Workflow Security Hardening#506
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Security changes applied to all 19 workflow files:
1. environment: dev — All jobs now pull secrets from the protected "dev"
environment instead of repo-level secrets, adding an extra access
control layer. Jobs with existing environment (maven-central) are
kept as-is.
2. Secrets moved from inline ${{ secrets.X }} to env: blocks — Prevents
secret values from appearing in the process argument list (visible via
ps/audit logs). Shell commands now reference $ENV_VAR instead.
3. set +x in every sensitive step — Disables bash debug-trace mode before
any secret variable is assigned, preventing accidental log exposure if
debug mode is ever enabled upstream.
4. ::add-mask:: for all runtime-fetched and copied secret variables —
Registers CF credentials, clientSecret/clientID (fetched from XSUAA
at runtime), usernames and passwords with GitHub's log scrubber so
any accidental echo or error trace is redacted as *** in logs.
Co-authored-by: Yashmeet . <yashmeet@sap.com>
vibhutikumar07
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Jun 5, 2026
…apps from SDM plugin (#504) * Move leading app to SDM plugin & workflow files update to read these apps from SDM plugin * remove .gitignore from leading apps and add mta.yaml back * Update action.yml for new app path * Workflow Security Hardening (#506) * Harden GitHub Actions workflows — environment, secret masking & log protection Security changes applied to all 19 workflow files: 1. environment: dev — All jobs now pull secrets from the protected "dev" environment instead of repo-level secrets, adding an extra access control layer. Jobs with existing environment (maven-central) are kept as-is. 2. Secrets moved from inline ${{ secrets.X }} to env: blocks — Prevents secret values from appearing in the process argument list (visible via ps/audit logs). Shell commands now reference $ENV_VAR instead. 3. set +x in every sensitive step — Disables bash debug-trace mode before any secret variable is assigned, preventing accidental log exposure if debug mode is ever enabled upstream. 4. ::add-mask:: for all runtime-fetched and copied secret variables — Registers CF credentials, clientSecret/clientID (fetched from XSUAA at runtime), usernames and passwords with GitHub's log scrubber so any accidental echo or error trace is redacted as *** in logs. * Update pom.xml * remove .gitignore from leading apps and add mta.yaml back (#505) Co-authored-by: Yashmeet . <yashmeet@sap.com> * Update multiTenancyDeployLocal.yml * Update pom.xml * modified workflow * Added retry logic * Added Retry logic * modified workflow * updated sdm version * Updated sdm version in pom --------- Co-authored-by: Yashmeet . <yashmeet@sap.com> * Update blackduck.yml * updated the workflow to use the pr environment & also added codeowner * updated the workflow * modified workflow --------- Co-authored-by: vibhutikumar <160819926+vibhutikumar07@users.noreply.github.com>
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Describe your changes
Changes Made to GitHub Actions Workflows (19 files):
Environment Protection (environment: dev)
Added environment: dev to every job across all workflows so secrets are served from a protected environment instead of repo-level, adding an extra access-control layer. Fork PRs will not receive secrets.
Secrets moved from inline to env: blocks
Replaced all ${{ secrets.X }} references inside shell commands with env: blocks. Values are now injected as environment variables instead of being baked into the process argument string (which is visible in process listings and audit logs).
cf login banner suppressed (> /dev/null)
The CF CLI prints org, space, user to stdout after every login. Appended > /dev/null to all cf login commands to suppress this banner. stderr is unaffected so login failures still surface as errors.
set +x as first line of every sensitive step
Ensures bash debug-trace mode is disabled before any secret variable is assigned, preventing values from being printed if debug mode is ever enabled.
::add-mask:: for all secret-holding variables
Registered every secret-holding shell variable (CF credentials, XSUAA clientSecret/clientID fetched at runtime, test usernames/passwords) with GitHub's log scrubber. This ensures any accidental echo or error trace is redacted as *** in logs. Masks are placed as the very first lines of each run block — before any command that could reference those values.
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