feat(independent): independent_v1 composer and live canary runner

[wallscaler]

Outcome target

Deliver a bounded, one-write SN39 Compute canary whose weight vector originates from this validator, not the Cathedral relay feed.

The runner must read the exact closed-tempo chain view, collect Intel TDX evidence from registered SN39 axons, derive canonical SAT work units, compose one independently authorized set_mechanism_weights vector, and submit only through the dedicated canary hotkey after an explicit operator confirmation.

This PR targets merge-ready source and canary controls. It does not claim a production deployment, a finalized on-chain write, subnet emissions, or miner rewards.

Acceptance checks

Pre-spend and chain snapshot

• Pin Finney genesis and freeze the closed-tempo anchor before any Cathedral Workers request, billable rental, miner dial, composition, or submission.
• Refuse composition when the chain endpoint cannot return the exact historical metagraph. The head fallback remains diagnostic only.
• Re-read the inclusion metagraph before composition so UID-to-hotkey changes forfeit affected payout to burn.

Policy authorization and economics

• Verify the current bundle signatures, and the cached bundle signatures when present, before lineage or commitment checks.
• Require v1 genesis lineage or an exact version-plus-one successor naming the previous digest. Refuse skips, forks, and rollbacks.
• Require the anchor commitment to name the exact policy document being composed.
• Keep Compute funded at 10^11 mass. CyberGym and Voice remain at zero.

Evidence and scoring

• Require the published QVL binary digest 35bb55f89f411d5dcf5f72be90488e999ee68c41dfc0429a0dcb8cc2b448b6bb.
• Treat QVL PASS as admission only. Payment mass comes only from SAT units independently re-derived by the validator.
• Abort the whole epoch without composition on any QVL infrastructure result. Verifier uncertainty must not become a failing miner or a windfall for another miner.
• Bind evidence to the requested hotkey, challenge, observed peer TLS SPKI, and returned certificate-chain leaf. Recheck the same SPKI on the SAT request.
• Isolate ordinary SAT failures to the affected miner. Preserve KeyboardInterrupt and SystemExit as process stops.

Identity and allocation

• Claim the quote-bound machine identity immediately after QVL PASS and before any SAT outcome. Two hotkeys claiming one machine forfeit both, including when the duplicate side fails SAT.
• Allocate each miner floor(allocation * units / total_units). Leave integer remainder unassigned so the composer folds it to burn.
• Refuse self-payment to the live relay hotkey, the canary hotkey, and all configured refused destinations. The burn destination is the only payable exception.

One-write chain boundary

• Keep cathedral_thin.independent free of Bittensor, relay-fetch, and writer imports.
• Require --confirm-canary, the dedicated canary wallet identity, a COMPOSED result, exact u16 arguments, identified paid destinations, and a durable O_EXCL canary lock before transport.
• Submit only SubtensorModule.set_mechanism_weights(netuid, mecid, dests, weights, version_key) with a mortal era and inclusion wait.
• Never use the live relay wallet. Never expose a generic --broadcast path.

Verification at head 681cbf39cd374a4d6553f3eff7cf3185e2f42ca6

• Python 3.12: 608 passed across tests/thin/test_independent_*.py.
• Python 3.11: 608 passed across the same scope.
• Ruff: pass across the sealed package, live runtime, and independent tests.
• Ruff format: 44 files already formatted.
• Python compile, git diff --check, and changed-diff secret-pattern scan: pass.
• Focused adversarial tests cover pruned-anchor pre-spend refusal, QVL infrastructure global refusal, duplicate identity before SAT, remainder-to-burn, signature forgery, economics forks, HTTPS authority and deadlines, SPKI mismatch, journal bounds, startup gates, and exact chain-call arguments.

GitHub CI for this exact head must also pass before merge.

Trust boundary

• The sealed composer enforces signature, lineage, commitment, inclusion, Hamilton, refusal, and one-write gates.
• The first live canary does not consume an externally governed or on-chain CATHPOL1 policy. It generates ephemeral process-local Ed25519 keys, signs a fixed genesis EconomicsSet, and creates its matching local commitment. This proves independent composition mechanics. It is not production policy authorization.
• SN39 axons use self-signed in-guest certificates. The validator intentionally does not use public-CA verification for IP axons. Authentication instead depends on Intel TDX REPORT_DATA binding the observed TLS SPKI, the returned certificate leaf matching that peer SPKI, and the measured miner refusing a requested binding that differs from its configured in-guest identity.
• Quote-bound application-key extraction is not implemented. Until it is, the observed and attested TLS SPKI is the machine identity and SAT channel binding.
• Attestation proves admission under the pinned verifier. It does not earn mass. Canonical SAT work is the payment input.
• The chain transport waits for inclusion, not finalization. Operators must confirm the exact row at finalized heads before reporting an on-chain success.
• No reward or TAO-earning claim follows from registration, uptime, a submitted row, or this PR.

Rollout

1. Merge only after exact-head CI and review threads are green.
2. Run without --confirm-canary. Require an exact historical anchor, QVL PASS with no INFRA result, expected miner identities, verified SAT units, and the intended composed destinations and weights.
3. Inspect the JSON report and immutable source SHA. Confirm the dedicated canary identity is not the relay or burn identity.
4. Run once with --confirm-canary and the dedicated canary wallet supplied outside the repository.
5. Preserve the canary lock, journal, extrinsic hash, and full report.
6. Confirm inclusion and then repeat the exact UID/weight read at two later finalized heads before making a success claim.
7. Keep continuous operation out of scope until external policy authority, operational monitoring, and a deliberate repeat-write design are reviewed.

Rollback

• Before submission, stop the runner, omit --confirm-canary, or revert this PR. No chain state changes.
• After an included extrinsic, do not delete or reset the canary lock. The included write is not reversible by a code rollback.
• Stop the runner, preserve all evidence, and require a separately authorized later weight update after the applicable chain cooldown to change the row.
• Reverting 681cbf3 restores the prior source behavior but does not undo any existing chain state.

Remaining risks and launch inputs

• No external or on-chain policy authority feeds the live runner yet. The local ephemeral policy is bounded-canary only.
• A registered SN39 miner must serve protocol-compatible /v1/evidence and /v1/sat-work endpoints.
• The exact pinned QVL executable and dedicated canary wallet JSON must be present on the launch machine. Neither belongs in Git.
• The validator requires a chain endpoint retaining the exact closed-tempo metagraph. Pruned public endpoints now fail closed.
• The QVL executable is hashed at load and invoked later by path. A local actor able to replace that file between those operations remains inside the launch-machine trust boundary.
• Each axon has bounded fetches, but a full sequential subnet scan can accumulate multiple per-axon deadlines.
• The dry-run journal fsyncs its temporary file before atomic replacement but does not fsync the parent directory. The separate one-write canary lock does fsync both file and directory and remains the safety fence.
• Composition exceptions can still exit without the final JSON report. This is an operability limitation, not a path to submission.
• Live E2E, finalized chain state, emissions, and miner rewards remain unproven by repository tests.

Out of scope

• Merging, deployment, wallet access, signing, or broadcasting as part of this PR review.
• The live SN39 relay hotkey or config/validator-thin-sn39-relay.toml.
• CyberGym and Voice scoring. Both stay at allocation zero.
• General repeat submission or production validator operation.
• Work metering beyond the canonical SAT audit.
• Public-CA validation for self-signed TDX guest certificates.

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[cursor]

@codex review

Please re-review HEAD after the fail-closed QA pass (1063be6):

• Dedicated CANARY_HOTKEY is no longer Substrate //Bob. Well-known development keys are canary-ineligible.
• A QVL PASS is admission, not payment. verified_units stays empty until independently re-derived SAT work units exist.
• --state-dir defaults to /var/lib/cathedral-validator (0o700, no symlink). Inclusion re-snapshots the metagraph after collect.
• --rent is gated on live custom.v1 Intel TDX create. --confirm-canary is required to spend the one-write lock.
• Local economics keys are ephemeral, not bytes([n])*32.
• Launch QVL pin is the published binary blob digest 35bb55f8…, not the thin-relay implementation pin 8292b085….

Do not treat attestation as payment. Do not use the live SN39 relay hotkey. The sealed package must still have no chain client.

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[cursor]

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[cursor]

Stale comment

Agentic security review of the independent_v1 composer and live canary runner. One new high-severity payment-integrity issue on the live scoring path; the previously reported pruned-metagraph (at_anchor) concern is unchanged.

  

_{Sent by Cursor Security Agent: Security Reviewer}

[cursor]

Stale comment

Agentic security review found one high-severity issue on the live miner HTTPS path: IP axons disable TLS certificate verification, and quote REPORT_DATA is bound to the client-observed SPKI rather than an enclave-held TLS key. Prior findings: missing assert_machine_identity is addressed; at_anchor still does not gate compose/submit.

  

_{Sent by Cursor Security Agent: Security Reviewer}

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[wallscaler]

Exact-head merge-readiness record

Reviewed SHA: 681cbf39cd374a4d6553f3eff7cf3185e2f42ca6

Outcome: READY for dependency-order merge as a bounded, one-write SN39 Compute canary. This is not approval for continuous production operation and is not live-chain proof.

Validated repairs in this head

• Exact historical anchor is now a pre-spend gate. A pruned fallback stops before catalog access, Worker construction or rental, miner dial, state creation, compose, or submit.
• Any QVL INFRA result blocks composition for the whole epoch. Verifier uncertainty cannot reallocate a miner share to another miner.
• The quote-bound machine identity is claimed before SAT. A duplicate hotkey cannot preserve the first payout by failing its own SAT request.
• Proportional mass uses floor division for every miner. Integer remainder stays unassigned and folds to burn in the composer.

Exact-head verification

• Python 3.12 independent suite: 608 passed.
• Python 3.11 independent suite: 608 passed.
• Ruff, format, compile, diff whitespace, and changed-diff secret-pattern checks: pass.
• GitHub Python 3.11, Python 3.12, Integration lane, Publisher suite, Cursor approval, and Cursor security checks: pass.
• All six previously outstanding inline/security threads have exact-head evidence replies and are resolved.

Independent Fable review

Claude Fable performed a read-only exact-tree review and returned: merge-ready as a bounded one-write canary, no blockers.

Fable independently falsified the signature, economics-lineage, anchor-fallback, identity-order, SPKI/channel-binding, Hamilton/remainder, self-payment, confirmation-bypass, one-write, QVL-INFRA, bundle-splice, and chain-call concerns against the current source and tests.

Nonblocking follow-ups

• A confirmed rerun against an already-spent lock can update the dry-run journal before the lock refuses submission. The durable lock still prevents a second write.
• A signal-killed QVL subprocess currently maps to FAIL instead of INFRA. It remains fail-closed for the affected quote, but the operational classification should be separated later.
• An unexpected compose exception can lose the final JSON report.
• The dry-run journal does not fsync its parent directory. The one-write lock does fsync both file and directory and remains the submission fence.
• The state-directory gate occurs after optional rental and miner collection. Spend remains bounded, but this should move earlier before repeat operation.

Trust and rollout boundary

The live runner still uses a process-local ephemeral 2-of-3 policy and matching local commitment. It proves canary pipeline mechanics, not external policy authorization. Self-signed miner TLS relies on pinned-QVL REPORT_DATA binding to the observed SPKI. The chain transport waits for inclusion only. Finalized chain reads are required before any on-chain success statement. No emissions or reward claim follows from this PR.

The PR body now records the complete outcome target, acceptance checks, rollout, rollback, trust boundary, launch inputs, and remaining risks.

No merge, deployment, wallet access, signing, or broadcast occurred during this review.

[wallscaler]

PM after #148 merge (0350dcd on main).

Live cathedral.computer catalog unchanged (validator source, not a site/PolarIS deploy). PolarIS prod still source_sha=8e1dc3d / migration_head 080. Homepage still Sealed receipt caption. Fast Persistent Hetzner $0.15 available, no receipt; one-shot Fast off; GPU unavailable. No SN70. Do not roll PolarIS alembic 081 onto Cathedral prod for this.

This merge is reviewed source only. No --confirm-canary, no live relay wallet, no UID30 submit, no emissions/reward claim.

GHCR audit image from sandbox #171 is public (anonymous index pull just verified):
ghcr.io/cathedralai/cathedral-sn39-audit-miner@sha256:afdc51a931dec1433981166033cffcebecb8fc3d432b65a6500063bd6a06b032
linux/amd64 manifest: sha256:e60f800ebea5359f3c6d21f5b1d3276ff1dcca3d671328c8846764a3dab9d681

Next:

1. feat(independent): gate one verified miner axon announcement #150 already rebased onto this main — keep draft until exact-head CI + review. No serve_axon.
2. feat(validator): gate UID30 launch on a reviewed one-miner 100/0 preview #149 retargeted to main; rebase onto 0350dcd like feat(independent): gate one verified miner axon announcement #150, keep draft, merge only after feat(independent): gate one verified miner axon announcement #150. No --confirm-uid30-launch.
3. PolarIS #1163: pin CATHEDRAL_SN39_MINER_IMAGE to that same index digest, stay draft, no Cathedral PolarIS prod deploy.
4. CyberGym v3 feat(cybergym): v3 lane bottom-fill payout curve (leader takes remainder) #146/feat(cybergym): v3 redirects the CyberGym lane to compute when idle (N=0) #147 stay unmerged. Distillery rewards off.
5. fix: let reviewed UID30 launch sign from bounded finalized descendants #155 bearer + enroll Cloudflare 522 remain the separate operator-mint gate on cathedral-enroll-sn39 — not this Cathedral-owned miner path (5CJTD6…).

Did not ping Astro.