ci: move to GitHub-hosted runner with hardened workflow - #3
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Switch from self-hosted to ubuntu-24.04 to remove the fork-PR attack surface on a public repo. Add SHA-pinned actions, step-security/harden-runner in audit mode, permissions: contents: read, persist-credentials: false, job timeout, and a concurrency group.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kulikov <kulikov.dm@gmail.com>
`go get -u ./...` and `go mod tidy` produced no other changes — direct and transitive dependencies are already at their latest stable versions. `go test ./...` still passes.
mkramarczyk
approved these changes
May 13, 2026
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Summary
Switch CI from self-hosted to
ubuntu-24.04to remove the fork-PR attack surface on this public repository, and add standard supply-chain hardening to the workflow itself. Also bump to Go 1.26.What changed
runs-on: self-hosted→runs-on: ubuntu-24.04(immutable, pinned)actions/checkout,actions/setup-go)step-security/harden-runner@v2.19.1inauditmode (egress monitoring + telemetry disabled)permissions: contents: read(least privilege)persist-credentials: falseonactions/checkouttimeout-minutes: 15concurrencygroup (cancels redundant runs on rapid pushes)go.modviaactions/setup-gowith module cache enabledgo.modbumped from 1.24 to 1.26 (go get -u ./...+go mod tidyproduced no other dep changes)Why
A public repo with
runs-on: self-hostedexposes the maintainer's runner infrastructure to fork-PR code execution. The recent TanStack npm supply-chain incident demonstrated the chain: fork PR /pull_request_target→ cache poisoning → OIDC token extraction from the runner process. Moving the public CI to disposable GitHub-hosted runners eliminates that class of attack entirely. The hardening additions (SHA-pinning, harden-runner audit, persist-credentials: false) close the secondary risks that remain even on GitHub-hosted runners.Test plan
pull_request)harden-runneraudit output in the run summary to verify egress endpoints look sane