Report privately via GitHub Security → Advisories ("Report a vulnerability") on this repository, or by email to the maintainer. Please don't open public issues for vulnerabilities. We aim to acknowledge within 72 hours.

The bridge sits between a phone and a self-hosted Hermes agent that can read mail, files, and more, so it is a sensitive trust boundary.

• Credential separation. The webui password lives only in the bridge's server-side config (.env); the phone holds a separate BRIDGE_TOKEN. Rotate the token to revoke a device without touching the webui password.
• Constant-time auth. Bearer tokens are compared with secrets.compare_digest.
• Auth required by default in practice. If BRIDGE_TOKEN is unset the bridge logs a loud warning and runs open — only acceptable on a trusted loopback / during development. Always set a token before exposing the bridge.
• No secrets in the repo. .env, tokens, and keys are git-ignored; .env.example ships placeholders only.
• Transport. Terminate TLS in front of the bridge (Tailscale Serve / reverse proxy). Don't expose plain HTTP to the internet.
• Runs as non-root in the container; minimal base image.
• Push is best-effort and one-way (publish-only to ntfy); a delivery failure never affects an in-flight run.

Securing the upstream hermes-webui and the Hermes agent (their auth, TLS, and network exposure) is the operator's responsibility.