fix(security): detect Windows drive letters and reserved device names in isArchiveEntryNameSafe

[ZhuchkaTriplesix]

Summary

In isArchiveEntryNameSafe (lib/core/security/archive_path_guard.dart, lines 13–18):

bool isArchiveEntryNameSafe(String entryName) {
  if (entryName.contains('..')) return false;
  if (entryName.startsWith('/') || entryName.startsWith('\\')) return false;
  return true;
}

This check is used across archive extractors in local_extension_installer.dart, http_marketplace_repository.dart, and update_install_utils.dart to prevent Zip Slip / path traversal attacks.

However, the validation only checks for leading / and \:

1. Windows Drive Letters: Paths with drive letters such as C:\Windows\System32\payload.dll or D:file.exe do not start with a slash and do not contain ... When passed to p.join(root, entryName) on Windows, absolute drive paths override the destination directory root.
2. Windows Reserved Device Names: Entries named CON, PRN, AUX, NUL, COM1-9, or LPT1-9 (and variants with extensions like CON.txt) cause file lockups or system I/O errors on Windows.
3. Null Bytes: Entry names containing embedded null bytes (\0) can lead to filesystem truncation vulnerabilities on POSIX and Windows.

Repro

1. Create a zip archive containing an entry named C:\test.txt or CON.
2. Run isArchiveEntryNameSafe(entry.name).
3. Observe it returns true.

Scope

• Reject entry names containing Windows drive letters (^[a-zA-Z]:).
• Reject Windows reserved device names (CON, PRN, AUX, NUL, COM1-9, LPT1-9).
• Reject entry names containing null bytes or control characters.
• Add unit tests verifying malicious Windows archive entry paths are safely blocked.

Out of scope

• Archive password decryption.

[ZhuchkaTriplesix]

Resolved by #950 (already merged into dev; not auto-closed since this repo's default branch is main and PRs merge into dev).