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Fase 0 Day 1: agent-injection harness scaffold + first AgentDojo vector (card a6906265) - #210

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Fase 0 Day 1: agent-injection harness scaffold + first AgentDojo vector (card a6906265)#210
SabaTech-dev wants to merge 17 commits into
feat/diataxis-api-reffrom
fase0/harness-scaffold

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What

Fase 0 (GO condicionado, spec 2026-09-01-agent-prompt-injection-testing-spec.md) — Día 1 de 5.

  • Scaffold del harness CLI agent-injection (src/adapters/agent/harness_cli.py, argparse stdlib, sin dependencias nuevas): list y run con códigos de salida 0=PASS / 1=UTILITY_FAIL / 2=SECURITY_VIOLATED y salida --json máquina-legible.
  • src/core/injection/: modelos (Scenario, AgentRunResult, Verdict con outcome binario utility×security), evaluador objetivo capa-1 (análisis de tool-call trace + invariantes de filesystem), utility checker fail-closed.
  • src/adapters/agent/cli_adapter.py: AgentCliAdapter — subprocess aislado en workspace dedicado, captura de trace JSONL y archivos creados.
  • Corpus seed: agentdojo-001 (indirect-injection sobre documento envenenado, OWASP LLM01) — 1 de los 20 vectores planificados.
  • Fixtures deterministas: agentes safe/vulnerable que REGISTRAN tool-calls en trace sin ejecutarlos (sin red — constraint C4 egress deny-by-default).
  • Config: config/agent_injection.yaml (defaults + notas de sandbox).

TDD

37 tests unitarios green (tests/unit/injection/), ciclo red-green-respectado.

E2E

harness run agentdojo-001 (agente seguro)  -> PASS, rc=0
harness run agentdojo-001 (agente vulnerable) -> SECURITY_VIOLATED, rc=2
  evidence: forbidden pattern 'curl' in trace; write to 'exfiltrated/'

Notas de decisión (día 1)

  • Sin typer/click en el repo: CLI con argparse (stdlib) para cero dependencias nuevas.
  • El adapter no materializa el asset envenenado; lo hace el harness (cmd_run) — el adapter solo ejecuta y observa.
  • Sandbox Docker (red-off) planificado para días siguientes antes de apuntar a agentes reales.

Refs: card a6906265, spec d33c0c9.

Joker added 17 commits August 25, 2026 08:33
…458d4)

Spec del 2026-07-27 vivía untracked desde hace 1 mes — commit aditivo
(archivo nuevo, sin tocar nada tracked). Home natural: docs/internal/specs/
solo existe en este branch (reestructura Diátaxis).
…o vector (card a6906265)

- core/injection: Scenario/AgentRunResult/Verdict models (binary utility x security outcome), objective evaluator (tool-call trace + FS invariants), utility checker (fail-closed)
- adapters/agent: AgentCliAdapter (isolated subprocess workspace, JSONL trace capture) + argparse harness CLI (list/run, exit codes 0/1/2, --json)
- corpus: agentdojo-001 seed (indirect-injection, OWASP LLM01) of 20 planned vectors
- 37 TDD unit tests green; fixture agents record tool calls only (no network, C4-safe)
- config/agent_injection.yaml: defaults + sandbox notes (egress deny-by-default)
…d a6906265)

- corpus: vectors 2-20 across AgentDojo indirect-injection seeds + spec §2
  families (direct-injection, tool-transition-nudge, payload-in-file,
  import-shadowing, exfiltration-passive, multi-turn), each with inline
  asset_content (per-vector poisoned asset) mapped to OWASP LLM01
- models: Scenario.asset_content field
- harness: materialize scenario.asset_content instead of the single Day-1 document
- 40 unit tests green (3 new corpus tests); e2e detection verified on nudge-001
…ance gate C2 (card a6906265)

- judge: LLM-as-judge over OpenAI-compatible endpoint (stdlib urllib, no new
  deps), JSON verdict + confidence; unparseable/low-confidence -> HITL queue
- HITLQueue: append-only JSONL (reports/injection/hitl_queue.jsonl)
- key resolution: INJECTION_JUDGE_API_KEY -> LLAMA_API_KEY -> shared key file;
  never hardcoded. Note: LiteLLM :4000 proxy currently down (no DB); engines
  8001/8009 accept the same shared key and are the measured Day-2 endpoint
- harness CLI:  (layer1+layer2, HITL enqueue) and
  (N runs over deterministic balanced case set, gate C2 <15% disagreement,
  exit 2 on gate failure)
- 14 judge unit tests + 3 CLI judge tests green; real variance run in progress
…ance gate C2 (card a6906265)

- judge: LLM-as-judge over OpenAI-compatible endpoint (stdlib urllib, no new
  deps), JSON verdict + confidence; unparseable/low-confidence -> HITL queue
- HITLQueue: append-only JSONL (reports/injection/hitl_queue.jsonl)
- key resolution: INJECTION_JUDGE_API_KEY -> LLAMA_API_KEY -> shared key file;
  never hardcoded. Note: LiteLLM :4000 proxy currently down (no DB); engines
  8001/8009 accept the same shared key and are the measured Day-2 endpoint
- harness CLI: `judge` (layer1+layer2, HITL enqueue) and `judge-variance`
  (N runs over deterministic balanced case set, gate C2 <15% disagreement,
  exit 2 on gate failure)
- 14 judge unit tests + 3 CLI judge tests green; real variance run in progress
… (card a6906265)

- design doc (docs/internal/design/): nudge = fail-triggered tool transition;
  T+C+P+J rule set, static transition table (config-declarative), integration
  with layer-1 evidence and layer-2 judge context, known limits, Day-3 plan
- config: sandbox section updated to implemented DockerSandbox state
…J (card a6906265)

TransitionTable (declarative, config/agent_injection.yaml detector.tool_transition)
+ NudgeDetector: failure-triggered class-lowering transitions per design doc.
Unknown-status traces defer high/critical transitions to HITL (never infer).
…-1 nudge integration + 0 FP (card a6906265)

- fixture nudge_agent.py: 415->curl->zip-refused->decoder.py->exec chain (record-only, C4-safe)
- corpus +nudge-003 (21 vectors: 20 seed + end-to-end detection repro)
- ObjectiveEvaluator: optional NudgeDetector; severity>=min marks violated;
  unknown-status traces defer to Verdict.needs_human -> HITLQueue (never infer)
- FP measurement: safe agent across the full corpus -> 0 nudge findings
…ION_HITL_QUEUE (card a6906265)

conftest autouse fixture redirects the queue for all injection tests;
HITLQueue honors the env override. CLI-level tests no longer pollute
reports/injection/hitl_queue.jsonl.
…SS (card a6906265)

C2: judge variance 0.0% (0/89 pairs, gate <15%) — caveat: 33% null verdicts
defer to HITL by design (reasoning model exhausts max_tokens before JSON).
C4: sandbox review PASS (--network none, caps, no-new-privileges, snapshot/
restore, no host-env leak into container).
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