XAIOS is an experimental operating system. Its security behavior is exercised under QEMU, but it is not ready for untrusted production deployment or physical hardware use.

Production vulnerability reporting is not active because there is no production release. Report security design concerns through repository issues or pull requests without including live secrets or exploit data that would expose a third party.

Never commit credentials, GitHub tokens, API keys, private keys, SSH keys, passwords, or benchmark data that contains secrets.

If a secret is exposed, revoke and rotate it immediately before continuing development.

Current source and QEMU gates verify:

• every syscall is mapped to a required process capability;
• syscall request structures and nested user pointers are range/permission checked before dereference;
• filesystem descriptors and network sockets are process-owned;
• sockets are reclaimed when a process address space is reclaimed;
• log, filesystem-write, positional-write and network-send payloads are copied into bounded kernel-owned snapshots before policy checks or subsystem use;
• filesystem calls reject high-bit values before narrowing descriptors to 32 bits, and per-call filesystem/network transfer sizes are bounded;
• credential-like material is rejected from protected logs and writes;
• filesystem, workspace, sandbox, administrative-role, replay, rollback and development update-signature policies have focused self-tests.

The primary implementation surfaces are kernel/user/syscall.c, kernel/runtime/security.c, kernel/runtime/admin_control.c, kernel/runtime/update.c, kernel/runtime/sandbox.c, and userspace/sshd/.

• QEMU validation is not a production security certification.
• The x86_64 image does not yet integrate the full process-owned security, SSH/control, filesystem, networking, AI Cell and telemetry service stack.
• Development update keys and QEMU fixtures are not production trust roots.
• Physical DMA isolation, firmware trust, side-channel resistance and hardware fault behavior require separate physical-platform validation.

Security-sensitive changes must run at least make compile-check, make qemu-security-gate, and make qemu-smoke. Update, storage, SSH or network changes also require their focused gates.