feat: added docs for fixing privilege escalation bug - #678
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📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughAdds a user guide for preventing namespace-to-cluster privilege escalation through Authorino ChangesPrivilege escalation prevention documentation
Estimated code review effort: 1 (Trivial) | ~5 minutes Merge Risk: 🟠 High · up to The new guide can document a policy that still permits some AuthConfig updates to enable broader cluster-wide Secret lookups, while its RBAC examples may overwrite existing grants and omit required permissions. These inaccuracies could lead to ineffective privilege-escalation protection, so the PR should not merge until they are fixed. Poem
🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 5✅ Passed checks (5 passed)
Full details: Docstring CoverageExplanation No functions found in the changed files to evaluate docstring coverage. Skipping docstring coverage check. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 0 functions across 0 files. (1 skipped: 1 unsupported.) ✨ Finishing Touches🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
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Actionable comments posted: 3
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Inline comments:
In `@docs/user-guides/preventing-privilege-escalation.md`:
- Around line 1-5: Qualify the allNamespaces privilege-escalation guidance for
cluster-scoped Authorino instances only, since it has no effect for namespaced
instances. Update the introduction in
docs/user-guides/preventing-privilege-escalation.md (lines 1-5) and apply the
same qualifier to the index description in docs/user-guides.md (lines 89-91).
- Around line 43-54: Update the documentation’s permitted and update examples to
state that the synthetic set-apikey-all-namespaces and set-x509-all-namespaces
ClusterRole bindings are additive and do not grant ordinary AuthConfig create,
update, patch, or get permissions; note that those permissions must already
exist. Replace “admitted for any subject” with “not rejected by this policy” in
the affected policy explanation and apply the same clarification to the
referenced examples.
- Around line 66-89: Update the ClusterRoleBinding and RoleBinding templates to
support multiple subjects: either define one binding with a subjects list
containing all required accounts, or make each binding name unique per subject
or Authorino instance so applying additional instances preserves existing
grants. Apply the same change to both API-key and X.509 binding examples.
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Inline comments:
In `@docs/user-guides/preventing-privilege-escalation.md`:
- Around line 93-124: Update the RoleBinding examples to document Kubernetes
User subjects as promised: add a kind: User example using the user name without
a namespace, while retaining the existing ServiceAccount example and its
namespace fields.
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guicassolato
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Not from me, but a few more nits from /kdt:verify-docs:
Signed-off-by: DaliborD45 <dalibordetko@gmail.com>
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…even for users without permission Signed-off-by: DaliborD45 <dalibordetko@gmail.com>
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Inline comments:
In `@docs/user-guides/preventing-privilege-escalation.md`:
- Around line 124-127: Update the hadApiKeyAllNamespaces and
hadX509AllNamespaces expressions to compare each new authentication entry with
the old entry having the same key, rather than matching any old entry. Preserve
the existing checks for the corresponding authentication type and enabled
allNamespaces value while enforcing same-key comparison.
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| - name: hadApiKeyAllNamespaces | ||
| expression: "oldObject != null && has(oldObject.spec.authentication) && oldObject.spec.authentication.exists(k, has(oldObject.spec.authentication[k].apiKey) && has(oldObject.spec.authentication[k].apiKey.allNamespaces) && oldObject.spec.authentication[k].apiKey.allNamespaces)" | ||
| - name: hadX509AllNamespaces | ||
| expression: "oldObject != null && has(oldObject.spec.authentication) && oldObject.spec.authentication.exists(k, has(oldObject.spec.authentication[k].x509) && has(oldObject.spec.authentication[k].x509.allNamespaces) && oldObject.spec.authentication[k].x509.allNamespaces)" |
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🔒 Security & Privacy | 🟠 Major | 🏗️ Heavy lift
🧩 Analysis chain
🏁 Script executed:
#!/bin/bash
set -eu
printf '%s\n' '--- applicable repository conventions ---'
find /tmp/coderabbit-repo-knowledge/kuadrant-authorino-98f7ae98 -maxdepth 2 -type f -name '*.md' -print | sort
printf '%s\n' '--- document under review ---'
sed -n '1,180p' docs/user-guides/preventing-privilege-escalation.md
printf '%s\n' '--- related AuthConfig field documentation ---'
find docs -type f -iname '*api*key*' -o -iname '*x509*' | sortRepository: Kuadrant/authorino
Length of output: 9860
🏁 Script executed:
#!/bin/bash
set -eu
printf '%s\n' '--- allNamespaces semantics in user documentation ---'
rg -n -C 4 'allNamespaces|authentication:' docs/user-guides/api-key-authentication.md docs/user-guides/preventing-privilege-escalation.md
printf '%s\n' '--- AuthConfig authentication map and secret lookup definitions ---'
rg -n -C 3 'type Authentication|Authentication map|allNamespaces|apiKey|x509' api pkg controllers docs -g '*.go' -g '*.md' 2>/dev/null | head -240Repository: Kuadrant/authorino
Length of output: 40240
Authorization Bypass (CWE-863): Incorrect Authorization
Reachability: External · Exploitability: Moderate
Compare each new entry with the old entry of the same key.
The current expressions allow a user with ordinary AuthConfig update access to enable allNamespaces on another entry when any old entry already has it enabled. This permits additional cluster-wide Secret lookups.
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only still-valid issues, skip the rest with a brief reason, keep changes
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In `@docs/user-guides/preventing-privilege-escalation.md` around lines 124 - 127,
Update the hadApiKeyAllNamespaces and hadX509AllNamespaces expressions to
compare each new authentication entry with the old entry having the same key,
rather than matching any old entry. Preserve the existing checks for the
corresponding authentication type and enabled allNamespaces value while
enforcing same-key comparison.
| validations: | ||
| - expression: "!variables.wantsApiKeyAllNamespaces || variables.isExemptApiKey" | ||
| message: "apiKey allNamespaces: true (cluster-wide secret lookup) can only be set by a subject granted the 'set-apikey-all-namespaces' permission on authconfigs" | ||
| - expression: "!variables.wantsApiKeyAllNamespaces || variables.hadApiKeyAllNamespaces || variables.isExemptApiKey" |
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I think this change adds back the grandfathered allNamespaces issue mentioned in this other review.
I understand the goal is to make it possible for unauthorised users to modify resources that contain a privileged value (set by an authorised user in the past). However, in practice it has implications for the revocation of privileges. A user who's once given permission to set a restricted value and then has the permission revoked can continue to modify the resource perpetuating the restricted value indefinitely until the value explicitly reset to a non-restricted one. This may confuse admins that think that, by revoking the RBAC permissions from a user, the user will be forced to reset the resources to non-privileged values when actually that is not the case.
I suppose the trade-off we're facing it:
-
VAP does not check old state – Unauthorised users cannot at all touch resources that contain any restricted values in it. It implies that, once a restricted value is set, all unauthorised users will have to reach out to authorised ones to modify that resource from that moment on, until the resource is modified back to no longer contain restricted values (if ever).
-
VAP makes exception to authorised the operation based on the old state of the resource – Users inherit privileges from others (and from previous selfs, in case of permission once granted then revoked) in order to be able to modify resources with restricted values. It implies that, once a user is granted the privilege to modify a restricted value (i.e. it's granted authorisation), the privilege cannot ever be revoked; even by deleting the binding that once granted the permission will do nothing to prevent the user from keep using the restricted value in the resource, until the value is reset back to a non restricted one (if ever).
cc @CodeRabbit
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@guicassolato, confirmed. The concern is valid.
hadApiKeyAllNamespaces and hadX509AllNamespaces test only the old resource state. They do not verify the requester’s current permission. Therefore, any subject with update access can preserve allNamespaces: true after its dedicated permission is revoked. This also permits subjects that never held the dedicated permission to update an existing privileged resource.
The policy should use strict revalidation. On every CREATE and UPDATE, if the resulting AuthConfig has either restricted field set to true, the requester must have the matching permission. This makes RBAC revocation effective immediately.
- Remove the old-state grandfathering variables from the
ValidatingAdmissionPolicyexample. - Restore validation expressions that require
isExemptApiKeyorisExemptX509whenever the resulting resource enables the matchingallNamespacesfield. - Update the surrounding guide text and verification scenario so they state that restricted resources require the permission for every update.
🐇
✏️ Learnings added
Learnt from: guicassolato
Repo: Kuadrant/authorino PR: 678
File: docs/user-guides/preventing-privilege-escalation.md:129-129
Timestamp: 2026-08-31T10:28:46.089Z
Learning: In `docs/user-guides/preventing-privilege-escalation.md`, the ValidatingAdmissionPolicy for Authorino `AuthConfig` resources must revalidate the requester's current dedicated RBAC permission on every CREATE and UPDATE that results in `spec.authentication.*.apiKey.allNamespaces: true` or `spec.authentication.*.x509.allNamespaces: true`. Do not grandfather an existing restricted value based only on `oldObject`, because that prevents effective permission revocation.
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Summary
Adds a new user guide documenting how to prevent a namespace-to-cluster privilege escalation vector in Authorino
AuthConfigresources.Two fields —
spec.authentication.*.apiKey.allNamespacesandspec.authentication.*.x509.allNamespacestrigger cluster-wideSecretlookups when set totrue. This means any subject able to create anAuthConfigin a single namespace can reach API-key / trusted-certificate secrets across every namespace in the cluster.Changes
docs/user-guides/preventing-privilege-escalation.md(new) — Step-by-step guide covering:ClusterRoles that expose custom verbs (set-apikey-all-namespaces,set-x509-all-namespaces) onauthconfigs.RoleBindings.ValidatingAdmissionPolicy+ binding that rejectsallNamespaces: trueunless the requesting subject holds the matching permission (checked viaauthorizer.requestResource.check(...)).RoleBinding-granted permissions stay namespace-scoped.Summary by CodeRabbit
AuthConfigresources.