🛡️ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix TOTP privilege escalation#363
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Co-authored-by: arumes31 <114224498+arumes31@users.noreply.github.com>
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🚨 Severity: CRITICAL 💡 Vulnerability: Privilege Escalation (CWE-269) - Missing authorization checks in `ChangeAdminTOTP` and `GetQR` handlers allowed any user with `manage_admins` permission to reset or retrieve the TOTP secret of the main system admin (`GUIAdmin`). Additionally, fixed Go standard library CVEs by updating the Go toolchain to 1.26.5 and patched an infinite loop vulnerability in `golang.org/x/text`. 🎯 Impact: Account takeover of the primary system administrative account, potentially leading to full system compromise. Unpatched CVEs exposed the application to potential denial of service via standard library or text manipulation. 🔧 Fix: Implemented strict authorization checks in both handlers to return a `403 Forbidden` if the target username matches the configured `GUIAdmin`. Upgraded `golang.org/x/text` and Go toolchain version in `go.mod`, `Dockerfile`, and GitHub Action workflows. ✅ Verification: Tested locally via `go test -short ./...` and manual review of the handler logic. Also verified the fix passes `govulncheck`. Co-authored-by: arumes31 <114224498+arumes31@users.noreply.github.com>
🚨 Severity: CRITICAL 💡 Vulnerability: Privilege Escalation (CWE-269) - Missing authorization checks in `ChangeAdminTOTP` and `GetQR` handlers allowed any user with `manage_admins` permission to reset or retrieve the TOTP secret of the main system admin (`GUIAdmin`). Additionally, fixed Go standard library CVEs by updating the Go toolchain to 1.26.5 across the repository (including Dockerfile and CI configurations) and patched an infinite loop vulnerability in `golang.org/x/text`. 🎯 Impact: Account takeover of the primary system administrative account, potentially leading to full system compromise. Unpatched CVEs exposed the application to potential denial of service via standard library or text manipulation, which also caused CI pipeline failures during govulncheck scans. 🔧 Fix: Implemented strict authorization checks in both handlers to return a `403 Forbidden` if the target username matches the configured `GUIAdmin`. Upgraded `golang.org/x/text` and Go toolchain version (to 1.26.5) in `go.mod`, `Dockerfile`, and GitHub Action workflows to resolve CI issues. ✅ Verification: Tested locally via `go test -short ./...` and manual review of the handler logic. Also verified the fix passes `govulncheck`. Co-authored-by: arumes31 <114224498+arumes31@users.noreply.github.com>
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🚨 Severity: CRITICAL
💡 Vulnerability: Privilege Escalation (CWE-269) - Missing authorization checks in
ChangeAdminTOTPandGetQRhandlers allowed any user withmanage_adminspermission to reset or retrieve the TOTP secret of the main system admin (GUIAdmin).🎯 Impact: Account takeover of the primary system administrative account, potentially leading to full system compromise.
🔧 Fix: Implemented strict authorization checks in both handlers to return a
403 Forbiddenif the target username matches the configuredGUIAdmin.✅ Verification: Tested locally via
go test ./...and manual review of the handler logic.PR created automatically by Jules for task 226371566722958546 started by @arumes31