Pensar - auto fix for Unsanitized User Input in Log Message Interpolation#27
Open
pensarappstaging[bot] wants to merge 1 commit into
Open
Pensar - auto fix for Unsanitized User Input in Log Message Interpolation#27pensarappstaging[bot] wants to merge 1 commit into
pensarappstaging[bot] wants to merge 1 commit into
Conversation
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
Sign up for free
to join this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in to comment
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
Security issue fixed: Log injection vulnerability
In the
user_lookup_snsmethod, user-supplied input (user) was interpolated directly into the log message:logger.info(f"Pulling {user}'s tweets")
This could allow attackers to inject control characters or manipulate log contents.
How it was fixed:
_sanitize_for_logto theUtilsclass, which:\n,\rshown as\\n,\\rin logs)?logger.info(f"Pulling {self._sanitize_for_log(user)}'s tweets")Result:
Log entries will not contain injected line breaks or control sequences, thus preserving log integrity if
useris attacker-controlled. Only the log output is sanitized; functionality using the unsanitizeduservariable elsewhere remains unchanged.More Details
userparameter is interpolated directly into a log message without any neutralization or sanitization. If an attacker can control theuservalue, they could inject control characters (e.g.,\n,\r, ANSI escapes) or crafted text that forges log entries, obscures real logs, or triggers downstream log-parsing vulnerabilities. This is a classic log-injection flaw (CWE-117: Improper Output Neutralization for Logs).