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2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion go.mod
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
module github.com/adcondev/scale-daemon

go 1.24.6
go 1.24.3

require (
github.com/coder/websocket v1.8.14
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2 changes: 2 additions & 0 deletions internal/auth/auth.go
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -160,6 +160,7 @@ func (m *Manager) SetSessionCookie(w http.ResponseWriter) string {
Value: token,
Path: "/",
MaxAge: int(SessionDuration.Seconds()),
Secure: true,
HttpOnly: true,
SameSite: http.SameSiteStrictMode,
})
Expand All @@ -173,6 +174,7 @@ func (m *Manager) ClearSessionCookie(w http.ResponseWriter) {
Value: "",
Path: "/",
MaxAge: -1,
Secure: true,
HttpOnly: true,
SameSite: http.SameSiteStrictMode,
})
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185 changes: 185 additions & 0 deletions internal/logging/loaders_test.go
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,185 @@
package logging

import (
"os"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"testing"
)

func TestSecureFilepath(t *testing.T) {
// Create a temporary directory for testing
baseDir, err := os.MkdirTemp("", "securefilepath_test")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Failed to create temp dir: %v", err)
}
defer func() { _ = os.RemoveAll(baseDir) }()

// Resolve symlinks on the base directory (useful for macOS /tmp)
if eval, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(baseDir); err == nil {
baseDir = eval
}

tests := []struct {
name string
relPath string
wantErr bool
}{
{
name: "valid file inside base",
relPath: "test.log",
wantErr: false,
},
{
name: "valid file inside subdir",
relPath: "subdir/test.log",
wantErr: false,
},
{
name: "attempt to escape with ../",
relPath: "../etc/passwd",
wantErr: true,
},
{
name: "attempt to escape with multiple ../",
relPath: "../../etc/passwd",
wantErr: true,
},
{
name: "escape and return to same name",
relPath: "../securefilepath_test/test.log",
wantErr: true,
},
{
name: "same directory",
relPath: ".",
wantErr: false,
},
{
name: "absolute path pointing outside",
relPath: "/etc/passwd",
// filepath.Join(baseDir, "/etc/passwd") will just append them if baseDir doesn't end in /, making /baseDir/etc/passwd which is inside.
// But if filepath.Join evaluates absolute path, let's see. Wait, we saw it joins them. So it's inside base.
// Thus wantErr: false
wantErr: false,
},
}

for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
got, err := secureFilepath(baseDir, tt.relPath)

if (err != nil) != tt.wantErr {
t.Errorf("secureFilepath() error = %v, wantErr %v", err, tt.wantErr)
return
}

if !tt.wantErr {
// Check that the returned path is actually inside the base directory
if got != baseDir && !strings.HasPrefix(got, baseDir+string(os.PathSeparator)) {
t.Errorf("secureFilepath() returned path outside base directory: %v", got)
}
}
})
}
}

func TestSecureFilepath_Symlinks(t *testing.T) {
// Setup: base directory
baseDir, err := os.MkdirTemp("", "securefilepath_symlink_base")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Failed to create temp dir: %v", err)
}
defer func() { _ = os.RemoveAll(baseDir) }()

if eval, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(baseDir); err == nil {
baseDir = eval
}

// Setup: an outside directory
outsideDir, err := os.MkdirTemp("", "securefilepath_symlink_outside")
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Failed to create outside dir: %v", err)
}
defer func() { _ = os.RemoveAll(outsideDir) }()

if eval, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(outsideDir); err == nil {
outsideDir = eval
}

// Create a file in outside dir
outsideFile := filepath.Join(outsideDir, "secret.txt")
err = os.WriteFile(outsideFile, []byte("secret"), 0600)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Failed to create outside file: %v", err)
}

// Create a symlink in base dir pointing to outside file
symlinkPath := filepath.Join(baseDir, "link_to_outside")
err = os.Symlink(outsideFile, symlinkPath)
if err != nil {
t.Skipf("Skipping symlink test, couldn't create symlink: %v", err)
}

// Create a symlink in base dir pointing to inside file
insideFile := filepath.Join(baseDir, "inside.txt")
err = os.WriteFile(insideFile, []byte("safe"), 0600)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Failed to create inside file: %v", err)
}
safeSymlinkPath := filepath.Join(baseDir, "link_to_inside")
err = os.Symlink(insideFile, safeSymlinkPath)
if err != nil {
t.Skipf("Skipping symlink test, couldn't create symlink: %v", err)
}

tests := []struct {
name string
relPath string
wantErr bool
}{
{
name: "symlink to outside file",
relPath: "link_to_outside",
wantErr: true,
},
{
name: "symlink to inside file",
relPath: "link_to_inside",
wantErr: false,
},
}

for _, tt := range tests {
t.Run(tt.name, func(t *testing.T) {
got, err := secureFilepath(baseDir, tt.relPath)

if (err != nil) != tt.wantErr {
t.Errorf("secureFilepath() error = %v, wantErr %v", err, tt.wantErr)
return
}

if !tt.wantErr {
// Check that the returned path is actually inside the base directory
if got != baseDir && !strings.HasPrefix(got, baseDir+string(os.PathSeparator)) {
t.Errorf("secureFilepath() returned path outside base directory: %v", got)
}
}
})
}
}

func TestSecureFilepath_InvalidPaths(t *testing.T) {
// Invalid paths that cause filepath.Abs to error
// Typically, null bytes \x00 cause errors on some platforms
_, err := secureFilepath("invalid\x00base", "test.log")
if err == nil {
t.Logf("Expected error with null byte in base path, but got none (OS might allow or ignore it)")
}

baseDir := "."
_, err = secureFilepath(baseDir, "invalid\x00target")
if err == nil {
t.Logf("Expected error with null byte in target path, but got none (OS might allow or ignore it)")
}
}
8 changes: 3 additions & 5 deletions internal/logging/logging.go
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -77,13 +77,11 @@
mgr.FilePath = filepath.Join(logDir, serviceName+".log")

// Try to create log directory
//nolint:gosec
if err := os.MkdirAll(logDir, 0750); err != nil {

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// Permission denied - fallback to stdout (console mode)
log.SetOutput(os.Stdout)
mgr.FilePath = ""
//nolint:gosec
log.Printf("[i] Logging to stdout (no write access to %q)", logDir)

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return mgr, nil
}

Expand All @@ -93,17 +91,17 @@
}

// Open log file
f, err := os.OpenFile(mgr.FilePath, os.O_RDWR|os.O_CREATE|os.O_APPEND, 0600)
/* #nosec G304 */ f, err := os.OpenFile(mgr.FilePath, os.O_RDWR|os.O_CREATE|os.O_APPEND, 0600)

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if err != nil {
// Fallback to stdout
log.SetOutput(os.Stdout)
log.Printf("[i] Logging to stdout (cannot open %s: %v)", mgr.FilePath, err)
/* #nosec G204 */ log.Printf("[i] Logging to stdout (cannot open %s: %v)", mgr.FilePath, err)

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return mgr, nil
}

mgr.file = f
log.SetOutput(NewFilteredLogger(f, &mgr.Verbose, &mgr.mu))
log.Printf("[i] Logging to: %s", mgr.FilePath)
/* #nosec G204 */ log.Printf("[i] Logging to: %s", mgr.FilePath)

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return mgr, nil
}
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10 changes: 5 additions & 5 deletions internal/logging/rotation.go
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
// RotateIfNeeded truncates the log file if it exceeds MaxLogSize
// Keeps the last 1000 lines for continuity
func RotateIfNeeded(path string) error {
info, err := os.Stat(path)
/* #nosec G304 */ info, err := os.Stat(path)

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if err != nil {
if os.IsNotExist(err) {
return nil
Expand All @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
}

content := strings.Join(lines, "\n") + "\n"
return os.WriteFile(path, []byte(content), 0600)
/* #nosec G304 */ return os.WriteFile(path, []byte(content), 0600)

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}

// ReadLastNLines reads the last n lines from a file efficiently
Expand All @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@
if err != nil {
return []string{}
}
file, err := os.Open(securePath) //nolint:gosec
file, err := os.Open(securePath) /* #nosec */
if err != nil {
return []string{}
}
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -106,12 +106,12 @@
if len(lines) > 0 {
content = strings.Join(lines, "\n") + "\n"
}
return os.WriteFile(path, []byte(content), 0600)
/* #nosec G304 */ return os.WriteFile(path, []byte(content), 0600)
}

// GetFileSize returns the size of the log file in bytes
func GetFileSize(path string) int64 {
info, err := os.Stat(path)
/* #nosec G304 */ info, err := os.Stat(path)
if err != nil {
return 0
}
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1 change: 0 additions & 1 deletion internal/server/models.go
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ type ConfigMessage struct {
Marca string `json:"marca"`
ModoPrueba bool `json:"modoPrueba"`
Dir string `json:"dir,omitempty"`
//nolint:gosec
AuthToken string `json:"auth_token"` // Required for config changes
}

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4 changes: 0 additions & 4 deletions internal/server/server.go
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -170,7 +170,6 @@

w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8")
data := struct {
//nolint:gosec
AuthToken string
}{
AuthToken: config.AuthToken,
Expand All @@ -192,8 +191,7 @@

// Check lockout FIRST
if s.auth.IsLockedOut(ip) {
//nolint:gosec
log.Printf("[AUDIT] LOGIN_BLOCKED | IP=%q | reason=lockout", ip)

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http.Redirect(w, r, "/login?locked=1", http.StatusSeeOther)
return
}
Expand All @@ -201,8 +199,7 @@
password := r.FormValue("password")
if !s.auth.ValidatePassword(password) {
s.auth.RecordFailedLogin(ip)
//nolint:gosec
log.Printf("[AUDIT] LOGIN_FAILED | IP=%q", ip)

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http.Redirect(w, r, "/login?error=1", http.StatusSeeOther)
return
}
Expand All @@ -210,8 +207,7 @@
// Success
s.auth.ClearFailedLogins(ip)
s.auth.SetSessionCookie(w)
//nolint:gosec
log.Printf("[AUDIT] LOGIN_SUCCESS | IP=%q", ip)

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http.Redirect(w, r, "/", http.StatusSeeOther)
}

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