fix: MCP publish arbitrary file read via spec_path (security) — v0.12.11#75
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The readSpecArg function accepted any absolute file path for spec_path without enforcing containment. An MCP client could read any file on the filesystem (e.g. /etc/passwd) by passing its absolute path as spec_path. Fix: added path containment check using isWithinPathResolved. spec_path must be within the workspace .codecarto/ directory or the configured library path. Regression tests verify both rejection and acceptance. 270/270 tests pass (268 + 2 new).
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Security fix
MCP codecarto_publish accepted any absolute file path for spec_path without enforcing containment. An MCP client could read any file on the filesystem by passing its absolute path as spec_path.
Fix
Discovery
Found during the v0.12.9 self-analysis case study security triage. The semantic defect scan (Pass 5: API Contract Violations) identified it. The security triage subagent classified it as blocking.
Validation