`` is currently a developer implementation for local protocol iteration. It is not yet a production distributed registry or production key-custody service.

Security review is welcome for:

• protocol signing and canonicalization
• mutation authorization
• capability-token verification
• revocation semantics
• local storage boundaries
• demo/private-key export controls
• SDK request signing helpers
• web-platform data exposure and mock-data boundaries

Please open a private security advisory if available, or file an issue with minimal sensitive detail and a request to move details privately.

Do not post live private keys, production secrets, personal data, or exploit payloads that target third-party systems.

Local demo private-key records under data/private/ are intentionally gitignored. If demo keys were ever published in repository history, treat them as compromised samples and rotate/regenerate any affected data before using the repository as a base for real deployments.

Demo private-key records for the following identities were committed to repository history in commit 9b935f8 (uploaded 2026-05-11) and deleted in commit 1986ff6 (organized 2026-05-13):

• alice@home (root key and assistant@alice#agent key)
• api@home (root key)
• krav-admin@home (root key)
• krav@home (root key and foreman@krav#agent key)

These keys are permanently exposed in repository history and must be treated as compromised. They must not be used for any real deployment, trust anchor, or non-demo purpose. The public manifests under data/manifests/ that correspond to these keys are retained as inspectable demo fixtures only.

A full history rewrite was evaluated and declined to avoid disrupting existing clones and forks. The compromise boundary is instead documented here explicitly.

If you have cloned this repository before 2026-05-13, regenerate all demo data before using it as a trust anchor.

Production deployments should disable bootstrap private-key export, avoid server-returned private keys, and use an explicit custody layer such as passkeys/WebAuthn, client-side signing, KMS, HSM, or another reviewed signing boundary.

Audited 2026-05-13. High-severity advisories resolved; 7 moderate remain. All require breaking dependency changes and are documented below as accepted risk.

GHSA-67mh-4wv8-2f99 · esbuild ≤0.24.2 (moderate) Affects vitest@2.x → vite → esbuild. The vulnerability allows a website to proxy requests to the esbuild dev server during development. Fixing requires upgrading vitest 2→4 which is a major breaking change in the test harness. Risk is confined to local developer machines running npm test or npm run dev; it has no surface in CI (headless) or in any deployed environment. Accepted until vitest 4.x migration is scheduled.

GHSA-qx2v-qp2m-jg93 · postcss < 8.5.10 (moderate) Affects next@15.x which bundles its own postcss. The XSS involves unescaped </style> tags in PostCSS CSS-serialization output. npm audit suggests next@9.3.3 as a fix, which is an unusable 6-major-version downgrade; the correct resolution is a Next.js patch that updates its internal postcss. Risk is in the build toolchain/CSS processing pipeline, not in runtime HTTP responses or the protocol layer. Accepted until Next.js 15.x ships postcss ≥8.5.10.