Paper 3 of the Agent Governance Series.
Admission control determines what can happen. Fairness determines who gets to act.
Correctness is local. Fairness is global.
Fair Atomic Governance: Allocating Decision Boundaries under Shared Resource Constraints in Multi-Agent Systems
Marcelo Fernandez (TraslaIA), 2026
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.19672597 · arXiv: under review
This repository contains the LaTeX source for Paper 3 of the Agent Governance Series — a formal theory paper that characterizes the allocation layer above the atomic decision boundary.
The core problem: Atomic decision boundaries (Paper 0) guarantee that every individual admission decision is correct. In a multi-agent system, however, per-agent bounded enforcement creates a global capacity K = N · k₀ that scales linearly with agent count. A single actor controlling m agents can capture m · k₀ admissible actions — its entire pro-rata share — without any individual agent exceeding its local bound. The system is correct at every decision point and yet arbitrarily unfair in aggregate.
The paper introduces:
- The allocation layer: the formal mechanism that determines which agent's pending request is presented to the atomic boundary at each step — independent of the correctness of the boundary itself.
- Three failure modes consistent with full atomic correctness: Sybil amplification, temporal domination, and resource contention unfairness.
- A fairness hierarchy for atomic governance: share fairness, actor-level proportionality, envy-freeness, and strategy-proofness.
- Four allocation mechanisms (M1–M4) with proofs of which fairness properties each achieves.
Paper 0 (DBM): https://github.com/chelof100/decision-boundary-model
Paper 1 (ACP): https://github.com/chelof100/acp-framework-en
Paper 2 (IML): https://github.com/chelof100/iml-benchmark
Paper 4 (Compositional): https://github.com/chelof100/compositional-governance
Paper 5 (RAM): https://github.com/chelof100/reconstructive-authority-model
fair-atomic-governance/
├── main.tex # Full LaTeX source
├── references.bib # Bibliography
├── main.pdf # Compiled paper (27 pages)
├── README.md
├── LICENSE
└── .gitignore
This is a theory paper with formal experiments. The contribution is entirely formal.
Under per-agent bounded enforcement with bound k₀ and an identity-oblivious allocation function, the actor share satisfies:
S_{u_j} = m_j / N
where m_j = |A_j| is the number of agents controlled by actor u_j. Registering additional agents increases actor share linearly: ∂S_{u_j}/∂m_j = 1/N > 0. No identity-oblivious mechanism can guarantee ε-actor-level proportionality for ε < max_j |m_j/N − 1/M|.
There exists a multi-agent system in which F satisfies the atomic decision boundary property (every admitted action is atomically correct) and the trivial FCFS allocation function, such that actor-level proportionality fails with maximum deviation |S_{u_j} − 1/M| = 1/2. Atomic correctness does not imply fair allocation; an explicit allocation layer is a necessary additional component.
Under per-agent independent enforcement, no allocation mechanism can simultaneously achieve:
- (i) ε-actor-level proportionality, and
- (ii) strategy-proofness against identity fragmentation.
Any actor-aware mechanism that achieves both must aggregate state across agents of the same actor, breaking per-agent independence. This is a governance-layer analogue of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem.
| Mechanism | Share Fair | Actor Prop. | Strategy-Proof | Starvation-Free |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| M1 — Per-Agent Token Bucket (ACP baseline) | ≈ | ✗ | ✗ | ✓ |
| M2 — Round-Robin Fair Queuing | ✓ | ✗ | ✗ | ✓ |
| M3 — Actor-Aware Rate Limiting | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| M4 — WFQ (uniform weights) | ✓ | ✗ | ✗ | ✓ |
| M4 — WFQ (actor weights 1/m_j) | ≈ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
- Escalation queue fairness: The Escalate outcome (Paper 0, Corollary 4.5) creates a pending-review queue that is itself a resource subject to contention. Actor-aware queuing (M3 applied to the escalation scheduler) prevents actors from dominating supervisor attention.
- Allocation bias as behavioral drift: Persistent allocation skew induces IML drift. An over-served agent's empirical tool distribution diverges from its admission-time baseline P_{E₀}, increasing D̂(τ, A₀) even though g(τ) = 0 throughout. Allocation fairness and IML monitoring are complementary: M3/M4 prevent false IML positives caused by over-service.
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ L5 — RAM [Paper 5, RAM] │ When to execute under partial observability?
├──────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ L3 — Allocation [Paper 3, this repo] │ Who gets to act?
│ Fair scheduling across agents │
├──────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ L2 — IML [Paper 2, iml-benchmark] │ Has behavior drifted?
│ Behavioral drift within g⁻¹(0) │
├──────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ L1 — ACP [Paper 1, acp-framework-en] │ Is this action admissible?
│ Stateful per-action admission control │
├──────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ L0 — Atomic Boundary [Paper 0, decision-boundary] │ Can guarantees be made?
│ Decision + transition as a single LTS step │
└──────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
| Paper | Title | Repo | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Paper 0 | Atomic Decision Boundaries | decision-boundary-model | Zenodo · arXiv:2604.17511 |
| Paper 1 | Agent Control Protocol (ACP) | acp-framework-en | Zenodo · arXiv:2603.18829 |
| Paper 2 | From Admission to Invariants (IML) | iml-benchmark | Zenodo · arXiv:2604.17517 |
| Paper 3 | Fair Atomic Governance (this repo) | fair-atomic-governance | Zenodo · arXiv: under review |
| Paper 4 | Irreducible Multi-Scale Governance | compositional-governance | Zenodo · arXiv: under review |
| Paper 5 | Reconstructive Authority Model (RAM) | reconstructive-authority-model | Zenodo · arXiv: under review |
Series logic:
- Paper 0 proves when admissibility can be guaranteed (structural necessity of atomic boundaries).
- Paper 1 builds a protocol that satisfies that condition (ACP, with TLA+ verification).
- Paper 2 operates above the boundary to detect behavioral drift invisible to enforcement.
- Paper 3 proves that correct enforcement does not imply fair allocation, and characterizes the allocation layer (this paper).
- Paper 4 composes all layers and proves their joint necessity (irreducibility).
- Paper 5 provides the operational closure: given partial observability, determines when execution is valid at runtime (RAM).
@misc{fernandez2026fair,
title = {Fair Atomic Governance: Allocating Decision Boundaries under
Shared Resource Constraints in Multi-Agent Systems},
author = {Fernandez, Marcelo},
year = {2026},
doi = {10.5281/zenodo.19672597},
howpublished = {\url{https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19672597}},
note = {Paper~3 of the Agent Governance Series. Zenodo. arXiv: under review.}
}Marcelo Fernandez — TraslaIA — info@traslaia.com
https://agentcontrolprotocol.xyz