fix(v1): verify exact incoming token transfer amount to prevent dispute deadlock (#164) - #169
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fix(v1): verify exact incoming token transfer amount to prevent dispute deadlock (#164)#169s6pa1rta3n-lab wants to merge 1 commit into
s6pa1rta3n-lab wants to merge 1 commit into
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@s6pa1rta3n-lab Closing. #164 has no assignee. Comment on the issue and wait to be assigned before opening a PR. |
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Summary
Resolves #164 by verifying exact-amount balance delta on incoming token transfers and bounding resolution / finalization payouts to the contract's actual balance.
Root Cause
When an assertion or dispute transfer occurs with non-standard tokens (e.g. fee-on-transfer tokens), the contract may receive strictly less than the requested bond amount. Previously,
resolveattempted to transferassertion.bond * 2regardless of whether the incoming bond transfers delivered the full amount. If the contract's actual token balance was less thanassertion.bond * 2,resolvewould revert with insufficient balance on payout, permanently deadlocking the disputed assertion.Solution
Error::TransferShortfall(= 23). Inassert_outcomeanddispute, verified thatbalance_after - balance_before >= bond_amount. If a fee-on-transfer or defective token delivers less than requested, the transaction immediately rolls back withErr(Error::TransferShortfall).resolveandfinalize, capped payout transfers tocontract_balanceto guarantee that payout execution cannot revert due to shortfall under any circumstance.test_fee_on_transfer_token_rejected_on_assert_outcome: Assertions using fee-on-transfer tokens are rejected upfront.test_fee_on_transfer_token_rejected_on_dispute: Disputes using fee-on-transfer tokens are rejected upfront without altering assertion state.test_resolve_payout_capped_at_contract_balance:resolvesafely handles short balances without deadlock.test_finalize_payout_capped_at_contract_balance:finalizesafely handles short balances without deadlock.Payout Routing
0xF46C9F6d70C50BF81ef3588AB523a90a594a2F89GCL6OXAMLD75BMTINA6EMRUDWK5THQUSHMYNLSNBCJAPZJHNYJTUNIBC