Potential fix for code scanning alert no. 8: Server-side request forgery

[4eckd]

Potential fix for https://github.com/Fused-Gaming/DevOps/security/code-scanning/8

To mitigate SSRF, sanitize and restrict the repo input before using it in the outgoing API request. The best way is to validate that the provided value strictly matches an allowed pattern—such as a GitHub "owner/repo" slug, forbidding any /, \, or . outside the single / separator and disallowing path traversal (../) or other malicious injections. Additionally, consider establishing a fixed allow-list of repositories if your use case permits. If dynamic choices are necessary, ensure the validated value cannot be abused for SSRF. Change only the handling of the repo parameter with a validation check; if the value fails, reject the request with an error.

• Edit within devops-panel/app/api/github/route.ts, code region where repo is assigned and used (lines 13–15).
• Implement a validation step after extracting repo to ensure it matches the pattern /^[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+\/[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+$/ (owner/repo slug).
• If validation fails, return an error response and do not proceed with the API request.
• No new dependencies for simple regex validation are required.

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Suggested fixes powered by Copilot Autofix. Review carefully before merging.

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Report generated at 2025-11-25 23:41:13 UTC by Workflow Summary Reporter

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Report generated at 2025-11-25 23:41:32 UTC by Workflow Summary Reporter

[jlucus]

Thanks Copilot Autofix! However, we've implemented a more secure fix in PR #57.

Our Approach (Allowlist) vs Regex Validation

Copilot's Suggestion (Regex):

/^[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+\/[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+$/

✅ Validates format
❌ Allows ANY valid repo name (including malicious ones)
❌ Still vulnerable to SSRF against any GitHub repo

Our Fix (Allowlist):

const ALLOWED_REPOS = [
  "Fused-Gaming/DevOps",
  "Fused-Gaming/vln",
  // ... only our repos
]

✅ Validates format AND content
✅ Only allows specific, known repositories
✅ Prevents SSRF completely
✅ Better security posture (deny-by-default)

Why Allowlist is Better

With regex, an attacker could still use:

• attacker-org/malicious-repo (valid format)
• Access any public GitHub repo
• Potentially exploit GitHub token permissions

With allowlist:

• Only Fused-Gaming repos allowed
• No external access possible
• Zero-trust security model

Status

• ✅ Fix deployed in v2.4.1
• ✅ Live on production
• ✅ Included in PR feat: Navigation Shell, Brute Force Protection & Enhanced Security #57
• ✅ CodeQL alert will resolve on merge

Closing this PR as the issue is already fixed with a stronger solution.

[jlucus]

Closing in favor of PR #57 which implements a more secure allowlist-based fix (v2.4.1)