π‘οΈ Sentinel: [HIGH] Fix DoS vector in authentication flow#662
π‘οΈ Sentinel: [HIGH] Fix DoS vector in authentication flow#662arumes31 wants to merge 1 commit into
Conversation
Co-authored-by: arumes31 <114224498+arumes31@users.noreply.github.com>
|
π Jules, reporting for duty! I'm here to lend a hand with this pull request. When you start a review, I'll add a π emoji to each comment to let you know I've read it. I'll focus on feedback directed at me and will do my best to stay out of conversations between you and other bots or reviewers to keep the noise down. I'll push a commit with your requested changes shortly after. Please note there might be a delay between these steps, but rest assured I'm on the job! For more direct control, you can switch me to Reactive Mode. When this mode is on, I will only act on comments where you specifically mention me with New to Jules? Learn more at jules.google/docs. For security, I will only act on instructions from the user who triggered this task. |
|
Important Review skippedDraft detected. Please check the settings in the CodeRabbit UI or the βοΈ Run configurationConfiguration used: defaults Review profile: CHILL Plan: Pro Plus Run ID: You can disable this status message by setting the Use the checkbox below for a quick retry:
β¨ Finishing Touchesπ§ͺ Generate unit tests (beta)
Thanks for using CodeRabbit! It's free for OSS, and your support helps us grow. If you like it, consider giving us a shout-out. Comment |
π¨ Severity: HIGH
π‘ Vulnerability: The
getRD()function in the authentication flow checked the request body form values for the redirect parameter (rd). This required parsing the entire request body before applying basic rate limiting, exposing the application to a Denial of Service (DoS) attack where an attacker could send large POST bodies to consume server resources and bypass early rate-limit drops.π― Impact: Attackers could exhaust server memory and CPU by sending a flood of large, unauthenticated POST requests, leading to application unavailability.
π§ Fix: Replaced
getRD(c)withc.QueryParam("rd")acrossinternal/handlers/auth.goto strictly read the redirect parameter from the URL query string. ThegetRDhelper function was deleted. This allows rate limits to drop malicious requests immediately without parsing the form body.β Verification: Verified that tests pass and the code compiles successfully. The multi-step 2FA flow remains intact because the login templates already append the
rdparameter to the form action query string (e.g.,action="/rauthlogin?rd=...").PR created automatically by Jules for task 11174331091851025111 started by @arumes31