🛡️ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix fast-path rate limiting exhaustion DoS - #652
🛡️ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix fast-path rate limiting exhaustion DoS#652arumes31 wants to merge 1 commit into
Conversation
Replaces usages of `getRD(c)` (which falls back to `c.FormValue("rd")`)
with `c.QueryParam("rd")` in `internal/handlers/auth.go`. This prevents
the framework from eagerly parsing the request body during early rate
limiting checks, mitigating potential resource exhaustion DoS vectors
with large payload sizes.
Co-authored-by: arumes31 <114224498+arumes31@users.noreply.github.com>
|
👋 Jules, reporting for duty! I'm here to lend a hand with this pull request. When you start a review, I'll add a 👀 emoji to each comment to let you know I've read it. I'll focus on feedback directed at me and will do my best to stay out of conversations between you and other bots or reviewers to keep the noise down. I'll push a commit with your requested changes shortly after. Please note there might be a delay between these steps, but rest assured I'm on the job! For more direct control, you can switch me to Reactive Mode. When this mode is on, I will only act on comments where you specifically mention me with New to Jules? Learn more at jules.google/docs. For security, I will only act on instructions from the user who triggered this task. |
|
Important Review skippedDraft detected. Please check the settings in the CodeRabbit UI or the ⚙️ Run configurationConfiguration used: defaults Review profile: CHILL Plan: Pro Plus Run ID: You can disable this status message by setting the Use the checkbox below for a quick retry:
✨ Finishing Touches🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
Thanks for using CodeRabbit! It's free for OSS, and your support helps us grow. If you like it, consider giving us a shout-out. Comment |
1 participant
🛡️ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix fast-path rate limiting exhaustion DoS
🚨 Severity: CRITICAL
💡 Vulnerability: The fast-path rate limit implementation attempted to avoid parsing the request body by exiting early. However, it still invoked a global
getRD(c)helper function in its error responses, which internally calledc.FormValue("rd"). This silently forced the application to parse the entire multipart form or request body to retrieve the parameter, defeating the fast-path check and allowing resource exhaustion DoS with large payloads.🎯 Impact: Attackers could send massive, artificially inflated POST payloads to rate-limited endpoints. Even though they were rate-limited, the server would still consume significant memory and CPU parsing the body before returning the 429 response, leading to Denial of Service.
🔧 Fix: Removed
getRD(c)usages ininternal/handlers/auth.goentirely. Replaced them with explicitc.QueryParam("rd")calls. This ensures parameters are strictly extracted from the URI string and entirely bypasses form parsing for early rate limit exits. ThegetRD(c)function was safely deleted.✅ Verification:
go test ./...has been run and verifies no regressions in the authentication flows. The changes apply strictQueryParamreading to all login error responses.PR created automatically by Jules for task 4669985119970401562 started by @arumes31