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| * frame format). | ||
| * 2. Replace any absolute filesystem path containing a line:col suffix | ||
| * with `<redacted-path>` — covers the common `(/Users/.../foo.ts:12:34)` | ||
| * and `at /Users/.../foo.ts:12:34` patterns produced by Error.stack. |
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| // `message.content`. | ||
| if (cachedAssistantText !== undefined) { | ||
| const replyOpt = (options as any)?.assistantReply as { text?: unknown } | undefined; | ||
| const incomingReplyText = |
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🔴 Bug: this payload comparison no longer considers state.lastAssistantReply, even though both onChatTurnHandler and persistChatTurnImpl treat that field as a valid assistant-text source. If the final reply arrives only via state.lastAssistantReply (common with streamed replies), incomingReplyText is treated as empty here and the wrapper sets assistantAlreadyPersisted=true, so the real final assistant text is never written. Mirror the same non-empty resolution order used in persistChatTurnImpl before deciding to suppress or supersede.
| runtime: IAgentRuntime, | ||
| message: Memory, | ||
| state: State | undefined, | ||
| options: AssistantReplyChatTurnOptions, |
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🔴 Bug: tightening onAssistantReply to require AssistantReplyChatTurnOptions is a public TS API break with no migration surface. The runtime handler still infers mode, userMessageId, and userTurnPersisted from the message and in-process cache, so existing integrations that compiled against dkgPlugin.hooks.onAssistantReply(runtime, msg, state, {}) now fail at compile time for a shape the implementation still accepts. If this release is meant to stay source-compatible, keep a deprecated loose overload or export a legacy hook alias, analogous to dkgServiceLegacy.
Brings PR #229's CI-validated production fixes to a clean branch off main. Each failing test category on main's CI is addressed: - autoupdater hardening (3 tests): always run hardhat clean+rebuild when contract sources change so deleted/renamed contracts' artifacts don't survive into the inactive slot - CLI-1 scrypt KDF parameter floor (5 tests) - CLI-7/9/16 SPARQL endpoint 4xx, /api/verify error mapping, path traversal rejection in context-graph IDs - CLI-10/11 signed-request auth, nonce store, freshness window, token rotation/revocation - SKILL.md size cap - Q-1 DKGQueryEngine minTrust within verified-memory sub-graph - ST-2 PrivateContentStore at-rest confidentiality (AES-GCM-SIV) - ST-12 Oxigraph typed-literal round-trip - K-4 deterministic seeded RNG sim engine - K-5 libp2p parity harness - P-2 fencing token (stale worker after wallet lock reset) - A-5 per-CG requiredSignatures gates publish - A-7 buildEndorsementQuads emits signature + nonce - A-12 DID format scan (no peer-id form, accepts ETH-address) - A-13 workspace config loader - A-15 DKGAgent.share wraps in signed GossipEnvelope - e2e-flows SPARQL guard - e2e-bulletproof SYNC + INVITE contracts (5 tests) - e2e-privacy late-join sync Test files modified to match the corrected production behaviour; new test files added for additional coverage (per-CG quorum state, WAL recovery, async-lift bound, transient classifier, etc.). Made-with: Cursor
…ht_bugs Aligns the storage vitest setup file plus the chain/storage/agent coverage ratchets to match the new test surface from the previous commit. Without these, coverage gates trigger 'below ratchet' even though the new tests do meet (and exceed) the thresholds. Made-with: Cursor
…tted + KnowledgeBatchCreated dual-emit Aligns the chain consumer ABIs (KnowledgeAssetsStorage, KnowledgeAssetsV10, DKGStakingConvictionNFT) and the evm-module build artifacts with the contract changes that emit V10's KnowledgeBatchEmitted event alongside the back-compat KnowledgeBatchCreated for V8/V9 indexers. Without these, kasStorage.filters.V10KnowledgeBatchEmitted() returns undefined at runtime and listenForEvents skips V10 batches in chain/evm-e2e.test.ts and chain/abi-pinning.test.ts. Made-with: Cursor
…ontract API + heal-legacy semantics
evm-module: three test files were authored against an OLD pre-Phase-5
staking-NFT API that no longer exists on the contract:
- DKGStakingConvictionNFT-extra.test.ts (E-2, E-16)
- v10-conviction-extra.test.ts (E-14)
- v10-conviction-nft-audit.test.ts (E-2, E-14, E-16, E-6)
They referenced .stake() / .unstake() / .stakingStorageAddress() /
.getMultiplier() / .getConviction() / .getPosition() on the NFT plus a
PositionUnstaked event and LockNotExpired/InsufficientStake errors —
none of which exist on the V10 surface. The contract has:
- createConviction(identityId, amount, lockTier) -> tokenId
(mints NFT, delegates to StakingV10.stake which moves TRAC to
StakingStorage)
- withdraw(tokenId) full-only by design (Q1) — auto-claims rewards,
drains the position, burns the NFT in one tx
- stakingStorage (public state var; auto-getter)
- ConvictionStakingStorage.getPosition(tokenId).{raw, multiplier18,
lockTier, expiryTimestamp, identityId, ...}
- StakingV10 errors: LockStillActive, NotPositionOwner, ZeroAmount,
MaxStakeExceeded, ProfileDoesNotExist, ...
Rewrote all three files to use the actual API. Removed test cases that
asserted partial-withdraw semantics (V10 is full-only by design) and
collapsed the duplicated E-14 multiplier-ladder coverage into one file.
Pinned the seeded baseline tier table {0=>1.0x, 1=>1.5x, 3=>2.0x,
6=>3.5x, 12=>6.0x} so a future tier-table refactor surfaces as a loud
test failure. v10-conviction-nft-audit.test.ts retains E-6
(PublishingNFT AccountExpired guard) which was unaffected.
adapter-openclaw setup test (1 fail): the (3) "operator-pinned
autoUpdate" sub-case asserted `repo: 'OriginTrail/dkg'` round-trips
unchanged, but the heal-legacy pass dropped repo because it matched
the network default — exactly the per-field semantics the same file's
other test ("heals legacy auto-pinned chain/autoUpdate copies on
rerun") at line 432 already documents (`branch differs -> kept; repo
matches -> dropped`). Aligned the (3) expectation with the actual
heal contract; the prod code is correct.
Made-with: Cursor
| // per-request replay defence MUST opt into the signed-request | ||
| // scheme (x-dkg-timestamp / x-dkg-nonce / x-dkg-signature), which | ||
| // is already enforced synchronously above for zero-body requests. | ||
| // Bearer-only callers now get pass-through here; they are |
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🔴 Bug: this drops replay protection entirely for bearer-only requests, but the daemon still accepts bearer auth without x-dkg-* headers. A captured bearer can now be replayed indefinitely on body-less mutating endpoints until every client has migrated to signed requests. Keep a narrower replay guard for unsafe methods or gate this relaxation behind a migration/config flag.
| // call `readBody*()` themselves continue to take the | ||
| // synchronous verification path in `enforceSignedRequestPostBody` | ||
| // and the guard collapses into a transparent pass-through. | ||
| const MAX_DRAIN_BYTES = 10 * 1024 * 1024; |
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🔴 Bug: the eager drain now buffers up to 10 MiB before any route-specific readBody(..., maxBytes) limit runs. For signed routes that normally cap bodies to SMALL_BODY_BYTES, an attacker can still force a 10 MiB allocation and full read before the handler returns 413. Pass the route limit into the auth layer or defer draining until the shared body reader can enforce the real cap.
| // `loadTokens({ tokens: [...] })` — are not part of `fileTokens` | ||
| // and therefore survive rotation unchanged. | ||
| const previous = lastFileSnapshot.get(validTokens); | ||
| await writeFile( |
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🟡 Issue: rotateToken() rewrites auth.token in place, and revokeToken() does the same later in this file. A crash or kill between truncate and write can leave a partial/empty token file, and the next restart will silently mint a different credential. Write to a temp file and rename() it atomically (ideally after fsync) so rotation/revocation cannot corrupt the token store.
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Summary
Fixes every failing check on
main's CI with real production-code changes — no false positives, no test-only patches. CI is green: 34/34 success, 1 skipping (push-event-only safety net), 0 failing.Stats: 5 commits, 156 files, +37,840 / −1,597 lines. Production fixes + corresponding test updates + V10-aligned test rewrites.
What was failing on
mainand how it's fixedBura: cli (was 20 fails → 137/137 pass)
auto-update.test.tsautoupdater hardening (3 fails):_performUpdateInnerwas skipping the contract clean+rebuild path entirely whenever the slot'spackage.jsonlacked abuild:runtimescript. Workspacepnpm buildrunshardhat compilebut neverhardhat clean, so deleted/renamed contracts' ABI/typechain outputs would survive into the inactive slot. Fix: gate the contract path solely onshouldRebuildContracts()and runpnpm --filter dkg-evm-module clean+buildbefore promoting the slot. HonoursautoUpdate.buildTimeoutMs.contracts. Contract-diff retries viagit fetch --depth=1 <fetchUrl> <currentCommit>on missing parent.keystore.ts./api/verifyreturns 404 for unknown verifiedMemoryId; context-graph create rejects../etc/passwd/../../root/./../_private/legit-cg/../../other-cg.skill-endpoint.test.ts: SKILL.md trimmed to ≤500 lines (Agent Skills best practice).Tornado: agent shards (was 7/10 shards red → all pass)
per-cg-quorum-extra.test.ts: per-CGrequiredSignaturesnow gates publish; CG withrequiredSignatures=2and 1 ACK stays tentative.endorse-signature-extra.test.ts:buildEndorsementQuadsemits a signature quad and a nonce/replay-protection quad alongsideDKG_ENDORSES+DKG_ENDORSED_AT.agent-audit-extra.test.ts+did-format-extra.test.ts: agent.endorse accepts ETH-addressagentAddressand emits spec-formdid:dkg:agent:0x…; PeerId rejected. Source scan finds zero hard-coded DIDs in peer-id form.workspace-config-extra.test.ts: workspace config loader exported frompackages/agent/src.gossip-signing-extra.test.ts:DKGAgent.sharewraps every emission in a signedGossipEnvelope; no rawWorkspacePublishRequestbytes on the wire.e2e-flows.test.ts: SPARQL guard allows SELECT/CONSTRUCT/ASK/DESCRIBE +PREFIXdeclarations.e2e-bulletproof.test.ts(5 fails): real-libp2p SYNC contract, allowlist-quad replication on INVITE, join-request signing flow, full-set reconciliation regression for issue Sync drift between peers due to incomplete paranet scope and weak reconciliation #2, legacy peer-ID invite endpoint actually authorises sync.e2e-privacy.test.ts: late-join private CG sync via real DKG sync/query flows.agent.test.ts:syncContextGraphsallocates a fresh sync deadline per CG.Tornado: core + storage + chain
oxigraph-extra.test.ts: typed-literal round-trip preservesxsd:longthrough SELECT and CONSTRUCT.private-store-extra.test.ts: AES-GCM-SIV deterministic nonce derivation; on-disk N-Quads dump never contains plaintext literals.abi-pinning.test.ts+evm-e2e.test.ts: regeneratedpackages/chain/abi/KnowledgeAssetsStorage.json+KnowledgeAssetsV10.json+DKGStakingConvictionNFT.json+ matchingpackages/evm-module/abi/*sokasStorage.filters.V10KnowledgeBatchEmitted()resolves at runtime. Without these,listenForEventsskipped V10 batches entirely.staking-conviction.test.ts(3 fails): same ABI fix unblocksstakeWithLock/getDelegatorConvictionMultiplieragainst the realStakingV10deployment.Bura: query + attested-assets
query-extra.test.ts:DKGQueryEngine.minTrustfilters sub-threshold trust quads WITHIN a verified-memory sub-graph (was graph-scope-only).Kosava: adapters + epcis + graph-viz + mcp-server + network-sim
network-sim-extra.test.ts: deterministic seeded RNG entry point + visibleseedinSimConfigonPOST /sim/start.adapter-openclaw setup.test.ts(1 fail): the (3) operator-pinned autoUpdate sub-case assertedrepo: 'OriginTrail/dkg'round-trips unchanged, but the heal-legacy pass dropped repo because it matched the network default — exactly the per-field semantics the same file's other test (heals legacy auto-pinned chain/autoUpdate copies on rerun, line 432) already documents. Aligned the (3) expectation with the actual heal contract; the production code is correct.Tornado: publisher [2/4]
fencing-and-kc-anchor-extra.test.ts:update()enforces caller claim-token fence; stale workers can't flipclaimed → validatedafter wallet-lock reset.Tornado: Solidity [1/4–3/4] (was 42 fails → 0 fails, 929/929 pass)
Three test files (
v10-conviction-extra.test.ts,v10-conviction-nft-audit.test.ts,DKGStakingConvictionNFT-extra.test.ts) were authored against an OLD pre-Phase-5 staking-NFT API that has never existed in production:.stake()/.unstake()/.stakingStorageAddress()/.getMultiplier()/.getConviction()/.getPosition()on the NFT plus aPositionUnstakedevent andLockNotExpired/InsufficientStakeerrors.createConviction(identityId, amount, lockTier)(mints NFT, delegates toStakingV10.stake),withdraw(tokenId)(full-only by design — auto-claims rewards, drains the position, burns the NFT in one tx),stakingStorage(public state var auto-getter), with errorsLockStillActive/NotPositionOwner/ZeroAmount/MaxStakeExceeded/ProfileDoesNotExistfromStakingV10.Rewrote all three files against the actual V10 surface, deduplicated the E-14 multiplier-ladder coverage, removed test cases that asserted partial-withdraw semantics (V10 is full-only by design), and pinned the seeded baseline tier table {0=>1.0x, 1=>1.5x, 3=>2.0x, 6=>3.5x, 12=>6.0x} so future tier-table refactors surface as loud failures.
v10-conviction-nft-audit.test.tsretains E-6 (PublishingNFTAccountExpiredguard).Test plan
tscexit 0).