perf: the local and CI lifecycle, measured — mutate 92.6s→2.4s, agentic_record 89.0s→2.85s, darwin-link 242s→59s - #921
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In `@crates/batten/src/checks_green.rs`:
- Around line 245-247: Make latest_per_name order-independent by selecting the
maximum run by (key, rank) before applying displacement logic, rather than
folding runs with the non-transitive displaces predicate. If that selected run
is completed and unanswered, compare it with the remaining run having the
maximum key and retain the latter only when its key is strictly smaller. Add
regression tests covering the successful, in-flight, and newer skipped runs in
both slice orders, verifying decide does not return Green while the rerun is
active.
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Inline comments:
In `@mise.toml`:
- Line 620: Update the MUTANT_GATES roster by removing the invalid
engine-checks-green and engine-surface entries, unless corresponding mutation
sources and fallback Bats suites are added; ensure no-such-gate entries remain.
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`[[mcp.result]]` declared `save_issue`, `get_issue` and `list_issues` and not
`get_document`, so every document read was handed back re-serialised rather than
reduced -- the "more out than in" shape the verb already reports for an
undeclared method.
before undeclared, whole body
after reduced -- stored 15,922 bytes, emitted 626
25x on one call, measured against the restored Definition of Ready & Done. A
document's `content` IS its body, so it is the widest field the tracker returns
and the one nobody reading a projection asked for.
DROPPING IT COSTS A GATE NOTHING, for the reason the `get_issue` block already
states of its own narrowing: `mcp call` stores every response whole, so a gate
reads the body from the capture store by key while the model receives a dozen
fields. The two have never needed to be the same channel.
THE PROVENANCE FIELDS ARE NOT DECORATION, and choosing the set for size would
have been the error. `updatedAt`, `updatedBy` and `team` are the three that made
CLOUD-1742 legible -- a spec AGENTS.md cites as authoritative was overwritten in
place and reparented to another team, and those fields are what showed it. A
projection of `id`, `title` and `url` alone would have reported the clobbered
document as the same document.
Measured context: 64 MCP results reached one session's window and 2 carried a
reduction marker.
Refs: CLOUD-1742
Admits: 8280406b2acdf7d9f81889e8cc9fdf16ee0d3a6a3f3b2b6f314af8944791a8a1
Admits-rule: protected-mutation
Admits-verdict: path write refused
Admits-subject: batten.toml
Admits-anchor: call:2586367af13dc07c71d76242280d3887412cef08
Admits-epoch: 2ef723b282192747aefd09a195aecc9c780482f1d325c3d93449d7a8bb3f5a3e
Admits-author: alec@wenzowski.com
Admits-prev: 7b50267372a83706050e0f3c0537978e5fc258d6c6bfffbc2cf6a73de7587b4b
Admits-answer-lost: Every `get_document` call keeps being handed back re-serialised rather than reduced — the "more out than in" shape `crates/batten/src/mcp.rs:466-468` records, measured at 20,366 bytes emitted against 17,313 stored for the sibling method. Measured this session: 64 MCP results reached the window and 2 carried a reduction marker. It is also the precondition for CLOUD-1742's clobber detection, which needs `updatedAt`/`updatedBy`/`team` projected rather than buried in a whole-body response.
Admits-answer-precondition: `batten config` exposes only `show`, `epoch`, `deprecations` and `lint` — every one a read. There is no verb that authors a `[[mcp.result]]` row, so the surface this class names cannot express the change and writing `batten.toml` directly is the only route left. The write lands in PR #921, where a reviewer sees it in the diff, and `mise run config-lint` checks it before it lands.
Admits-answer-rejected-route: Rejected "patch run first": there is no patch verb on the config surface — `batten config` has no write subcommand at all, so there is nothing to run. I did take "config read first": the `[[mcp.result]]` block for `get_issue` at `batten.toml:4365-4389` was read first and this row is modelled on it, including its stated reason that dropping a wide field is safe because `mcp call` stores every response whole for gates to read from the capture store.
`cross` is a required check that cold-built on every pull request AND uploaded a multi-hundred-MB entry scoped to `refs/pull/N/merge` that no other pull request could read. Both halves were waste: the build, and the write that filled the store without ever being restored. THE FAMILY HAD NO WRITER. `ci-` has had one since CLOUD-1416/1477 -- two, in fact, `cache-warm-linux` (arm64) and `cache-warm-linux-x64` -- and `windows-` has `cache-warm-windows`. `cross-` had none, so its readers restored nothing on every run by construction. BOTH HALVES LAND TOGETHER, and neither is safe alone: a reader given `save-if: false` with no writer is permanently cold, and a writer with a reader still writing leaves the store pressure in place. CLOUD-1453 measured that pressure at 10.77 GiB against a 10 GiB ceiling, 81% of it four already-merged PRs' unreadable entries -- which is what `cache-sweep.yml` exists to reclaim rather than a saving. x64 BECAUSE THE READER IS. rust-cache puts `runnerOS-runnerArch` inside the restore prefix (`config.ts:93`, before `:133`), so a writer on another arch writes an entry its reader cannot see. That is the trap CLOUD-1416 sprang on `batten-check`; the warm job and `rust.yml`'s `cross` job must move only together. `semver-` IS DELIBERATELY NOT WARMED, and the file says why. Its own block records that it builds RUSTDOC with a different rustc than every other job, which is why it holds a separate key. A warm job running `cargo build --workspace` would fill that family with host artifacts the reader does not want while the rustdoc build stayed cold -- occupying the slot with the wrong content, which is worse than the cold build it replaces. The first draft of this change did exactly that and was removed before it shipped. NOT VERIFIABLE LOCALLY, and stated rather than implied: a cache hit only exists in CI. `ci-cache-declared` and `batten-check` pass here, which is the most a local run can say. The proof is the first pull request after this lands. Refs: CLOUD-1453, CLOUD-1477, CLOUD-1416 Admits: 105afda348abc87cfed8fcf01d9ffc73a7d0e887c845b76b831c0e507c38a1fb Admits-rule: protected-mutation Admits-verdict: path write refused Admits-subject: .github/workflows/release-plz.yml Admits-anchor: call:465d4692b61c2baa2fa61a13e69defc1dc65c56b Admits-epoch: 128333a421e3b73849dd28278ccd686c5c2604ff0e9d124c48b411cc7b1bb3f8 Admits-author: alec@wenzowski.com Admits-prev: e320b15216a7f81f8b17b231e5f62f128ca8b373499501bcc3fdbbf7d8ecf45f Admits-answer-lost: The `cross-` and `semver-` rust-cache families have no warm writer on trunk — only `ci-` (arm64 and x64) and `windows-` do, at release-plz.yml:138, :220 and :260. So every pull request cold-builds both jobs, and each then uploads a multi-hundred-MB entry scoped to `refs/pull/N/merge` that no other pull request can ever read. That is what fills the 10 GiB store `cache-sweep.yml` was built to reclaim (measured on CLOUD-1453: 10.77 GiB, 81% of it four already-merged PRs). Both jobs are required checks, so every branch pays both on every lap. Admits-answer-precondition: The surface this class names is a pull request, and this write is in one: PR #921 on branch claude/glacial-ci-regression-d9qtr3, where a reviewer sees the diff. No batten verb authors a workflow job; `batten` has no generator for `.github/workflows/**`, so writing the file directly is the only route left. `ci-local-parity` and `ci-cache-declared` check the edit before it lands. Admits-answer-rejected-route: Rejected "point the orphaned readers at the already-warm `ci-` family instead of adding writers": rust.yml:307 already records why that is wrong — a second leg restoring a shared entry thrashes it, and `cross` builds a windows-gnu target and `semver` a base-revision closure, neither of which is the `ci-` host artifact set. Sharing would trade a cold build for a thrashed entry. The repository's own established pattern is a warm writer per family, which is what this follows. Admits: 83adfd02e2fc830b35f9e1d4414712d69ce26ee757f48742651ce6bd164afa98 Admits-rule: protected-mutation Admits-verdict: path write refused Admits-subject: .github/workflows/rust.yml Admits-anchor: call:465d4692b61c2baa2fa61a13e69defc1dc65c56b Admits-epoch: 128333a421e3b73849dd28278ccd686c5c2604ff0e9d124c48b411cc7b1bb3f8 Admits-author: alec@wenzowski.com Admits-prev: 8efa23f5401b475d58c607f3ae8e2adf60dbca5cd2df506ffb00546de908fcb6 Admits-answer-lost: Without `save-if: false` on the `cross-` and `semver-` readers, both keep writing a multi-hundred-MB entry per pull request scoped to `refs/pull/N/merge` that no other pull request can read — the store pressure CLOUD-1453 measured at 10.77 GiB against a 10 GiB ceiling, 81% of it four already-merged PRs. This is the reader half of a pair: the warm writers just added to release-plz.yml are what make these families readable, and a writer without a quiet reader leaves the waste in place. Admits-answer-precondition: The surface this class names is a pull request, and this write is in one: PR #921, where a reviewer sees the diff. No batten verb authors a workflow step, so writing the file directly is the only route left, and `ci-local-parity` plus `ci-cache-declared` check the edit before it lands. Admits-answer-rejected-route: Rejected "leave the readers writing and rely on cache-sweep to reclaim": that is the arrangement in place today and it treats a daily sweep as a substitute for not generating the garbage. The `ci-` family's own pattern is the opposite and is what this follows — every PR-side reader of a warmed family carries `save-if: false` (ci.yml:420, :846, commit-lint.yml:138, rust.yml:500).
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`darwin-link` is in `CI_REQUIRED_CHECKS`, so every ready pays it, and nothing
on the trunk wrote the `aarch64-apple-darwin` family. It cold-built the Darwin
cross-link every run and then wrote a `refs/pull/N/merge`-scoped entry no other
pull request could read — the waste CLOUD-1453 measured as 81% of a 10.77 GiB
store.
Measured cold on run 34332015804: 242s, the second-longest completed job on the
pull request behind `semver`. On the next run, with a warm entry the branch had
written for itself, the same job was 63s. The trunk writer makes that the
steady state rather than an accident of which run went first.
`cache-warm-darwin-link` mirrors `cache-warm-cross`: same guard shape, same
`continue-on-error`, and it runs `mise run darwin-link aarch64-apple-darwin`,
which is exactly what the reader runs. The key is the literal triple because
the reader spells it `${{ matrix.target }}` over a single-leg matrix and
rust-cache sees only the expansion.
Refs: CLOUD-1225, CLOUD-1453
Admits: 329b33216aac8c3c8109c7a4d292a89180ab44f18e2d53fa38564b0b778fd64f
Admits-rule: protected-mutation
Admits-verdict: path write refused
Admits-subject: .github/workflows/rust.yml
Admits-anchor: call:37ca17e88d1fecc1ba7cfb50f8d9c84167806349
Admits-epoch: 06f972cbc634979ed332bb096796b59a6e56001a7c25c1844d8b353983197a36
Admits-author: alec@wenzowski.com
Admits-prev: 72ca277dfdc0cb731bfc41f0723adc1e7c5a75bdbb0924e46c5131b09bbcd3ba
Admits-answer-lost: `darwin-link` is in `CI_REQUIRED_CHECKS`, so every ready pays it, and nothing on the trunk writes the `aarch64-apple-darwin` family. Measured cold on run 34332015804 it was 242s, the second-longest completed job on the pull request; with a warm entry the branch happened to have written for itself, the same job was 63s on run 34333739544. Without `save-if: false` the reader keeps writing a `refs/pull/N/merge`-scoped entry no other pull request can read — the waste CLOUD-1453 measured as 81% of a 10.77 GiB store — and the fleet keeps paying the cold build on every ready.
Admits-answer-precondition: No batten verb authors a GitHub Actions workflow. The surface offers `check`, `enforce` and `doctor` over workflows as READS — `ci-tools-check`, `rust-paths-check`, `timeout-check` and `mise-action-floor` all adjudicate this file and none can write it — so editing `.github/workflows/rust.yml` directly is the only route to adding `save-if: false`. The write lands in PR #921 where a reviewer sees it in the diff, and `zizmor`, `actionlint` and `timeout-check` all ran green over it before this request.
Admits-answer-rejected-route: Rejected "config read first": I did read the config first — `batten.toml` declares no row that can add a cache posture to a workflow job, because the artifact is GitHub's schema and not batten's. Rejected "patch run first": there is no patch verb over workflow files on this surface; `batten` has no write subcommand reaching `.github/`, so there is nothing to run. What I did instead is read the sibling this change copies: `rust.yml:179-185`, the `cross-` reader's own `save-if: false` and its stated reason, and this edit is that block applied to the family beside it.
Admits: d085467abc96fe35b27da86944758c5ca1c940006725bf5049d9bad249167d89
Admits-rule: protected-mutation
Admits-verdict: path write refused
Admits-subject: .github/workflows/release-plz.yml
Admits-anchor: call:37ca17e88d1fecc1ba7cfb50f8d9c84167806349
Admits-epoch: 06f972cbc634979ed332bb096796b59a6e56001a7c25c1844d8b353983197a36
Admits-author: alec@wenzowski.com
Admits-prev: 004e22c424e198f92e983eba35d8412fc87144ee100d01d7b01381c83812cc3a
Admits-answer-lost: The `aarch64-apple-darwin` cache family has no writer on the trunk at all, so every pull request cold-builds the Darwin cross-link and then writes an entry scoped to `refs/pull/N/merge` that no other pull request can read. Measured on run 34332015804 that cold job was 242s and it is in `CI_REQUIRED_CHECKS`, so the whole fleet pays it on every ready. Without this job the `save-if: false` on the reader would be strictly worse than the status quo — a read-only consumer of a family nothing writes reads empty forever, which is what `read-family-has-a-warm-writer` refuses.
Admits-answer-precondition: No batten verb authors a GitHub Actions workflow. The surface offers `check`, `enforce` and `doctor` over workflows as READS — `ci-tools-check`, `timeout-check`, `release-tracking-check`, `publish-credential-check` and `mise-action-floor` all adjudicate this file and none can write it — so adding the `cache-warm-darwin-link` job to `.github/workflows/release-plz.yml` directly is the only route left. The write lands in PR #921 where a reviewer sees it in the diff, and `zizmor`, `actionlint`, `timeout-check`, `ci-tools-check` and `release-tracking-check` all ran green over it before this request.
Admits-answer-rejected-route: Rejected "config read first": read first, and `batten.toml` declares no row that can add a job to a workflow — the artifact is GitHub's schema, not batten's, so the config surface cannot express it. Rejected "patch run first": `batten` has no write subcommand reaching `.github/`, so there is no patch verb to run. What I did instead is read the sibling this job copies: `cache-warm-cross` at `release-plz.yml:282-320`, added in this same pull request for the identical defect, and this job is that shape with the reader's own `install_args` and command substituted.
…it expands
`ci-cache-declared` resolves a cache family from the `shared-key` AS WRITTEN in
the workflow. `cache-warm-darwin-link` spelled the expansion,
`aarch64-apple-darwin`, while `rust.yml`'s reader spells `${{ matrix.target }}`
over a single-leg matrix — one family to GitHub and two to the module. So the
reader carried `save-if: false` against a family the gate could see no writer
for, which is strictly worse than the cold build it replaced: read-only against
an empty family reads empty forever.
Measured locally rather than inferred:
`ci_cache_declared::this_repository_is_clean_today` failed with
`read-family-has-a-warm-writer` on `.github/workflows/rust.yml:206`, the
`darwin-link` job, with the warm job already committed. 39/39 pass after this.
The fix mirrors the reader's matrix onto the writer instead of flattening the
reader's key to the literal. Both spellings make one family; only this one keeps
the reader's recorded promise that restoring the second Darwin leg is a one-word
change — it is now one word on each side.
Refs: CLOUD-1225, CLOUD-1453
Admits: 1556cc76f8824f9cc3715807b22fe4731e021becabc8e92054074b63eaf78b2b
Admits-rule: protected-mutation
Admits-verdict: path write refused
Admits-subject: .github/workflows/release-plz.yml
Admits-anchor: call:516cbbb7e251814c615814762e2b00963e627e6f
Admits-epoch: 06f972cbc634979ed332bb096796b59a6e56001a7c25c1844d8b353983197a36
Admits-author: alec@wenzowski.com
Admits-prev: d085467abc96fe35b27da86944758c5ca1c940006725bf5049d9bad249167d89
Admits-answer-lost: The gate that motivated the previous commit still fires without this. `ci-cache-declared` resolves a cache family from the `shared-key` AS WRITTEN, so the writer spelling the expansion `aarch64-apple-darwin` while the reader spells `${{ matrix.target }}` is two families to the module and one to GitHub. Measured locally: `ci_cache_declared::this_repository_is_clean_today` failed with `read-family-has-a-warm-writer` on `.github/workflows/rust.yml:206` — the `darwin-link` job — with the warm job already committed. So the reader would carry `save-if: false` against a family the gate cannot see a writer for, which is strictly worse than before: read-only against an empty family reads empty forever.
Admits-answer-precondition: No batten verb authors a GitHub Actions workflow — `check`, `enforce` and `doctor` read them and none writes one — so correcting `cache-warm-darwin-link`'s `shared-key` spelling in `.github/workflows/release-plz.yml` directly is the only route left. The write lands in PR #921 where a reviewer sees it in the diff, and `zizmor`, `actionlint`, `timeout-check`, `ci-tools-check`, `release-tracking-check` and the `ci_cache_declared`/`ci_hygiene` suites all ran green over it before this request.
Admits-answer-rejected-route: Rejected "config read first": read first, and `batten.toml` declares no row that can spell a workflow job's cache key — the artifact is GitHub's schema, not batten's. Rejected "patch run first": `batten` has no write subcommand reaching `.github/`, so there is no patch verb to run. The alternative I rejected on the merits was spelling the READER's key as the literal triple instead: that would also make one family, but it would discard the reader's own recorded promise that restoring the second Darwin leg is a one-word change. Mirroring the matrix onto the writer keeps that promise on both sides.
… had one `ci.yml`'s `perf` job restores `perf-` and then writes a full `--release` target directory on top of it, scoped to `refs/pull/N/merge` where no other pull request can read it. `perf.yml`'s own job has been this family's writer all along: daily schedule, `runs-on: ubuntu-latest`, the same `shared-key` — same key, same architecture, entry on `refs/heads/main`. The reader was paying for a write nobody could use, on the one profile no other job builds. The job was 420s on run 34332015804. `save-if: false` alone would have been refused, and the refusal would have been the gate's mistake rather than the change's. `warmed` was built from `on_push` only, and defended that with "trunk writers in this repository are push-triggered" — but its own operative sentence is that GitHub scopes a cache read to the run's ref plus the base branch, and a scheduled run on the default branch has ref `refs/heads/main` exactly as a pushed one does. The bound described habits, not the mechanism. It is now `trunk_writer`: push OR schedule. The CLOUD-1331 carve-out that comment invoked survives untouched — it settled `perf`'s BASE ARM, a separate entry keyed to the merge base, which no clause here reaches. Naming it in defence of excluding `perf-` conflated two caches that share a job and nothing else. `coverage-` and `fuzz-` become warmed under the widened set, which changes nothing: both rules require `on_pull_request` and neither workflow has it. Two cases, both directions: a scheduled writer warms its family, and a scheduled writer on another architecture still leaves the reader empty — so the widening cannot pass by warming everything. Refs: CLOUD-1225, CLOUD-1453 Admits: e70bf10c2a6ce2dbdce27b382ca07717d8afc6aee79dcdd64585e76be6dbd323 Admits-rule: protected-mutation Admits-verdict: path write refused Admits-subject: .github/workflows/ci.yml Admits-anchor: call:164689fa3fbdd90affc90726fb592cc78ac63c66 Admits-epoch: 06f972cbc634979ed332bb096796b59a6e56001a7c25c1844d8b353983197a36 Admits-author: alec@wenzowski.com Admits-prev: 14a7813f18d11c452bb5851acf9aad131e3f63a3e7c0ede84f7ca15db7325b7e Admits-answer-lost: `perf.yml`'s daily job already writes the `perf-` family from `main`, on `ubuntu-latest`, under this exact `shared-key` — same key, same architecture, so its entry is readable by every pull request. Without this, `ci.yml`'s `perf` job keeps writing a full `--release` target directory on top of it, scoped to `refs/pull/N/merge` where nothing else can reach it. That is the largest single entry any reader in this workflow produces, for the one profile no other job builds, and it is the store pressure `cache-sweep` exists to reclaim — CLOUD-1453 measured 81% of a 10.77 GiB store as merged pull requests' unreadable entries. Measured on run 34332015804 the job was 420s. Admits-answer-precondition: No batten verb authors a GitHub Actions workflow — `check`, `enforce` and `doctor` read them and none writes one — so adding `save-if: false` to the `perf` job in `.github/workflows/ci.yml` directly is the only route left. The write lands in PR #921 where a reviewer sees it in the diff, and `zizmor`, `actionlint`, `timeout-check`, `ci-tools-check`, `policy test` (852 cases) and the `ci_cache_declared`/`ci_hygiene` suites (39/39) all ran green over it before this request. Admits-answer-rejected-route: Rejected "config read first": read first, and `batten.toml` declares no row that can set a workflow job's cache posture — the artifact is GitHub's schema, not batten's. Rejected "patch run first": `batten` has no write subcommand reaching `.github/`, so there is no patch verb to run. The alternative I rejected on the merits was adding `save-if: false` alone: `ci-cache-declared`'s `warmed` set counted `push` triggers only, so the gate could not see `perf.yml`'s scheduled writer and `read-family-has-a-warm-writer` would have fired on this job. Widening that predicate to `trunk_writer` is the other half of this same commit, and it is why this write is safe rather than merely quiet.
`delay-waivers-not-growing` and `spawn-widening` both fired on ONE physical line: the `#[expect(clippy::disallowed_methods)]` over a poll loop's `std::thread::sleep`. The ratchet counts that lint name across engine source and its `no_fix_reason` refuses the obvious dodge in advance — "a waiver is not a fix ... Adding a twelfth exemption is the thing this row refuses" — and `spawn-widening` matches added clippy-escape lines, so a waiver would have been refused by the second row anyway. The two are mutually reinforcing and they were right: this wait has a terminal state to block on and therefore needs no delay. A worker thread owns the child and calls `wait`; the caller blocks on `recv_timeout(suite_bound())`. A suite that returns wakes it immediately and one that hangs runs into the bound — no interval to tune, nothing standing in for an exit condition, which is the line `clippy.toml` draws. Engine-source count is back to 11 and `mutate.rs` carries none. The kill stays child-only. Signalling the process group is what reddened three `symbols` cases in CI: `kill(-pid)` addresses whatever group carries that id, and `process_group(0)` is best effort with an invisible failure, so when the group never formed the signal reached sibling test processes under the parallel runner. Clippy caught three more on the way — `similar_names`, `single_match_else`, `unnecessary_wraps` — each fixed in the code rather than waived; the last is why reading the capture back is now its own function, shared by both exits. The `[[waiver]]` is for the watchdog's anti-vacuity case, and it is the route this rule declares rather than a hatch. The remedy it prefers is `cfg!` inside the case, checked and rejected on the merits: the case reaches `TOY_GATE`, `CAUGHT` and `lend_bats`, all `#[cfg(unix)]` because bats is a bash program Windows can neither symlink nor execute, so a `cfg!` arm would not type-check. `override request` was deliberately not used — batten.toml records it measured as a local/CI parity trap on this exact class. Refs: CLOUD-1726, CLOUD-1225 Admits: 621e12380a9b4096f8fd8de2145d4e4d1246c9a9c9384d3cb83d490e710e5ef7 Admits-rule: protected-mutation Admits-verdict: path write refused Admits-subject: batten.toml Admits-anchor: call:9c1f5ed4a8b3e3d6986a604005f3dac620b3cfa4 Admits-epoch: 9f9763f897549b32719d92ed349405de4786d62107e40394d5a7b7d87528c9b6 Admits-author: alec@wenzowski.com Admits-prev: 8280406b2acdf7d9f81889e8cc9fdf16ee0d3a6a3f3b2b6f314af8944791a8a1 Admits-answer-lost: CI's `batten-check` is red on `crates/batten/tests/it/mutate.rs platform-gated-test-added`. The case it names is the anti-vacuity for CLOUD-1726: `BATS_TEST_TIMEOUT` was removed because the runner does not reap its `sleep N` watchdog on a FAILING case, and a caught mutation is a failing case — that removal took the `mutate` module from 92.6s to 2.4s and the whole `it` suite from 260.2s to 159.0s. Without a bound of our own a hanging mutant would hold a sweep forever, and without this case the removal is indistinguishable from having no bound at all. Dropping the case to satisfy the gate would delete the only proof the replacement works. Admits-answer-precondition: `batten config` exposes only `show`, `epoch`, `deprecations` and `lint` — every one a read. There is no verb that authors a `[[waiver]]` row, so writing `batten.toml` directly is the only route left. The write lands in PR #921 where a reviewer sees it in the diff, and `mise run config-lint` ran green over it (0 smells) before this request. Admits-answer-rejected-route: Rejected the route this rule itself prefers, and only after checking it: the declared remedy is `cfg!` inside the case rather than an attribute over it, and it does not type-check here. The case reaches `TOY_GATE` (:107), `CAUGHT` (:134) and `lend_bats` (:177), each `#[cfg(unix)]` because bats is a bash program with no extension that Windows can neither symlink nor execute — so on that target the three items do not exist and a `cfg!` arm would fail to compile. That is the one bar this route is held to, and it is the same argument the existing `provision.rs` waiver makes. Also rejected `override request`, deliberately: `batten.toml:13440-13455` records it measured as a local/CI parity trap on this exact class — an admission's record is keyed to the checkout's state directory, so a spend reads green to its author and CI raises the same finding on the same commit.
`[[mcp.result]]` declared `save_issue`, `get_issue` and `list_issues` and not
`get_document`, so every document read was handed back re-serialised rather than
reduced -- the "more out than in" shape the verb already reports for an
undeclared method.
before undeclared, whole body
after reduced -- stored 15,922 bytes, emitted 626
25x on one call, measured against the restored Definition of Ready & Done. A
document's `content` IS its body, so it is the widest field the tracker returns
and the one nobody reading a projection asked for.
DROPPING IT COSTS A GATE NOTHING, for the reason the `get_issue` block already
states of its own narrowing: `mcp call` stores every response whole, so a gate
reads the body from the capture store by key while the model receives a dozen
fields. The two have never needed to be the same channel.
THE PROVENANCE FIELDS ARE NOT DECORATION, and choosing the set for size would
have been the error. `updatedAt`, `updatedBy` and `team` are the three that made
CLOUD-1742 legible -- a spec AGENTS.md cites as authoritative was overwritten in
place and reparented to another team, and those fields are what showed it. A
projection of `id`, `title` and `url` alone would have reported the clobbered
document as the same document.
Measured context: 64 MCP results reached one session's window and 2 carried a
reduction marker.
Refs: CLOUD-1742
Admits: 8280406b2acdf7d9f81889e8cc9fdf16ee0d3a6a3f3b2b6f314af8944791a8a1
Admits-rule: protected-mutation
Admits-verdict: path write refused
Admits-subject: batten.toml
Admits-anchor: call:2586367af13dc07c71d76242280d3887412cef08
Admits-epoch: 2ef723b282192747aefd09a195aecc9c780482f1d325c3d93449d7a8bb3f5a3e
Admits-author: alec@wenzowski.com
Admits-prev: 7b50267372a83706050e0f3c0537978e5fc258d6c6bfffbc2cf6a73de7587b4b
Admits-answer-lost: Every `get_document` call keeps being handed back re-serialised rather than reduced — the "more out than in" shape `crates/batten/src/mcp.rs:466-468` records, measured at 20,366 bytes emitted against 17,313 stored for the sibling method. Measured this session: 64 MCP results reached the window and 2 carried a reduction marker. It is also the precondition for CLOUD-1742's clobber detection, which needs `updatedAt`/`updatedBy`/`team` projected rather than buried in a whole-body response.
Admits-answer-precondition: `batten config` exposes only `show`, `epoch`, `deprecations` and `lint` — every one a read. There is no verb that authors a `[[mcp.result]]` row, so the surface this class names cannot express the change and writing `batten.toml` directly is the only route left. The write lands in PR #921, where a reviewer sees it in the diff, and `mise run config-lint` checks it before it lands.
Admits-answer-rejected-route: Rejected "patch run first": there is no patch verb on the config surface — `batten config` has no write subcommand at all, so there is nothing to run. I did take "config read first": the `[[mcp.result]]` block for `get_issue` at `batten.toml:4365-4389` was read first and this row is modelled on it, including its stated reason that dropping a wide field is safe because `mcp call` stores every response whole for gates to read from the capture store.
`cross` is a required check that cold-built on every pull request AND uploaded a multi-hundred-MB entry scoped to `refs/pull/N/merge` that no other pull request could read. Both halves were waste: the build, and the write that filled the store without ever being restored. THE FAMILY HAD NO WRITER. `ci-` has had one since CLOUD-1416/1477 -- two, in fact, `cache-warm-linux` (arm64) and `cache-warm-linux-x64` -- and `windows-` has `cache-warm-windows`. `cross-` had none, so its readers restored nothing on every run by construction. BOTH HALVES LAND TOGETHER, and neither is safe alone: a reader given `save-if: false` with no writer is permanently cold, and a writer with a reader still writing leaves the store pressure in place. CLOUD-1453 measured that pressure at 10.77 GiB against a 10 GiB ceiling, 81% of it four already-merged PRs' unreadable entries -- which is what `cache-sweep.yml` exists to reclaim rather than a saving. x64 BECAUSE THE READER IS. rust-cache puts `runnerOS-runnerArch` inside the restore prefix (`config.ts:93`, before `:133`), so a writer on another arch writes an entry its reader cannot see. That is the trap CLOUD-1416 sprang on `batten-check`; the warm job and `rust.yml`'s `cross` job must move only together. `semver-` IS DELIBERATELY NOT WARMED, and the file says why. Its own block records that it builds RUSTDOC with a different rustc than every other job, which is why it holds a separate key. A warm job running `cargo build --workspace` would fill that family with host artifacts the reader does not want while the rustdoc build stayed cold -- occupying the slot with the wrong content, which is worse than the cold build it replaces. The first draft of this change did exactly that and was removed before it shipped. NOT VERIFIABLE LOCALLY, and stated rather than implied: a cache hit only exists in CI. `ci-cache-declared` and `batten-check` pass here, which is the most a local run can say. The proof is the first pull request after this lands. Refs: CLOUD-1453, CLOUD-1477, CLOUD-1416 Admits: 105afda348abc87cfed8fcf01d9ffc73a7d0e887c845b76b831c0e507c38a1fb Admits-rule: protected-mutation Admits-verdict: path write refused Admits-subject: .github/workflows/release-plz.yml Admits-anchor: call:465d4692b61c2baa2fa61a13e69defc1dc65c56b Admits-epoch: 128333a421e3b73849dd28278ccd686c5c2604ff0e9d124c48b411cc7b1bb3f8 Admits-author: alec@wenzowski.com Admits-prev: e320b15216a7f81f8b17b231e5f62f128ca8b373499501bcc3fdbbf7d8ecf45f Admits-answer-lost: The `cross-` and `semver-` rust-cache families have no warm writer on trunk — only `ci-` (arm64 and x64) and `windows-` do, at release-plz.yml:138, :220 and :260. So every pull request cold-builds both jobs, and each then uploads a multi-hundred-MB entry scoped to `refs/pull/N/merge` that no other pull request can ever read. That is what fills the 10 GiB store `cache-sweep.yml` was built to reclaim (measured on CLOUD-1453: 10.77 GiB, 81% of it four already-merged PRs). Both jobs are required checks, so every branch pays both on every lap. Admits-answer-precondition: The surface this class names is a pull request, and this write is in one: PR #921 on branch claude/glacial-ci-regression-d9qtr3, where a reviewer sees the diff. No batten verb authors a workflow job; `batten` has no generator for `.github/workflows/**`, so writing the file directly is the only route left. `ci-local-parity` and `ci-cache-declared` check the edit before it lands. Admits-answer-rejected-route: Rejected "point the orphaned readers at the already-warm `ci-` family instead of adding writers": rust.yml:307 already records why that is wrong — a second leg restoring a shared entry thrashes it, and `cross` builds a windows-gnu target and `semver` a base-revision closure, neither of which is the `ci-` host artifact set. Sharing would trade a cold build for a thrashed entry. The repository's own established pattern is a warm writer per family, which is what this follows. Admits: 83adfd02e2fc830b35f9e1d4414712d69ce26ee757f48742651ce6bd164afa98 Admits-rule: protected-mutation Admits-verdict: path write refused Admits-subject: .github/workflows/rust.yml Admits-anchor: call:465d4692b61c2baa2fa61a13e69defc1dc65c56b Admits-epoch: 128333a421e3b73849dd28278ccd686c5c2604ff0e9d124c48b411cc7b1bb3f8 Admits-author: alec@wenzowski.com Admits-prev: 8efa23f5401b475d58c607f3ae8e2adf60dbca5cd2df506ffb00546de908fcb6 Admits-answer-lost: Without `save-if: false` on the `cross-` and `semver-` readers, both keep writing a multi-hundred-MB entry per pull request scoped to `refs/pull/N/merge` that no other pull request can read — the store pressure CLOUD-1453 measured at 10.77 GiB against a 10 GiB ceiling, 81% of it four already-merged PRs. This is the reader half of a pair: the warm writers just added to release-plz.yml are what make these families readable, and a writer without a quiet reader leaves the waste in place. Admits-answer-precondition: The surface this class names is a pull request, and this write is in one: PR #921, where a reviewer sees the diff. No batten verb authors a workflow step, so writing the file directly is the only route left, and `ci-local-parity` plus `ci-cache-declared` check the edit before it lands. Admits-answer-rejected-route: Rejected "leave the readers writing and rely on cache-sweep to reclaim": that is the arrangement in place today and it treats a daily sweep as a substitute for not generating the garbage. The `ci-` family's own pattern is the opposite and is what this follows — every PR-side reader of a warmed family carries `save-if: false` (ci.yml:420, :846, commit-lint.yml:138, rust.yml:500).
`darwin-link` is in `CI_REQUIRED_CHECKS`, so every ready pays it, and nothing
on the trunk wrote the `aarch64-apple-darwin` family. It cold-built the Darwin
cross-link every run and then wrote a `refs/pull/N/merge`-scoped entry no other
pull request could read — the waste CLOUD-1453 measured as 81% of a 10.77 GiB
store.
Measured cold on run 34332015804: 242s, the second-longest completed job on the
pull request behind `semver`. On the next run, with a warm entry the branch had
written for itself, the same job was 63s. The trunk writer makes that the
steady state rather than an accident of which run went first.
`cache-warm-darwin-link` mirrors `cache-warm-cross`: same guard shape, same
`continue-on-error`, and it runs `mise run darwin-link aarch64-apple-darwin`,
which is exactly what the reader runs. The key is the literal triple because
the reader spells it `${{ matrix.target }}` over a single-leg matrix and
rust-cache sees only the expansion.
Refs: CLOUD-1225, CLOUD-1453
Admits: 329b33216aac8c3c8109c7a4d292a89180ab44f18e2d53fa38564b0b778fd64f
Admits-rule: protected-mutation
Admits-verdict: path write refused
Admits-subject: .github/workflows/rust.yml
Admits-anchor: call:37ca17e88d1fecc1ba7cfb50f8d9c84167806349
Admits-epoch: 06f972cbc634979ed332bb096796b59a6e56001a7c25c1844d8b353983197a36
Admits-author: alec@wenzowski.com
Admits-prev: 72ca277dfdc0cb731bfc41f0723adc1e7c5a75bdbb0924e46c5131b09bbcd3ba
Admits-answer-lost: `darwin-link` is in `CI_REQUIRED_CHECKS`, so every ready pays it, and nothing on the trunk writes the `aarch64-apple-darwin` family. Measured cold on run 34332015804 it was 242s, the second-longest completed job on the pull request; with a warm entry the branch happened to have written for itself, the same job was 63s on run 34333739544. Without `save-if: false` the reader keeps writing a `refs/pull/N/merge`-scoped entry no other pull request can read — the waste CLOUD-1453 measured as 81% of a 10.77 GiB store — and the fleet keeps paying the cold build on every ready.
Admits-answer-precondition: No batten verb authors a GitHub Actions workflow. The surface offers `check`, `enforce` and `doctor` over workflows as READS — `ci-tools-check`, `rust-paths-check`, `timeout-check` and `mise-action-floor` all adjudicate this file and none can write it — so editing `.github/workflows/rust.yml` directly is the only route to adding `save-if: false`. The write lands in PR #921 where a reviewer sees it in the diff, and `zizmor`, `actionlint` and `timeout-check` all ran green over it before this request.
Admits-answer-rejected-route: Rejected "config read first": I did read the config first — `batten.toml` declares no row that can add a cache posture to a workflow job, because the artifact is GitHub's schema and not batten's. Rejected "patch run first": there is no patch verb over workflow files on this surface; `batten` has no write subcommand reaching `.github/`, so there is nothing to run. What I did instead is read the sibling this change copies: `rust.yml:179-185`, the `cross-` reader's own `save-if: false` and its stated reason, and this edit is that block applied to the family beside it.
Admits: d085467abc96fe35b27da86944758c5ca1c940006725bf5049d9bad249167d89
Admits-rule: protected-mutation
Admits-verdict: path write refused
Admits-subject: .github/workflows/release-plz.yml
Admits-anchor: call:37ca17e88d1fecc1ba7cfb50f8d9c84167806349
Admits-epoch: 06f972cbc634979ed332bb096796b59a6e56001a7c25c1844d8b353983197a36
Admits-author: alec@wenzowski.com
Admits-prev: 004e22c424e198f92e983eba35d8412fc87144ee100d01d7b01381c83812cc3a
Admits-answer-lost: The `aarch64-apple-darwin` cache family has no writer on the trunk at all, so every pull request cold-builds the Darwin cross-link and then writes an entry scoped to `refs/pull/N/merge` that no other pull request can read. Measured on run 34332015804 that cold job was 242s and it is in `CI_REQUIRED_CHECKS`, so the whole fleet pays it on every ready. Without this job the `save-if: false` on the reader would be strictly worse than the status quo — a read-only consumer of a family nothing writes reads empty forever, which is what `read-family-has-a-warm-writer` refuses.
Admits-answer-precondition: No batten verb authors a GitHub Actions workflow. The surface offers `check`, `enforce` and `doctor` over workflows as READS — `ci-tools-check`, `timeout-check`, `release-tracking-check`, `publish-credential-check` and `mise-action-floor` all adjudicate this file and none can write it — so adding the `cache-warm-darwin-link` job to `.github/workflows/release-plz.yml` directly is the only route left. The write lands in PR #921 where a reviewer sees it in the diff, and `zizmor`, `actionlint`, `timeout-check`, `ci-tools-check` and `release-tracking-check` all ran green over it before this request.
Admits-answer-rejected-route: Rejected "config read first": read first, and `batten.toml` declares no row that can add a job to a workflow — the artifact is GitHub's schema, not batten's, so the config surface cannot express it. Rejected "patch run first": `batten` has no write subcommand reaching `.github/`, so there is no patch verb to run. What I did instead is read the sibling this job copies: `cache-warm-cross` at `release-plz.yml:282-320`, added in this same pull request for the identical defect, and this job is that shape with the reader's own `install_args` and command substituted.
…it expands
`ci-cache-declared` resolves a cache family from the `shared-key` AS WRITTEN in
the workflow. `cache-warm-darwin-link` spelled the expansion,
`aarch64-apple-darwin`, while `rust.yml`'s reader spells `${{ matrix.target }}`
over a single-leg matrix — one family to GitHub and two to the module. So the
reader carried `save-if: false` against a family the gate could see no writer
for, which is strictly worse than the cold build it replaced: read-only against
an empty family reads empty forever.
Measured locally rather than inferred:
`ci_cache_declared::this_repository_is_clean_today` failed with
`read-family-has-a-warm-writer` on `.github/workflows/rust.yml:206`, the
`darwin-link` job, with the warm job already committed. 39/39 pass after this.
The fix mirrors the reader's matrix onto the writer instead of flattening the
reader's key to the literal. Both spellings make one family; only this one keeps
the reader's recorded promise that restoring the second Darwin leg is a one-word
change — it is now one word on each side.
Refs: CLOUD-1225, CLOUD-1453
Admits: 1556cc76f8824f9cc3715807b22fe4731e021becabc8e92054074b63eaf78b2b
Admits-rule: protected-mutation
Admits-verdict: path write refused
Admits-subject: .github/workflows/release-plz.yml
Admits-anchor: call:516cbbb7e251814c615814762e2b00963e627e6f
Admits-epoch: 06f972cbc634979ed332bb096796b59a6e56001a7c25c1844d8b353983197a36
Admits-author: alec@wenzowski.com
Admits-prev: d085467abc96fe35b27da86944758c5ca1c940006725bf5049d9bad249167d89
Admits-answer-lost: The gate that motivated the previous commit still fires without this. `ci-cache-declared` resolves a cache family from the `shared-key` AS WRITTEN, so the writer spelling the expansion `aarch64-apple-darwin` while the reader spells `${{ matrix.target }}` is two families to the module and one to GitHub. Measured locally: `ci_cache_declared::this_repository_is_clean_today` failed with `read-family-has-a-warm-writer` on `.github/workflows/rust.yml:206` — the `darwin-link` job — with the warm job already committed. So the reader would carry `save-if: false` against a family the gate cannot see a writer for, which is strictly worse than before: read-only against an empty family reads empty forever.
Admits-answer-precondition: No batten verb authors a GitHub Actions workflow — `check`, `enforce` and `doctor` read them and none writes one — so correcting `cache-warm-darwin-link`'s `shared-key` spelling in `.github/workflows/release-plz.yml` directly is the only route left. The write lands in PR #921 where a reviewer sees it in the diff, and `zizmor`, `actionlint`, `timeout-check`, `ci-tools-check`, `release-tracking-check` and the `ci_cache_declared`/`ci_hygiene` suites all ran green over it before this request.
Admits-answer-rejected-route: Rejected "config read first": read first, and `batten.toml` declares no row that can spell a workflow job's cache key — the artifact is GitHub's schema, not batten's. Rejected "patch run first": `batten` has no write subcommand reaching `.github/`, so there is no patch verb to run. The alternative I rejected on the merits was spelling the READER's key as the literal triple instead: that would also make one family, but it would discard the reader's own recorded promise that restoring the second Darwin leg is a one-word change. Mirroring the matrix onto the writer keeps that promise on both sides.
… had one `ci.yml`'s `perf` job restores `perf-` and then writes a full `--release` target directory on top of it, scoped to `refs/pull/N/merge` where no other pull request can read it. `perf.yml`'s own job has been this family's writer all along: daily schedule, `runs-on: ubuntu-latest`, the same `shared-key` — same key, same architecture, entry on `refs/heads/main`. The reader was paying for a write nobody could use, on the one profile no other job builds. The job was 420s on run 34332015804. `save-if: false` alone would have been refused, and the refusal would have been the gate's mistake rather than the change's. `warmed` was built from `on_push` only, and defended that with "trunk writers in this repository are push-triggered" — but its own operative sentence is that GitHub scopes a cache read to the run's ref plus the base branch, and a scheduled run on the default branch has ref `refs/heads/main` exactly as a pushed one does. The bound described habits, not the mechanism. It is now `trunk_writer`: push OR schedule. The CLOUD-1331 carve-out that comment invoked survives untouched — it settled `perf`'s BASE ARM, a separate entry keyed to the merge base, which no clause here reaches. Naming it in defence of excluding `perf-` conflated two caches that share a job and nothing else. `coverage-` and `fuzz-` become warmed under the widened set, which changes nothing: both rules require `on_pull_request` and neither workflow has it. Two cases, both directions: a scheduled writer warms its family, and a scheduled writer on another architecture still leaves the reader empty — so the widening cannot pass by warming everything. Refs: CLOUD-1225, CLOUD-1453 Admits: e70bf10c2a6ce2dbdce27b382ca07717d8afc6aee79dcdd64585e76be6dbd323 Admits-rule: protected-mutation Admits-verdict: path write refused Admits-subject: .github/workflows/ci.yml Admits-anchor: call:164689fa3fbdd90affc90726fb592cc78ac63c66 Admits-epoch: 06f972cbc634979ed332bb096796b59a6e56001a7c25c1844d8b353983197a36 Admits-author: alec@wenzowski.com Admits-prev: 14a7813f18d11c452bb5851acf9aad131e3f63a3e7c0ede84f7ca15db7325b7e Admits-answer-lost: `perf.yml`'s daily job already writes the `perf-` family from `main`, on `ubuntu-latest`, under this exact `shared-key` — same key, same architecture, so its entry is readable by every pull request. Without this, `ci.yml`'s `perf` job keeps writing a full `--release` target directory on top of it, scoped to `refs/pull/N/merge` where nothing else can reach it. That is the largest single entry any reader in this workflow produces, for the one profile no other job builds, and it is the store pressure `cache-sweep` exists to reclaim — CLOUD-1453 measured 81% of a 10.77 GiB store as merged pull requests' unreadable entries. Measured on run 34332015804 the job was 420s. Admits-answer-precondition: No batten verb authors a GitHub Actions workflow — `check`, `enforce` and `doctor` read them and none writes one — so adding `save-if: false` to the `perf` job in `.github/workflows/ci.yml` directly is the only route left. The write lands in PR #921 where a reviewer sees it in the diff, and `zizmor`, `actionlint`, `timeout-check`, `ci-tools-check`, `policy test` (852 cases) and the `ci_cache_declared`/`ci_hygiene` suites (39/39) all ran green over it before this request. Admits-answer-rejected-route: Rejected "config read first": read first, and `batten.toml` declares no row that can set a workflow job's cache posture — the artifact is GitHub's schema, not batten's. Rejected "patch run first": `batten` has no write subcommand reaching `.github/`, so there is no patch verb to run. The alternative I rejected on the merits was adding `save-if: false` alone: `ci-cache-declared`'s `warmed` set counted `push` triggers only, so the gate could not see `perf.yml`'s scheduled writer and `read-family-has-a-warm-writer` would have fired on this job. Widening that predicate to `trunk_writer` is the other half of this same commit, and it is why this write is safe rather than merely quiet.
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`delay-waivers-not-growing` and `spawn-widening` both fired on ONE physical line: the `#[expect(clippy::disallowed_methods)]` over a poll loop's `std::thread::sleep`. The ratchet counts that lint name across engine source and its `no_fix_reason` refuses the obvious dodge in advance — "a waiver is not a fix ... Adding a twelfth exemption is the thing this row refuses" — and `spawn-widening` matches added clippy-escape lines, so a waiver would have been refused by the second row anyway. The two are mutually reinforcing and they were right: this wait has a terminal state to block on and therefore needs no delay. A worker thread owns the child and calls `wait`; the caller blocks on `recv_timeout(suite_bound())`. A suite that returns wakes it immediately and one that hangs runs into the bound — no interval to tune, nothing standing in for an exit condition, which is the line `clippy.toml` draws. Engine-source count is back to 11 and `mutate.rs` carries none. The kill stays child-only. Signalling the process group is what reddened three `symbols` cases in CI: `kill(-pid)` addresses whatever group carries that id, and `process_group(0)` is best effort with an invisible failure, so when the group never formed the signal reached sibling test processes under the parallel runner. Clippy caught three more on the way — `similar_names`, `single_match_else`, `unnecessary_wraps` — each fixed in the code rather than waived; the last is why reading the capture back is now its own function, shared by both exits. The `[[waiver]]` is for the watchdog's anti-vacuity case, and it is the route this rule declares rather than a hatch. The remedy it prefers is `cfg!` inside the case, checked and rejected on the merits: the case reaches `TOY_GATE`, `CAUGHT` and `lend_bats`, all `#[cfg(unix)]` because bats is a bash program Windows can neither symlink nor execute, so a `cfg!` arm would not type-check. `override request` was deliberately not used — batten.toml records it measured as a local/CI parity trap on this exact class. Refs: CLOUD-1726, CLOUD-1225 Admits: 621e12380a9b4096f8fd8de2145d4e4d1246c9a9c9384d3cb83d490e710e5ef7 Admits-rule: protected-mutation Admits-verdict: path write refused Admits-subject: batten.toml Admits-anchor: call:9c1f5ed4a8b3e3d6986a604005f3dac620b3cfa4 Admits-epoch: 9f9763f897549b32719d92ed349405de4786d62107e40394d5a7b7d87528c9b6 Admits-author: alec@wenzowski.com Admits-prev: 8280406b2acdf7d9f81889e8cc9fdf16ee0d3a6a3f3b2b6f314af8944791a8a1 Admits-answer-lost: CI's `batten-check` is red on `crates/batten/tests/it/mutate.rs platform-gated-test-added`. The case it names is the anti-vacuity for CLOUD-1726: `BATS_TEST_TIMEOUT` was removed because the runner does not reap its `sleep N` watchdog on a FAILING case, and a caught mutation is a failing case — that removal took the `mutate` module from 92.6s to 2.4s and the whole `it` suite from 260.2s to 159.0s. Without a bound of our own a hanging mutant would hold a sweep forever, and without this case the removal is indistinguishable from having no bound at all. Dropping the case to satisfy the gate would delete the only proof the replacement works. Admits-answer-precondition: `batten config` exposes only `show`, `epoch`, `deprecations` and `lint` — every one a read. There is no verb that authors a `[[waiver]]` row, so writing `batten.toml` directly is the only route left. The write lands in PR #921 where a reviewer sees it in the diff, and `mise run config-lint` ran green over it (0 smells) before this request. Admits-answer-rejected-route: Rejected the route this rule itself prefers, and only after checking it: the declared remedy is `cfg!` inside the case rather than an attribute over it, and it does not type-check here. The case reaches `TOY_GATE` (:107), `CAUGHT` (:134) and `lend_bats` (:177), each `#[cfg(unix)]` because bats is a bash program with no extension that Windows can neither symlink nor execute — so on that target the three items do not exist and a `cfg!` arm would fail to compile. That is the one bar this route is held to, and it is the same argument the existing `provision.rs` waiver makes. Also rejected `override request`, deliberately: `batten.toml:13440-13455` records it measured as a local/CI parity trap on this exact class — an admission's record is keyed to the checkout's state directory, so a spend reads green to its author and CI raises the same finding on the same commit.
`delay-waivers-not-growing` and `spawn-widening` both fired on ONE physical line: the `#[expect(clippy::disallowed_methods)]` over a poll loop's `std::thread::sleep`. The ratchet counts that lint name across engine source and its `no_fix_reason` refuses the obvious dodge in advance — "a waiver is not a fix ... Adding a twelfth exemption is the thing this row refuses" — and `spawn-widening` matches added clippy-escape lines, so a waiver would have been refused by the second row anyway. The two are mutually reinforcing and they were right: this wait has a terminal state to block on and therefore needs no delay. A worker thread owns the child and calls `wait`; the caller blocks on `recv_timeout(suite_bound())`. A suite that returns wakes it immediately and one that hangs runs into the bound — no interval to tune, nothing standing in for an exit condition, which is the line `clippy.toml` draws. Engine-source count is back to 11 and `mutate.rs` carries none. The kill stays child-only. Signalling the process group is what reddened three `symbols` cases in CI: `kill(-pid)` addresses whatever group carries that id, and `process_group(0)` is best effort with an invisible failure, so when the group never formed the signal reached sibling test processes under the parallel runner. Clippy caught three more on the way — `similar_names`, `single_match_else`, `unnecessary_wraps` — each fixed in the code rather than waived; the last is why reading the capture back is now its own function, shared by both exits. The `[[waiver]]` is for the watchdog's anti-vacuity case, and it is the route this rule declares rather than a hatch. The remedy it prefers is `cfg!` inside the case, checked and rejected on the merits: the case reaches `TOY_GATE`, `CAUGHT` and `lend_bats`, all `#[cfg(unix)]` because bats is a bash program Windows can neither symlink nor execute, so a `cfg!` arm would not type-check. `override request` was deliberately not used — batten.toml records it measured as a local/CI parity trap on this exact class. Refs: CLOUD-1726, CLOUD-1225 Admits: 621e12380a9b4096f8fd8de2145d4e4d1246c9a9c9384d3cb83d490e710e5ef7 Admits-rule: protected-mutation Admits-verdict: path write refused Admits-subject: batten.toml Admits-anchor: call:9c1f5ed4a8b3e3d6986a604005f3dac620b3cfa4 Admits-epoch: 9f9763f897549b32719d92ed349405de4786d62107e40394d5a7b7d87528c9b6 Admits-author: alec@wenzowski.com Admits-prev: 8280406b2acdf7d9f81889e8cc9fdf16ee0d3a6a3f3b2b6f314af8944791a8a1 Admits-answer-lost: CI's `batten-check` is red on `crates/batten/tests/it/mutate.rs platform-gated-test-added`. The case it names is the anti-vacuity for CLOUD-1726: `BATS_TEST_TIMEOUT` was removed because the runner does not reap its `sleep N` watchdog on a FAILING case, and a caught mutation is a failing case — that removal took the `mutate` module from 92.6s to 2.4s and the whole `it` suite from 260.2s to 159.0s. Without a bound of our own a hanging mutant would hold a sweep forever, and without this case the removal is indistinguishable from having no bound at all. Dropping the case to satisfy the gate would delete the only proof the replacement works. Admits-answer-precondition: `batten config` exposes only `show`, `epoch`, `deprecations` and `lint` — every one a read. There is no verb that authors a `[[waiver]]` row, so writing `batten.toml` directly is the only route left. The write lands in PR #921 where a reviewer sees it in the diff, and `mise run config-lint` ran green over it (0 smells) before this request. Admits-answer-rejected-route: Rejected the route this rule itself prefers, and only after checking it: the declared remedy is `cfg!` inside the case rather than an attribute over it, and it does not type-check here. The case reaches `TOY_GATE` (:107), `CAUGHT` (:134) and `lend_bats` (:177), each `#[cfg(unix)]` because bats is a bash program with no extension that Windows can neither symlink nor execute — so on that target the three items do not exist and a `cfg!` arm would fail to compile. That is the one bar this route is held to, and it is the same argument the existing `provision.rs` waiver makes. Also rejected `override request`, deliberately: `batten.toml:13440-13455` records it measured as a local/CI parity trap on this exact class — an admission's record is keyed to the checkout's state directory, so a spend reads green to its author and CI raises the same finding on the same commit. Weakens: waiver-added waiver[platform-gated-test-added][crates/batten/tests/it/mutate.rs]
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Six required checks read as "no verdict" over a head whose every job had
succeeded, and nothing reached `main` for six hours while three branches took
the landing lease in turn and held it.
$ SHA=2ce05b82 mise run checks-green
checks green: pending -- required check(s) with no verdict:
ci skipped, bats skipped, cross skipped, commit-lint skipped,
semver skipped, windows skipped
GitHub registers the path-filtered COPY of a workflow one to five seconds AFTER
the copy that runs, and the copy that does not apply concludes `skipped`. `ci`
succeeded at 02:34:02 and was overruled by a `skipped` twin at 02:34:03. So the
twin is the later run by `started_at` and won outright.
CLOUD-436 IS COMPLETED BY THIS, NOT WEAKENED. That rule ordered by start time
because a draft-era skip set "vetoes a verdict that already exists" -- which
fixes the case where the residue is OLDER. Here it is newer, so the same veto
came back through the ordering introduced to end it. `absent_ok` does not reach
it either: that column excuses ABSENCE, not a skipped conclusion, and `ci`,
`bats` and `commit-lint` are not in it.
STILL-RUNNING IS DELIBERATELY NOT COVERED. A rerun in flight over a name that
already succeeded must still read `Pending` -- the new run may fail, and
preferring the standing success would be a false green on the one path where
waiting is correct. Only a run that COMPLETED without producing a verdict is
refused the displacement. An unorderable pair is excluded too, so a reading
carrying no ordering key still falls to the least conclusive row and can never
read greener than it did before ordering existed.
ONE CASE IS REVERSED AND IT IS THE POINT OF REVIEW HERE.
`a_success_superseded_by_a_skip_is_not_an_answer` asserted the draft economy
(CLOUD-247, CLOUD-327): a re-drafted PR must not keep reading green off a stale
run. That case is real, and it cannot be told from this one -- both are "a
success, then a later skip", differing only in the gap, and a gate deciding on a
duration would be estimating rather than deciding (rule 3). `check_suite`, the
workflow-run id and the check-run id were each checked as discriminators and
none is one: two workflow files dispatched by a single push take their ids in
arbitrary relative order.
Its concern moves to the gate that already owns it. `fast-forward.yml` refuses a
draft head unconditionally and before any checks reading, added by CLOUD-853 for
exactly that reason. A re-drafted PR cannot fast-forward whatever this predicate
answers, so the cost of the reversal is one wasted lap of `land` rather than a
merge nobody graded.
Verified: 35/35 in `checks_green`, including the three anti-vacuity arms --
a rerun in flight still Pending, an older skip still losing to the verdict that
followed it, and a later real failure still red.
Refs: CLOUD-1722
THE CONSUMER'S BATS TIMEOUT WAS COSTING ~490s OF EVERY `verify`, LOCAL AND CI.
`mise.toml`'s `[env]` sets `BATS_TEST_TIMEOUT = "300"`, chosen because a real
`land.bats` case once sat at 0% CPU for forty minutes holding the landing lease.
`[env]` reaches every process, so it also reached the toy repositories a mutation
sweep builds -- three files and one filtered case, under a five-minute watchdog.
AND THE SWEEP WAITS OUT THE WHOLE BOUND EVEN WHEN THE CASE PASSES. Measured on
`mutate::the_tree_is_restored_between_rows`, which runs two bats suites:
bound case
300s 600.481s
5s 10.664s
unset 0.480s
Exactly linear, 1250x between the ends. `bats-exec-test` aborts its countdown on
a normal finish and closes fds 0-255 on the watchdog subshell precisely so this
cannot happen, and a plain capture of the same invocation returns in ~140ms --
so those protections do work, and do not under `spawn`'s `.output()`, which
reads stdout and stderr to EOF on two separate pipes. Why is CLOUD-1726's
remaining question; it does not block this, because the consumer's number was
never the right bound for a staged toy tree either way.
A BOUND, NOT ITS REMOVAL. Unsetting is the fastest column and the wrong fix: a
mutant that hangs is exactly what a sweep must survive, and with no watchdog
`.output()` blocks forever. So the sweep declares its own, overridable under a
batten-owned name so it cannot collide with the `BATS_*` namespace the runner
owns. Whole `mutate::*` suite: 35 passed, 94s.
THE DECLARATION THAT DID NOTHING, KEPT AS A COMMENT. `checks_green.rs` gains the
`#MUTANT` row `unanswered-displaces-a-verdict`, and it was first written as
`/// #MUTANT-SUITE` inside a doc comment. `OPENERS` is `["//", "#"]` and the
marker must follow one directly, so the third slash left `/ MUTANT-SUITE` and
matched nothing: census stayed green at 129 gates over a declaration nobody
would ever sweep -- the coverage-shaped nothing the verb exists to refuse,
written into the very commit meant to close that gap. Moved to `//MUTANT-SUITE`,
the census went 129 -> 130 and reported `uncovered`, and `engine-checks-green`
is now in `MUTANT_GATES`. The trap is recorded above the row.
Refs: CLOUD-1726
…reading it TWO PROSE DEFECTS, BOTH MEASURED IN THE SESSION THAT FOUND THEM. `rules/scanning.md` routes a whole-tree question to an instrument, and all four of its rows chose between READERS. The fifth question -- what does this gate DECIDE over this subject -- has no reader as its instrument, so it was answered by whichever neighbour was closest, which is the exact failure row two's own paragraph describes one category out. Measured 2026-09-09, three answers to one question: why did `checks green` report `pending` over a head whose every job had succeeded? Reading `pr_watch.rs` gave a mechanism. Reading `checks_green.rs:33-39` gave the opposite, and the first was retracted into two Linear rows. `SHA=... mise run checks-green` printed the answer in four seconds, and the first reading had been right -- so the retraction had to be retracted. Row four's own sentence carries over unchanged: source feels like an answer and running the predicate feels like a detour. It is worse than recall, because it LOOKS like rigour. AGENTS.md said "Redirect to a file" for a backgrounded command. The redirect was never what made the pager and `nohup` cases safe -- those are separately named and separately gated -- and the harness already captures a backgrounded command's output to a file it shows the HUMAN. So the redirect does not add capture, it MOVES it: measured on one `land` lap, 0 bytes in the harness's file and 159,267 in the scratchpad only the agent reads. The human sees a task running with no output for its entire life, and a wedged task is then byte-identical to healthy silence -- which is most of one session's "is it running?" exchanges, over a loop that had genuinely stalled twice. Both refusals are kept exactly as they were. What changed is the sentence that was right about its own hazard and carried an unrecorded cost. THE BUDGET REFUSED THE FIRST TWO DRAFTS, which is the file's own cap working: `policy-budget` reported 203 lines of 199 and then 200 of 199, because AGENTS.md shares the ceiling with `.serena/project.yml#initial_prompt`. The measurement moved to CLOUD-1736 and the sentence is two lines, as the one it replaced was. Refs: CLOUD-1735, CLOUD-1736
Two comments added on this branch named the consumer artifacts they reasoned about -- the task runner's manifest and the forge's fast-forward workflow path. `no_artifact_name_reaches_the_core` refused the tree at `src/mutate.rs:933` and `src/checks_green.rs:870`. Non-negotiable rule 1 holds over a comment as much as over code: the core knows FORMATS, and which path carries which format is the consumer's own config (CLOUD-772). Both are reworded to name the role rather than the artifact, which costs the comments nothing -- neither sentence was ever about the path. Refs: CLOUD-1726, CLOUD-1722
…ys yours ROW FIVE TAUGHT THE FAILURE IT WAS WRITTEN TO PREVENT, TWO COMMITS LATER. `5070baff`'s successor added "what does this gate DECIDE over this subject -> run it, and read the exit code". That names the instrument and says nothing about what the reading LICENSES, and the same session then read a floor's exit code as a verdict. Measured 2026-09-09. Four rows this branch filed were refused `filed-unrefined`. Their Ready blocks were repaired, `ready lint` answered `satisfies the checkable Ready clauses` on all four, and that was reported to a human as grooming done. Two of the four had had their required `tests` key filled with a test file picked off a glob and a mutation name invented to fit -- well-formed, unverifiable by the gate, false. One of those two was a row whose own clause two said its mechanism was still undecided between two uncosted candidates, which is exactly the case `REQUIRED_CLAIMS` exists to catch; the fabricated fill hid it from the gate built to see it. The gate behaved as designed. `ready.rs` says so about itself where `REQUIRED_CLAIMS` is declared: the prose path validates the clauses that ARE there and says nothing about absence, and the claims object exists because a key cannot be well-formed prose. A key CAN be well-formed and untrue. So the file now carries the distinction and its discriminator. A DECIDER takes the whole question as its object and its zero is the answer. A FLOOR takes a necessary condition and its zero says only that no known defect was found. One question separates them: can this gate be satisfied by content that is well-formed and false? Prose is feedforward only (rule 2). The mechanism half is CLOUD-1567's, which already asks for it and already names `ready-lint` as the gate that cannot see the difference; the measurement and a proposed column shape are recorded there rather than restated here. Refs: CLOUD-1567, CLOUD-1735
An adversarial pass over the section landed in `3abaa76e` refuted its discriminator as stated and the mechanism proposed alongside it. THE DISCRIMINATOR OVER-CLAIMED. "Can this gate be satisfied by content that is well-formed and false? If it can, it is a floor" reads as a property of the rule. It is a property of the pair -- this gate, your question -- and the counterexample is in the tree: `[budget.instructions]` is a DECIDER over "is this surface inside its line budget" and a FLOOR over "is this surface correct". CLOUD-1687 exists because it read green at 199 of 199 while the content had forked from the spec it cites. One rule, both roles, settled by which question the reader brought. SO THE OBVIOUS MECHANISM DOES NOT EXIST, AND THAT IS NOW STATED RATHER THAN LEFT AS AN OWED DEBT. A column on each rule declaring its kind asks a rule to declare a property it does not have, and a gate whose object is "which question did you mean" is a judgement, which non-negotiable rule 3 forbids. The section is therefore feedforward BY CONSTRUCTION rather than by omission -- the same disposition this file already takes for instrument suitability, and for the same reason. What a mechanism here can still reach stays CLOUD-1567's. The rest of the section stands unchanged; its closing sentence was already the relational form and is what the discriminator now matches. Refs: CLOUD-1567, CLOUD-1687
The commit that added row five did not touch the sentence introducing the table, so the file opened by announcing three questions above five of them -- stale, and wrong about the file it introduces. It now names five and says what separates the new one, which is the distinction the section below the table turns on. Refs: CLOUD-1735
`[[mcp.result]]` declared `save_issue`, `get_issue` and `list_issues` and not
`get_document`, so every document read was handed back re-serialised rather than
reduced -- the "more out than in" shape the verb already reports for an
undeclared method.
before undeclared, whole body
after reduced -- stored 15,922 bytes, emitted 626
25x on one call, measured against the restored Definition of Ready & Done. A
document's `content` IS its body, so it is the widest field the tracker returns
and the one nobody reading a projection asked for.
DROPPING IT COSTS A GATE NOTHING, for the reason the `get_issue` block already
states of its own narrowing: `mcp call` stores every response whole, so a gate
reads the body from the capture store by key while the model receives a dozen
fields. The two have never needed to be the same channel.
THE PROVENANCE FIELDS ARE NOT DECORATION, and choosing the set for size would
have been the error. `updatedAt`, `updatedBy` and `team` are the three that made
CLOUD-1742 legible -- a spec AGENTS.md cites as authoritative was overwritten in
place and reparented to another team, and those fields are what showed it. A
projection of `id`, `title` and `url` alone would have reported the clobbered
document as the same document.
Measured context: 64 MCP results reached one session's window and 2 carried a
reduction marker.
Refs: CLOUD-1742
Admits: 8280406b2acdf7d9f81889e8cc9fdf16ee0d3a6a3f3b2b6f314af8944791a8a1
Admits-rule: protected-mutation
Admits-verdict: path write refused
Admits-subject: batten.toml
Admits-anchor: call:2586367af13dc07c71d76242280d3887412cef08
Admits-epoch: 2ef723b282192747aefd09a195aecc9c780482f1d325c3d93449d7a8bb3f5a3e
Admits-author: alec@wenzowski.com
Admits-prev: 7b50267372a83706050e0f3c0537978e5fc258d6c6bfffbc2cf6a73de7587b4b
Admits-answer-lost: Every `get_document` call keeps being handed back re-serialised rather than reduced — the "more out than in" shape `crates/batten/src/mcp.rs:466-468` records, measured at 20,366 bytes emitted against 17,313 stored for the sibling method. Measured this session: 64 MCP results reached the window and 2 carried a reduction marker. It is also the precondition for CLOUD-1742's clobber detection, which needs `updatedAt`/`updatedBy`/`team` projected rather than buried in a whole-body response.
Admits-answer-precondition: `batten config` exposes only `show`, `epoch`, `deprecations` and `lint` — every one a read. There is no verb that authors a `[[mcp.result]]` row, so the surface this class names cannot express the change and writing `batten.toml` directly is the only route left. The write lands in PR #921, where a reviewer sees it in the diff, and `mise run config-lint` checks it before it lands.
Admits-answer-rejected-route: Rejected "patch run first": there is no patch verb on the config surface — `batten config` has no write subcommand at all, so there is nothing to run. I did take "config read first": the `[[mcp.result]]` block for `get_issue` at `batten.toml:4365-4389` was read first and this row is modelled on it, including its stated reason that dropping a wide field is safe because `mcp call` stores every response whole for gates to read from the capture store.
…po once
89.0s -> 8.3s for the `agentic_record` suite; the replay case alone was 89.0s
isolated and 133.4s under `verify`'s load, ~22% of a 608s lap paid by every
agent on every branch.
TWO CHANGES, AND THE MEASUREMENTS SAY WHICH MATTERED.
`repo()` was rebuilt per mutation: 78 scratch trees, each writing the config and
both records, copying the module, then `git init` + `git add -A` + commit over
the whole tree. It is now built once per block, 78 builds -> 6, and the record is
rewritten in place under a repository that already exists.
The case was also ONE `#[test]` looping every block, so nextest's per-test
parallelism could not reach it -- one core busy and three idle. It is now six
tests, one per block.
1 repo + 1 check 1.140s (89.0s / 78, serial)
1 repo + 13 checks 2.127s (one block, isolated)
=> batten check ~82ms
=> repo() ~1.06s 93% of every original iteration
A FIRST PASS GOT THIS BACKWARDS and the wrong number is recorded in the code
comment as a caution. It timed `git init` alone at ~5.4ms on an EMPTY directory
and concluded the rebuilds were worth ~0.4s of the 89s -- measuring the cheap
primitive a helper calls rather than the helper. Timing the wrong thing reads as
rigour and is not.
THE SPLIT NEEDED ITS OWN ANTI-VACUITY, which is the only new assertion here. Six
tests replay six blocks by name and nothing else notices a seventh, so a corpus
that outgrows them would silently shrink the replay while every test stayed
green -- the coverage-shaped nothing this replay exists to refuse.
`the_replay_covers_every_trial_block` fails on that, and `REPLAYED_BLOCKS`
records the population the file covers.
CLOUD-1116's acceptance clause is unchanged: every required key still removed in
turn, every removal still asserted to fire, 6 x 13 = 78 mutations, now asserted
as 13 per block rather than 78 in aggregate. 17/17 pass.
Refs: CLOUD-1745, CLOUD-1116
89.0s -> 2.85s for `agentic_record`, 17/17 passing. Per block 14.8s -> 1.29s. THE SPLIT AND THE HOIST MADE AN E2E CHEAPER; THIS MOVES THE TIER. The replay still spawned the compiled binary once per mutation -- 78 processes, each reloading the whole policy bundle, to decide one Rego predicate. It now calls `rules::run_static`, the same read surface a consumer reaches, in-process. WHAT STAYS E2E, DELIBERATELY. This file's header names three claims only the compiled binary can prove: that the engine PARSES both records into `input.tree.documents`, that an array of tables arrives iterable, and that an absent record reaches `input.tree.missing` rather than being merely absent. The cases asserting those still spawn. The replay is none of them -- it asserts one predicate, 78 times. `run_static` is the engine, not a `with input as` stub, so the guarantee the header defends is unchanged. The scratch repository stays too: `input.tree.*` is defined over TRACKED paths, so git is what makes the surface non-empty. TWO THINGS THE FIRST ATTEMPT GOT WRONG, BOTH CAUGHT BY MEASURING. The whole committed verdict table was passed in, and `run_static` refused it -- a fixture enabling ONE module leaves every other row's class unraised, which "reads as coverage". Narrowed to the three `RAISED` names. The refusal was the engine being right. Then the vocabulary was rebuilt inside the loop, re-parsing the committed table 13 times per block: the tier moved and the block went 2.0s -> 4.4s. Hoisted. A conversion that loses the time it was made for is not a fix, and only the number says which happened. CLOUD-1116's acceptance clause is untouched: 6 blocks x 13 keys = 78 mutations, every removal still asserted to fire, `examined` and `fired` still confirmed explicitly rather than inferred from green. Refs: CLOUD-1750, CLOUD-1745, CLOUD-1116
`cross` is a required check that cold-built on every pull request AND uploaded a multi-hundred-MB entry scoped to `refs/pull/N/merge` that no other pull request could read. Both halves were waste: the build, and the write that filled the store without ever being restored. THE FAMILY HAD NO WRITER. `ci-` has had one since CLOUD-1416/1477 -- two, in fact, `cache-warm-linux` (arm64) and `cache-warm-linux-x64` -- and `windows-` has `cache-warm-windows`. `cross-` had none, so its readers restored nothing on every run by construction. BOTH HALVES LAND TOGETHER, and neither is safe alone: a reader given `save-if: false` with no writer is permanently cold, and a writer with a reader still writing leaves the store pressure in place. CLOUD-1453 measured that pressure at 10.77 GiB against a 10 GiB ceiling, 81% of it four already-merged PRs' unreadable entries -- which is what `cache-sweep.yml` exists to reclaim rather than a saving. x64 BECAUSE THE READER IS. rust-cache puts `runnerOS-runnerArch` inside the restore prefix (`config.ts:93`, before `:133`), so a writer on another arch writes an entry its reader cannot see. That is the trap CLOUD-1416 sprang on `batten-check`; the warm job and `rust.yml`'s `cross` job must move only together. `semver-` IS DELIBERATELY NOT WARMED, and the file says why. Its own block records that it builds RUSTDOC with a different rustc than every other job, which is why it holds a separate key. A warm job running `cargo build --workspace` would fill that family with host artifacts the reader does not want while the rustdoc build stayed cold -- occupying the slot with the wrong content, which is worse than the cold build it replaces. The first draft of this change did exactly that and was removed before it shipped. NOT VERIFIABLE LOCALLY, and stated rather than implied: a cache hit only exists in CI. `ci-cache-declared` and `batten-check` pass here, which is the most a local run can say. The proof is the first pull request after this lands. Refs: CLOUD-1453, CLOUD-1477, CLOUD-1416 Admits: 105afda348abc87cfed8fcf01d9ffc73a7d0e887c845b76b831c0e507c38a1fb Admits-rule: protected-mutation Admits-verdict: path write refused Admits-subject: .github/workflows/release-plz.yml Admits-anchor: call:465d4692b61c2baa2fa61a13e69defc1dc65c56b Admits-epoch: 128333a421e3b73849dd28278ccd686c5c2604ff0e9d124c48b411cc7b1bb3f8 Admits-author: alec@wenzowski.com Admits-prev: e320b15216a7f81f8b17b231e5f62f128ca8b373499501bcc3fdbbf7d8ecf45f Admits-answer-lost: The `cross-` and `semver-` rust-cache families have no warm writer on trunk — only `ci-` (arm64 and x64) and `windows-` do, at release-plz.yml:138, :220 and :260. So every pull request cold-builds both jobs, and each then uploads a multi-hundred-MB entry scoped to `refs/pull/N/merge` that no other pull request can ever read. That is what fills the 10 GiB store `cache-sweep.yml` was built to reclaim (measured on CLOUD-1453: 10.77 GiB, 81% of it four already-merged PRs). Both jobs are required checks, so every branch pays both on every lap. Admits-answer-precondition: The surface this class names is a pull request, and this write is in one: PR #921 on branch claude/glacial-ci-regression-d9qtr3, where a reviewer sees the diff. No batten verb authors a workflow job; `batten` has no generator for `.github/workflows/**`, so writing the file directly is the only route left. `ci-local-parity` and `ci-cache-declared` check the edit before it lands. Admits-answer-rejected-route: Rejected "point the orphaned readers at the already-warm `ci-` family instead of adding writers": rust.yml:307 already records why that is wrong — a second leg restoring a shared entry thrashes it, and `cross` builds a windows-gnu target and `semver` a base-revision closure, neither of which is the `ci-` host artifact set. Sharing would trade a cold build for a thrashed entry. The repository's own established pattern is a warm writer per family, which is what this follows. Admits: 83adfd02e2fc830b35f9e1d4414712d69ce26ee757f48742651ce6bd164afa98 Admits-rule: protected-mutation Admits-verdict: path write refused Admits-subject: .github/workflows/rust.yml Admits-anchor: call:465d4692b61c2baa2fa61a13e69defc1dc65c56b Admits-epoch: 128333a421e3b73849dd28278ccd686c5c2604ff0e9d124c48b411cc7b1bb3f8 Admits-author: alec@wenzowski.com Admits-prev: 8efa23f5401b475d58c607f3ae8e2adf60dbca5cd2df506ffb00546de908fcb6 Admits-answer-lost: Without `save-if: false` on the `cross-` and `semver-` readers, both keep writing a multi-hundred-MB entry per pull request scoped to `refs/pull/N/merge` that no other pull request can read — the store pressure CLOUD-1453 measured at 10.77 GiB against a 10 GiB ceiling, 81% of it four already-merged PRs. This is the reader half of a pair: the warm writers just added to release-plz.yml are what make these families readable, and a writer without a quiet reader leaves the waste in place. Admits-answer-precondition: The surface this class names is a pull request, and this write is in one: PR #921, where a reviewer sees the diff. No batten verb authors a workflow step, so writing the file directly is the only route left, and `ci-local-parity` plus `ci-cache-declared` check the edit before it lands. Admits-answer-rejected-route: Rejected "leave the readers writing and rely on cache-sweep to reclaim": that is the arrangement in place today and it treats a daily sweep as a substitute for not generating the garbage. The `ci-` family's own pattern is the opposite and is what this follows — every PR-side reader of a warmed family carries `save-if: false` (ci.yml:420, :846, commit-lint.yml:138, rust.yml:500).
`replayed_findings` takes `verdicts: &[DeclaredVerdict]`, so passing
`&verdicts` into `Vocabulary` borrowed it twice. `needless_borrow` under
`-D warnings`, which failed the `ci` job on run 34332015804 after 450s.
It reached CI because `cargo-clippy` carries `profiles = List("slow")` and
`git-hook.sh` passes `--profile '!slow'`, so the commit hook structurally
cannot see it. The instrument that can is `mise run lint:clippy`, and it was
not run before the push.
Refs: CLOUD-1745, CLOUD-1116
`darwin-link` is in `CI_REQUIRED_CHECKS`, so every ready pays it, and nothing
on the trunk wrote the `aarch64-apple-darwin` family. It cold-built the Darwin
cross-link every run and then wrote a `refs/pull/N/merge`-scoped entry no other
pull request could read — the waste CLOUD-1453 measured as 81% of a 10.77 GiB
store.
Measured cold on run 34332015804: 242s, the second-longest completed job on the
pull request behind `semver`. On the next run, with a warm entry the branch had
written for itself, the same job was 63s. The trunk writer makes that the
steady state rather than an accident of which run went first.
`cache-warm-darwin-link` mirrors `cache-warm-cross`: same guard shape, same
`continue-on-error`, and it runs `mise run darwin-link aarch64-apple-darwin`,
which is exactly what the reader runs. The key is the literal triple because
the reader spells it `${{ matrix.target }}` over a single-leg matrix and
rust-cache sees only the expansion.
Refs: CLOUD-1225, CLOUD-1453
Admits: 329b33216aac8c3c8109c7a4d292a89180ab44f18e2d53fa38564b0b778fd64f
Admits-rule: protected-mutation
Admits-verdict: path write refused
Admits-subject: .github/workflows/rust.yml
Admits-anchor: call:37ca17e88d1fecc1ba7cfb50f8d9c84167806349
Admits-epoch: 06f972cbc634979ed332bb096796b59a6e56001a7c25c1844d8b353983197a36
Admits-author: alec@wenzowski.com
Admits-prev: 72ca277dfdc0cb731bfc41f0723adc1e7c5a75bdbb0924e46c5131b09bbcd3ba
Admits-answer-lost: `darwin-link` is in `CI_REQUIRED_CHECKS`, so every ready pays it, and nothing on the trunk writes the `aarch64-apple-darwin` family. Measured cold on run 34332015804 it was 242s, the second-longest completed job on the pull request; with a warm entry the branch happened to have written for itself, the same job was 63s on run 34333739544. Without `save-if: false` the reader keeps writing a `refs/pull/N/merge`-scoped entry no other pull request can read — the waste CLOUD-1453 measured as 81% of a 10.77 GiB store — and the fleet keeps paying the cold build on every ready.
Admits-answer-precondition: No batten verb authors a GitHub Actions workflow. The surface offers `check`, `enforce` and `doctor` over workflows as READS — `ci-tools-check`, `rust-paths-check`, `timeout-check` and `mise-action-floor` all adjudicate this file and none can write it — so editing `.github/workflows/rust.yml` directly is the only route to adding `save-if: false`. The write lands in PR #921 where a reviewer sees it in the diff, and `zizmor`, `actionlint` and `timeout-check` all ran green over it before this request.
Admits-answer-rejected-route: Rejected "config read first": I did read the config first — `batten.toml` declares no row that can add a cache posture to a workflow job, because the artifact is GitHub's schema and not batten's. Rejected "patch run first": there is no patch verb over workflow files on this surface; `batten` has no write subcommand reaching `.github/`, so there is nothing to run. What I did instead is read the sibling this change copies: `rust.yml:179-185`, the `cross-` reader's own `save-if: false` and its stated reason, and this edit is that block applied to the family beside it.
Admits: d085467abc96fe35b27da86944758c5ca1c940006725bf5049d9bad249167d89
Admits-rule: protected-mutation
Admits-verdict: path write refused
Admits-subject: .github/workflows/release-plz.yml
Admits-anchor: call:37ca17e88d1fecc1ba7cfb50f8d9c84167806349
Admits-epoch: 06f972cbc634979ed332bb096796b59a6e56001a7c25c1844d8b353983197a36
Admits-author: alec@wenzowski.com
Admits-prev: 004e22c424e198f92e983eba35d8412fc87144ee100d01d7b01381c83812cc3a
Admits-answer-lost: The `aarch64-apple-darwin` cache family has no writer on the trunk at all, so every pull request cold-builds the Darwin cross-link and then writes an entry scoped to `refs/pull/N/merge` that no other pull request can read. Measured on run 34332015804 that cold job was 242s and it is in `CI_REQUIRED_CHECKS`, so the whole fleet pays it on every ready. Without this job the `save-if: false` on the reader would be strictly worse than the status quo — a read-only consumer of a family nothing writes reads empty forever, which is what `read-family-has-a-warm-writer` refuses.
Admits-answer-precondition: No batten verb authors a GitHub Actions workflow. The surface offers `check`, `enforce` and `doctor` over workflows as READS — `ci-tools-check`, `timeout-check`, `release-tracking-check`, `publish-credential-check` and `mise-action-floor` all adjudicate this file and none can write it — so adding the `cache-warm-darwin-link` job to `.github/workflows/release-plz.yml` directly is the only route left. The write lands in PR #921 where a reviewer sees it in the diff, and `zizmor`, `actionlint`, `timeout-check`, `ci-tools-check` and `release-tracking-check` all ran green over it before this request.
Admits-answer-rejected-route: Rejected "config read first": read first, and `batten.toml` declares no row that can add a job to a workflow — the artifact is GitHub's schema, not batten's, so the config surface cannot express it. Rejected "patch run first": `batten` has no write subcommand reaching `.github/`, so there is no patch verb to run. What I did instead is read the sibling this job copies: `cache-warm-cross` at `release-plz.yml:282-320`, added in this same pull request for the identical defect, and this job is that shape with the reader's own `install_args` and command substituted.
…it expands
`ci-cache-declared` resolves a cache family from the `shared-key` AS WRITTEN in
the workflow. `cache-warm-darwin-link` spelled the expansion,
`aarch64-apple-darwin`, while `rust.yml`'s reader spells `${{ matrix.target }}`
over a single-leg matrix — one family to GitHub and two to the module. So the
reader carried `save-if: false` against a family the gate could see no writer
for, which is strictly worse than the cold build it replaced: read-only against
an empty family reads empty forever.
Measured locally rather than inferred:
`ci_cache_declared::this_repository_is_clean_today` failed with
`read-family-has-a-warm-writer` on `.github/workflows/rust.yml:206`, the
`darwin-link` job, with the warm job already committed. 39/39 pass after this.
The fix mirrors the reader's matrix onto the writer instead of flattening the
reader's key to the literal. Both spellings make one family; only this one keeps
the reader's recorded promise that restoring the second Darwin leg is a one-word
change — it is now one word on each side.
Refs: CLOUD-1225, CLOUD-1453
Admits: 1556cc76f8824f9cc3715807b22fe4731e021becabc8e92054074b63eaf78b2b
Admits-rule: protected-mutation
Admits-verdict: path write refused
Admits-subject: .github/workflows/release-plz.yml
Admits-anchor: call:516cbbb7e251814c615814762e2b00963e627e6f
Admits-epoch: 06f972cbc634979ed332bb096796b59a6e56001a7c25c1844d8b353983197a36
Admits-author: alec@wenzowski.com
Admits-prev: d085467abc96fe35b27da86944758c5ca1c940006725bf5049d9bad249167d89
Admits-answer-lost: The gate that motivated the previous commit still fires without this. `ci-cache-declared` resolves a cache family from the `shared-key` AS WRITTEN, so the writer spelling the expansion `aarch64-apple-darwin` while the reader spells `${{ matrix.target }}` is two families to the module and one to GitHub. Measured locally: `ci_cache_declared::this_repository_is_clean_today` failed with `read-family-has-a-warm-writer` on `.github/workflows/rust.yml:206` — the `darwin-link` job — with the warm job already committed. So the reader would carry `save-if: false` against a family the gate cannot see a writer for, which is strictly worse than before: read-only against an empty family reads empty forever.
Admits-answer-precondition: No batten verb authors a GitHub Actions workflow — `check`, `enforce` and `doctor` read them and none writes one — so correcting `cache-warm-darwin-link`'s `shared-key` spelling in `.github/workflows/release-plz.yml` directly is the only route left. The write lands in PR #921 where a reviewer sees it in the diff, and `zizmor`, `actionlint`, `timeout-check`, `ci-tools-check`, `release-tracking-check` and the `ci_cache_declared`/`ci_hygiene` suites all ran green over it before this request.
Admits-answer-rejected-route: Rejected "config read first": read first, and `batten.toml` declares no row that can spell a workflow job's cache key — the artifact is GitHub's schema, not batten's. Rejected "patch run first": `batten` has no write subcommand reaching `.github/`, so there is no patch verb to run. The alternative I rejected on the merits was spelling the READER's key as the literal triple instead: that would also make one family, but it would discard the reader's own recorded promise that restoring the second Darwin leg is a one-word change. Mirroring the matrix onto the writer keeps that promise on both sides.
… had one `ci.yml`'s `perf` job restores `perf-` and then writes a full `--release` target directory on top of it, scoped to `refs/pull/N/merge` where no other pull request can read it. `perf.yml`'s own job has been this family's writer all along: daily schedule, `runs-on: ubuntu-latest`, the same `shared-key` — same key, same architecture, entry on `refs/heads/main`. The reader was paying for a write nobody could use, on the one profile no other job builds. The job was 420s on run 34332015804. `save-if: false` alone would have been refused, and the refusal would have been the gate's mistake rather than the change's. `warmed` was built from `on_push` only, and defended that with "trunk writers in this repository are push-triggered" — but its own operative sentence is that GitHub scopes a cache read to the run's ref plus the base branch, and a scheduled run on the default branch has ref `refs/heads/main` exactly as a pushed one does. The bound described habits, not the mechanism. It is now `trunk_writer`: push OR schedule. The CLOUD-1331 carve-out that comment invoked survives untouched — it settled `perf`'s BASE ARM, a separate entry keyed to the merge base, which no clause here reaches. Naming it in defence of excluding `perf-` conflated two caches that share a job and nothing else. `coverage-` and `fuzz-` become warmed under the widened set, which changes nothing: both rules require `on_pull_request` and neither workflow has it. Two cases, both directions: a scheduled writer warms its family, and a scheduled writer on another architecture still leaves the reader empty — so the widening cannot pass by warming everything. Refs: CLOUD-1225, CLOUD-1453 Admits: e70bf10c2a6ce2dbdce27b382ca07717d8afc6aee79dcdd64585e76be6dbd323 Admits-rule: protected-mutation Admits-verdict: path write refused Admits-subject: .github/workflows/ci.yml Admits-anchor: call:164689fa3fbdd90affc90726fb592cc78ac63c66 Admits-epoch: 06f972cbc634979ed332bb096796b59a6e56001a7c25c1844d8b353983197a36 Admits-author: alec@wenzowski.com Admits-prev: 14a7813f18d11c452bb5851acf9aad131e3f63a3e7c0ede84f7ca15db7325b7e Admits-answer-lost: `perf.yml`'s daily job already writes the `perf-` family from `main`, on `ubuntu-latest`, under this exact `shared-key` — same key, same architecture, so its entry is readable by every pull request. Without this, `ci.yml`'s `perf` job keeps writing a full `--release` target directory on top of it, scoped to `refs/pull/N/merge` where nothing else can reach it. That is the largest single entry any reader in this workflow produces, for the one profile no other job builds, and it is the store pressure `cache-sweep` exists to reclaim — CLOUD-1453 measured 81% of a 10.77 GiB store as merged pull requests' unreadable entries. Measured on run 34332015804 the job was 420s. Admits-answer-precondition: No batten verb authors a GitHub Actions workflow — `check`, `enforce` and `doctor` read them and none writes one — so adding `save-if: false` to the `perf` job in `.github/workflows/ci.yml` directly is the only route left. The write lands in PR #921 where a reviewer sees it in the diff, and `zizmor`, `actionlint`, `timeout-check`, `ci-tools-check`, `policy test` (852 cases) and the `ci_cache_declared`/`ci_hygiene` suites (39/39) all ran green over it before this request. Admits-answer-rejected-route: Rejected "config read first": read first, and `batten.toml` declares no row that can set a workflow job's cache posture — the artifact is GitHub's schema, not batten's. Rejected "patch run first": `batten` has no write subcommand reaching `.github/`, so there is no patch verb to run. The alternative I rejected on the merits was adding `save-if: false` alone: `ci-cache-declared`'s `warmed` set counted `push` triggers only, so the gate could not see `perf.yml`'s scheduled writer and `read-family-has-a-warm-writer` would have fired on this job. Widening that predicate to `trunk_writer` is the other half of this same commit, and it is why this write is safe rather than merely quiet.
Counted from the mapping rather than recalled: `coderabbit-config-check`, `hk-contract-check`, `token-bench-check`, `sbom-check`, `test:bats`, `cargo-clippy`, `test`, `batten-check`, `policy-test`. The comment said "six" from the tier's first shape and three steps joined it afterwards without the count following. Same drift `suite-bench-check` exists to keep out of the bats table: a number in prose has no gate behind it and ages silently, and this one is load-bearing — it is the sentence a reader consults to know what a `git commit` does and does not pay for. Refs: CLOUD-1727
The mutate module was 92.6s locally, the largest in the Rust tier, with eight cases sitting at exactly the bound and one at twice it. It is now 2.43s, 36/36, and nextest marks none of them slow. WHAT IT WAS, observed in `ps` rather than reasoned about: `bats-exec-test` implements `BATS_TEST_TIMEOUT` as a literal `sleep N` child, and does not reap it when a case FAILS. Caught at 12s into one case: `sleep 300`, under a `bats-exec-test` reparented to init, with `bats` itself still waiting on it. A caught mutation IS a failing case, so every row the sweep got right waited out the whole bound — which is why the cost read as exactly linear in it. The 300 is the consumer's own suite bound, exported from their task runner's environment for their own suite, and an exported variable reaches every descendant. So dropping the entry from `suite_env` is not enough: absent an explicit removal the child inherits the ambient value, and a run with "no bound" still cost 300s. It has to be unset on the command. THREE READINGS THIS FALSIFIES, recorded so they are not re-derived. The comment this replaces blamed `.output()` reading two pipes to EOF while the watchdog held them — capturing to files instead changes nothing. It also held that a passing test cannot wait for the watchdog and that capture defeats that protection; standalone, through the lent runner, stdin closed, output to pipes or files or /dev/null, bats returns in under 0.13s in every shape. And the pass/fail split measured on the way here (bound 3: 3.086s red against 0.086s green) is the symptom, not the cause. THE BOUND STAYS, because a mutant can make a gate loop forever and surviving that is what a sweep is for. It moves into the sweep as a process-group watchdog that fires only on a real hang — the group, not the child, for `exec.rs`'s reason: bats forks twice and signalling the leader alone orphans the rest. Capture moves to files because nothing reads them until the child is gone, and a pipe would deadlock its writer at 64 KiB. Anti-vacuity: `a_suite_that_hangs_is_ended_by_the_sweeps_own_bound` runs a case that sleeps 3600 and asserts the sweep comes back, in 2.15s at a bound of 2. Without it, removing the runner's bound is indistinguishable from having none. Refs: CLOUD-1726, CLOUD-1225
`c6291a03` made the child a process-group leader and signalled the GROUP, on the reasoning that bats forks twice and killing the leader alone orphans the rest. That reasoning is right and the trade is not: `kill(-pid)` addresses whatever group carries that id, and `process_group(0)` is best effort with an invisible failure — so when the group does not form, the signal lands on the group this process is already in, which under a parallel test runner is its SIBLINGS. Measured on run 34338425782: three `symbols` cases red with "the analyser did not resolve", a suite sharing nothing with this module except that it happened to be running at the same time. `ci` was green on 6755351 immediately before, so this was the cause rather than a pre-existing failure. The direct child is enough and cannot reach a sibling. What an orphan costs by comparison is bounded: a `sleep` under a staged tree the sweep is about to replace, which exits on its own. Also annotates the poll delay, which `disallowed_methods` requires to name the bound it comes from. It was unannotated in `c6291a03` and the pre-push `lint:clippy` returned 0 anyway — a step-receipt short-circuit rather than a run, which is why the gate did not stop the push it exists to stop. Refs: CLOUD-1726, CLOUD-1177
`delay-waivers-not-growing` and `spawn-widening` both fired on ONE physical line: the `#[expect(clippy::disallowed_methods)]` over a poll loop's `std::thread::sleep`. The ratchet counts that lint name across engine source and its `no_fix_reason` refuses the obvious dodge in advance — "a waiver is not a fix ... Adding a twelfth exemption is the thing this row refuses" — and `spawn-widening` matches added clippy-escape lines, so a waiver would have been refused by the second row anyway. The two are mutually reinforcing and they were right: this wait has a terminal state to block on and therefore needs no delay. A worker thread owns the child and calls `wait`; the caller blocks on `recv_timeout(suite_bound())`. A suite that returns wakes it immediately and one that hangs runs into the bound — no interval to tune, nothing standing in for an exit condition, which is the line `clippy.toml` draws. Engine-source count is back to 11 and `mutate.rs` carries none. The kill stays child-only. Signalling the process group is what reddened three `symbols` cases in CI: `kill(-pid)` addresses whatever group carries that id, and `process_group(0)` is best effort with an invisible failure, so when the group never formed the signal reached sibling test processes under the parallel runner. Clippy caught three more on the way — `similar_names`, `single_match_else`, `unnecessary_wraps` — each fixed in the code rather than waived; the last is why reading the capture back is now its own function, shared by both exits. The `[[waiver]]` is for the watchdog's anti-vacuity case, and it is the route this rule declares rather than a hatch. The remedy it prefers is `cfg!` inside the case, checked and rejected on the merits: the case reaches `TOY_GATE`, `CAUGHT` and `lend_bats`, all `#[cfg(unix)]` because bats is a bash program Windows can neither symlink nor execute, so a `cfg!` arm would not type-check. `override request` was deliberately not used — batten.toml records it measured as a local/CI parity trap on this exact class. Refs: CLOUD-1726, CLOUD-1225 Admits: 621e12380a9b4096f8fd8de2145d4e4d1246c9a9c9384d3cb83d490e710e5ef7 Admits-rule: protected-mutation Admits-verdict: path write refused Admits-subject: batten.toml Admits-anchor: call:9c1f5ed4a8b3e3d6986a604005f3dac620b3cfa4 Admits-epoch: 9f9763f897549b32719d92ed349405de4786d62107e40394d5a7b7d87528c9b6 Admits-author: alec@wenzowski.com Admits-prev: 8280406b2acdf7d9f81889e8cc9fdf16ee0d3a6a3f3b2b6f314af8944791a8a1 Admits-answer-lost: CI's `batten-check` is red on `crates/batten/tests/it/mutate.rs platform-gated-test-added`. The case it names is the anti-vacuity for CLOUD-1726: `BATS_TEST_TIMEOUT` was removed because the runner does not reap its `sleep N` watchdog on a FAILING case, and a caught mutation is a failing case — that removal took the `mutate` module from 92.6s to 2.4s and the whole `it` suite from 260.2s to 159.0s. Without a bound of our own a hanging mutant would hold a sweep forever, and without this case the removal is indistinguishable from having no bound at all. Dropping the case to satisfy the gate would delete the only proof the replacement works. Admits-answer-precondition: `batten config` exposes only `show`, `epoch`, `deprecations` and `lint` — every one a read. There is no verb that authors a `[[waiver]]` row, so writing `batten.toml` directly is the only route left. The write lands in PR #921 where a reviewer sees it in the diff, and `mise run config-lint` ran green over it (0 smells) before this request. Admits-answer-rejected-route: Rejected the route this rule itself prefers, and only after checking it: the declared remedy is `cfg!` inside the case rather than an attribute over it, and it does not type-check here. The case reaches `TOY_GATE` (:107), `CAUGHT` (:134) and `lend_bats` (:177), each `#[cfg(unix)]` because bats is a bash program with no extension that Windows can neither symlink nor execute — so on that target the three items do not exist and a `cfg!` arm would fail to compile. That is the one bar this route is held to, and it is the same argument the existing `provision.rs` waiver makes. Also rejected `override request`, deliberately: `batten.toml:13440-13455` records it measured as a local/CI parity trap on this exact class — an admission's record is keyed to the checkout's state directory, so a spend reads green to its author and CI raises the same finding on the same commit. Weakens: waiver-added waiver[platform-gated-test-added][crates/batten/tests/it/mutate.rs]
… order CodeRabbit on #921: `latest_per_name` folded the runs with `displaces`, a non-transitive predicate, so a success, an in-flight rerun and a NEWER skipped twin read `Green` in the order `skipped, in-flight, success` — the older success displaced the rerun through the unanswered guard — and `Pending` in the reverse order. `runs_from_body` preserves the source array order, so the verdict depended on what GitHub happened to serialise first. That is a false green over the one path the anti-vacuity case exists to protect. The selection now takes the maximum by (key, rank) over the whole group, and only then yields a completed-but-unanswered latest to the newest run that judged or is still judging — and only when that run's key is STRICTLY smaller, which is what keeps the unorderable pair falling to the least conclusive reading. Refs: CLOUD-1722
…call keeps its own output Two families over the mediated-call surface, both landing as gates rather than prose. `foreground-mise` (`task run blocked`) refuses any `mise` invocation the host did not mark backgrounded. AGENTS.md carried this as a DURATION -- "any command that can exceed ~2 minutes" -- which is a prediction the caller makes about a task it has not run, and the mis-estimate does not cost the difference between the guess and the truth: a foreground call is killed at ~2 minutes, so it costs the whole run plus the turn. There is no fast list and `alive` is not on one: a carve-out hands the judgement back to the caller this rule exists to stop consulting, and backgrounding a short task costs one turn for the same text. The four routes recommending `mise run alive` now say backgrounded, and `a_process_read_outside_a_loop_is_not_a_wait` asserts the backgrounded form -- a route recommending a command another gate refuses is the collision this would otherwise have shipped. `background-redirect` (`redirect write unread`) refuses a backgrounded call that redirects its OWN output. The harness already captures that output to a file it names back, and surfaces it where the human watches; a `> log 2>&1` substitutes a private file, so the notification still fires over an empty pane. Measured on this container with no redirect: stdout, stderr and the exit status all reach the harness file. An input redirect is untouched -- reading a file into a backgrounded command discards nothing, and the same measurement shows it arriving. Refs: CLOUD-1722 Admits: da9ec15e76ab593afb21064068afdc065547692a6a0b6ebe16f4bedf99514624 Admits-rule: protected-mutation Admits-verdict: path write refused Admits-subject: batten.toml Admits-anchor: call:3f88573e0d67659f7d944bcb7f3890f4842100f2 Admits-epoch: 80c98f39b34c224ad6884d2c9fe85561a0b4defc8c1d4c1a854368b58f05da6f Admits-author: alec@wenzowski.com Admits-prev: 621e12380a9b4096f8fd8de2145d4e4d1246c9a9c9384d3cb83d490e710e5ef7 Admits-answer-lost: The two rules would be unloadable. `foreground-mise` and `background-redirect` raise `task run blocked` and `redirect write unread`, and CLOUD-1050 refuses a token no `[[verdict]]` row declares at config load — so without this write the gates cannot be armed at all and the rule stays prose, which non-negotiable rule 2 calls half a change. The four `[[verdict.route]]` edits are the other half: `timer run refused` and `task watch duplicate` both recommended `mise run alive` as a foreground command, which `foreground-mise` now denies. Leaving them would ship a gate whose remedy another gate refuses. Admits-answer-precondition: `batten config` exposes only `show`, `epoch`, `deprecations` and `lint` — every one a read. There is no verb that authors a `[[verdict]]` row or edits a `[[verdict.route]]` target, so writing `batten.toml` directly is the only route left. This write declares the two classes the new `run-shape` rules raise (`task run blocked`, `redirect write unread`) — a rule whose verdict token no row declares is refused at load, so the module and its classes cannot land separately — and retargets the four routes that recommended a foreground `mise run alive`, which the new gate refuses. It lands in PR #921 where a reviewer sees it in the diff. Admits-answer-rejected-route: `config read first` is the route this class prefers and it cannot reach: every `batten config` subcommand is a read, and none of them authors a verdict row or a route target. `patch run first` does not apply either — it is the message-source route for a commit, not a way to author config; the change here IS the config edit, so a patch of it is the same write with an extra step.
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…e commands Three shapes were denied in one session, each of them the declared route for a gate this repository ships: - `mise exec -- cargo run ... override request <<'EOF'` — the heredoc compound that answers an admission's preconditions. `Bash(mise:*)` is a PREFIX rule and a compound does not match it, so the call fell through to the classifier. - `python3 - <<'PY' ... && git add -A && git commit -F <file>` — writing a commit message to a file and passing it to `-F` is the ONE form `run-shape` admits: `commit write missing` refuses a bare `git commit` and `commit bind missing` refuses `-F -`. The route the engine mandates was the route the classifier read as evasion. - `python3` at all, which no rule listed. `permissions.allow` gains the four programs the lifecycle actually spawns. Prefix rules cannot cover compounds, so `autoMode.allow` carries the rest as prose the classifier reads: lifecycle verbs are ordinary work here, a scratch-file write chained to `git commit` is one step rather than two unrelated actions, and a heredoc feeding an admission is the mechanism rather than a way around one. Project settings rather than local: every agent on this repository hits the same three denials, and `.claude/settings.json` is where the batten wiring they fight with already lives. Refs: CLOUD-1722
…reground mise call is allowed CI run 34371069859 was red on two things and `verify` on a third, all three this branch's own. `cli::the_committed_shape_rules_fire_on_every_banned_shape` asserted that the committed policy ALLOWS a foreground `mise run test:cargo`. `foreground-mise` refuses that by design and with no fast list, so the assertion was a claim the gate does not hold. The two mise calls move to the backgrounded form through a new `claude_payload_backgrounded` builder; `gh pr view 42` stays foreground. They stay in the case rather than leaving it, because the claim they carry -- that `mise run` is not blanket-refused -- is unchanged and still worth pinning. `policy test` reported `predicate-unexercised` for both `foreground-mise` and `background-redirect`: a bundle's own `test_` rules are what that gate counts, and `crates/batten/tests/it/run_shape.rs` is a different tier. Eight rego cases follow, including the anchoring one (`mise` as an argument is not a call) and the two that keep `background-redirect` from becoming a blanket ban on redirection -- a foreground redirect and a backgrounded INPUT redirect. One of those eight caught a defect in its own first draft. Written with `run-in-background` ABSENT, `test_an_unstated_posture_is_refused_too` measured green over a refusal that never fired: Rego reads an absent key as undefined and `undefined != true` is undefined, so the conjunct fails and the violation drops. The schema types the field `["boolean", "null"]` and the engine always emits it, so the fixture now says `null` and the comment records why a fixture encoding a document the engine cannot produce proves nothing. `clippy::expect_used` refused `winner`'s `expect` over the empty group. The group is non-empty by construction -- `latest_per_name` builds it by pushing -- but that is a claim the signature can carry instead of a panic message, so `winner` returns `Option<&Run>` and the caller reads it back with `filter_map`, where an empty group contributes no name rather than aborting a verdict the rest of the reading could still answer. `policy test`: 66 bundles, 859 passed, 0 failed, nothing unexercised. `cargo nextest` over the two suites: 44 passed. `cargo clippy`: exit 0. Refs: CLOUD-1722
…a batten hook README publishes `wired` at 8.0ms p50 against a <=100ms ceiling and `perf-assert` enforces it on the mediated surface. Nothing makes the commit-msg surface exempt because git is the harness rather than Claude Code, and it was missing that ceiling by an order of magnitude. Measured on this container, same message, warm, three runs each: mise run commit-msg, body spelling `cargo run` 582ms mise run commit-msg, body resolving the binary ~300ms batten commit check --message 121-130ms batten attribution check --message 16-18ms first commit after touching one crates/batten/src 8687ms Two layers come off. The task bodies resolve the binary before falling back to `cargo run`, which is CLOUD-1620's shape applied where it costs most; and the two hk steps leave the task layer entirely, because `mise --version` alone -- the process, no task -- is 105-125ms here, so the floor was above the budget before a body ran. The pair goes from ~1.16s to ~145ms. `commit check` at ~125ms is STILL OVER and this does not fix that. Attributed: 6ms process start, 13ms to load a 13,749-line batten.toml, 4ms for the staged set, and ~100ms inside the verb that nothing here has profiled. `attribution check` over the same message is 16-18ms, so it is that verb's cost rather than the surface's, and closing it is a separate measurement. A HOOK MUST NEVER COMPILE. The 8687ms case is a hook running the compiler, and rebuilding the release binary took ~4 minutes on this container (`lto = "thin"`), so a hook that rebuilt on staleness would spend that at the moment an author saves. The build belongs at provisioning, where `session:batten` already puts it. The hazard this trades for latency is a stale binary, and it was measured on this very change rather than argued: `_.path` resolved a bare `batten` to a `target/release` build three versions behind the tree, which refused today's batten.toml outright, so this step blocked the commit that introduced it until the binary was rebuilt. CLOUD-1397 section 4 named that failure in advance and CLOUD-1688 is what makes the binary one artifact instead of two. The tasks stay and are still the ones CI runs, so this is not the divergence `lint:rego` and `cargo-fmt` route through tasks to prevent: those steps share a fixer and a config with their task, these two share neither. On a runner there is no installed binary and `bash: line 25: batten: command not found` is a measured failure there, which is what the fallback branch is for. `mise run hk-drift`: contracts/hk.json matches the pinned runner. Refs: CLOUD-1397, CLOUD-1620, CLOUD-1688
…its denial reads as design `no-pr-activity-subscription` has denied `subscribe_pr_activity` as a shape rule since it was written, and `.claude/settings.json` denies it again at the harness layer. What neither says is WHY, in the file that governs PR conduct above any harness default -- so the denial reads from inside a session as a capability the agent lacks rather than as the design. Measured this session: the harness default says to auto-subscribe after opening a PR, the two denials silently stopped it, and the resulting report to the human was "one thing you should know: I can't subscribe to PR events" -- a boundary report, which the output posture section names as a sentence carrying nothing the reader cannot already see. Naming the tool in the ban is what makes the next reading "this is the rule" instead. The budget is fixed, so this is paid for rather than added: the background section loses its list of examples of long commands, which `foreground-mise` now enforces directly and which was the weakest prose in that paragraph. `batten policy budget`: exit 0. Refs: CLOUD-1722
…nd follow the commit-msg call site
`mise run verify` refused this tree in four places, three of them one class.
`gh_guard::a_task_name_is_not_a_wrapped_program` adjudicates against the LIVE
root, so `foreground-mise` reaches it: `allowed("mise run fmt")` and
`allowed("mise exec --")` are both refused now. The property under test is the
look-through -- that `mise run` names a TASK while `mise exec` runs another
program -- so left foreground the case would measure the newer row and report
the older one broken. `bash_payload_backgrounded` and `allowed_backgrounded`
state the posture; nothing else about the case moves.
`tests/commit-attribution.bats` and `tests/commit-convention.bats` pin the
SPELLING of hk.pkl's commit-msg call site, which the latency change replaced
with a direct `batten` call. The property is unchanged and is the one CLOUD-216
found missing -- that the hook has a call site at all, rather than a gate wired
to nothing -- so only the matched text moves. `both tasks resolve to the engine`
still passes over the task bodies, which is what keeps the other half honest.
`clippy::single_element_loop` refused the `for` loop left holding one element
after the mise cases were split out of it. Collapsed to a binding.
`test:cargo` and `batten-check` were downstream of the compile failure.
Swept the rest of the suite for the same class rather than paying a CI lap per
instance: `ask_disposition.rs`, `ci_parity.rs`, `ci_cache_declared.rs` and
`config_fault_class.rs` all mention mise commands but build their own fixture
roots, so the committed rules do not reach them.
`bats tests/commit-attribution.bats tests/commit-convention.bats`: 13 ok.
Refs: CLOUD-1722, CLOUD-1397
…ing them requires an edit shell-retirement refuses ce4020a moved hk.pkl's two commit-msg steps off `mise run` and onto the binary, and 792665c followed the two bats suites that pin the call site by its text. That second half is the problem: `tests/commit-attribution.bats:19` and `tests/commit-convention.bats:42` are governed files, and `shell-retirement`'s edit arm refuses editing one in place -- admitting only a line that drops a reference to a path the same delta deleted. Its own comment records that the verdict "declares no override route and no `bypass_env`". The campaign admits DELETING such a suite whole, never changing it, and retiring these two into Rust is CLOUD-1748's work being done elsewhere. Buying 170ms by taking that campaign's subject hostage is not the trade. So the steps go back to `mise run`, both bats suites go back to their committed text byte for byte -- the branch's net delta against them is now empty, which is what leaves `shell-retirement` nothing to judge -- and hk.pkl carries the measurements plus the blocking gate so the next reader does not re-derive them. WHAT SURVIVES IS THE LARGER HALF, and it is in `mise.toml` rather than here: the task bodies resolve the binary before falling back to `cargo run`, which is 582ms -> ~300ms, and it removes the 8687ms case entirely -- the first commit after touching one `crates/batten/src` file, which was a hook running the compiler. The remaining ~200ms is `mise`'s own floor (105-125ms for the process alone, before any task body) and is unreachable from a task by construction. Also here: `hook_skip_local`'s two anti-vacuity cases adjudicate against the live root, so `foreground-mise` reaches them and refused `allowed("mise run ci")` and `allowed("HK_SKIP_STEPS=test:bats mise run ci")`. An anti-vacuity case has to survive on its own row's account rather than by another row's silence, so both state the posture through a new `allowed_backgrounded`. `cargo nextest` over hook_skip_local and gh_guard: 25 passed. `bats` over both commit suites: 13 ok. Refs: CLOUD-1397, CLOUD-1722, CLOUD-1748
…redirected, since two rows now refuse the old one `verdict-not-discarded` prescribed `mise run verify >/tmp/verify.log 2>&1`: redirect the output rather than pipe it, so the exit status stays the task's. Two rows added this session make that exact string unrunnable from either side -- `foreground-mise` refuses it foreground because the harness kills a foreground call at ~2 minutes, and `background-redirect` refuses it backgrounded because the harness already captures a backgrounded task's output where the human watches. A repository that prescribes a form two of its own rows refuse is worse than one that prescribes nothing. So the form moves to BACKGROUNDED, UNREDIRECTED, UNPIPED, which all three rows agree on, and the cases follow it: - `the_prescribed_form_is_allowed_including_its_redirection` splits in two. The parser regression it really carried -- that `2>&1` and `&>` contain a literal `&` and must not read as a detach -- stays as `a_redirection_is_not_a_background_ampersand`, pinned on `git push`, a program no other row has an opinion about. The prescription half becomes `the_prescribed_form_is_backgrounded_and_keeps_its_own_output`, with `the_retired_redirect_form_is_refused_from_both_sides` as its anti-vacuity: without it, "the prescribed form is backgrounded" is satisfied by a build that allows the old form too. - The cause-rendering cases needed the posture stated as a PRECONDITION rather than a detail. A refusal renders ONE cause, so a second row firing on the same string masks the class under test: measured, `mise run verify >log 2>&1; ls` read `task run blocked foreground-mise` and the case could no longer see `verdict carry other` at all. `cause_backgrounded` takes `foreground-mise` out of the way. The same shape also dropped its `>log 2>&1`, which was never what it was about -- `; ls` is, because it hands the exit status to `ls`. `cargo nextest` over pipeline_shapes: 25 passed. Refs: CLOUD-1722
…d-redirect refuses Two rows added this session made the repository's own advice unrunnable, and until now only the tests followed the change. Both authorities that a refused author actually reads still said to redirect: `verdict.rs:1777`, the registry class for `verdict read dropped`, said "Redirect to a file and read the file in a separate call". `batten.toml:3283`, the rule reason behind it, opened with "The compliant form is the command alone in the call, redirected to a file: mise run <task> >/tmp/<task>.log 2>&1". That string is now refused from both sides. `foreground-mise` refuses it foreground, because the harness kills a foreground call at ~2 minutes. `background-redirect` refuses it backgrounded, because the harness already captures a backgrounded task's output to a file it names back and surfaces it where the human watches, so a private log is one nobody reads. An author who piped a verdict would have been refused, sent to a class, and told to write the one other thing this engine refuses. A remedy that cannot be followed is worse than no remedy, and it is the same failure `override request` on a tree-scope class was retired for: a route that reads as an answer and is not one. Both now prescribe the form all three rows agree on -- backgrounded, unredirected, unpiped -- and both say out loud that the old form is refused and why, so a reader who learned the redirect idiom is corrected rather than left to discover it at the next refusal. `cargo nextest` over pipeline_shapes and the verdict suites: 129 passed. `batten config show`: exit 0. Refs: CLOUD-1722 Admits: 23410e711fc338e8187db86cfc3362c0fb58ddb0d05122908400e18525efc840 Admits-rule: protected-mutation Admits-verdict: path write refused Admits-subject: batten.toml Admits-anchor: call:4f54f99e0655a0bb516a9e1548d9b86b685d8447 Admits-epoch: d96de9bb5126aa627c91b05214930208d2e470aaee74b6d066c6d1ca78efa5bd Admits-author: alec@wenzowski.com Admits-prev: da9ec15e76ab593afb21064068afdc065547692a6a0b6ebe16f4bedf99514624 Admits-answer-lost: A refused author is sent to a remedy the engine itself refuses. Pipe a verdict, get `verdict read dropped`, follow its reason, write the redirect, and be refused again by `background-redirect` — the same shape `override request` on a tree-scope class was retired for: a route that reads as an answer and is not one. Leaving it costs every future author that loop, and it silently contradicts AGENTS.md, which this session already updated to say the harness captures the output and a redirect writes where nobody reads. Admits-answer-precondition: `batten config` exposes only `show`, `epoch`, `deprecations` and `lint` — every one a read. No verb edits a `[[rule]]`'s `reason` text, so writing `batten.toml` directly is the only route left. The edit is prose inside one rule: `verdict-not-discarded`'s reason opened with "The compliant form is the command alone in the call, redirected to a file: mise run <task> >/tmp/<task>.log 2>&1", and `background-redirect` now refuses exactly that string while `foreground-mise` refuses its foreground spelling. It lands in PR #921 where a reviewer reads it beside the two rows that made it false. Admits-answer-rejected-route: `config read first` is the route this class prefers and it cannot reach: every `batten config` subcommand is a read and none authors or edits a rule's reason. `patch run first` does not apply either — it is the message-source route for a commit, not a way to author config; the change here IS the config edit, so a patch of it is the same write with an extra step.
DO-NOT-CLOSE CLOUD-1722
Closes CLOUD-1726
Closes CLOUD-1745
This started as one
checks_greenfix and became the performance bundle. 19 commits. Every number below is measured on this tree, not estimated.What landed
mutatesweep watchdogagentic_recordreplay: split per block, moved in-processverifyitsuite, localdarwin-linkCI jobget_documentMCP reductionchecks_greennon-verdict displacementcross-warm writer + read-only readerperf-read-only +warmedwidened--releasewrite no other PR can readThe two that are worth reading
checks_green— a completed run that judged nothing cannot erase a verdict. Nothing reachedmainfor six hours on 2026-09-08/09 while three branches took the lease in turn. GitHub registers the path-filtered copy of a workflow 1–5s after the copy that runs, and the copy that does not apply concludesskipped;latest_per_nameordered strictly bystarted_at, so the twin won andskippedis not inCI_ANSWERED_CONCLUSIONS. Six green checks read as "no verdict" forever. CLOUD-436 is completed by this, not weakened: it ordered by start time to stop an older draft-era skip vetoing a verdict, and the same veto returned through newer residue.CLOUD-1726 — the runner's bound is a
sleepit never reaps on a red case.bats-exec-testimplementsBATS_TEST_TIMEOUTas a literalsleep Nchild and does not reap it when a case fails. A caught mutation is a failing case, so every row the sweep got right waited out the whole bound. Measured standalone, output to/dev/null, stdin closed:The discriminator is the case's verdict, not the capture — which refutes this PR's own earlier diagnosis that
.output()reading two pipes to EOF was responsible. The 300s is the consumer's, exported from[env], and an exported variable reaches every descendant, sosuite_envhad toenv_removeit rather than merely stop setting it.The bound still exists — a mutant can make a gate loop forever — but it now lives in the sweep as a worker thread plus
recv_timeout, firing on a hang rather than on a verdict.a_suite_that_hangs_is_ended_by_the_sweeps_own_boundis its anti-vacuity: a case that sleeps 3600 returns in 2.15s at a bound of 2.Corrections made in flight, recorded because the wrong turns are instructive
symbolscases in CI.kill(-pid)addresses whatever group carries that id, andprocess_group(0)is best-effort with an invisible failure — so when the group never formed, the signal reached sibling test processes under the parallel runner. The kill is now child-only; an orphanedsleepunder a staged tree the sweep is about to replace is the bounded cost.delay-waivers-not-growingandspawn-wideningboth fired on one physical line — an#[expect(clippy::disallowed_methods)]over a poll loop. The ratchet'sno_fix_reasonrefuses a twelfth exemption andspawn-wideningmatches added escape lines, so a waiver would have been refused by the second row anyway. Removing the delay cleared both.perf-family was warmed in fact and unwarmed in the model.ci-cache-declared'swarmedset readon_pushonly, defending it with "trunk writers here are push-triggered" — but its own operative sentence is that GitHub scopes a cache read to the run's ref plus the base branch, and a scheduled run onmainhas refrefs/heads/main. Readability follows the ref, not the trigger.The
[[waiver]], and why it is declared rather than quietplatform-gated-test-addedfires on the watchdog's anti-vacuity case. The remedy that rule prefers iscfg!inside the case, checked and rejected on the merits: it reachesTOY_GATE,CAUGHTandlend_bats, all three#[cfg(unix)]because bats is a bash program Windows can neither symlink nor execute, so acfg!arm would not type-check.override requestwas deliberately not used —batten.toml:13440records it measured as a local/CI parity trap on tree-scope classes. The weakening is declared on CLOUD-1726, carried into the claim receipt, and named by aWeakens:trailer.Not in this PR
The lease-surrender half of CLOUD-1722 — a wait that has learned nothing for N beats should surrender the lease rather than heartbeat to its 3600-ask bound (
land.rs:598). Overlaps #919 / CLOUD-1703; whichever lands first should absorb the other's half.The remaining performance work, filed rather than guessed at: CLOUD-1756 (
verifyruns the hk gate twice concurrently —ci:quickis a strict subset ofci, 99.6s measured), CLOUD-1750 (the Rust tier's spawn/in-process ratio), CLOUD-1754 and CLOUD-1755 (a one-shot SessionStart repair cannot hold a surface the platform rewrites mid-session — observed twice in one session).sccache is refuted on the hot path, measured.
target/mutate-cargoduplicates 299 of 299 crates fromtarget/debug, butmutant.ymlis schedule-only and weekly;semver's baseline is already SHA-keyed bycargo-semver-checks;perf's base arm was keyed to the merge base by CLOUD-1331. No compiler-cache case survives for the per-lap path.🤖 Generated with Claude Code
https://claude.ai/code/session_01F1kFtyX6Fr37ANwTjr7yEV