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fix: the dma proxy driver passes user-supplied physi... in dmaproxy.c#7

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orbisai0security:fix-dmaproxy-offset-bounds-check
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fix: the dma proxy driver passes user-supplied physi... in dmaproxy.c#7
orbisai0security wants to merge 1 commit into
Xilinx:masterfrom
orbisai0security:fix-dmaproxy-offset-bounds-check

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Summary

Fix critical severity security issue in microblaze/dmaproxy/dmaproxy.c.

Vulnerability

Field Value
ID V-010
Severity CRITICAL
Scanner multi_agent_ai
Rule V-010
File microblaze/dmaproxy/dmaproxy.c:258

Description: The DMA proxy driver passes user-supplied physical memory addresses (um->addr[0] and um->addr[1]) directly to the DMA engine without any validation. A local attacker with access to the dmaproxy device node can supply arbitrary physical addresses, directing the DMA hardware to read from or write to any location in physical memory — including kernel code, credential structures, and hardware registers. This attack bypasses all software-based memory protections including SMEP, SMAP, and KASLR because the DMA engine operates at the hardware level, outside the CPU's memory protection mechanisms.

Changes

  • microblaze/dmaproxy/dmaproxy.c

Verification

  • Build passes
  • Scanner re-scan confirms fix
  • LLM code review passed

Automated security fix by OrbisAI Security

Automated security fix generated by Orbis Security AI
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