Pensar - auto fix for Arbitrary Code Execution via Unsafe NumPy File Loading

[pensarappdev]

Security issue fixed:

• In the Profile class's create_social_profile_sns method, the line that loaded local embeddings from a user-controlled file path used np.load(embedding_path) without specifying allow_pickle=False. This allowed possible arbitrary code execution if an attacker provided a malicious .npy file which used pickle-based deserialization (the default is allow_pickle=True, which is dangerous for untrusted files).
• Fix applied: Changed embeddings = np.load(embedding_path) to embeddings = np.load(embedding_path, allow_pickle=False) to ensure only standard NumPy array data is loaded, disabling pickle deserialization and preventing unsafe code execution.
• No other code or dependency changes were necessary or allowed according to the provided issue and scope.

More Details

Type	Identifier	Message	Severity	Link
Application	CWE-502	embedding_path can be influenced by the caller. np.load() implicitly allows pickled object dtypes in several NumPy versions (or when the runtime’s default remains allow_pickle=True). A malicious .npy/.npz crafted with pickle payloads would be deserialized as soon as this line executes, leading to arbitrary code execution inside the Python process. No integrity check, signature validation, or allow_pickle=False safeguard is present, making this an instance of Insecure Deserialization (CWE-502) and a potential model-supply-chain attack vector.	high	Link