Research: falsify receipt-only Contract-B authority RC3 - #79
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Classification
Draft Research only. Do not merge as a maintained runtime change, tag, release, or infer production readiness.
This successor is stacked on RC2 Draft Research PR #78. It changes no maintained
src/**,scripts/**, ortests/**bytes.Question
Is the published first-genuine portable receipt sufficient by itself to establish the exact Contract-B participant authority required by canonical C2 verification? If not, does an independently selected immutable artifact locator recover that authority as a mechanism control?
Disposition
FALSIFIED_RECEIPT_ONLY_AUTHORITY_SUPPORTED_IMMUTABLE_LOCATOR_MECHANISMDecisive execution:
f99e3f56937b7d722e08a5decaf5966bc0fcaccf3523614410610525243466810502843169sha256:e877672ccd15f0e2d00d28c443b695edcdecb8447658a8210e7690e56c5742ebResult
The exact public first-genuine receipt correctly binds Contract B
1.2.0, bundlefc459009-fc50-5cc7-a874-0371ce7a3853, and bundle hashsha256:8c25ad48cb0a87081088706eed98e53bcb426b6f7f1b944ba776db722a134c80, but intentionally omits the raw B packet and does not expose participant references or a raw-artifact locator. Receipt-level identity alone therefore cannot enumerate participant authority.An independently Git/tree/checksum-bound fixture locator did recover exact participant authority and rejected source/passage and locator substitutions. A caller-selected authority control remained unsafe, preserving the conclusion that trust-anchor selection cannot be caller-controlled.
Successor observation
After preregistration, Contract B authority showed that
bundle_hashis a commitment to the whole bundle. That creates a smaller successor hypothesis: trusted bundle commitment + presented raw B bytes may be sufficient without a trusted locator. That hypothesis is explicitly not part of the RC3 disposition and is being tested separately.See
research/first-genuine-receipt-authority-rc3/RESULT.md.