| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| v0.1.x | ✅ Yes |
Only the latest preview release receives security updates. This is a preview wallet — not production-ready for mainnet funds.
Do not open a public issue for security vulnerabilities.
Email: security@110wallet.xyz (or DM @apo110_dev on Twitter/X)
Include:
- Description of the vulnerability
- Steps to reproduce
- Potential impact
- Suggested fix (if any)
We'll acknowledge within 48 hours and provide a timeline for fix.
110 Wallet v0.1 preview — threat model in 110-wallet/docs/THREAT_MODEL.md
- Private keys never leave the secure element (ATECC608C)
- Host cannot enter PIN, unlock device, or approve transactions
- Physical button press required for every signature
- No remote button injection
- Pairing ≠ signing approval
- Keys stored encrypted at rest (AES-256-GCM + PBKDF2, 100k iterations)
- Password verified via simple hash (DJB2) — not cryptographic
- No hardware enforcement — browser/OS compromise = key compromise
- Testnet only — no mainnet funds
In scope:
- Extension code (
110-wallet/software/apps/extension/src/) - Background service worker, popup, content script
- WalletConnect v2 integration
- Transaction simulation/preview
- Encryption at rest implementation
Out of scope (hardware/firmware):
- Firefly Pixie firmware
- ATECC608C secure element integration
- BLE transport protocol
- Device PIN/lockout logic
| Step | Timeline |
|---|---|
| Acknowledgment | ≤ 48 hours |
| Triage | ≤ 5 business days |
| Fix (critical) | ≤ 14 days |
| Fix (high/medium) | ≤ 30 days |
| Public disclosure | After fix + 7 days |
(none yet — be the first)
Remember: This is a preview wallet. Do not store real funds. The security model assumes the host (browser/extension) is compromised — hardware signer is the fix, not the software.