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fix: real peer verification in SecureClient (hostname check + fail-closed CA load) #65

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fix: real peer verification in SecureClient (hostname check + fail-closed CA load) #65

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11 changes: 11 additions & 0 deletions libs/network/SecureNet/include/SecureHttpClient.h
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -262,6 +262,17 @@ class SecureHttpClient {
return -1;
}

// RFC 9110 §6.4.1: 1xx, 204 and 304 responses never carry a body,
// regardless of what Content-Length or Transfer-Encoding they echo (a
// 304 replays the cached response's headers). Without this, a 304 with
// no framing headers would fall into readUntilClose() and stall a
// kept-alive connection until the timeout.
if (_status == 204 || _status == 304 || (_status >= 100 && _status < 200)) {
_bodyComplete = true;
if (!_reuse || !keepAlive) closeConnection();
return _status;
}

// A close-delimited body (no framing) ends WITH the connection, so it can
// never leave a reusable socket behind.
// A 3xx body that is about to be followed is protocol plumbing, not
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24 changes: 22 additions & 2 deletions libs/network/SecureNet/src/SecureClient.cpp
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Expand Up @@ -85,8 +85,15 @@ int SecureClient::connectWithMethod(const char* host, uint16_t port, void* metho
if (_insecure) {
wolfSSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, WOLFSSL_VERIFY_NONE, nullptr);
} else if (_rootCA) {
wolfSSL_CTX_load_verify_buffer(ctx, reinterpret_cast<const unsigned char*>(_rootCA),
strlen(_rootCA), WOLFSSL_FILETYPE_PEM);
// Fail closed on a CA buffer that doesn't parse: the context would
// otherwise proceed to the handshake with an empty trust store, and the
// resulting verify failure is indistinguishable from a real bad peer.
if (wolfSSL_CTX_load_verify_buffer(ctx, reinterpret_cast<const unsigned char*>(_rootCA), strlen(_rootCA),
WOLFSSL_FILETYPE_PEM) != WOLFSSL_SUCCESS) {
if (Serial) Serial.printf("[SecureClient] CA load failed (%s)\n", label);
stop();
return 0;
}
}
wolfSSL_SetIORecv(ctx, wcRecv);
wolfSSL_SetIOSend(ctx, wcSend);
Expand All @@ -101,6 +108,19 @@ int SecureClient::connectWithMethod(const char* host, uint16_t port, void* metho
wolfSSL_SetIOReadCtx(ssl, &_transport);
wolfSSL_SetIOWriteCtx(ssl, &_transport);
wolfSSL_UseSNI(ssl, WOLFSSL_SNI_HOST_NAME, host, strlen(host));
if (!_insecure) {
// SNI names the host but does NOT bind the peer's certificate to it:
// without an explicit domain-name check, wolfSSL accepts any certificate
// signed by a trusted CA regardless of which hostname it was issued for,
// so a CA-verified connection would still be redirectable to any
// CA-certified attacker host. check_domain_name matches the connect host
// against the leaf's SANs/CN (wildcards included) during the handshake.
if (wolfSSL_check_domain_name(ssl, host) != WOLFSSL_SUCCESS) {
if (Serial) Serial.printf("[SecureClient] domain check setup failed (%s): %s\n", label, host);
stop();
return 0;
}
}
#if defined(WOLFSSL_TLS13) && defined(HAVE_CURVE25519)
// MEMFIX-PORT: pin the TLS 1.3 key_share to X25519. wolfSSL's default is a
// P-256 share, generated with fast-math bignums that WOLFSSL_SMALL_STACK
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