test): remove duplicate MongoMemoryServer import in refund.test.js

* fix(test): add errorHandler middleware to refund.test.js app

* fix(test): clean up MongoDB connection logic and add afterAll hook in refund.test.js

* fix(test): standardize Mongoose connection lifecycle and add missing afterAll hooks

* fix(test): remove duplicate afterAll hooks and handle Multer 413 response status

* test(refund): explicitly set 2FA enablement and 2FA verified tokens for admin in refund.test.js

* test: ensure admin test helpers include 2FA enablement and 2FA verified JWT claims

* fix(test): add 2FA enablement and 2FA verified tokens for admin in webhooks and educatorVerification tests

---------

Co-authored-by: zeemscript <150973162+zeemscript@users.noreply.github.com>

* Add scholarship escrow contract foundation (#108)

* Improve application test coverage (#110)

* Add dependency health checks (#112)

* Validate auth and Stellar requests (#109)

* Validate auth and Stellar requests

* Address validation review feedback

* Secure book deletion authorization (#113)

* Secure book deletion

* Keep delete response consistent

* feat(stellar): gift courses/books via claimable balances with expiry reclaim (#116)

Adds a gift-a-course/book flow built on Stellar claimable balances so a
buyer can send an item to another user — including one who has not
finished wallet onboarding — without the recipient needing a USDC
trustline. The sender creates an on-ledger USDC balance the recipient
claims when ready, with a sender reclaim-after-expiry predicate so funds
are never stranded. Includes a GiftClaim model (no document-deleting TTL,
so the record survives expiry for reclaim), a claimableBalanceService
(build create/claim transactions with complementary predicates, resolve
the REAL balance id from the create result XDR — not the tx hash — with
a Horizon forClaimant fallback, and validate the signed gift XDR before
any state change), gift routes/controller at /api/stellar/gifts, and
granting item access to the RECIPIENT (never the payer) on claim. Wires
a `{ fallback: "claimable_balance" }` response into the purchase flow
when a creator wallet/trustline is missing. Tests cover predicate
decoding, trustline-free single-signature claiming, claim authorization
before/after expiry, the balance-id-vs-tx-hash distinction, tampered-XDR
rejection, guards mirroring initializePayment, and the recipient access
grant.

* feat(stellar): add idempotency protection to the Stellar payment endpoints (#115)

Makes /api/stellar/payment/initialize and /submit safe against
double-clicks, client retries, and concurrent duplicates. Submit is
naturally idempotent per transaction hash: the deterministic hash of
the signed XDR is looked up against confirmed transactions before any
processing, so a replayed submission returns the original success
response without re-granting access, with the unique index on
stellarTxHash as the database-level backstop (an E11000 on the confirm
save is treated as already processed). Initialize no longer piles up
duplicates: a pending checkout for the same user+item returns the
existing record (with its persisted unsigned XDR) instead of creating
a new document, and stale pending records are reaped by the existing
pending-only TTL index. Adds a stricter per-user rate limiter
(paymentLimiter) on the payment routes, keyed on the authenticated
user id with an IPv6-aware IP fallback. Covers duplicate-submit,
duplicate-initialize, the E11000 race, and limiter enforcement with
tests.

* feat(stellar): validate Stellar config at startup and document the mainnet switch (#114)

Adds a single source of truth for the Stellar network configuration
(src/config/stellar.js) that resolves the network name, network
passphrase, Horizon URLs, and USDC issuer from STELLAR_NETWORK, and
validates the whole setup fail-fast at boot so a misconfigured
deployment (bad network value, mainnet flag with testnet Horizon or
issuer) fails with an error naming the exact problem instead of at
request time. stellarService.js and horizonClient.js now consume this
module. Adds docs/MAINNET.md covering the env changes, creator
trustlines, and a first-mainnet-transaction smoke checklist, plus unit
tests for resolution and validation across both networks.

* feat(stellar): fee-bump sponsorship with structural whitelist and spend caps (#111)

Let the platform pay a user's Stellar network fee by wrapping the user-signed
transaction in a fee-bump signed by a dedicated fee-source account, so a user
holding USDC but ~no XLM can buy a book, buy a course, or donate. Opt-in per
submit via `requestSponsorship: true`; off by default and byte-for-byte
identical when disabled.

Guard rails (server signs on the platform's behalf):
- Structural whitelist (reject-by-default, allow-list of `payment` ops only):
  source, exact op count/order, destinations, amounts (stroops), asset, and
  memo must match the pending Transaction row exactly. Any foreign/extra
  operation — including unknown future types — is rejected.
- Durable spend caps (SponsorshipSpend, keyed by UTC day): per-transaction fee
  ceiling, per-day total, and per-user per-day count.
- Sponsor float pre-check so an underfunded sponsor never marks the user's
  transaction failed.

Fee-bump fee is priced over inner ops + wrapper and clamped to the ceiling
(verified against @stellar/stellar-sdk v16 and asserted in tests). Sponsored
rows record `sponsored`, `sponsorFeeCharged`, and the fee-bump (outer) hash
alongside the inner hash. Sponsorship-specific failures return a distinct
non-fatal 4xx/503 with `retryUnsponsored: true` and never mark the row failed.

- Config: FEE_SPONSOR_* in .env.example + validateEnv (fail-fast at boot when
  enabled with a missing/invalid secret); secret never logged or returned.
- Admin status endpoint GET /api/stellar/payment/sponsorship/status exposes the
  sponsor public key, live float, caps, and today's spend.
- Prometheus counters for approved/rejected sponsorship decisions.
- Docs: docs/fee-sponsorship.md, README, and openapi.yaml.
- Tests: feeSponsorService (whitelist adversarial matrix, fee correctness,
  inner-untouched, caps, secret handling, boot config) and feeSponsorSubmit
  (payment + donation flag-off regression, flag-on sponsorship, cap/whitelist
  rejections that don't fail the row).

Closes #30

* feat: add managed course categories (#118)

* feat(courses): add managed category taxonomy

* fix(categories): preserve legacy course creation

* feat: add recurring sadaqah pledges (#119)

* feat(donations): add recurring sadaqah pledges

* fix(pledges): preserve donation test compatibility

* fix(pledges): ignore non-persisted transactions

* refactor(db): scaffold /mongo data-layer structure (closes #167)

---------

Co-authored-by: Afeez Tomisin <132703022+Banx17@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: zeemscript <150973162+zeemscript@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Alabi Ibrahim Abimbola <139625252+abimbolaalabi@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Kelechukwu Izuaba <144479895+Kaycee276@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: BountySpaghetti <zeemroyals@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: BountySpaghetti <286941608+BountySpaghetti@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Samuel Ojetunde <samuelojetunde898@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: abimbolaalabi <abimbolaalabi@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <shittulukmanbabatunde@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <304024794+Lspnjr1@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Alhassan Nuhu Idris <alhassannuhu0@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Mantissa <negativemantissa@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Ezekiel Akawa <akawaezekiel4@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Mfon <67503972+TS-mfon@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(soroban): Implement loyalty points contract (#279)

* stellar: validate signed XDR contents before submit; store expectedHa… (#51)

* stellar: validate signed XDR contents before submit; store expectedHash/memo; verify on-chain before granting access; add tests

* test: add validateSignedPaymentXdr to stellarService mock (new import in paymentController)

* test: expect expectedHash at payment init (XDR pre-validation stores it there)

---------

Co-authored-by: zeemscript <150973162+zeemscript@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(stellar): publish Soroban giving-escrow contract id in stellar.toml

Adds env-driven GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT (custom, non-SEP-1) so the deployed
On-Chain Giving escrow is discoverable from /.well-known/stellar.toml. Set
GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT_ID to enable. Includes test coverage.

* fix(stellar): resolve Horizon endpoints lazily + network-aware default

Horizon client was constructed at import time with a hardcoded testnet
fallback, so a mainnet deploy with HORIZON_URLS unset would silently talk to
testnet Horizon. Now the default is derived from STELLAR_NETWORK and the client
is built lazily on first use (after env is loaded). Explicit HORIZON_URLS still wins.

* feat(auth): authenticated change-password endpoint

PUT /api/auth/change-password (protected): verifies current password,
enforces the password policy, updates the hash, and signs out all other
sessions. Adds the auth.password_change audit action.

* feat(auth): harden authentication against login lockout, breached passwords, and signup abuse (#89) (#99)

* feat(auth): harden authentication against login lockout, breached passwords, and signup abuse (#89)

- Add progressive per-account login lockout (failedLoginAttempts + lockUntil) with env-configurable escalating backoff, generic 429 while locked, and AUTH_ACCOUNT_LOCKED audit emission.
- Add HaveIBeenPwned breached-password check (SHA-1 prefix k-anonymity, never transmits the password) at register and password reset; fails open on outage.
- Add per-email throttling on /register and /resend-verification (emailAuthLimiter, survives IP rotation, active in test env) plus a pluggable captcha gate (no-op when unconfigured).
- Add User lockout fields and document new env vars in .env.example.

* fix(auth): address CodeRabbit review on login lockout, HIBP, captcha, and JWT secret (#89)

- loginUser: locked accounts now return the same generic 401 'Invalid credentials'
  as a nonexistent account (no enumeration); failed-login counter incremented
  atomically via findByIdAndUpdate \, lock persisted via updateOne
- resetPassword: breached-password check moved to after successful OTP validation
  so unauthenticated callers cannot trigger HIBP lookups
- authController: refuse to start when JWT_SECRET is missing (no hardcoded fallback)
- hibp: request HIBP padding ('Add-Padding: true') and ignore zero-count records
- captcha: configurable CAPTCHA_TIMEOUT_MS (default 5s) passed to the provider call;
  captcha rejection now returns the standard { success, message, data: null } shape
- tests: assert escalating backoff magnitude (120s on 6th failure) and the 24h cap;
  locked-account test expects 401; per-email limiter buckets reset between tests;
  outage test routed through mockHibp so the shared spy is cleaned up; added
  padding-record and cap coverage

* Feat/93 idempotency keys (#100)

* feat(stellar): publish Soroban giving-escrow contract id in stellar.toml

Adds env-driven GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT (custom, non-SEP-1) so the deployed
On-Chain Giving escrow is discoverable from /.well-known/stellar.toml. Set
GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT_ID to enable. Includes test coverage.

* fix(stellar): resolve Horizon endpoints lazily + network-aware default

Horizon client was constructed at import time with a hardcoded testnet
fallback, so a mainnet deploy with HORIZON_URLS unset would silently talk to
testnet Horizon. Now the default is derived from STELLAR_NETWORK and the client
is built lazily on first use (after env is loaded). Explicit HORIZON_URLS still wins.

* feat(auth): authenticated change-password endpoint

PUT /api/auth/change-password (protected): verifies current password,
enforces the password policy, updates the hash, and signs out all other
sessions. Adds the auth.password_change audit action.

* feat(payment): add request-level idempotency keys to payment endpoints (#93)

* test: complement stellarService mock exports in idempotency test

* test: refine idempotency middleware concurrency lock test (#93)

* fix(stellar): export validateSignedPaymentXdr and complement test mock (#93)

* fix(stellar): remove duplicate validateSignedPaymentXdr export (#93)

---------

Co-authored-by: zeemscript <150973162+zeemscript@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(auth): enforce resource ownership across mutating endpoints (#88) (#105)

Add a centralized authorization layer that verifies the authenticated
user owns the target resource (or is an admin) before any mutating
handler runs, replacing the ad-hoc inline checks scattered across
controllers.

- add authorizeOwnership + authorizeReviewOwnership middleware
  (src/middlewares/authorize.js); on success the loaded doc is attached
  to req so handlers can reuse it
- apply the guards to book delete, course update, space update/delete,
  and review update/delete on books and courses; review create stays
  purchase-gated
- record ownership denials to the audit log (authz.ownership.denied)
- remove the now-redundant inline ownership checks from the book,
  course, space, and review controllers
- document the resource x action x role matrix (docs/authorization-matrix.md)
  and cover it with an integration test suite (test/ownershipAuthz.test.js)

Closes #88

Co-authored-by: BountySpaghetti <286941608+BountySpaghetti@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(security): stop logging OTP codes and verification tokens in email bodies (#104)

The NODE_ENV === "test" branch of sendMail logged the full rendered email
body — including the password-reset OTP span and the verification link's
token query param — and pino's redact config cannot censor values baked
into interpolated strings, so the leak bypassed the app-wide redaction.

Remove the body from every log statement (log only recipient, subject, and
template id via structured fields), and give tests a sanctioned in-memory
outbox hook instead of log scraping. sendOtpEmail/sendVerificationEmail/
sendReceiptEmail now return the sendMail result so callers can capture it.

Closes #95

* fix(transactions): prevent TTL index from deleting confirmed purchases and donations (#103)

The Transaction collection used a blanket TTL index on expiresAt with a
schema default that stamped a 30-minute expiry on every row regardless of
status. Because confirm paths never cleared expiresAt, confirmed on-chain
purchases and donations were permanently reaped ~30 minutes after creation,
deleting the proof of payment and orphaning recorded earnings.

Scope the TTL index to status: "pending" via partialFilterExpression, make
the expiresAt default conditional on status, add a pre-save hook that clears
expiresAt for any terminal state, explicitly unset expiresAt on every
terminal transition (submit, donation, refund, dispute, cancel, job handler,
reconciliation promotion), and add an idempotent migration that rescues
legacy non-pending rows and rebuilds the index.

Closes #94

* feat(security): implement educator verification pipeline and content-creation gating (#92) (#102)

* feat(security): implement educator verification pipeline and content-creation gating (#92)

- Add EducatorVerification model with legal state-machine transitions
  (draft -> pending -> approved/rejected, resubmit from rejected)
- Add verifiedEducator durable flag on User, set atomically on approval
- Add AUDIT_ACTIONS: EDUCATOR_VERIFY_SUBMIT/_RESUBMIT/_APPROVE/_REJECT
  with metadata allowlist entries in auditService
- requireVerifiedEducator middleware (403 for unverified, admin bypass)
- Applicant API: submit/resubmit app, get own app, signed doc URLs,
  signed Cloudinary upload-signature for private credential uploads
- Admin review queue: list+filter pending, view signed docs,
  approve/reject with notes (Mongo transaction for verifiedEducator grant)
- Gate all content-creation routes:
  * POST /api/courses  (courseRoutes.js)
  * POST /api/books    (bookRoutes.js)
  * POST /api/spaces   (spaceRoutes.js — live sessions per issue)
- Wire routes: /api/educator-verification + /api/admin/educator-verification
- Comprehensive test suite in test/educatorVerification.test.js
  (state-machine, middleware gating, submit/resubmit, approve/reject,
  content 403/2xx, both full lifecycles submit->pending->approve and
  reject->resubmit->approve, signed URL security, admin-only gating,
  audit log instrumentation)

Verification Results:
  app.test.js: 22/22 PASS (CI boot + endpoint health)
  auditLog.test.js: 21/21 PASS (append-only, redaction, admin gate)

Closes #92

* fix(ci): resolve educator verification pipeline test failures

- Remove redundant catchAsync double-wrap in educator-verification routes
  (controllers are already pre-wrapped; the outer wrap called .catch() on
  undefined, returning 500 for every new endpoint)
- Use MongoMemoryReplSet in educatorVerification.test.js so the approve/reject
  MongoDB transaction can run (standalone MongoMemoryServer cannot)
- Use AuditLog.collection.deleteMany in test cleanup to bypass append-only
  pre-hooks
- Return recordAudit's promise so callers can await durability; await it in
  submitApplication and performReview to eliminate the fire-and-forget
  audit-race in tests
- Fix testAuth.js password overwrite: destructure password out of the
  override spread so the hashed value is not clobbered by plaintext
- Seed bookUpload test user as a verifiedEducator mentor so the new content
  gate lets it through

---------

Co-authored-by: abimbolaalabi <abimbolaalabi@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(auth): signed service-to-service authentication for the AI service (#91) (#106)

Give the backend a real machine-to-machine auth channel for the AI
service (dnb-ai) — signed, scoped, rotatable keys instead of a single
static shared secret.

- add requireServiceAuth middleware (src/middlewares/serviceAuth.js):
  HMAC-SHA256 over a canonical method/path/timestamp/body-digest string,
  a ±300s replay window, constant-time signature comparison, per-key
  scope enforcement, and req.service on success
- key store (src/config/serviceKeys.js): multiple active keys keyed by
  kid for zero-downtime rotation; resilient env parsing, never throws
- mount a real internal route GET /api/internal/ai/whoami guarded by the
  guard (scope ai:read-content), plus raw-body capture in app.js
- migrate /admin/jobs off raw !== to a length-guarded timingSafeEqual
- audit denials (service_auth.denied), require AI_SERVICE_KEYS in prod
  (fail-fast), document the signing contract + rotation runbook
- cover the full accept/reject matrix in test/serviceAuth.test.js

Closes #91

Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <304024794+Lspnjr1@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(webhooks): signed outbound webhook event system (#45) (#107)

Add an outbound webhook/event system so external consumers can subscribe
to payment and enrollment lifecycle events over HMAC-signed HTTP
callbacks, with retries, dead-lettering, and redelivery.

- models: WebhookEndpoint (encrypted secret at rest, subscribed events,
  auto-disable counters) and WebhookDelivery (all scheduling state in the
  doc: status, attemptCount, nextAttemptAt indexed)
- webhookService.emitEvent: typed event catalog, per-event id for
  consumer idempotency, strict payload allowlist (no secrets/emails/user
  docs); persists a delivery per subscribed endpoint after the txn
  commits, never blocks or fails the request path, no-ops when the DB is
  unavailable
- signing: X-DeenBridge-Signature v1=hmac-sha256(secret, `${ts}.${body}`)
  over the exact sent bytes; timing-safe verify + 5-min staleness window
- deliveryWorker: atomic findOneAndUpdate claim (no double-send),
  exponential backoff + jitter, dead-letter after max attempts, endpoint
  auto-disable after sustained failures
- management API (/api/webhooks, admin-gated): endpoint CRUD, rotate
  secret, list deliveries, redeliver (atomic $set), and ping
- SSRF guard: https-only in prod, reject loopback/RFC-1918/link-local
- wire emitters into payment (initialized/confirmed/failed/expired),
  enrollment, and wallet connect/disconnect; migrate /admin/jobs to a
  timing-safe token compare
- docs/webhooks.md consumer verifier + full offline test suite

Closes #45

Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <304024794+Lspnjr1@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(security): implement TOTP two-factor authentication for admins a… (#98)

* feat(stellar): publish Soroban giving-escrow contract id in stellar.toml

Adds env-driven GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT (custom, non-SEP-1) so the deployed
On-Chain Giving escrow is discoverable from /.well-known/stellar.toml. Set
GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT_ID to enable. Includes test coverage.

* fix(stellar): resolve Horizon endpoints lazily + network-aware default

Horizon client was constructed at import time with a hardcoded testnet
fallback, so a mainnet deploy with HORIZON_URLS unset would silently talk to
testnet Horizon. Now the default is derived from STELLAR_NETWORK and the client
is built lazily on first use (after env is loaded). Explicit HORIZON_URLS still wins.

* feat(auth): authenticated change-password endpoint

PUT /api/auth/change-password (protected): verifies current password,
enforces the password policy, updates the hash, and signs out all other
sessions. Adds the auth.password_change audit action.

* feat(security): implement TOTP two-factor authentication for admins and mentors

- Add TOTP (RFC 6238) lifecycle: secret generation, encrypted storage at rest (AES-256-GCM), otpauth:// URI and QR code generation
- Add 10 single-use bcrypt-hashed recovery codes
- Add two-factor rate-limiting middleware (5 verification attempts per 15-minute window)
- Update login controller to issue step-up mfaToken challenges when 2FA is enabled
- Update authorizeRoles('admin') middleware to enforce 2FA-enabled status and 2FA-verified sessions
- Log audit actions for all 2FA lifecycle events (setup, enable, login challenge, success, failure, disable, recovery code usage)
- Add comprehensive test suite in test/auth2FA.test.js and update existing auth test suites

* ci: update node version to 22 and sync package-lock.json

* ci: pin mongo service to 6.0 and add wait-for-mongodb step

* test: add 2FA enablement and 2FA verified token to admin in refund.test.js

* fix(auth): switch bcrypt imports to pure-JS bcryptjs for cross-platform compatibility

* fix(test): remove duplicate MongoMemoryServer import in refund.test.js

* fix(test): add errorHandler middleware to refund.test.js app

* fix(test): clean up MongoDB connection logic and add afterAll hook in refund.test.js

* fix(test): standardize Mongoose connection lifecycle and add missing afterAll hooks

* fix(test): remove duplicate afterAll hooks and handle Multer 413 response status

* test(refund): explicitly set 2FA enablement and 2FA verified tokens for admin in refund.test.js

* test: ensure admin test helpers include 2FA enablement and 2FA verified JWT claims

* fix(test): add 2FA enablement and 2FA verified tokens for admin in webhooks and educatorVerification tests

---------

Co-authored-by: zeemscript <150973162+zeemscript@users.noreply.github.com>

* Add scholarship escrow contract foundation (#108)

* Improve application test coverage (#110)

* Add dependency health checks (#112)

* Validate auth and Stellar requests (#109)

* Validate auth and Stellar requests

* Address validation review feedback

* Secure book deletion authorization (#113)

* Secure book deletion

* Keep delete response consistent

* feat(stellar): gift courses/books via claimable balances with expiry reclaim (#116)

Adds a gift-a-course/book flow built on Stellar claimable balances so a
buyer can send an item to another user — including one who has not
finished wallet onboarding — without the recipient needing a USDC
trustline. The sender creates an on-ledger USDC balance the recipient
claims when ready, with a sender reclaim-after-expiry predicate so funds
are never stranded. Includes a GiftClaim model (no document-deleting TTL,
so the record survives expiry for reclaim), a claimableBalanceService
(build create/claim transactions with complementary predicates, resolve
the REAL balance id from the create result XDR — not the tx hash — with
a Horizon forClaimant fallback, and validate the signed gift XDR before
any state change), gift routes/controller at /api/stellar/gifts, and
granting item access to the RECIPIENT (never the payer) on claim. Wires
a `{ fallback: "claimable_balance" }` response into the purchase flow
when a creator wallet/trustline is missing. Tests cover predicate
decoding, trustline-free single-signature claiming, claim authorization
before/after expiry, the balance-id-vs-tx-hash distinction, tampered-XDR
rejection, guards mirroring initializePayment, and the recipient access
grant.

* feat(stellar): add idempotency protection to the Stellar payment endpoints (#115)

Makes /api/stellar/payment/initialize and /submit safe against
double-clicks, client retries, and concurrent duplicates. Submit is
naturally idempotent per transaction hash: the deterministic hash of
the signed XDR is looked up against confirmed transactions before any
processing, so a replayed submission returns the original success
response without re-granting access, with the unique index on
stellarTxHash as the database-level backstop (an E11000 on the confirm
save is treated as already processed). Initialize no longer piles up
duplicates: a pending checkout for the same user+item returns the
existing record (with its persisted unsigned XDR) instead of creating
a new document, and stale pending records are reaped by the existing
pending-only TTL index. Adds a stricter per-user rate limiter
(paymentLimiter) on the payment routes, keyed on the authenticated
user id with an IPv6-aware IP fallback. Covers duplicate-submit,
duplicate-initialize, the E11000 race, and limiter enforcement with
tests.

* feat(stellar): validate Stellar config at startup and document the mainnet switch (#114)

Adds a single source of truth for the Stellar network configuration
(src/config/stellar.js) that resolves the network name, network
passphrase, Horizon URLs, and USDC issuer from STELLAR_NETWORK, and
validates the whole setup fail-fast at boot so a misconfigured
deployment (bad network value, mainnet flag with testnet Horizon or
issuer) fails with an error naming the exact problem instead of at
request time. stellarService.js and horizonClient.js now consume this
module. Adds docs/MAINNET.md covering the env changes, creator
trustlines, and a first-mainnet-transaction smoke checklist, plus unit
tests for resolution and validation across both networks.

* feat(stellar): fee-bump sponsorship with structural whitelist and spend caps (#111)

Let the platform pay a user's Stellar network fee by wrapping the user-signed
transaction in a fee-bump signed by a dedicated fee-source account, so a user
holding USDC but ~no XLM can buy a book, buy a course, or donate. Opt-in per
submit via `requestSponsorship: true`; off by default and byte-for-byte
identical when disabled.

Guard rails (server signs on the platform's behalf):
- Structural whitelist (reject-by-default, allow-list of `payment` ops only):
  source, exact op count/order, destinations, amounts (stroops), asset, and
  memo must match the pending Transaction row exactly. Any foreign/extra
  operation — including unknown future types — is rejected.
- Durable spend caps (SponsorshipSpend, keyed by UTC day): per-transaction fee
  ceiling, per-day total, and per-user per-day count.
- Sponsor float pre-check so an underfunded sponsor never marks the user's
  transaction failed.

Fee-bump fee is priced over inner ops + wrapper and clamped to the ceiling
(verified against @stellar/stellar-sdk v16 and asserted in tests). Sponsored
rows record `sponsored`, `sponsorFeeCharged`, and the fee-bump (outer) hash
alongside the inner hash. Sponsorship-specific failures return a distinct
non-fatal 4xx/503 with `retryUnsponsored: true` and never mark the row failed.

- Config: FEE_SPONSOR_* in .env.example + validateEnv (fail-fast at boot wh…
zeemscript added a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 24, 2026
* Merge dev into main (#117)

* stellar: validate signed XDR contents before submit; store expectedHa… (#51)

* stellar: validate signed XDR contents before submit; store expectedHash/memo; verify on-chain before granting access; add tests

* test: add validateSignedPaymentXdr to stellarService mock (new import in paymentController)

* test: expect expectedHash at payment init (XDR pre-validation stores it there)

---------

Co-authored-by: zeemscript <150973162+zeemscript@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(stellar): publish Soroban giving-escrow contract id in stellar.toml

Adds env-driven GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT (custom, non-SEP-1) so the deployed
On-Chain Giving escrow is discoverable from /.well-known/stellar.toml. Set
GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT_ID to enable. Includes test coverage.

* fix(stellar): resolve Horizon endpoints lazily + network-aware default

Horizon client was constructed at import time with a hardcoded testnet
fallback, so a mainnet deploy with HORIZON_URLS unset would silently talk to
testnet Horizon. Now the default is derived from STELLAR_NETWORK and the client
is built lazily on first use (after env is loaded). Explicit HORIZON_URLS still wins.

* feat(auth): authenticated change-password endpoint

PUT /api/auth/change-password (protected): verifies current password,
enforces the password policy, updates the hash, and signs out all other
sessions. Adds the auth.password_change audit action.

* feat(auth): harden authentication against login lockout, breached passwords, and signup abuse (#89) (#99)

* feat(auth): harden authentication against login lockout, breached passwords, and signup abuse (#89)

- Add progressive per-account login lockout (failedLoginAttempts + lockUntil) with env-configurable escalating backoff, generic 429 while locked, and AUTH_ACCOUNT_LOCKED audit emission.
- Add HaveIBeenPwned breached-password check (SHA-1 prefix k-anonymity, never transmits the password) at register and password reset; fails open on outage.
- Add per-email throttling on /register and /resend-verification (emailAuthLimiter, survives IP rotation, active in test env) plus a pluggable captcha gate (no-op when unconfigured).
- Add User lockout fields and document new env vars in .env.example.

* fix(auth): address CodeRabbit review on login lockout, HIBP, captcha, and JWT secret (#89)

- loginUser: locked accounts now return the same generic 401 'Invalid credentials'
  as a nonexistent account (no enumeration); failed-login counter incremented
  atomically via findByIdAndUpdate \, lock persisted via updateOne
- resetPassword: breached-password check moved to after successful OTP validation
  so unauthenticated callers cannot trigger HIBP lookups
- authController: refuse to start when JWT_SECRET is missing (no hardcoded fallback)
- hibp: request HIBP padding ('Add-Padding: true') and ignore zero-count records
- captcha: configurable CAPTCHA_TIMEOUT_MS (default 5s) passed to the provider call;
  captcha rejection now returns the standard { success, message, data: null } shape
- tests: assert escalating backoff magnitude (120s on 6th failure) and the 24h cap;
  locked-account test expects 401; per-email limiter buckets reset between tests;
  outage test routed through mockHibp so the shared spy is cleaned up; added
  padding-record and cap coverage

* Feat/93 idempotency keys (#100)

* feat(stellar): publish Soroban giving-escrow contract id in stellar.toml

Adds env-driven GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT (custom, non-SEP-1) so the deployed
On-Chain Giving escrow is discoverable from /.well-known/stellar.toml. Set
GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT_ID to enable. Includes test coverage.

* fix(stellar): resolve Horizon endpoints lazily + network-aware default

Horizon client was constructed at import time with a hardcoded testnet
fallback, so a mainnet deploy with HORIZON_URLS unset would silently talk to
testnet Horizon. Now the default is derived from STELLAR_NETWORK and the client
is built lazily on first use (after env is loaded). Explicit HORIZON_URLS still wins.

* feat(auth): authenticated change-password endpoint

PUT /api/auth/change-password (protected): verifies current password,
enforces the password policy, updates the hash, and signs out all other
sessions. Adds the auth.password_change audit action.

* feat(payment): add request-level idempotency keys to payment endpoints (#93)

* test: complement stellarService mock exports in idempotency test

* test: refine idempotency middleware concurrency lock test (#93)

* fix(stellar): export validateSignedPaymentXdr and complement test mock (#93)

* fix(stellar): remove duplicate validateSignedPaymentXdr export (#93)

---------

Co-authored-by: zeemscript <150973162+zeemscript@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(auth): enforce resource ownership across mutating endpoints (#88) (#105)

Add a centralized authorization layer that verifies the authenticated
user owns the target resource (or is an admin) before any mutating
handler runs, replacing the ad-hoc inline checks scattered across
controllers.

- add authorizeOwnership + authorizeReviewOwnership middleware
  (src/middlewares/authorize.js); on success the loaded doc is attached
  to req so handlers can reuse it
- apply the guards to book delete, course update, space update/delete,
  and review update/delete on books and courses; review create stays
  purchase-gated
- record ownership denials to the audit log (authz.ownership.denied)
- remove the now-redundant inline ownership checks from the book,
  course, space, and review controllers
- document the resource x action x role matrix (docs/authorization-matrix.md)
  and cover it with an integration test suite (test/ownershipAuthz.test.js)

Closes #88

Co-authored-by: BountySpaghetti <286941608+BountySpaghetti@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(security): stop logging OTP codes and verification tokens in email bodies (#104)

The NODE_ENV === "test" branch of sendMail logged the full rendered email
body — including the password-reset OTP span and the verification link's
token query param — and pino's redact config cannot censor values baked
into interpolated strings, so the leak bypassed the app-wide redaction.

Remove the body from every log statement (log only recipient, subject, and
template id via structured fields), and give tests a sanctioned in-memory
outbox hook instead of log scraping. sendOtpEmail/sendVerificationEmail/
sendReceiptEmail now return the sendMail result so callers can capture it.

Closes #95

* fix(transactions): prevent TTL index from deleting confirmed purchases and donations (#103)

The Transaction collection used a blanket TTL index on expiresAt with a
schema default that stamped a 30-minute expiry on every row regardless of
status. Because confirm paths never cleared expiresAt, confirmed on-chain
purchases and donations were permanently reaped ~30 minutes after creation,
deleting the proof of payment and orphaning recorded earnings.

Scope the TTL index to status: "pending" via partialFilterExpression, make
the expiresAt default conditional on status, add a pre-save hook that clears
expiresAt for any terminal state, explicitly unset expiresAt on every
terminal transition (submit, donation, refund, dispute, cancel, job handler,
reconciliation promotion), and add an idempotent migration that rescues
legacy non-pending rows and rebuilds the index.

Closes #94

* feat(security): implement educator verification pipeline and content-creation gating (#92) (#102)

* feat(security): implement educator verification pipeline and content-creation gating (#92)

- Add EducatorVerification model with legal state-machine transitions
  (draft -> pending -> approved/rejected, resubmit from rejected)
- Add verifiedEducator durable flag on User, set atomically on approval
- Add AUDIT_ACTIONS: EDUCATOR_VERIFY_SUBMIT/_RESUBMIT/_APPROVE/_REJECT
  with metadata allowlist entries in auditService
- requireVerifiedEducator middleware (403 for unverified, admin bypass)
- Applicant API: submit/resubmit app, get own app, signed doc URLs,
  signed Cloudinary upload-signature for private credential uploads
- Admin review queue: list+filter pending, view signed docs,
  approve/reject with notes (Mongo transaction for verifiedEducator grant)
- Gate all content-creation routes:
  * POST /api/courses  (courseRoutes.js)
  * POST /api/books    (bookRoutes.js)
  * POST /api/spaces   (spaceRoutes.js — live sessions per issue)
- Wire routes: /api/educator-verification + /api/admin/educator-verification
- Comprehensive test suite in test/educatorVerification.test.js
  (state-machine, middleware gating, submit/resubmit, approve/reject,
  content 403/2xx, both full lifecycles submit->pending->approve and
  reject->resubmit->approve, signed URL security, admin-only gating,
  audit log instrumentation)

Verification Results:
  app.test.js: 22/22 PASS (CI boot + endpoint health)
  auditLog.test.js: 21/21 PASS (append-only, redaction, admin gate)

Closes #92

* fix(ci): resolve educator verification pipeline test failures

- Remove redundant catchAsync double-wrap in educator-verification routes
  (controllers are already pre-wrapped; the outer wrap called .catch() on
  undefined, returning 500 for every new endpoint)
- Use MongoMemoryReplSet in educatorVerification.test.js so the approve/reject
  MongoDB transaction can run (standalone MongoMemoryServer cannot)
- Use AuditLog.collection.deleteMany in test cleanup to bypass append-only
  pre-hooks
- Return recordAudit's promise so callers can await durability; await it in
  submitApplication and performReview to eliminate the fire-and-forget
  audit-race in tests
- Fix testAuth.js password overwrite: destructure password out of the
  override spread so the hashed value is not clobbered by plaintext
- Seed bookUpload test user as a verifiedEducator mentor so the new content
  gate lets it through

---------

Co-authored-by: abimbolaalabi <abimbolaalabi@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(auth): signed service-to-service authentication for the AI service (#91) (#106)

Give the backend a real machine-to-machine auth channel for the AI
service (dnb-ai) — signed, scoped, rotatable keys instead of a single
static shared secret.

- add requireServiceAuth middleware (src/middlewares/serviceAuth.js):
  HMAC-SHA256 over a canonical method/path/timestamp/body-digest string,
  a ±300s replay window, constant-time signature comparison, per-key
  scope enforcement, and req.service on success
- key store (src/config/serviceKeys.js): multiple active keys keyed by
  kid for zero-downtime rotation; resilient env parsing, never throws
- mount a real internal route GET /api/internal/ai/whoami guarded by the
  guard (scope ai:read-content), plus raw-body capture in app.js
- migrate /admin/jobs off raw !== to a length-guarded timingSafeEqual
- audit denials (service_auth.denied), require AI_SERVICE_KEYS in prod
  (fail-fast), document the signing contract + rotation runbook
- cover the full accept/reject matrix in test/serviceAuth.test.js

Closes #91

Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <304024794+Lspnjr1@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(webhooks): signed outbound webhook event system (#45) (#107)

Add an outbound webhook/event system so external consumers can subscribe
to payment and enrollment lifecycle events over HMAC-signed HTTP
callbacks, with retries, dead-lettering, and redelivery.

- models: WebhookEndpoint (encrypted secret at rest, subscribed events,
  auto-disable counters) and WebhookDelivery (all scheduling state in the
  doc: status, attemptCount, nextAttemptAt indexed)
- webhookService.emitEvent: typed event catalog, per-event id for
  consumer idempotency, strict payload allowlist (no secrets/emails/user
  docs); persists a delivery per subscribed endpoint after the txn
  commits, never blocks or fails the request path, no-ops when the DB is
  unavailable
- signing: X-DeenBridge-Signature v1=hmac-sha256(secret, `${ts}.${body}`)
  over the exact sent bytes; timing-safe verify + 5-min staleness window
- deliveryWorker: atomic findOneAndUpdate claim (no double-send),
  exponential backoff + jitter, dead-letter after max attempts, endpoint
  auto-disable after sustained failures
- management API (/api/webhooks, admin-gated): endpoint CRUD, rotate
  secret, list deliveries, redeliver (atomic $set), and ping
- SSRF guard: https-only in prod, reject loopback/RFC-1918/link-local
- wire emitters into payment (initialized/confirmed/failed/expired),
  enrollment, and wallet connect/disconnect; migrate /admin/jobs to a
  timing-safe token compare
- docs/webhooks.md consumer verifier + full offline test suite

Closes #45

Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <304024794+Lspnjr1@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(security): implement TOTP two-factor authentication for admins a… (#98)

* feat(stellar): publish Soroban giving-escrow contract id in stellar.toml

Adds env-driven GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT (custom, non-SEP-1) so the deployed
On-Chain Giving escrow is discoverable from /.well-known/stellar.toml. Set
GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT_ID to enable. Includes test coverage.

* fix(stellar): resolve Horizon endpoints lazily + network-aware default

Horizon client was constructed at import time with a hardcoded testnet
fallback, so a mainnet deploy with HORIZON_URLS unset would silently talk to
testnet Horizon. Now the default is derived from STELLAR_NETWORK and the client
is built lazily on first use (after env is loaded). Explicit HORIZON_URLS still wins.

* feat(auth): authenticated change-password endpoint

PUT /api/auth/change-password (protected): verifies current password,
enforces the password policy, updates the hash, and signs out all other
sessions. Adds the auth.password_change audit action.

* feat(security): implement TOTP two-factor authentication for admins and mentors

- Add TOTP (RFC 6238) lifecycle: secret generation, encrypted storage at rest (AES-256-GCM), otpauth:// URI and QR code generation
- Add 10 single-use bcrypt-hashed recovery codes
- Add two-factor rate-limiting middleware (5 verification attempts per 15-minute window)
- Update login controller to issue step-up mfaToken challenges when 2FA is enabled
- Update authorizeRoles('admin') middleware to enforce 2FA-enabled status and 2FA-verified sessions
- Log audit actions for all 2FA lifecycle events (setup, enable, login challenge, success, failure, disable, recovery code usage)
- Add comprehensive test suite in test/auth2FA.test.js and update existing auth test suites

* ci: update node version to 22 and sync package-lock.json

* ci: pin mongo service to 6.0 and add wait-for-mongodb step

* test: add 2FA enablement and 2FA verified token to admin in refund.test.js

* fix(auth): switch bcrypt imports to pure-JS bcryptjs for cross-platform compatibility

* fix(test): remove duplicate MongoMemoryServer import in refund.test.js

* fix(test): add errorHandler middleware to refund.test.js app

* fix(test): clean up MongoDB connection logic and add afterAll hook in refund.test.js

* fix(test): standardize Mongoose connection lifecycle and add missing afterAll hooks

* fix(test): remove duplicate afterAll hooks and handle Multer 413 response status

* test(refund): explicitly set 2FA enablement and 2FA verified tokens for admin in refund.test.js

* test: ensure admin test helpers include 2FA enablement and 2FA verified JWT claims

* fix(test): add 2FA enablement and 2FA verified tokens for admin in webhooks and educatorVerification tests

---------

Co-authored-by: zeemscript <150973162+zeemscript@users.noreply.github.com>

* Add scholarship escrow contract foundation (#108)

* Improve application test coverage (#110)

* Add dependency health checks (#112)

* Validate auth and Stellar requests (#109)

* Validate auth and Stellar requests

* Address validation review feedback

* Secure book deletion authorization (#113)

* Secure book deletion

* Keep delete response consistent

* feat(stellar): gift courses/books via claimable balances with expiry reclaim (#116)

Adds a gift-a-course/book flow built on Stellar claimable balances so a
buyer can send an item to another user — including one who has not
finished wallet onboarding — without the recipient needing a USDC
trustline. The sender creates an on-ledger USDC balance the recipient
claims when ready, with a sender reclaim-after-expiry predicate so funds
are never stranded. Includes a GiftClaim model (no document-deleting TTL,
so the record survives expiry for reclaim), a claimableBalanceService
(build create/claim transactions with complementary predicates, resolve
the REAL balance id from the create result XDR — not the tx hash — with
a Horizon forClaimant fallback, and validate the signed gift XDR before
any state change), gift routes/controller at /api/stellar/gifts, and
granting item access to the RECIPIENT (never the payer) on claim. Wires
a `{ fallback: "claimable_balance" }` response into the purchase flow
when a creator wallet/trustline is missing. Tests cover predicate
decoding, trustline-free single-signature claiming, claim authorization
before/after expiry, the balance-id-vs-tx-hash distinction, tampered-XDR
rejection, guards mirroring initializePayment, and the recipient access
grant.

* feat(stellar): add idempotency protection to the Stellar payment endpoints (#115)

Makes /api/stellar/payment/initialize and /submit safe against
double-clicks, client retries, and concurrent duplicates. Submit is
naturally idempotent per transaction hash: the deterministic hash of
the signed XDR is looked up against confirmed transactions before any
processing, so a replayed submission returns the original success
response without re-granting access, with the unique index on
stellarTxHash as the database-level backstop (an E11000 on the confirm
save is treated as already processed). Initialize no longer piles up
duplicates: a pending checkout for the same user+item returns the
existing record (with its persisted unsigned XDR) instead of creating
a new document, and stale pending records are reaped by the existing
pending-only TTL index. Adds a stricter per-user rate limiter
(paymentLimiter) on the payment routes, keyed on the authenticated
user id with an IPv6-aware IP fallback. Covers duplicate-submit,
duplicate-initialize, the E11000 race, and limiter enforcement with
tests.

* feat(stellar): validate Stellar config at startup and document the mainnet switch (#114)

Adds a single source of truth for the Stellar network configuration
(src/config/stellar.js) that resolves the network name, network
passphrase, Horizon URLs, and USDC issuer from STELLAR_NETWORK, and
validates the whole setup fail-fast at boot so a misconfigured
deployment (bad network value, mainnet flag with testnet Horizon or
issuer) fails with an error naming the exact problem instead of at
request time. stellarService.js and horizonClient.js now consume this
module. Adds docs/MAINNET.md covering the env changes, creator
trustlines, and a first-mainnet-transaction smoke checklist, plus unit
tests for resolution and validation across both networks.

* feat(stellar): fee-bump sponsorship with structural whitelist and spend caps (#111)

Let the platform pay a user's Stellar network fee by wrapping the user-signed
transaction in a fee-bump signed by a dedicated fee-source account, so a user
holding USDC but ~no XLM can buy a book, buy a course, or donate. Opt-in per
submit via `requestSponsorship: true`; off by default and byte-for-byte
identical when disabled.

Guard rails (server signs on the platform's behalf):
- Structural whitelist (reject-by-default, allow-list of `payment` ops only):
  source, exact op count/order, destinations, amounts (stroops), asset, and
  memo must match the pending Transaction row exactly. Any foreign/extra
  operation — including unknown future types — is rejected.
- Durable spend caps (SponsorshipSpend, keyed by UTC day): per-transaction fee
  ceiling, per-day total, and per-user per-day count.
- Sponsor float pre-check so an underfunded sponsor never marks the user's
  transaction failed.

Fee-bump fee is priced over inner ops + wrapper and clamped to the ceiling
(verified against @stellar/stellar-sdk v16 and asserted in tests). Sponsored
rows record `sponsored`, `sponsorFeeCharged`, and the fee-bump (outer) hash
alongside the inner hash. Sponsorship-specific failures return a distinct
non-fatal 4xx/503 with `retryUnsponsored: true` and never mark the row failed.

- Config: FEE_SPONSOR_* in .env.example + validateEnv (fail-fast at boot when
  enabled with a missing/invalid secret); secret never logged or returned.
- Admin status endpoint GET /api/stellar/payment/sponsorship/status exposes the
  sponsor public key, live float, caps, and today's spend.
- Prometheus counters for approved/rejected sponsorship decisions.
- Docs: docs/fee-sponsorship.md, README, and openapi.yaml.
- Tests: feeSponsorService (whitelist adversarial matrix, fee correctness,
  inner-untouched, caps, secret handling, boot config) and feeSponsorSubmit
  (payment + donation flag-off regression, flag-on sponsorship, cap/whitelist
  rejections that don't fail the row).

Closes #30

* feat: add managed course categories (#118)

* feat(courses): add managed category taxonomy

* fix(categories): preserve legacy course creation

* feat: add recurring sadaqah pledges (#119)

* feat(donations): add recurring sadaqah pledges

* fix(pledges): preserve donation test compatibility

* fix(pledges): ignore non-persisted transactions

---------

Co-authored-by: Afeez Tomisin <132703022+Banx17@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Alabi Ibrahim Abimbola <139625252+abimbolaalabi@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Kelechukwu Izuaba <144479895+Kaycee276@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: BountySpaghetti <zeemroyals@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: BountySpaghetti <286941608+BountySpaghetti@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Samuel Ojetunde <samuelojetunde898@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: abimbolaalabi <abimbolaalabi@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <shittulukmanbabatunde@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <304024794+Lspnjr1@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Alhassan Nuhu Idris <alhassannuhu0@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Mantissa <negativemantissa@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Ezekiel Akawa <akawaezekiel4@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Mfon <67503972+TS-mfon@users.noreply.github.com>

* refactor(db): Create /mongo folder structure (#280)

* stellar: validate signed XDR contents before submit; store expectedHa… (#51)

* stellar: validate signed XDR contents before submit; store expectedHash/memo; verify on-chain before granting access; add tests

* test: add validateSignedPaymentXdr to stellarService mock (new import in paymentController)

* test: expect expectedHash at payment init (XDR pre-validation stores it there)

---------

Co-authored-by: zeemscript <150973162+zeemscript@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(stellar): publish Soroban giving-escrow contract id in stellar.toml

Adds env-driven GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT (custom, non-SEP-1) so the deployed
On-Chain Giving escrow is discoverable from /.well-known/stellar.toml. Set
GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT_ID to enable. Includes test coverage.

* fix(stellar): resolve Horizon endpoints lazily + network-aware default

Horizon client was constructed at import time with a hardcoded testnet
fallback, so a mainnet deploy with HORIZON_URLS unset would silently talk to
testnet Horizon. Now the default is derived from STELLAR_NETWORK and the client
is built lazily on first use (after env is loaded). Explicit HORIZON_URLS still wins.

* feat(auth): authenticated change-password endpoint

PUT /api/auth/change-password (protected): verifies current password,
enforces the password policy, updates the hash, and signs out all other
sessions. Adds the auth.password_change audit action.

* feat(auth): harden authentication against login lockout, breached passwords, and signup abuse (#89) (#99)

* feat(auth): harden authentication against login lockout, breached passwords, and signup abuse (#89)

- Add progressive per-account login lockout (failedLoginAttempts + lockUntil) with env-configurable escalating backoff, generic 429 while locked, and AUTH_ACCOUNT_LOCKED audit emission.
- Add HaveIBeenPwned breached-password check (SHA-1 prefix k-anonymity, never transmits the password) at register and password reset; fails open on outage.
- Add per-email throttling on /register and /resend-verification (emailAuthLimiter, survives IP rotation, active in test env) plus a pluggable captcha gate (no-op when unconfigured).
- Add User lockout fields and document new env vars in .env.example.

* fix(auth): address CodeRabbit review on login lockout, HIBP, captcha, and JWT secret (#89)

- loginUser: locked accounts now return the same generic 401 'Invalid credentials'
  as a nonexistent account (no enumeration); failed-login counter incremented
  atomically via findByIdAndUpdate \, lock persisted via updateOne
- resetPassword: breached-password check moved to after successful OTP validation
  so unauthenticated callers cannot trigger HIBP lookups
- authController: refuse to start when JWT_SECRET is missing (no hardcoded fallback)
- hibp: request HIBP padding ('Add-Padding: true') and ignore zero-count records
- captcha: configurable CAPTCHA_TIMEOUT_MS (default 5s) passed to the provider call;
  captcha rejection now returns the standard { success, message, data: null } shape
- tests: assert escalating backoff magnitude (120s on 6th failure) and the 24h cap;
  locked-account test expects 401; per-email limiter buckets reset between tests;
  outage test routed through mockHibp so the shared spy is cleaned up; added
  padding-record and cap coverage

* Feat/93 idempotency keys (#100)

* feat(stellar): publish Soroban giving-escrow contract id in stellar.toml

Adds env-driven GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT (custom, non-SEP-1) so the deployed
On-Chain Giving escrow is discoverable from /.well-known/stellar.toml. Set
GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT_ID to enable. Includes test coverage.

* fix(stellar): resolve Horizon endpoints lazily + network-aware default

Horizon client was constructed at import time with a hardcoded testnet
fallback, so a mainnet deploy with HORIZON_URLS unset would silently talk to
testnet Horizon. Now the default is derived from STELLAR_NETWORK and the client
is built lazily on first use (after env is loaded). Explicit HORIZON_URLS still wins.

* feat(auth): authenticated change-password endpoint

PUT /api/auth/change-password (protected): verifies current password,
enforces the password policy, updates the hash, and signs out all other
sessions. Adds the auth.password_change audit action.

* feat(payment): add request-level idempotency keys to payment endpoints (#93)

* test: complement stellarService mock exports in idempotency test

* test: refine idempotency middleware concurrency lock test (#93)

* fix(stellar): export validateSignedPaymentXdr and complement test mock (#93)

* fix(stellar): remove duplicate validateSignedPaymentXdr export (#93)

---------

Co-authored-by: zeemscript <150973162+zeemscript@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(auth): enforce resource ownership across mutating endpoints (#88) (#105)

Add a centralized authorization layer that verifies the authenticated
user owns the target resource (or is an admin) before any mutating
handler runs, replacing the ad-hoc inline checks scattered across
controllers.

- add authorizeOwnership + authorizeReviewOwnership middleware
  (src/middlewares/authorize.js); on success the loaded doc is attached
  to req so handlers can reuse it
- apply the guards to book delete, course update, space update/delete,
  and review update/delete on books and courses; review create stays
  purchase-gated
- record ownership denials to the audit log (authz.ownership.denied)
- remove the now-redundant inline ownership checks from the book,
  course, space, and review controllers
- document the resource x action x role matrix (docs/authorization-matrix.md)
  and cover it with an integration test suite (test/ownershipAuthz.test.js)

Closes #88

Co-authored-by: BountySpaghetti <286941608+BountySpaghetti@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(security): stop logging OTP codes and verification tokens in email bodies (#104)

The NODE_ENV === "test" branch of sendMail logged the full rendered email
body — including the password-reset OTP span and the verification link's
token query param — and pino's redact config cannot censor values baked
into interpolated strings, so the leak bypassed the app-wide redaction.

Remove the body from every log statement (log only recipient, subject, and
template id via structured fields), and give tests a sanctioned in-memory
outbox hook instead of log scraping. sendOtpEmail/sendVerificationEmail/
sendReceiptEmail now return the sendMail result so callers can capture it.

Closes #95

* fix(transactions): prevent TTL index from deleting confirmed purchases and donations (#103)

The Transaction collection used a blanket TTL index on expiresAt with a
schema default that stamped a 30-minute expiry on every row regardless of
status. Because confirm paths never cleared expiresAt, confirmed on-chain
purchases and donations were permanently reaped ~30 minutes after creation,
deleting the proof of payment and orphaning recorded earnings.

Scope the TTL index to status: "pending" via partialFilterExpression, make
the expiresAt default conditional on status, add a pre-save hook that clears
expiresAt for any terminal state, explicitly unset expiresAt on every
terminal transition (submit, donation, refund, dispute, cancel, job handler,
reconciliation promotion), and add an idempotent migration that rescues
legacy non-pending rows and rebuilds the index.

Closes #94

* feat(security): implement educator verification pipeline and content-creation gating (#92) (#102)

* feat(security): implement educator verification pipeline and content-creation gating (#92)

- Add EducatorVerification model with legal state-machine transitions
  (draft -> pending -> approved/rejected, resubmit from rejected)
- Add verifiedEducator durable flag on User, set atomically on approval
- Add AUDIT_ACTIONS: EDUCATOR_VERIFY_SUBMIT/_RESUBMIT/_APPROVE/_REJECT
  with metadata allowlist entries in auditService
- requireVerifiedEducator middleware (403 for unverified, admin bypass)
- Applicant API: submit/resubmit app, get own app, signed doc URLs,
  signed Cloudinary upload-signature for private credential uploads
- Admin review queue: list+filter pending, view signed docs,
  approve/reject with notes (Mongo transaction for verifiedEducator grant)
- Gate all content-creation routes:
  * POST /api/courses  (courseRoutes.js)
  * POST /api/books    (bookRoutes.js)
  * POST /api/spaces   (spaceRoutes.js — live sessions per issue)
- Wire routes: /api/educator-verification + /api/admin/educator-verification
- Comprehensive test suite in test/educatorVerification.test.js
  (state-machine, middleware gating, submit/resubmit, approve/reject,
  content 403/2xx, both full lifecycles submit->pending->approve and
  reject->resubmit->approve, signed URL security, admin-only gating,
  audit log instrumentation)

Verification Results:
  app.test.js: 22/22 PASS (CI boot + endpoint health)
  auditLog.test.js: 21/21 PASS (append-only, redaction, admin gate)

Closes #92

* fix(ci): resolve educator verification pipeline test failures

- Remove redundant catchAsync double-wrap in educator-verification routes
  (controllers are already pre-wrapped; the outer wrap called .catch() on
  undefined, returning 500 for every new endpoint)
- Use MongoMemoryReplSet in educatorVerification.test.js so the approve/reject
  MongoDB transaction can run (standalone MongoMemoryServer cannot)
- Use AuditLog.collection.deleteMany in test cleanup to bypass append-only
  pre-hooks
- Return recordAudit's promise so callers can await durability; await it in
  submitApplication and performReview to eliminate the fire-and-forget
  audit-race in tests
- Fix testAuth.js password overwrite: destructure password out of the
  override spread so the hashed value is not clobbered by plaintext
- Seed bookUpload test user as a verifiedEducator mentor so the new content
  gate lets it through

---------

Co-authored-by: abimbolaalabi <abimbolaalabi@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(auth): signed service-to-service authentication for the AI service (#91) (#106)

Give the backend a real machine-to-machine auth channel for the AI
service (dnb-ai) — signed, scoped, rotatable keys instead of a single
static shared secret.

- add requireServiceAuth middleware (src/middlewares/serviceAuth.js):
  HMAC-SHA256 over a canonical method/path/timestamp/body-digest string,
  a ±300s replay window, constant-time signature comparison, per-key
  scope enforcement, and req.service on success
- key store (src/config/serviceKeys.js): multiple active keys keyed by
  kid for zero-downtime rotation; resilient env parsing, never throws
- mount a real internal route GET /api/internal/ai/whoami guarded by the
  guard (scope ai:read-content), plus raw-body capture in app.js
- migrate /admin/jobs off raw !== to a length-guarded timingSafeEqual
- audit denials (service_auth.denied), require AI_SERVICE_KEYS in prod
  (fail-fast), document the signing contract + rotation runbook
- cover the full accept/reject matrix in test/serviceAuth.test.js

Closes #91

Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <304024794+Lspnjr1@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(webhooks): signed outbound webhook event system (#45) (#107)

Add an outbound webhook/event system so external consumers can subscribe
to payment and enrollment lifecycle events over HMAC-signed HTTP
callbacks, with retries, dead-lettering, and redelivery.

- models: WebhookEndpoint (encrypted secret at rest, subscribed events,
  auto-disable counters) and WebhookDelivery (all scheduling state in the
  doc: status, attemptCount, nextAttemptAt indexed)
- webhookService.emitEvent: typed event catalog, per-event id for
  consumer idempotency, strict payload allowlist (no secrets/emails/user
  docs); persists a delivery per subscribed endpoint after the txn
  commits, never blocks or fails the request path, no-ops when the DB is
  unavailable
- signing: X-DeenBridge-Signature v1=hmac-sha256(secret, `${ts}.${body}`)
  over the exact sent bytes; timing-safe verify + 5-min staleness window
- deliveryWorker: atomic findOneAndUpdate claim (no double-send),
  exponential backoff + jitter, dead-letter after max attempts, endpoint
  auto-disable after sustained failures
- management API (/api/webhooks, admin-gated): endpoint CRUD, rotate
  secret, list deliveries, redeliver (atomic $set), and ping
- SSRF guard: https-only in prod, reject loopback/RFC-1918/link-local
- wire emitters into payment (initialized/confirmed/failed/expired),
  enrollment, and wallet connect/disconnect; migrate /admin/jobs to a
  timing-safe token compare
- docs/webhooks.md consumer verifier + full offline test suite

Closes #45

Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <304024794+Lspnjr1@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(security): implement TOTP two-factor authentication for admins a… (#98)

* feat(stellar): publish Soroban giving-escrow contract id in stellar.toml

Adds env-driven GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT (custom, non-SEP-1) so the deployed
On-Chain Giving escrow is discoverable from /.well-known/stellar.toml. Set
GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT_ID to enable. Includes test coverage.

* fix(stellar): resolve Horizon endpoints lazily + network-aware default

Horizon client was constructed at import time with a hardcoded testnet
fallback, so a mainnet deploy with HORIZON_URLS unset would silently talk to
testnet Horizon. Now the default is derived from STELLAR_NETWORK and the client
is built lazily on first use (after env is loaded). Explicit HORIZON_URLS still wins.

* feat(auth): authenticated change-password endpoint

PUT /api/auth/change-password (protected): verifies current password,
enforces the password policy, updates the hash, and signs out all other
sessions. Adds the auth.password_change audit action.

* feat(security): implement TOTP two-factor authentication for admins and mentors

- Add TOTP (RFC 6238) lifecycle: secret generation, encrypted storage at rest (AES-256-GCM), otpauth:// URI and QR code generation
- Add 10 single-use bcrypt-hashed recovery codes
- Add two-factor rate-limiting middleware (5 verification attempts per 15-minute window)
- Update login controller to issue step-up mfaToken challenges when 2FA is enabled
- Update authorizeRoles('admin') middleware to enforce 2FA-enabled status and 2FA-verified sessions
- Log audit actions for all 2FA lifecycle events (setup, enable, login challenge, success, failure, disable, recovery code usage)
- Add comprehensive test suite in test/auth2FA.test.js and update existing auth test suites

* ci: update node version to 22 and sync package-lock.json

* ci: pin mongo service to 6.0 and add wait-for-mongodb step

* test: add 2FA enablement and 2FA verified token to admin in refund.test.js

* fix(auth): switch bcrypt imports to pure-JS bcryptjs for cross-platform compatibility

* fix(test): remove duplicate MongoMemoryServer import in refund.test.js

* fix(test): add errorHandler middleware to refund.test.js app

* fix(test): clean up MongoDB connection logic and add afterAll hook in refund.test.js

* fix(test): standardize Mongoose connection lifecycle and add missing afterAll hooks

* fix(test): remove duplicate afterAll hooks and handle Multer 413 response status

* test(refund): explicitly set 2FA enablement and 2FA verified tokens for admin in refund.test.js

* test: ensure admin test helpers include 2FA enablement and 2FA verified JWT claims

* fix(test): add 2FA enablement and 2FA verified tokens for admin in webhooks and educatorVerification tests

---------

Co-authored-by: zeemscript <150973162+zeemscript@users.noreply.github.com>

* Add scholarship escrow contract foundation (#108)

* Improve application test coverage (#110)

* Add dependency health checks (#112)

* Validate auth and Stellar requests (#109)

* Validate auth and Stellar requests

* Address validation review feedback

* Secure book deletion authorization (#113)

* Secure book deletion

* Keep delete response consistent

* feat(stellar): gift courses/books via claimable balances with expiry reclaim (#116)

Adds a gift-a-course/book flow built on Stellar claimable balances so a
buyer can send an item to another user — including one who has not
finished wallet onboarding — without the recipient needing a USDC
trustline. The sender creates an on-ledger USDC balance the recipient
claims when ready, with a sender reclaim-after-expiry predicate so funds
are never stranded. Includes a GiftClaim model (no document-deleting TTL,
so the record survives expiry for reclaim), a claimableBalanceService
(build create/claim transactions with complementary predicates, resolve
the REAL balance id from the create result XDR — not the tx hash — with
a Horizon forClaimant fallback, and validate the signed gift XDR before
any state change), gift routes/controller at /api/stellar/gifts, and
granting item access to the RECIPIENT (never the payer) on claim. Wires
a `{ fallback: "claimable_balance" }` response into the purchase flow
when a creator wallet/trustline is missing. Tests cover predicate
decoding, trustline-free single-signature claiming, claim authorization
before/after expiry, the balance-id-vs-tx-hash distinction, tampered-XDR
rejection, guards mirroring initializePayment, and the recipient access
grant.

* feat(stellar): add idempotency protection to the Stellar payment endpoints (#115)

Makes /api/stellar/payment/initialize and /submit safe against
double-clicks, client retries, and concurrent duplicates. Submit is
naturally idempotent per transaction hash: the deterministic hash of
the signed XDR is looked up against confirmed transactions before any
processing, so a replayed submission returns the original success
response without re-granting access, with the unique index on
stellarTxHash as the database-level backstop (an E11000 on the confirm
save is treated as already processed). Initialize no longer piles up
duplicates: a pending checkout for the same user+item returns the
existing record (with its persisted unsigned XDR) instead of creating
a new document, and stale pending records are reaped by the existing
pending-only TTL index. Adds a stricter per-user rate limiter
(paymentLimiter) on the payment routes, keyed on the authenticated
user id with an IPv6-aware IP fallback. Covers duplicate-submit,
duplicate-initialize, the E11000 race, and limiter enforcement with
tests.

* feat(stellar): validate Stellar config at startup and document the mainnet switch (#114)

Adds a single source of truth for the Stellar network configuration
(src/config/stellar.js) that resolves the network name, network
passphrase, Horizon URLs, and USDC issuer from STELLAR_NETWORK, and
validates the whole setup fail-fast at boot so a misconfigured
deployment (bad network value, mainnet flag with testnet Horizon or
issuer) fails with an error naming the exact problem instead of at
request time. stellarService.js and horizonClient.js now consume this
module. Adds docs/MAINNET.md covering the env changes, creator
trustlines, and a first-mainnet-transaction smoke checklist, plus unit
tests for resolution and validation across both networks.

* feat(stellar): fee-bump sponsorship with structural whitelist and spend caps (#111)

Let the platform pay a user's Stellar network fee by wrapping the user-signed
transaction in a fee-bump signed by a dedicated fee-source account, so a user
holding USDC but ~no XLM can buy a book, buy a course, or donate. Opt-in per
submit via `requestSponsorship: true`; off by default and byte-for-byte
identical when disabled.

Guard rails (server signs on the platform's behalf):
- Structural whitelist (reject-by-default, allow-list of `payment` ops only):
  source, exact op count/order, destinations, amounts (stroops), asset, and
  memo must match the pending Transaction row exactly. Any foreign/extra
  operation — including unknown future types — is rejected.
- Durable spend caps (SponsorshipSpend, keyed by UTC day): per-transaction fee
  ceiling, per-day total, and per-user per-day count.
- Sponsor float pre-check so an underfunded sponsor never marks the user's
  transaction failed.

Fee-bump fee is priced over inner ops + wrapper and clamped to the ceiling
(verified against @stellar/stellar-sdk v16 and asserted in tests). Sponsored
rows record `sponsored`, `sponsorFeeCharged`, and the fee-bump (outer) hash
alongside the inner hash. Sponsorship-specific failures return a distinct
non-fatal 4xx/503 with `retryUnsponsored: true` and never mark the row failed.

- Config: FEE_SPONSOR_* in .env.example + validateEnv (fail-fast at boot when
  enabled with a missing/invalid secret); secret never logged or returned.
- Admin status endpoint GET /api/stellar/payment/sponsorship/status exposes the
  sponsor public key, live float, caps, and today's spend.
- Prometheus counters for approved/rejected sponsorship decisions.
- Docs: docs/fee-sponsorship.md, README, and openapi.yaml.
- Tests: feeSponsorService (whitelist adversarial matrix, fee correctness,
  inner-untouched, caps, secret handling, boot config) and feeSponsorSubmit
  (payment + donation flag-off regression, flag-on sponsorship, cap/whitelist
  rejections that don't fail the row).

Closes #30

* feat: add managed course categories (#118)

* feat(courses): add managed category taxonomy

* fix(categories): preserve legacy course creation

* feat: add recurring sadaqah pledges (#119)

* feat(donations): add recurring sadaqah pledges

* fix(pledges): preserve donation test compatibility

* fix(pledges): ignore non-persisted transactions

* refactor(db): scaffold /mongo data-layer structure (closes #167)

---------

Co-authored-by: Afeez Tomisin <132703022+Banx17@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: zeemscript <150973162+zeemscript@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Alabi Ibrahim Abimbola <139625252+abimbolaalabi@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Kelechukwu Izuaba <144479895+Kaycee276@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: BountySpaghetti <zeemroyals@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: BountySpaghetti <286941608+BountySpaghetti@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Samuel Ojetunde <samuelojetunde898@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: abimbolaalabi <abimbolaalabi@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <shittulukmanbabatunde@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <304024794+Lspnjr1@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Alhassan Nuhu Idris <alhassannuhu0@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Mantissa <negativemantissa@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Ezekiel Akawa <akawaezekiel4@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Mfon <67503972+TS-mfon@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(soroban): Implement loyalty points contract (#279)

* stellar: validate signed XDR contents before submit; store expectedHa… (#51)

* stellar: validate signed XDR contents before submit; store expectedHash/memo; verify on-chain before granting access; add tests

* test: add validateSignedPaymentXdr to stellarService mock (new import in paymentController)

* test: expect expectedHash at payment init (XDR pre-validation stores it there)

---------

Co-authored-by: zeemscript <150973162+zeemscript@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(stellar): publish Soroban giving-escrow contract id in stellar.toml

Adds env-driven GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT (custom, non-SEP-1) so the deployed
On-Chain Giving escrow is discoverable from /.well-known/stellar.toml. Set
GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT_ID to enable. Includes test coverage.

* fix(stellar): resolve Horizon endpoints lazily + network-aware default

Horizon client was constructed at import time with a hardcoded testnet
fallback, so a mainnet deploy with HORIZON_URLS unset would silently talk to
testnet Horizon. Now the default is derived from STELLAR_NETWORK and the client
is built lazily on first use (after env is loaded). Explicit HORIZON_URLS still wins.

* feat(auth): authenticated change-password endpoint

PUT /api/auth/change-password (protected): verifies current password,
enforces the password policy, updates the hash, and signs out all other
sessions. Adds the auth.password_change audit action.

* feat(auth): harden authentication against login lockout, breached passwords, and signup abuse (#89) (#99)

* feat(auth): harden authentication against login lockout, breached passwords, and signup abuse (#89)

- Add progressive per-account login lockout (failedLoginAttempts + lockUntil) with env-configurable escalating backoff, generic 429 while locked, and AUTH_ACCOUNT_LOCKED audit emission.
- Add HaveIBeenPwned breached-password check (SHA-1 prefix k-anonymity, never transmits the password) at register and password reset; fails open on outage.
- Add per-email throttling on /register and /resend-verification (emailAuthLimiter, survives IP rotation, active in test env) plus a pluggable captcha gate (no-op when unconfigured).
- Add User lockout fields and document new env vars in .env.example.

* fix(auth): address CodeRabbit review on login lockout, HIBP, captcha, and JWT secret (#89)

- loginUser: locked accounts now return the same generic 401 'Invalid credentials'
  as a nonexistent account (no enumeration); failed-login counter incremented
  atomically via findByIdAndUpdate \, lock persisted via updateOne
- resetPassword: breached-password check moved to after successful OTP validation
  so unauthenticated callers cannot trigger HIBP lookups
- authController: refuse to start when JWT_SECRET is missing (no hardcoded fallback)
- hibp: request HIBP padding ('Add-Padding: true') and ignore zero-count records
- captcha: configurable CAPTCHA_TIMEOUT_MS (default 5s) passed to the provider call;
  captcha rejection now returns the standard { success, message, data: null } shape
- tests: assert escalating backoff magnitude (120s on 6th failure) and the 24h cap;
  locked-account test expects 401; per-email limiter buckets reset between tests;
  outage test routed through mockHibp so the shared spy is cleaned up; added
  padding-record and cap coverage

* Feat/93 idempotency keys (#100)

* feat(stellar): publish Soroban giving-escrow contract id in stellar.toml

Adds env-driven GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT (custom, non-SEP-1) so the deployed
On-Chain Giving escrow is discoverable from /.well-known/stellar.toml. Set
GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT_ID to enable. Includes test coverage.

* fix(stellar): resolve Horizon endpoints lazily + network-aware default

Horizon client was constructed at import time with a hardcoded testnet
fallback, so a mainnet deploy with HORIZON_URLS unset would silently talk to
testnet Horizon. Now the default is derived from STELLAR_NETWORK and the client
is built lazily on first use (after env is loaded). Explicit HORIZON_URLS still wins.

* feat(auth): authenticated change-password endpoint

PUT /api/auth/change-password (protected): verifies current password,
enforces the password policy, updates the hash, and signs out all other
sessions. Adds the auth.password_change audit action.

* feat(payment): add request-level idempotency keys to payment endpoints (#93)

* test: complement stellarService mock exports in idempotency test

* test: refine idempotency middleware concurrency lock test (#93)

* fix(stellar): export validateSignedPaymentXdr and complement test mock (#93)

* fix(stellar): remove duplicate validateSignedPaymentXdr export (#93)

---------

Co-authored-by: zeemscript <150973162+zeemscript@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(auth): enforce resource ownership across mutating endpoints (#88) (#105)

Add a centralized authorization layer that verifies the authenticated
user owns the target resource (or is an admin) before any mutating
handler runs, replacing the ad-hoc inline checks scattered across
controllers.

- add authorizeOwnership + authorizeReviewOwnership middleware
  (src/middlewares/authorize.js); on success the loaded doc is attached
  to req so handlers can reuse it
- apply the guards to book delete, course update, space update/delete,
  and review update/delete on books and courses; review create stays
  purchase-gated
- record ownership denials to the audit log (authz.ownership.denied)
- remove the now-redundant inline ownership checks from the book,
  course, space, and review controllers
- document the resource x action x role matrix (docs/authorization-matrix.md)
  and cover it with an integration test suite (test/ownershipAuthz.test.js)

Closes #88

Co-authored-by: BountySpaghetti <286941608+BountySpaghetti@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(security): stop logging OTP codes and verification tokens in email bodies (#104)

The NODE_ENV === "test" branch of sendMail logged the full rendered email
body — including the password-reset OTP span and the verification link's
token query param — and pino's redact config cannot censor values baked
into interpolated strings, so the leak bypassed the app-wide redaction.

Remove the body from every log statement (log only recipient, subject, and
template id via structured fields), and give tests a sanctioned in-memory
outbox hook instead of log scraping. sendOtpEmail/sendVerificationEmail/
sendReceiptEmail now return the sendMail result so callers can capture it.

Closes #95

* fix(transactions): prevent TTL index from deleting confirmed purchases and donations (#103)

The Transaction collection used a blanket TTL index on expiresAt with a
schema default that stamped a 30-minute expiry on every row regardless of
status. Because confirm paths never cleared expiresAt, confirmed on-chain
purchases and donations were permanently reaped ~30 minutes after creation,
deleting the proof of payment and orphaning recorded earnings.

Scope the TTL index to status: "pending" via partialFilterExpression, make
the expiresAt default conditional on status, add a pre-save hook that clears
expiresAt for any terminal state, explicitly unset expiresAt on every
terminal transition (submit, donation, refund, dispute, cancel, job handler,
reconciliation promotion), and add an idempotent migration that rescues
legacy non-pending rows and rebuilds the index.

Closes #94

* feat(security): implement educator verification pipeline and content-creation gating (#92) (#102)

* feat(security): implement educator verification pipeline and content-creation gating (#92)

- Add EducatorVerification model with legal state-machine transitions
  (draft -> pending -> approved/rejected, resubmit from rejected)
- Add verifiedEducator durable flag on User, set atomically on approval
- Add AUDIT_ACTIONS: EDUCATOR_VERIFY_SUBMIT/_RESUBMIT/_APPROVE/_REJECT
  with metadata allowlist entries in auditService
- requireVerifiedEducator middleware (403 for unverified, admin bypass)
- Applicant API: submit/resubmit app, get own app, signed doc URLs,
  signed Cloudinary upload-signature for private credential uploads
- Admin review queue: list+filter pending, view signed docs,
  approve/reject with notes (Mongo transaction for verifiedEducator grant)
- Gate all content-creation routes:
  * POST /api/courses  (courseRoutes.js)
  * POST /api/books    (bookRoutes.js)
  * POST /api/spaces   (spaceRoutes.js — live sessions per issue)
- Wire routes: /api/educator-verification + /api/admin/educator-verification
- Comprehensive test suite in test/educatorVerification.test.js
  (state-machine, middleware gating, submit/resubmit, approve/reject,
  content 403/2xx, both full lifecycles submit->pending->approve and
  reject->resubmit->approve, signed URL security, admin-only gating,
  audit log instrumentation)

Verification Results:
  app.test.js: 22/22 PASS (CI boot + endpoint health)
  auditLog.test.js: 21/21 PASS (append-only, redaction, admin gate)

Closes #92

* fix(ci): resolve educator verification pipeline test failures

- Remove redundant catchAsync double-wrap in educator-verification routes
  (controllers are already pre-wrapped; the outer wrap called .catch() on
  undefined, returning 500 for every new endpoint)
- Use MongoMemoryReplSet in educatorVerification.test.js so the approve/reject
  MongoDB transaction can run (standalone MongoMemoryServer cannot)
- Use AuditLog.collection.deleteMany in test cleanup to bypass append-only
  pre-hooks
- Return recordAudit's promise so callers can await durability; await it in
  submitApplication and performReview to eliminate the fire-and-forget
  audit-race in tests
- Fix testAuth.js password overwrite: destructure password out of the
  override spread so the hashed value is not clobbered by plaintext
- Seed bookUpload test user as a verifiedEducator mentor so the new content
  gate lets it through

---------

Co-authored-by: abimbolaalabi <abimbolaalabi@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(auth): signed service-to-service authentication for the AI service (#91) (#106)

Give the backend a real machine-to-machine auth channel for the AI
service (dnb-ai) — signed, scoped, rotatable keys instead of a single
static shared secret.

- add requireServiceAuth middleware (src/middlewares/serviceAuth.js):
  HMAC-SHA256 over a canonical method/path/timestamp/body-digest string,
  a ±300s replay window, constant-time signature comparison, per-key
  scope enforcement, and req.service on success
- key store (src/config/serviceKeys.js): multiple active keys keyed by
  kid for zero-downtime rotation; resilient env parsing, never throws
- mount a real internal route GET /api/internal/ai/whoami guarded by the
  guard (scope ai:read-content), plus raw-body capture in app.js
- migrate /admin/jobs off raw !== to a length-guarded timingSafeEqual
- audit denials (service_auth.denied), require AI_SERVICE_KEYS in prod
  (fail-fast), document the signing contract + rotation runbook
- cover the full accept/reject matrix in test/serviceAuth.test.js

Closes #91

Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <304024794+Lspnjr1@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(webhooks): signed outbound webhook event system (#45) (#107)

Add an outbound webhook/event system so external consumers can subscribe
to payment and enrollment lifecycle events over HMAC-signed HTTP
callbacks, with retries, dead-lettering, and redelivery.

- models: WebhookEndpoint (encrypted secret at rest, subscribed events,
  auto-disable counters) and WebhookDelivery (all scheduling state in the
  doc: status, attemptCount, nextAttemptAt indexed)
- webhookService.emitEvent: typed event catalog, per-event id for
  consumer idempotency, strict payload allowlist (no secrets/emails/user
  docs); persists a delivery per subscribed endpoint after the txn
  commits, never blocks or fails the request path, no-ops when the DB is
  unavailable
- signing: X-DeenBridge-Signature v1=hmac-sha256(secret, `${ts}.${body}`)
  over the exact sent bytes; timing-safe verify + 5-min staleness window
- deliveryWorker: atomic findOneAndUpdate claim (no double-send),
  exponential backoff + jitter, dead-letter after max attempts, endpoint
  auto-disable after sustained failures
- management API (/api/webhooks, admin-gated): endpoint CRUD, rotate
  secret, list deliveries, redeliver (atomic $set), and ping
- SSRF guard: https-only in prod, reject loopback/RFC-1918/link-local
- wire emitters into payment (initialized/confirmed/failed/expired),
  enrollment, and wallet connect/disconnect; migrate /admin/jobs to a
  timing-safe token compare
- docs/webhooks.md consumer verifier + full offline test suite

Closes #45

Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <304024794+Lspnjr1@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(security): implement TOTP two-factor authentication for admins a… (#98)

* feat(stellar): publish Soroban giving-escrow contract id in stellar.toml

Adds env-driven GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT (custom, non-SEP-1) so the deployed
On-Chain Giving escrow is discoverable from /.well-known/stellar.toml. Set
GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT_ID to enable. Includes test coverage.

* fix(stellar): resolve Horizon endpoints lazily + network-aware default

Horizon client was constructed at import time with a hardcoded testnet
fallback, so a mainnet deploy with HORIZON_URLS unset would silently talk to
testnet Horizon. Now the default is derived from STELLAR_NETWORK and the client
is built lazily on first use (after env is loaded). Explicit HORIZON_URLS still wins.

* feat(auth): authenticated change-password endpoint

PUT /api/auth/change-password (protected): verifies current password,
enforces the password policy, updates the hash, and signs out all other
sessions. Adds the auth.password_change audit action.

* feat(security): implement TOTP two-factor authentication for admins and mentors

- Add TOTP (RFC 6238) lifecycle: secret generation, encrypted storage at rest (AES-256-GCM), otpauth:// URI and QR code generation
- Add 10 single-use bcrypt-hashed recovery codes
- Add two-factor rate-limiting middleware (5 verification attempts per 15-minute window)
- Update login controller to issue step-up mfaToken challenges when 2FA is enabled
- Update authorizeRoles('admin') middleware to enforce 2FA-enabled status and 2FA-verified sessions
- Log audit actions for all 2FA lifecycle events (setup, enable, login challenge, success, failure, disable, recovery code usage)
- Add comprehensive test suite in test/auth2FA.test.js and update existing auth test suites

* ci: update node version to 22 and sync package-lock.json

* ci: pin mongo service to 6.0 and add wait-for-mongodb step

* test: add 2FA enablement and 2FA verified token to admin in refund.test.js

* fix(auth): switch bcrypt imports to pure-JS bcryptjs for cross-platform compatibility

* fix(test): remove duplicate MongoMemoryServer import in refund.test.js

* fix(test): add errorHandler middleware to refund.test.js app

* fix(test): clean up MongoDB connection logic and add afterAll hook in refund.test.js

* fix(test): standardize Mongoose connection lifecycle and add missing afterAll hooks

* fix(test): remove duplicate afterAll hooks and handle Multer 413 response status

* test(refund): explicitly set 2FA enablement and 2FA verified tokens for admin in refund.test.js

* test: ensure admin test helpers include 2FA enablement and 2FA verified JWT claims

* fix(test): add 2FA enablement and 2FA verified tokens for admin in webhooks and educatorVerification tests

---------

Co-authored-by: zeemscript <150973162+zeemscript@users.noreply.github.com>

* Add scholarship escrow contract foundation (#108)

* Improve application test coverage (#110)

* Add dependency health checks (#112)

* Validate auth and Stellar requests (#109)

* Validate auth and Stellar requests

* Address validation review feedback

* Secure book deletion authorization (#113)

* Secure book deletion

* Keep delete response consistent

* feat(stellar): gift courses/books via claimable balances with expiry reclaim (#116)

Adds a gift-a-course/book flow built on Stellar claimable balances so a
buyer can send an item to another user — including one who has not
finished wallet onboarding — without the recipient needing a USDC
trustline. The sender creates an on-ledger USDC balance the recipient
claims when ready, with a sender reclaim-after-expiry predicate so funds
are never stranded. Includes a GiftClaim model (no document-deleting TTL,
so the record survives expiry for reclaim), a claimableBalanceService
(build create/claim transactions with complementary predicates, resolve
the REAL balance id from the create result XDR — not the tx hash — with
a Horizon forClaimant fallback, and validate the signed gift XDR before
any state change), gift routes/controller at /api/stellar/gifts, and
granting item access to the RECIPIENT (never the payer) on claim. Wires
a `{ fallback: "claimable_balance" }` response into the purchase flow
when a creator wallet/trustline is missing. Tests cover predicate
decoding, trustline-free single-signature claiming, claim authorization
before/after expiry, the balance-id-vs-tx-hash distinction, tampered-XDR
rejection, guards mirroring initializePayment, and the recipient access
grant.

* feat(stellar): add idempotency protection to the Stellar payment endpoints (#115)

Makes /api/stellar/payment/initialize and /submit safe against
double-clicks, client retries, and concurrent duplicates. Submit is
naturally idempotent per transaction hash: the deterministic hash of
the signed XDR is looked up against confirmed transactions before any
processing, so a replayed submission returns the original success
response without re-granting access, with the unique index on
stellarTxHash as the database-level backstop (an E11000 on the confirm
save is treated as already processed). Initialize no longer piles up
duplicates: a pending checkout for the same user+item returns the
existing record (with its persisted unsigned XDR) instead of creating
a new document, and stale pending records are reaped by the existing
pending-only TTL index. Adds a stricter per-user rate limiter
(paymentLimiter) on the payment routes, keyed on the authenticated
user id with an IPv6-aware IP fallback. Covers duplicate-submit,
duplicate-initialize, the E11000 race, and limiter enforcement with
tests.

* feat(stellar): validate Stellar config at startup and document the mainnet switch (#114)

Adds a single source of truth for the Stellar network configuration
(src/config/stellar.js) that resolves the network name, network
passphrase, Horizon URLs, and USDC issuer from STELLAR_NETWORK, and
validates the whole setup fail-fast at boot so a misconfigured
deployment (bad network value, mainnet flag with testnet Horizon or
issuer) fails with an error naming the exact problem instead of at
request time. stellarService.js and horizonClient.js now consume this
module. Adds docs/MAINNET.md covering the env changes, creator
trustlines, and a first-mainnet-transaction smoke checklist, plus unit
tests for resolution and validation across both networks.

* feat(stellar): fee-bump sponsorship with structural whitelist and spend caps (#111)

Let the platform pay a user's Stellar network fee by wrapping the user-signed
transaction in a fee-bump signed by a dedicated fee-source account, so a user
holding USDC but ~no XLM can buy a book, buy a course, or donate. Opt-in per
submit via `requestSponsorship: true`; off by default and byte-for-byte
identical when disabled.

Guard rails (server signs on the platform's behalf):
- Structural whitelist (reject-by-default, allow-list of `payment` ops only):
  source, exact op count/order, destinations, amounts (stroops), asset, and
  memo must match the pending Transaction row exactly. Any foreign/extra
  operation — including unknown future types — is rejected.
- Durable spend caps (SponsorshipSpend, keyed by UTC day): per-transaction fee
  ceiling, per-day total, and per-user per-day count.
- Sponsor float pre-check so an underfunded sponsor never marks the user's
  transaction failed.

Fee-bump fee is priced over inner ops + wrapper and clamped to the ceiling
(verified against @stellar/stellar-sdk v16 and asserted in tests). Sponsored
rows record `sponsored`, `sponsorFeeCharged`, and the fee-bump (outer) hash
alongside the inner hash. Sponsorship-specific failures return a distinct
non-fatal 4xx/503 with `retryUnsponsored: true` and never mark the row failed.

- Config: FEE_SPONSOR_* in .env.example + validateEnv (fail-fast at boot…
zeemscript added a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 24, 2026
* Merge dev into main (#117)

* stellar: validate signed XDR contents before submit; store expectedHa… (#51)

* stellar: validate signed XDR contents before submit; store expectedHash/memo; verify on-chain before granting access; add tests

* test: add validateSignedPaymentXdr to stellarService mock (new import in paymentController)

* test: expect expectedHash at payment init (XDR pre-validation stores it there)

---------

Co-authored-by: zeemscript <150973162+zeemscript@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(stellar): publish Soroban giving-escrow contract id in stellar.toml

Adds env-driven GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT (custom, non-SEP-1) so the deployed
On-Chain Giving escrow is discoverable from /.well-known/stellar.toml. Set
GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT_ID to enable. Includes test coverage.

* fix(stellar): resolve Horizon endpoints lazily + network-aware default

Horizon client was constructed at import time with a hardcoded testnet
fallback, so a mainnet deploy with HORIZON_URLS unset would silently talk to
testnet Horizon. Now the default is derived from STELLAR_NETWORK and the client
is built lazily on first use (after env is loaded). Explicit HORIZON_URLS still wins.

* feat(auth): authenticated change-password endpoint

PUT /api/auth/change-password (protected): verifies current password,
enforces the password policy, updates the hash, and signs out all other
sessions. Adds the auth.password_change audit action.

* feat(auth): harden authentication against login lockout, breached passwords, and signup abuse (#89) (#99)

* feat(auth): harden authentication against login lockout, breached passwords, and signup abuse (#89)

- Add progressive per-account login lockout (failedLoginAttempts + lockUntil) with env-configurable escalating backoff, generic 429 while locked, and AUTH_ACCOUNT_LOCKED audit emission.
- Add HaveIBeenPwned breached-password check (SHA-1 prefix k-anonymity, never transmits the password) at register and password reset; fails open on outage.
- Add per-email throttling on /register and /resend-verification (emailAuthLimiter, survives IP rotation, active in test env) plus a pluggable captcha gate (no-op when unconfigured).
- Add User lockout fields and document new env vars in .env.example.

* fix(auth): address CodeRabbit review on login lockout, HIBP, captcha, and JWT secret (#89)

- loginUser: locked accounts now return the same generic 401 'Invalid credentials'
  as a nonexistent account (no enumeration); failed-login counter incremented
  atomically via findByIdAndUpdate \, lock persisted via updateOne
- resetPassword: breached-password check moved to after successful OTP validation
  so unauthenticated callers cannot trigger HIBP lookups
- authController: refuse to start when JWT_SECRET is missing (no hardcoded fallback)
- hibp: request HIBP padding ('Add-Padding: true') and ignore zero-count records
- captcha: configurable CAPTCHA_TIMEOUT_MS (default 5s) passed to the provider call;
  captcha rejection now returns the standard { success, message, data: null } shape
- tests: assert escalating backoff magnitude (120s on 6th failure) and the 24h cap;
  locked-account test expects 401; per-email limiter buckets reset between tests;
  outage test routed through mockHibp so the shared spy is cleaned up; added
  padding-record and cap coverage

* Feat/93 idempotency keys (#100)

* feat(stellar): publish Soroban giving-escrow contract id in stellar.toml

Adds env-driven GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT (custom, non-SEP-1) so the deployed
On-Chain Giving escrow is discoverable from /.well-known/stellar.toml. Set
GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT_ID to enable. Includes test coverage.

* fix(stellar): resolve Horizon endpoints lazily + network-aware default

Horizon client was constructed at import time with a hardcoded testnet
fallback, so a mainnet deploy with HORIZON_URLS unset would silently talk to
testnet Horizon. Now the default is derived from STELLAR_NETWORK and the client
is built lazily on first use (after env is loaded). Explicit HORIZON_URLS still wins.

* feat(auth): authenticated change-password endpoint

PUT /api/auth/change-password (protected): verifies current password,
enforces the password policy, updates the hash, and signs out all other
sessions. Adds the auth.password_change audit action.

* feat(payment): add request-level idempotency keys to payment endpoints (#93)

* test: complement stellarService mock exports in idempotency test

* test: refine idempotency middleware concurrency lock test (#93)

* fix(stellar): export validateSignedPaymentXdr and complement test mock (#93)

* fix(stellar): remove duplicate validateSignedPaymentXdr export (#93)

---------

Co-authored-by: zeemscript <150973162+zeemscript@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(auth): enforce resource ownership across mutating endpoints (#88) (#105)

Add a centralized authorization layer that verifies the authenticated
user owns the target resource (or is an admin) before any mutating
handler runs, replacing the ad-hoc inline checks scattered across
controllers.

- add authorizeOwnership + authorizeReviewOwnership middleware
  (src/middlewares/authorize.js); on success the loaded doc is attached
  to req so handlers can reuse it
- apply the guards to book delete, course update, space update/delete,
  and review update/delete on books and courses; review create stays
  purchase-gated
- record ownership denials to the audit log (authz.ownership.denied)
- remove the now-redundant inline ownership checks from the book,
  course, space, and review controllers
- document the resource x action x role matrix (docs/authorization-matrix.md)
  and cover it with an integration test suite (test/ownershipAuthz.test.js)

Closes #88

Co-authored-by: BountySpaghetti <286941608+BountySpaghetti@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(security): stop logging OTP codes and verification tokens in email bodies (#104)

The NODE_ENV === "test" branch of sendMail logged the full rendered email
body — including the password-reset OTP span and the verification link's
token query param — and pino's redact config cannot censor values baked
into interpolated strings, so the leak bypassed the app-wide redaction.

Remove the body from every log statement (log only recipient, subject, and
template id via structured fields), and give tests a sanctioned in-memory
outbox hook instead of log scraping. sendOtpEmail/sendVerificationEmail/
sendReceiptEmail now return the sendMail result so callers can capture it.

Closes #95

* fix(transactions): prevent TTL index from deleting confirmed purchases and donations (#103)

The Transaction collection used a blanket TTL index on expiresAt with a
schema default that stamped a 30-minute expiry on every row regardless of
status. Because confirm paths never cleared expiresAt, confirmed on-chain
purchases and donations were permanently reaped ~30 minutes after creation,
deleting the proof of payment and orphaning recorded earnings.

Scope the TTL index to status: "pending" via partialFilterExpression, make
the expiresAt default conditional on status, add a pre-save hook that clears
expiresAt for any terminal state, explicitly unset expiresAt on every
terminal transition (submit, donation, refund, dispute, cancel, job handler,
reconciliation promotion), and add an idempotent migration that rescues
legacy non-pending rows and rebuilds the index.

Closes #94

* feat(security): implement educator verification pipeline and content-creation gating (#92) (#102)

* feat(security): implement educator verification pipeline and content-creation gating (#92)

- Add EducatorVerification model with legal state-machine transitions
  (draft -> pending -> approved/rejected, resubmit from rejected)
- Add verifiedEducator durable flag on User, set atomically on approval
- Add AUDIT_ACTIONS: EDUCATOR_VERIFY_SUBMIT/_RESUBMIT/_APPROVE/_REJECT
  with metadata allowlist entries in auditService
- requireVerifiedEducator middleware (403 for unverified, admin bypass)
- Applicant API: submit/resubmit app, get own app, signed doc URLs,
  signed Cloudinary upload-signature for private credential uploads
- Admin review queue: list+filter pending, view signed docs,
  approve/reject with notes (Mongo transaction for verifiedEducator grant)
- Gate all content-creation routes:
  * POST /api/courses  (courseRoutes.js)
  * POST /api/books    (bookRoutes.js)
  * POST /api/spaces   (spaceRoutes.js — live sessions per issue)
- Wire routes: /api/educator-verification + /api/admin/educator-verification
- Comprehensive test suite in test/educatorVerification.test.js
  (state-machine, middleware gating, submit/resubmit, approve/reject,
  content 403/2xx, both full lifecycles submit->pending->approve and
  reject->resubmit->approve, signed URL security, admin-only gating,
  audit log instrumentation)

Verification Results:
  app.test.js: 22/22 PASS (CI boot + endpoint health)
  auditLog.test.js: 21/21 PASS (append-only, redaction, admin gate)

Closes #92

* fix(ci): resolve educator verification pipeline test failures

- Remove redundant catchAsync double-wrap in educator-verification routes
  (controllers are already pre-wrapped; the outer wrap called .catch() on
  undefined, returning 500 for every new endpoint)
- Use MongoMemoryReplSet in educatorVerification.test.js so the approve/reject
  MongoDB transaction can run (standalone MongoMemoryServer cannot)
- Use AuditLog.collection.deleteMany in test cleanup to bypass append-only
  pre-hooks
- Return recordAudit's promise so callers can await durability; await it in
  submitApplication and performReview to eliminate the fire-and-forget
  audit-race in tests
- Fix testAuth.js password overwrite: destructure password out of the
  override spread so the hashed value is not clobbered by plaintext
- Seed bookUpload test user as a verifiedEducator mentor so the new content
  gate lets it through

---------

Co-authored-by: abimbolaalabi <abimbolaalabi@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(auth): signed service-to-service authentication for the AI service (#91) (#106)

Give the backend a real machine-to-machine auth channel for the AI
service (dnb-ai) — signed, scoped, rotatable keys instead of a single
static shared secret.

- add requireServiceAuth middleware (src/middlewares/serviceAuth.js):
  HMAC-SHA256 over a canonical method/path/timestamp/body-digest string,
  a ±300s replay window, constant-time signature comparison, per-key
  scope enforcement, and req.service on success
- key store (src/config/serviceKeys.js): multiple active keys keyed by
  kid for zero-downtime rotation; resilient env parsing, never throws
- mount a real internal route GET /api/internal/ai/whoami guarded by the
  guard (scope ai:read-content), plus raw-body capture in app.js
- migrate /admin/jobs off raw !== to a length-guarded timingSafeEqual
- audit denials (service_auth.denied), require AI_SERVICE_KEYS in prod
  (fail-fast), document the signing contract + rotation runbook
- cover the full accept/reject matrix in test/serviceAuth.test.js

Closes #91

Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <304024794+Lspnjr1@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(webhooks): signed outbound webhook event system (#45) (#107)

Add an outbound webhook/event system so external consumers can subscribe
to payment and enrollment lifecycle events over HMAC-signed HTTP
callbacks, with retries, dead-lettering, and redelivery.

- models: WebhookEndpoint (encrypted secret at rest, subscribed events,
  auto-disable counters) and WebhookDelivery (all scheduling state in the
  doc: status, attemptCount, nextAttemptAt indexed)
- webhookService.emitEvent: typed event catalog, per-event id for
  consumer idempotency, strict payload allowlist (no secrets/emails/user
  docs); persists a delivery per subscribed endpoint after the txn
  commits, never blocks or fails the request path, no-ops when the DB is
  unavailable
- signing: X-DeenBridge-Signature v1=hmac-sha256(secret, `${ts}.${body}`)
  over the exact sent bytes; timing-safe verify + 5-min staleness window
- deliveryWorker: atomic findOneAndUpdate claim (no double-send),
  exponential backoff + jitter, dead-letter after max attempts, endpoint
  auto-disable after sustained failures
- management API (/api/webhooks, admin-gated): endpoint CRUD, rotate
  secret, list deliveries, redeliver (atomic $set), and ping
- SSRF guard: https-only in prod, reject loopback/RFC-1918/link-local
- wire emitters into payment (initialized/confirmed/failed/expired),
  enrollment, and wallet connect/disconnect; migrate /admin/jobs to a
  timing-safe token compare
- docs/webhooks.md consumer verifier + full offline test suite

Closes #45

Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <304024794+Lspnjr1@users.noreply.github.com>

* feat(security): implement TOTP two-factor authentication for admins a… (#98)

* feat(stellar): publish Soroban giving-escrow contract id in stellar.toml

Adds env-driven GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT (custom, non-SEP-1) so the deployed
On-Chain Giving escrow is discoverable from /.well-known/stellar.toml. Set
GIVING_ESCROW_CONTRACT_ID to enable. Includes test coverage.

* fix(stellar): resolve Horizon endpoints lazily + network-aware default

Horizon client was constructed at import time with a hardcoded testnet
fallback, so a mainnet deploy with HORIZON_URLS unset would silently talk to
testnet Horizon. Now the default is derived from STELLAR_NETWORK and the client
is built lazily on first use (after env is loaded). Explicit HORIZON_URLS still wins.

* feat(auth): authenticated change-password endpoint

PUT /api/auth/change-password (protected): verifies current password,
enforces the password policy, updates the hash, and signs out all other
sessions. Adds the auth.password_change audit action.

* feat(security): implement TOTP two-factor authentication for admins and mentors

- Add TOTP (RFC 6238) lifecycle: secret generation, encrypted storage at rest (AES-256-GCM), otpauth:// URI and QR code generation
- Add 10 single-use bcrypt-hashed recovery codes
- Add two-factor rate-limiting middleware (5 verification attempts per 15-minute window)
- Update login controller to issue step-up mfaToken challenges when 2FA is enabled
- Update authorizeRoles('admin') middleware to enforce 2FA-enabled status and 2FA-verified sessions
- Log audit actions for all 2FA lifecycle events (setup, enable, login challenge, success, failure, disable, recovery code usage)
- Add comprehensive test suite in test/auth2FA.test.js and update existing auth test suites

* ci: update node version to 22 and sync package-lock.json

* ci: pin mongo service to 6.0 and add wait-for-mongodb step

* test: add 2FA enablement and 2FA verified token to admin in refund.test.js

* fix(auth): switch bcrypt imports to pure-JS bcryptjs for cross-platform compatibility

* fix(test): remove duplicate MongoMemoryServer import in refund.test.js

* fix(test): add errorHandler middleware to refund.test.js app

* fix(test): clean up MongoDB connection logic and add afterAll hook in refund.test.js

* fix(test): standardize Mongoose connection lifecycle and add missing afterAll hooks

* fix(test): remove duplicate afterAll hooks and handle Multer 413 response status

* test(refund): explicitly set 2FA enablement and 2FA verified tokens for admin in refund.test.js

* test: ensure admin test helpers include 2FA enablement and 2FA verified JWT claims

* fix(test): add 2FA enablement and 2FA verified tokens for admin in webhooks and educatorVerification tests

---------

Co-authored-by: zeemscript <150973162+zeemscript@users.noreply.github.com>

* Add scholarship escrow contract foundation (#108)

* Improve application test coverage (#110)

* Add dependency health checks (#112)

* Validate auth and Stellar requests (#109)

* Validate auth and Stellar requests

* Address validation review feedback

* Secure book deletion authorization (#113)

* Secure book deletion

* Keep delete response consistent

* feat(stellar): gift courses/books via claimable balances with expiry reclaim (#116)

Adds a gift-a-course/book flow built on Stellar claimable balances so a
buyer can send an item to another user — including one who has not
finished wallet onboarding — without the recipient needing a USDC
trustline. The sender creates an on-ledger USDC balance the recipient
claims when ready, with a sender reclaim-after-expiry predicate so funds
are never stranded. Includes a GiftClaim model (no document-deleting TTL,
so the record survives expiry for reclaim), a claimableBalanceService
(build create/claim transactions with complementary predicates, resolve
the REAL balance id from the create result XDR — not the tx hash — with
a Horizon forClaimant fallback, and validate the signed gift XDR before
any state change), gift routes/controller at /api/stellar/gifts, and
granting item access to the RECIPIENT (never the payer) on claim. Wires
a `{ fallback: "claimable_balance" }` response into the purchase flow
when a creator wallet/trustline is missing. Tests cover predicate
decoding, trustline-free single-signature claiming, claim authorization
before/after expiry, the balance-id-vs-tx-hash distinction, tampered-XDR
rejection, guards mirroring initializePayment, and the recipient access
grant.

* feat(stellar): add idempotency protection to the Stellar payment endpoints (#115)

Makes /api/stellar/payment/initialize and /submit safe against
double-clicks, client retries, and concurrent duplicates. Submit is
naturally idempotent per transaction hash: the deterministic hash of
the signed XDR is looked up against confirmed transactions before any
processing, so a replayed submission returns the original success
response without re-granting access, with the unique index on
stellarTxHash as the database-level backstop (an E11000 on the confirm
save is treated as already processed). Initialize no longer piles up
duplicates: a pending checkout for the same user+item returns the
existing record (with its persisted unsigned XDR) instead of creating
a new document, and stale pending records are reaped by the existing
pending-only TTL index. Adds a stricter per-user rate limiter
(paymentLimiter) on the payment routes, keyed on the authenticated
user id with an IPv6-aware IP fallback. Covers duplicate-submit,
duplicate-initialize, the E11000 race, and limiter enforcement with
tests.

* feat(stellar): validate Stellar config at startup and document the mainnet switch (#114)

Adds a single source of truth for the Stellar network configuration
(src/config/stellar.js) that resolves the network name, network
passphrase, Horizon URLs, and USDC issuer from STELLAR_NETWORK, and
validates the whole setup fail-fast at boot so a misconfigured
deployment (bad network value, mainnet flag with testnet Horizon or
issuer) fails with an error naming the exact problem instead of at
request time. stellarService.js and horizonClient.js now consume this
module. Adds docs/MAINNET.md covering the env changes, creator
trustlines, and a first-mainnet-transaction smoke checklist, plus unit
tests for resolution and validation across both networks.

* feat(stellar): fee-bump sponsorship with structural whitelist and spend caps (#111)

Let the platform pay a user's Stellar network fee by wrapping the user-signed
transaction in a fee-bump signed by a dedicated fee-source account, so a user
holding USDC but ~no XLM can buy a book, buy a course, or donate. Opt-in per
submit via `requestSponsorship: true`; off by default and byte-for-byte
identical when disabled.

Guard rails (server signs on the platform's behalf):
- Structural whitelist (reject-by-default, allow-list of `payment` ops only):
  source, exact op count/order, destinations, amounts (stroops), asset, and
  memo must match the pending Transaction row exactly. Any foreign/extra
  operation — including unknown future types — is rejected.
- Durable spend caps (SponsorshipSpend, keyed by UTC day): per-transaction fee
  ceiling, per-day total, and per-user per-day count.
- Sponsor float pre-check so an underfunded sponsor never marks the user's
  transaction failed.

Fee-bump fee is priced over inner ops + wrapper and clamped to the ceiling
(verified against @stellar/stellar-sdk v16 and asserted in tests). Sponsored
rows record `sponsored`, `sponsorFeeCharged`, and the fee-bump (outer) hash
alongside the inner hash. Sponsorship-specific failures return a distinct
non-fatal 4xx/503 with `retryUnsponsored: true` and never mark the row failed.

- Config: FEE_SPONSOR_* in .env.example + validateEnv (fail-fast at boot when
  enabled with a missing/invalid secret); secret never logged or returned.
- Admin status endpoint GET /api/stellar/payment/sponsorship/status exposes the
  sponsor public key, live float, caps, and today's spend.
- Prometheus counters for approved/rejected sponsorship decisions.
- Docs: docs/fee-sponsorship.md, README, and openapi.yaml.
- Tests: feeSponsorService (whitelist adversarial matrix, fee correctness,
  inner-untouched, caps, secret handling, boot config) and feeSponsorSubmit
  (payment + donation flag-off regression, flag-on sponsorship, cap/whitelist
  rejections that don't fail the row).

Closes #30

* feat: add managed course categories (#118)

* feat(courses): add managed category taxonomy

* fix(categories): preserve legacy course creation

* feat: add recurring sadaqah pledges (#119)

* feat(donations): add recurring sadaqah pledges

* fix(pledges): preserve donation test compatibility

* fix(pledges): ignore non-persisted transactions

---------

Co-authored-by: Afeez Tomisin <132703022+Banx17@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Alabi Ibrahim Abimbola <139625252+abimbolaalabi@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Kelechukwu Izuaba <144479895+Kaycee276@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: BountySpaghetti <zeemroyals@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: BountySpaghetti <286941608+BountySpaghetti@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Samuel Ojetunde <samuelojetunde898@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: abimbolaalabi <abimbolaalabi@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <shittulukmanbabatunde@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <304024794+Lspnjr1@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Alhassan Nuhu Idris <alhassannuhu0@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Mantissa <negativemantissa@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Ezekiel Akawa <akawaezekiel4@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Mfon <67503972+TS-mfon@users.noreply.github.com>

* refactor(db): scaffold /mongo data-layer structure (closes #167)

---------

Co-authored-by: Sakariyah Abdulhazeem <150973162+zeemscript@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Afeez Tomisin <132703022+Banx17@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Alabi Ibrahim Abimbola <139625252+abimbolaalabi@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Kelechukwu Izuaba <144479895+Kaycee276@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: BountySpaghetti <zeemroyals@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: BountySpaghetti <286941608+BountySpaghetti@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Samuel Ojetunde <samuelojetunde898@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: abimbolaalabi <abimbolaalabi@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <shittulukmanbabatunde@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Lspnjr1 <304024794+Lspnjr1@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Alhassan Nuhu Idris <alhassannuhu0@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Mantissa <negativemantissa@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Ezekiel Akawa <akawaezekiel4@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Mfon <67503972+TS-mfon@users.noreply.github.com>
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