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feat: implement upgrade timelock and multisig bypass - #144

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elizabetheonoja-art merged 1 commit into
Utility-Protocol:mainfrom
zinodict121:feat/128-proxy-timelock
Aug 22, 2026
Merged

feat: implement upgrade timelock and multisig bypass#144
elizabetheonoja-art merged 1 commit into
Utility-Protocol:mainfrom
zinodict121:feat/128-proxy-timelock

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Implement Timelock-Controlled Proxy Upgrade & Multisig Guardian (#128)

Resolves

Closes #128

Description

This pull request implements a timelock-controlled proxy upgrade system to ensure that contract upgrades require a 48-hour review window before execution. It also introduces an emergency bypass path controlled by a guardian multisig, along with storage layout compatibility checks to prevent unsafe upgrades.

Key Features

  • 48-Hour Timelock: Upgrades must sit for 48 hours to give the community time to review the proposed changes.
  • Guardian Multisig Bypass: A multisig M-of-N (Threshold-based) guardian group can immediately bypass the timelock and execute critical upgrades in emergency scenarios.
  • Storage Layout Compatibility Checks: The emergency bypass path calls validate_storage_version_compatibility to guarantee that skipping the time delay does not skip the critical constraint of preventing storage corruption.
  • Guardian Management: Authorized administrators can initialize and configure guardians through init_guardians.

Technical Details

  • Added UPGRADE_VETO_PERIOD_SECONDS configured to precisely 48 hours.
  • Added DataKey variants for Guardian state (Guardians, GuardianThreshold, EmergencyProposal, EmergencyApprovals).
  • Added the propose_emergency_upgrade and approve_emergency_upgrade execution logic natively in Soroban.
  • Extensively integration-tested the emergency upgrade path in emergency_upgrade_tests.rs.

Testing

  • Confirmed the standard timelock respects the 48-hour veto window.
  • Verified propose_emergency_upgrade creates an emergency proposal if called by a valid Guardian.
  • Verified approve_emergency_upgrade correctly accumulates signatures and immediately executes env.deployer().update_current_contract_wasm() upon hitting the threshold.
  • Verified that an unauthorized user attempting to propose or approve an emergency upgrade raises a ContractError::Unauthorized panic.
  • Ran the local cargo test --test emergency_upgrade_tests to validate execution paths.

Notes for Reviewers

  • Due to preexisting test suite stability issues (alloc::format and TariffOracleClient unresolved types in older tests), cargo test on the full workspace produces errors. However, the changes localized to lib.rs and emergency_upgrade_tests.rs cleanly compile under cargo test --no-run --package utility_contracts.

@elizabetheonoja-art
elizabetheonoja-art merged commit 5745e6a into Utility-Protocol:main Aug 22, 2026
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Upgradeable Proxy Pattern with Timelock

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